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Introduction
In the last three decades of the nineteenth century, American men of all
ages, ethnicities, and economic positions seized on the antebellum tradi-
tion of the volunteer militia company as a vehicle to negotiate and act
out their crucial concerns of manhood and citizenship. The resolution of
the first concern depended on the definition, meanings, and behaviors
assigned to the concept of manhood, a conception that was itself under-
going rapid mutation as a consequence of industrialization.1 The resolu-
tion of the second, the issue of citizenship, was, if anything, more diffi-
cult to achieve than a secure verdict on the meaning of manhood. Where
citizenship was previously clearly linked with and dependent on the def-
inition of white manhood, in the postwar decades that coupling was frac-
turing under a variety of strains.2 The scattered old-style volunteer mili-
tia companies were not necessarily the solution to either problem, but
new members quickly discovered that volunteering to serve with their
local militia company could supply meaning to either question, and often
to both questions, of manhood and of citizenship. As the militia evolved
into the National Guard over the next three decades, members grew ever
more articulate about the connections they drew between their volun-
teer service, their citizenship, and their manhood, and the ways these
connections secured their identities as men and as citizens.
Not many historians currently view the nineteenth-century state mili-
tias in the context of contemporary debates over manhood or
citizenship—perhaps because the National Guards are today so clearly an
integral part of the regular military, perhaps because most historians
encounter the nineteenth-century National Guard only briefly as it is
being dismissed as a tool of management in labor-capital disputes, if they
ever encounter the militias at all. But most late nineteenth-century state
militias, or as they eventually called themselves, state National Guards,
did not enjoy the patronage of their state governments, or especially of
1
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the federal government, to any significant or reliable degree until after
their members had made the case for the importance of their movement
to the nation.3 Volunteers brought the National Guards into existence
before their states found a use for them, and long before their states were
willing to support them generously. National Guard members gave their
personal time and provided their own money to build their movement
from scattered companies into an integrated and organized all-volunteer
reserve army, and they did it virtually unaided by state or federal agen-
cies or cash. Considering these points, how did this organization that is
today so casually, if mistakenly, accepted as a natural part of the
nineteenth-century landscape come to be? Why were so many men will-
ing to volunteer so much of their time and effort to the creation of an
unsought—and, from many points of view, unwelcome—reserve army?
The short answer is obviously because the volunteers wanted to.
Uncovering the complex of concerns that created that desire is the pur-
pose of this study. In brief, the National Guard movement is best under-
stood as one of a host of associations and organizations late nineteenth-
century American men devised to help them negotiate their location
and purpose in the strange new world of industrial Capitalism.
The National Guards were unique among those organizations, how-
ever, in the ways they explicitly linked manhood and citizenship
through the figure of the citizen-soldier. They were also unique for the
ways they linked older men and young men, middle-class men and
working-class men, men from a wide range of ethnic backgrounds, and
even white and African American men through their voluntary mem-
bership in the same larger organization. The Civil War served as the
touchstone that created this unusually accommodating and broadly
based organization. The Union Army, in particular, provided a rationale
and a model for the volunteers to use as they built a new organization on
top of older, antebellum militia traditions. The Civil War also emerged
as one of the increasingly dominant images of male coming-of-age in the
later half of the nineteenth century.4 Many Americans came to see the
war as a rite of passage, as the moment when millions of American boys,
not least the newly freed slaves-cum-Union-soldiers, became men as a
result of their battlefield experiences. In addition, many Americans
came to perceive the war itself as a coming-of-age moment for the
nation, even as a millennial moment, when a young nation reconfirmed
its commitments to freedom, liberty, and equality.5 It was also, of course,
the ultimate argument for full African American citizenship.6 A power-
ful blend of patriotism, nationalism, violence, and gunplay fueled these
ideas and presented acute challenges to all Americans in the long post-
war peace. How were young men to come of age without a battlefield
INTRODUCTION2
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testing of their own? How were men who felt most alive during the
bloody war years to hold onto that image of themselves? How were
African American men to retain and enlarge the gains of their service in
the Union Army?
The antebellum model of volunteer militia companies provided an
obvious and convenient place for all these men to look when seeking a
resolution to their specific personal concerns; the companies could be at
once a rite of passage, a link to the past, and an expression of citizenship.
Once gathered there, the new postwar volunteers discovered that they
shared enough of a language and vision of soldiering and its importance
to both manhood and citizenship that they could create and sustain a
larger single organization that would house and shelter them all while
each pursued his own more particular agenda. Postwar militia volunteers
built an organization that could allow all of these groups to prosper, not
only in the sense that each saw in the institution a way to validate or
claim an identity that was otherwise difficult to realize, but also in their
ability to gain from the proximity to others with similar visions. They
discovered a synergy that allowed and even forced them to create an
entirely new sort of volunteer reserve army and then press it upon an
ambivalent nation.
l
The history of the Illinois National Guard (ING) from 1870 to 1917 is
an excellent subject for a study aimed at recovering the complexity and
importance of the development of the National Guards. Because each
has its own quirks, no one state militia can replicate the experiences of
all of them, but for a variety of reasons, the ING contains within itself
examples of nearly every kind of incident that any other state militia
experienced. Thus, in one sense, the ING is quite unrepresentative.
However, it also means that the ING can function as an extremely use-
ful stand-in for the whole of the disparate state National Guard experi-
ences of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The ING of
these decades contained within itself great diversity—racially, ethnical-
ly, economically, and regionally—and its members devised ways to func-
tion successfully together without cracking along ethnic or racial lines.
Because of the diversity of membership, a study of the ING offers the rare
opportunity to examine the ways in which both ethnicity and race func-
tioned within a single organization. The ING is particularly interesting
with regard to the persistence of its African American members. Only
Ohio and Massachusetts had as long and as steady an African American
presence in their state forces, and in the case of Massachusetts, African
Introduction 3
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American Guardsmen were always a tiny minority. Neither
Pennsylvania nor New York, to name two states often put forward as
models for understanding the whole of the National Guards in this peri-
od, can boast a similar record of African American membership.7 The
record of the Eighth Illinois United States Volunteers, composed entire-
ly of African American men, during the Spanish American War in par-
ticular, is among the more interesting and significant African American
military experiences of the entire era. Because its members were entire-
ly African Americans, up to and including their colonel, the Eighth
Illinois USV was the object of tremendous scrutiny, as it was treated as
a test case for the capabilities of African American commissioned
officers—as much by African Americans themselves as by any other set
of observers.8
The ING also engaged in the full range of National Guard activities
during this period, from strikes to race riots, through civic parades and
social activities to wartime service, in a way that few other individual
state guards did. The Massachusetts NG, for example, never served in a
strike after 1877, and even the Pennsylvania, New York, and Ohio NGs
saw significantly less strike service than the ING.9 As a result, ING offi-
cers and men grappled with strike service more intensely and over a
longer period of time than any other state NG members. Their unique-
ly intensive experiences provide a deep body of evidence from which to
understand how strike service shaped the development of the National
Guards as a whole across the time period. This experience, nevertheless,
is necessarily strongly rooted in the very local nature of strike service,
and it is a story that can be fully explored only by close examination of
the ways individual instances of strike service, within a single organiza-
tion within a single state, built over time into a body of opinion and
action.
The state of Illinois provided the ING much less financial support
than either New York or Massachusetts, to pick two other prominent
and well-funded state forces of the era, provided their state militia
organizations, and the ING’s relative impecuniousness is another area in
which their distinctiveness makes them a useful source for understand-
ing the larger National Guard movement.10 Given the ING’s lower lev-
els of state funding, individual ING company members turned to their
communities for fund-raising and supported lobbying efforts at both the
state and federal levels. Their need for funds forced them to articulate
often and regularly what their purpose and appeal was. A second, and
related, result was the prominence of ING officers in the national-level
lobbying organizations as they turned early and consistently toward the
federal government, seeking support for their organization and their mis-
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sion to train a reserve army for the nation. Illinois National Guard mem-
bers emerged as powerful spokesmen for their organization, both at the
state and the national level, in large part because of their financial needs.
Finally, a close social history of the various companies and regiments
emphasizes the local nature of the Guard throughout this period, and
would be lost in a study that did not focus clearly on a single, statewide
organization. The local nature of the organization, and the myriad of
ways that guardsmen and their companies were deeply embedded within
their local communities, makes the National Guard movement impor-
tant to any social history of the nineteenth-century United States. The
broader histories that look at the Guard across the country necessarily
lose emphasis on this strong tie, even where it is acknowledged, and this
loss of emphasis has contributed, albeit unintentionally, to the popular
notion of National Guardsmen of the era as faceless, corporate thugs, and
not as varied and interesting men who devoted large amounts of time and
money to an experience of manhood and citizenship that they valued. A
close social history of the ING offers historians a vehicle for exploring
the manifold concerns of American men at the turn of the last century.
The Illinois militia, functionally nonexistent in 1870, grew quickly to
be among the largest in the nation by the 1880s. It appealed to men of
widely different economic backgrounds, ethnicities, races, and regions
around the state, successfully recruiting up to a third of its membership
in any given year. As a result of the sudden and sustained growth, long-
term members successfully lobbied to reshape the state laws governing
the militia and to increase state, and eventually, federal budgets for the
upkeep of the militia. The ING also served in more than two dozen strike
interventions, allowing members to take the full measure of the conse-
quences of this kind of service and ultimately deciding to find ways to
minimize their politically untenable role in the maintenance of domes-
tic order. Important as these lobbying and order maintenance duties were
to ING members, however, the overwhelming bulk of an ING member’s
time was devoted to ceremonial, social, and competitive pursuits. These
activities lay at the heart of their public persona within their local com-
munities, and through them ING members created an organization that
at once tested and confirmed their claims to manliness and citizenship.
l
To fully appreciate the fundamental newness of the organizations creat-
ed after the Civil War, the history of the Illinois militia must be situated
in the broader context of the history of militias in the United States up
to the 1870s. What follows is a brief overview of the legal foundations of
Introduction 5
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the militia, and then a brief summary of the multiple ways that commu-
nities and states met their legal obligations with regard to militia law
from the colonial period until the post-Civil War era.
The legal foundations of the modern American militia lie in the
Constitution, and as with all political and military authority in the
United States, control is divided. The particularly complex and ambigu-
ous position of the militia as established by the Constitution in 1789 has
plagued the system to the present day. Congress has the power to organ-
ize, arm, and discipline the militia. The states have the power to appoint
the officers and train the militia, according to the discipline established
by Congress. When the militia is called into federal service, the presi-
dent is its commander-in-chief. However, Congress must call the militia
into federal service and can do so only to execute the laws of the Union,
suppress insurrections, or to repel invasion. The rest of the time, the
militia is under the command of the state governors and responsive to
their calls to duty under conditions determined by their respective state
constitutions.11
After ratification of the Constitution, the militia laws could be, but
seldom were, altered by legislation. In 1792 Congress passed two acts con-
cerning the militia that would not be superseded until 1903. The first
provided that all free, white, able-bodied men between 18 and 45 owed
military service to state and nation, and that they should provide them-
selves with the wherewithal to do so.12 This act also stipulated that the
states should all have similar organization tables, if it was convenient, and
report on the condition of their militia once a year to the federal govern-
ment.13 The second act delegated to the president some of Congress’s
authority to call the militia under certain conditions. One purpose of
these acts was more explicitly to create a body that could be considered
and used as a national military reserve. The states all eventually followed
the lead of the national government and established their own militia
acts, similar in content to the federal statutes. In subsequent years, it rap-
idly became clear that supporting the militia was going to require a more
serious commitment on the part of both the state and the national gov-
ernment. In 1808 Congress appropriated $200,000 annually to be appor-
tioned out to the states to buy arms on the basis of the returns sent by the
state adjutant generals to the secretary of war. Thereafter, despite repeat-
ed calls for reform, no more laws were passed at the federal level for the
rest of the century.14 The development of the militia from then until the
twentieth century lay in the hands of the state governments.15
After the Spanish American War (1898–99), the federal government
once again began to play a crucial role in the evolution of the National
Guards as Congress passed reform legislation, backed with federal
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money, in 1903, 1908, and 1914. The result of this flurry of activity was
what is now known as the federalization of the National Guards, that is,
the ever-increasing integration of what were once independent state
militias into the national defense structure, until, by the late twentieth
century, the National Guards had become a virtually indistinguishable
arm of the U.S. Army and its reserve systems. The federalization of the
state National Guards in the early twentieth century naturally led to a
decrease in the importance of state legislation concerning militias and to
an uneasy sharing of authority over the National Guard system. All leg-
islative action was at the state level between 1870 and 1903, and Illinois
was a relative hotbed of experimentation and development; state law
regarding the militias was revised or replaced no fewer than five times.16
The experimentation and development of legislation at the state level
during these years provides yet another rationale for looking closely at a
single state.
A challenge for historians of the United States in addressing the mili-
tia lies in the confusion surrounding the use of the term, despite its legal
basis, caused by different applications of it over time and space. “Militia,”
by definition, refers to the military service owed to the state (or commu-
nity) by every able-bodied man in the area—and historically this defini-
tion meant exactly that, a duty owed only by males. In the American
context, “militia” also refers to all the various permutations of systems for
organizing civilian military obligations to the state that have developed
over time. For example, owing to the precarious existence of the early
settlements in the first phases of British colonization of North America,
a rigorous training schedule was initiated for the entire militia
complement—that is, all able-bodied men of the locale. As time passed,
settlement increased, dangers faded, and general militia training fell to a
few days a year. In order to maintain some defense force in the case of
emergency, younger men were sometimes required to train together on a
more regular basis. They became the militia company in the region, yet
they were also the nucleus for the larger militia if the need arose. This
pattern repeated itself over and over as the population expanded.17
The next phase of militia development began once frontier dangers
faded away. Groups sprang up that voluntarily trained together more fre-
quently and with more ceremony than did the larger militia pool. The
general pool came to be referred to as the “common” or, if records were
kept of available men, the “enrolled” militia, whereas the more active
bands were called “volunteer” militia. The Minute Men, initially estab-
lished in and around Boston in the mid-seventeenth century, are an
example of the latter. After the Revolution, volunteer militia companies
were highly visible in public celebrations and popular with many groups.
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Companies were formed by wealthy young men, ethnic or immigrant
men (particularly Irish), craftsmen, or clerks. Thus, a distinction
between the volunteer militia and the common militia existed almost
from the beginning of the colonial period and remained significant
across time.18
After the Civil War, some understandings of militia faded, and more
terms were added to differentiate various voluntary reserve systems from
one another. Enrolling had gradually disappeared from practice during
the antebellum period, and by the end of the Civil War, the old common
militia had ceased to function. In the late 1870s, as new men re-
energized the volunteer militias, the term National Guard came into
wide use. It was adopted from the French term for the national enrolled
militia, but in practice in the United States it referred to the active vol-
unteer militia bands chartered or recognized by the various state govern-
ments. By the turn of the century, most state militias had formally adopt-
ed the name “National Guard.”19 Yet in 1916, the Army succeeded in
establishing, in addition, a national reserve system, separate from that of
the states and under its own contro1.20 However, all these terms—
Militia, Volunteer Militia, National Guard, Active Militia, Reserves—
are often used interchangeably in primary sources, in histories devoted
only to the civilian reserve structure, and in wider histories of the U.S.
armed forces.21
The names are used interchangeably because distinctions among all
these groups were easily blurred. Whenever situations demanded larger
numbers than one or two volunteer bands could supply—as in periods of
Indian fighting or the various more formal wars of the seventeenth, eigh-
teenth, and nineteenth centuries—the common militia was called upon
to make up the difference, but not indiscriminately; a call would be
issued, and volunteers, draftees, or their substitutes would join the exist-
ing bands or create a new one. The whole agglomeration was, and is,
referred to as the “militia.” Thus, whenever large numbers of militia con-
verged, the ranks could be filled with members of established volunteer
bands, recent volunteers, and compulsory volunteers, but rarely, if ever,
the entire available complement of the common or enrolled militia.
Variations on these methods of supplying the necessary men have been
used in nearly all wars of the United States.22
In the early nineteenth century, then, the older, general state militias
withered across the eastern seaboard and in the settled regions of the
northwest territories, until the last remnants became an object for mock-
ery when they assembled for their increasingly desultory (and often
drunken) annual training days.23 The popular volunteer companies cor-
respondingly became more visible and impressive. Initially, these volun-
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teer companies owed little to state governments, but with the passing of
the general militia’s effectiveness in the 1840s and 1850s, many state leg-
islatures began to recognize and support the volunteer companies as their
active state militia, usually with some form of financial assistance. In
return, the volunteers could be called out for riot duty, prisoner protec-
tion, and later, returning fugitive slaves. The relationship between state
governments and volunteer militias varied from region to region; in con-
tested frontier areas, the militias were distinctly more likely to be
involved in military action. In 1856, for example, the Law and Order
(pro-slavery) party in Missouri and the free-state party both formed ter-
ritorial militias that spent four months during the summer fighting and
raiding across the territory over the question of the political future of the
state.24 Despite the events in western areas however, the volunteer com-
panies of the eastern seaboard and settled areas of the Old Northwest
chiefly devoted their time to public displays.25
During the Civil War, the volunteer companies and territorial militias
joined the Confederate or Union armies, and what remained of the mili-
tia became both the home guard, filled with boys and older men, and the
recruiting structure for the volunteers who made up the bulk of both
armies. After the war, the hundreds of thousands of men who were mus-
tered into the Union and Confederate armies via their state militia sys-
tems, but were mustered out of state service and into federal service to
serve during the war, were mustered out of the federal service without re-
entering the services of their respective states. At the end of the process
of mustering out and demobilizing state regiments, most states were left
without any officially recognized, active state troops. The history of state
military forces might well have ended there in 1865–66, with state regi-
ments empty and no new military threat in sight to re-energize citizen
interest in state militias. The South was the exception; militias were cre-
ated in 1865–66 and were promptly filled by Confederate army veterans,
right down to the worn uniforms. Congressional reconstruction eliminat-
ed those militias and allowed for the formation of African American
militias. This action provoked further racial violence, as private “rifle
companies” sprang up across the South to combat the perceived threat of
armed African Americans. Eventually, the defeated southern states were
denied the authority to establish militias at all until their constitutions
received congressional approval. Once “redeemed” or returned to white
democratic control, southern state militias followed trends already estab-
lished in the Northeast and the Midwest.26 Outside the South, most state
governments were uninterested in funding any military structure at all,
whether universal militia or volunteer, in the decade between 1865 and
1875.27
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And yet, in the early 1870s, volunteer militias reemerged across the
northern states. Some outfits retained the name of a volunteer company
established before the war, though doing so was common mostly among
the long-established volunteer units of the older seaboard cities. For the
most part, the volunteer companies of the 1870s and 1880s were new
organizations without prewar histories. Although at first the new com-
panies modeled themselves after antebellum volunteer militias, members
quickly discarded those models in favor of new organizational forms at
both the state and the national levels. By the early 1880s, the state mili-
tias, or as they were increasingly called, the National Guards, had over
80,000 members across the country and organized lobbies seeking
increases in both their state and federal funds. In 1898, the National
Guards were the organizational framework for the volunteer troops
raised to fight the Spanish American War, and by 1914 they constitut-
ed a federally supported reserve military force prepared to face overseas
engagements. In 1916, the National Guards were mobilized for service
on the Mexican border, and in the fall of 1917, the National Guards
formed the nucleus of the American expeditionary force sent to Europe
to aid the allies in concluding the First World War.28
l
The history of the militia in Illinois follows the national trends. After
the Civil War, the antebellum frontier-state militia structure evaporated
completely in Illinois. By 1870, the governor reported to the secretary of
war that Illinois had no active militia at all. In 1872, seven small volun-
teer companies in Illinois can be identified, each with its own name in
the antebellum tradition. In 1874, the adjutant general reported twenty-
five companies with slightly over 1,500 members (though he expected
four to be disbanded soon); each company chose its own name and also
had a company and regiment number assigned by the state. In 1880, the
total strength of the Illinois National Guard (ING) was 8,254 officers
and men in numbered companies and regiments.29 This dramatic growth
spurred other equally dramatic changes in the organization and in the
state laws that governed the militia, reflecting, and sometimes leading,
the pace of development of state militias nationwide.
The Illinois volunteer militia was both familiar and flexible to
Americans of the late nineteenth century, and as an institution it
appealed to men of dramatically different backgrounds living widely dis-
parate lives from the 1870s through the turn of the century. The militia
certainly continued to appeal to men of the middle and upper classes,
much as it had done for decades.30 For example, in 1874 the adjutant
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general of Illinois noted that “at the present time there is being organ-
ized in Chicago a regiment composed of the elite of the city, which, from
indications, will become a permanent organization.”31 However, if
indebtedness is one marker of less elite membership, then most compa-
nies were filled with common men. The Second Regiment, formed in
Chicago by preexisting, predominately Irish companies at the end of
1875 and early 1876 (because they couldn’t get into the new elite regi-
ment), was $8,700.00 in debt by the end of 1876.32 One early Chicago
company was so poor the members couldn’t afford to rent an armory
space large enough for the entire group and had to break into to smaller
detachments for weekly drill.33 Most of the new companies of 1875–76
were in small towns, and they also struggled to make ends meet. For
example, the Mason City Guards raised sixty dollars by hosting two balls
during their first ten weeks as an active organization and considered
themselves off to a rousing start.34 African American men in Illinois cre-
ated military companies whenever and wherever they could find the
numerical strength and community support to do so. In 1870–71, the
Hannibal Guards formed in Chicago, and in the state capital the adjutant
general commissioned the African American officers of Company C in
1869, and the Springfield Zouaves sometime between 1870 and 1872.35 In
1872 the McLean County Guards (colored), formed by residents sur-
rounding Bloomington, Illinois, joined the state militia.36 The Sixteenth
Battalion, made up of two Chicago African American companies, joined
the ING in 1878. The ethnic and racial identification of companies,
native-born Americans, Irish, Bohemian, Scottish, and African
American, also show how broad the appeal could be.37 When the
statewide inspecting officers made any mention of members’ occupations
across the regiments in their annual reports during the 1870s and 1880s,
it seems that the enlisted men at least were primarily clerks, farmers,
skilled tradesmen, or small merchants. Even so, inspecting officers and
enlistment rosters make it clear that professionals and laborers also found
a place in the militias.38
At the turn of the century, the picture of wide regional, ethnic, class,
and racial background among Illinois militia members remained virtually
unchanged. The socially prestigious First Regiment, ING, was still the
home of men from relatively privileged backgrounds, particularly at the
level of the commissioned officers. White-collar workers, especially in the
job category “Clerk,” represented almost half of the enlisted men as well.
Of course, the rest of the enlisted men were primarily laborers or skilled
tradesmen, so even in this most elite of regiments, a wide variety of men
found a place.39 (See appendix A.) In contrast, at the same time,
Company A, Third Infantry, ING, of Dekalb, was almost entirely
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working-class in composition.40 (See appendix B.) New professions also
found a place in the National Guard. In 1916 the First Cavalry, ING, had
so strong a component of journalists that when they served on the
Mexican border that year they immediately set about publishing a week-
ly newspaper called The Illinois Cavalryman (using the presses of a local
San Antonio paper), which started at eight full pages and grew to twelve
by the end of their service thirteen weeks later.41 The African American
Ninth Battalion joined the ING in 1894.42 These diverse patterns of com-
pany formation, rural and urban, rich and poor, ethnic, Anglo, and
African American, continued through the call to active duty in 1917.
The benefits and rewards that kept such a large cross-section of men
active in the Guard are striking because membership appears to have
worked its transformation and confirmation of manhood and citizenship
fairly quickly. The vast majority of enlisted men and officers stayed in the
ING for three years or less.43 In 1908, the adjutant general of Illinois esti-
mated that over the preceding five years, the ING lost, on average, 20
percent of its almost 6,000 strong membership annually.44 Thus, many
years ING officers were successfully recruiting, on average, 1,200 new
members. Their need for new recruits may also have helped contribute to
their broad definition of soldiering, a definition that could attract and
hold men of widely divergent backgrounds and tastes. That they were
able to keep their reserve army at a steady membership while contending
with rapid turnover in their troops reinforces the power of their represen-
tation of the ING as an important and meaningful experience in the lives
of American men, as well as for the life of the nation. The fact that most
men served only a single term of service also allowed the organizations’
long-term leaders, those officers and enlisted men who served nine or
more years, to shape the ING in their own vision of a reserve army.
The ING’s active membership of roughly 5,000 to 8,000 men between
1876 and 1917 was supported by a combination of annual appropriations
from the state treasury, appropriations that slowly increased over time, and
extensive fund-raising activities in the various communities that supported
individual guard companies.45 These developments placed the ING near
the top of guard organizations nationwide in terms of size and somewhat
further down in terms of state funding, a position that the ING maintained
through 1917.46 (See appendix I.) Illinois had both large industrial and rail-
road centers—most notably, Chicago and East St. Louis—as well as a sig-
nificant rural population and scores of coal mining operations located
throughout the state. The ING was called to active duty during the nation-
wide strikes of 1877 and 1894 and also served during more than twenty coal
strikes policing public order and protecting lives and property between
1877 and 1900, more than in any other state of the union.47
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Despite the profound importance and impact of strike policing on the
development of the National Guards, especially in Illinois, strike polic-
ing was not the stimulant of National Guard growth. Membership in the
Illinois militia surged in the year preceding July 4, 1876, and when paired
with the reports of the adjutant general and histories of company forma-
tion, clearly roots the motivation for company formation in local patri-
otic and personal impulses. The great strikes of August 1877 arrived only
after the Illinois volunteer militia was so large and so well organized that
their lobbyists had already achieved the first of many militia reforms with
the 1876 Illinois militia law overhaul. Guardsmen themselves claimed in
later histories of the 1870s and 1880s that they were in training to be sol-
diers, to serve their nation as reserve troops to be committed in wartime
to augmenting the small regular army. Although some Guard historians
did argue that the presence of the Guard in turn had an effect on strikes
and striking workers, this development was clearly a result, not the cause,
of company formation. The Guard historians also claimed that the mem-
bers were serving their communities and their nation by the act of mili-
tary training, not just as potential soldiers, but also as molders of men and
exemplars of manly responsibility and centennial patriotism. They
applied the lessons of soldiering—self-discipline, obedience, healthy
habits, and personal initiative for both self and group improvement—to
the most desirable qualities of citizens and of masculinity.48
To state that policing capital-labor disputes was not the central aim or
function of the National Guards is not, however, to deny the powerful
connections between the role of state policing assigned to the Guards and
their development as an institution. The history of strike-related active
duty service on the part of the Illinois National Guard is a complex and
fragmented record. Guardsmen could be nonpartisan or even prolabor in
attitude and still ultimately contribute to the success of management in
its contest with strikers.49 This inescapable irony frames the history of
strike interventions in Illinois from the standpoint of the Illinois National
Guard from 1879 onward. It shaped aspects of the ING’s identity in
numerous and contradictory ways. It contributed to the cycle of growth in
the ING over time. It led the ING to formulate specific tactics for deal-
ing with strike interventions and for negotiating their relationships with
local governing authorities during such service. After twenty years of
experience in strike interventions, the ING successfully redefined their
intrastate mission from policing “disorder” into policing “disaster,” prefer-
ably natural but possibly social. This redefinition released the ING from
responsibility for all but the most extreme cases of urban rioting and still
allowed the ING to argue they were fulfilling their domestic responsibili-
ties as outlined by the federal and state constitutions. This rhetorical and
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intellectual move allowed the ING to retain their claims to the intrastate
service that continued to provide them with at least some of their ration-
ale for their increasing requests for public funds. It also allowed them to
direct the bulk of their resources, time, and public relations efforts to
their self-identified primary mission to serve as a reserve army for the
nation.
When a county sheriff or city mayor appealed to the governor for
state troops, and only they had the authority to do so, to intervene in
their county (or city) to restore an order that they were unable to main-
tain, implicit in that request was a confession of their inability to han-
dle the strike situation themselves. In essence, it was an admission of
weakness and incompetence. That one party to the issues surrounding
the strike often considered this process to have been subverted by a dif-
ferent party illustrates the uncertain relationships between local and
state authority. The history of Illinois strike interventions is fraught with
tension between the local sheriffs and the ING commanders who arrived
in their jurisdictions to take over the responsibility for order mainte-
nance. The uneasy alliances and continual bickering about legitimate
and illegitimate need for state aid surrounding the policing of disputes
between capital and labor highlight far more issues of governing author-
ity and responsibility in the late nineteenth century than they do the
purpose of the ING. Illinois National Guard leaders could only hope and
strive to escape the political fallout as unscathed as possible. On those
occasions when Illinois governors did call the ING into state service,
they ordered the militia to the scene of the strike to restore a public
order that local authority was temporarily unable to sustain. Upon the
restoration of order and the remanding of any captured criminal ele-
ments into local police hands, state troops returned to their homes, and
the local authorities were expected to carry on themselves.
As their organization grew in size, active duty assignments, and fund-
ing, members of the ING also played an important role in the profession-
al development of the National Guard movement. The ING developed
summer camp programs, competitive exams for promotion, and prizes for
marksmanship during the late 1870s and the 1880s. The ING developed
specialized companies of artillery and cavalry as early as 1877 and con-
tinued to follow closely professional army innovations. The ING devel-
oped signal corps, bicycle corps, and medical corps in the 1890s and
even predated the US Army in the innovative use of camp cooks during
training rather than requiring each enlisted man to prepare his own
food. Illinois National Guard officers were also key players in national
organizations attempting to modify federal policy in the early 1880s and
especially at the turn of the century. The ING had a diverse member-
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ship, made up of socially prestigious units, companies with strong ethnic
associations, a steady procession of African American companies, and
companies based in cities like Chicago to villages like Lincoln or Mason
City. The ING was an organization rocked by the crises of its time, and
yet it survived to prosper and grow into the role of reserve army in train-
ing at a time when it was far from obvious that this was the natural direc-
tion for development of state militia forces. Although no study of one
state guard can claim to stand for all, a study of the ING that situates the
organization firmly in their local context addresses all the significant
issues surrounding the flourishing National Guard movement in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
l
This book begins with a close look at the decade of the 1870s and the
revival of the volunteer militia in Illinois, a movement closely linked to
the centennial celebrations of 1876, examining the early development
of the Illinois National Guard as volunteers struggled to articulate their
purposes and roles. It was in the 1870s that Illinois volunteers began to
rely on language and images of manly men and responsible citizenship
to explain and define their organization. Chapter 2 documents and
explores the overwhelming importance of the social and public life of
ING members to their identity as manly, patriotic citizens and to the
survival of their organizations. The following chapter explores the way
ING leaders and members responded to the task of policing strike-
related violence between 1870 and 1890, tentatively embracing their
role as stalwart protectors of public order even as they learned about the
dangers of local political currents and racial violence. Chapter 4 focus-
es on the impact of the growing professionalization of ING training
practices, and the resulting switch to marksmanship rather than drill as
the preferred competitive sport, as the organization changed from focus-
ing primarily on serving their communities as models and creators of
manly citizenship to a much more individually focused form of self-
improvement and national duty. Chapter 5 discusses the way ING mem-
bers embraced service in the Spanish American War as both the test
and the validation of their claims to be both patriotic, manly citizens
and reliable soldiers. Chapter 6 returns to the subject of strike duty and
the reasons that the ING leadership eventually turned firmly away from
this sort of mission lest they be trapped forever by policing rather than
soldiering as their primary identity. The final chapter contains a discus-
sion of the political and financial position of the Guard, with particular
emphasis on their lobbying efforts at both the state and federal levels, as
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guardsmen grew ever more nationalized in focus and professional in
their approach to soldiering. The chapter also considers the potential
implications of the growing federalization and accompanying pull away
from the local communities on the Guards during the first decade-and-
a-half of the twentieth century.
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CHAPTER 1
Illinois Militia Revival 
in the 1870s
Be true to yourselves, be true to your country, be true to your God,
be true to that old flag, and be true to the ladies of Springfield.1
—Governor John L. Beveridge
In 1875, Governor John L. Beveridge of Illinois challenged the mem-
bers of a Springfield militia company to be true to themselves, to their
country, to their God, to their flag, and to the ladies of Springfield.
Beveridge left it to the company members to decide how to demon-
strate that they were true men and true citizens, either to themselves or
to the ladies. The members of the company might have found this a
frustrating task because as the nineteenth century entered its final
quarter, ideals of manly behavior and attributes of citizenship were
changing rapidly. Literate Americans simultaneously held that
American manhood, by which they generally meant the manhood of
white, middle-class men, was increasingly under assault by their own
civilization, and at the same time they were certain that the increasing
power and importance of the United States was a direct result of the
manliness of American men. Historians, particularly historians of
women and of African Americans, have also made it abundantly clear
that for all their concerns about the energy-sapping effects of moderni-
ty, white middle- and upper-class American men remained fully in
charge of all they surveyed and brooked no challenges to their author-
ity or autonomy.2 In the midst of living through this period ripe with
contradictions, paradox, and challenge, American men of all back-
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grounds struggled to find new ways to preserve, remake, and expand
the numbers of American men who could be rated as manly.3
The governor’s audience may have been spared some of the contem-
porary confusion over the content of manhood, however. Governor
Beveridge was addressing a specific group of men, those who had volun-
teered their time and effort to their local militia company. The members
of the Governor’s Guard had turned voluntarily to the old American tra-
dition of the militia in search of a way to express culturally approved
manliness and responsible citizenship. The men the governor was talk-
ing to did have a rough idea of what it meant to be true. They were being
true to their nation and their flag by volunteering to serve in their local
militia company and training themselves to support and defend the
nation at need. They showed the ladies of Springfield how true they
were by donning the uniform and embracing their role as handsome and
manly civic performers in parades and funerals and dances and drills.
They demonstrated to themselves that they were true by making a prom-
ise to serve nation and community by volunteering for military training
and responsibilities, and living out these promises in their militia
membership.4
In the early 1870s, membership in the Illinois state militia jumped
from just under 250 men in 1870 to over 1,500 members by 1874.5 The
new members, who ranged from Civil War veterans to young men just
coming of age and who included both white and African American men,
devoted their time and effort to the task of creating volunteer militia
companies throughout the state. In doing so, they embraced a tradition-
al way to put their manliness and their claims to citizenship on public
display. Individually, the volunteers had reasons that were as diverse as
the men themselves, ranging from an enthusiasm for military uniforms
and weapons to Civil War memorializing. Together they found a single
home in the Illinois militia, and once active companies demonstrated
the rewards of militia membership to local audiences, more and more
companies formed. The upcoming centennial celebrations also provided
a tantalizing opportunity for a public display of responsible manhood.
Men from all over Illinois seized the chance to be part of the celebra-
tions as uniformed members of their local company.6
Manhood on Parade
In the early 1870s, militia volunteers paraded regularly and often as they
worked to establish their claims to the history and social prestige of the
elite bands of citizen-soldiers of the antebellum era. They liked parades,
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and parading in general, because it was such an excellent way to estab-
lish their credentials as responsible and attractive men in the eyes of
their communities. As a result, volunteers pounced on those special
occasions that allowed members to dramatically link themselves to the
nation and its military history by participating in particularly important
civic events. For example, on October 15, 1874, five Illinois militia com-
panies marched in the procession leading U.S. President Ulysses S.
Grant to the unveiling of a statue of Abraham Lincoln in the Oak Ridge
Cemetery, Springfield, Illinois. By marching in this particular parade,
company members visibly tied themselves to two U.S. presidents and to
the Union general who won the war. The University Cadets, the militia
company from the Industrial University at Champaign; the Sterling City
Guards; the Governor’s Guard, the veteran Sherman Guards; and the
Springfield Zouaves were hardly alone in the parade. They joined sever-
al other military-style fraternal organizations in the two-mile–long pro-
cession, among them the national Union veteran officers’ organization,
the Army of the Tennessee; the Springfield Fire Department; the
German Catholic Church Society; a number of bands; and many, many
carriages of national, state, and city notables, all seeking to benefit by
association with national heroes.7
The day of the parade began with rain, almost as though “nature was
weeping over the memories of the past,” but by midmorning the weath-
er had cleared, and the members of the procession began gathering in the
middle of the city.8 Residents of Springfield had decorated almost every
square inch of public space with flags, banners, flowers, and evergreens,
and as the participants gathered, cannons set up at the cemetery began
to fire at regular intervals. The procession finally headed out just after
noon and wove its way through the city, up and down all the principal
business streets and with a special leg that brought all past the Lincoln
home, before ending up at the cemetery just outside of town. The march
took about thirty minutes, but it was an hour before the entire procession
was finally through the decorated gates of the cemetery. Crowds lined the
parade route and filled the cemetery; by some estimates, as many as
40,000 people came to Springfield to participate in the ceremonies or
watch them. So many people were pushing into the cemetery to gain a
good view of the statue and the ceremonies to come that many militia
members had been detailed directly to the cemetery and crowd control.
The cannon continued firing even as the many bands that were part of
the parade played marching music. The sounds ceased only once the last
of the parade had entered the cemetery, when the cannon and the bands
fell quiet, in a silence all the more imposing for the noise that preceded
it. Each division of the march separated into the areas near the statue
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that had been set aside for them, and the speeches, anthems, and ser-
mons began. Bishop Waymen, of the African Methodist Episcopal
Church, opened the ceremonies with a prayer, and they concluded with
a song.9
The militia members who marched in the Springfield parade and par-
ticipated in the ceremonies were able to draw on a long tradition to
secure the most important spots, those closest to the dignitaries, in the
parade honoring Grant and Lincoln.10 In the early nineteenth century,
militia companies had begun appearing in public parades celebrating the
United States, its holidays, and its heroes.11 By marching in these
parades, militia members helped to define a form of American patriotic
manliness marked by uniforms, weapons, and martial music. Members
used the orderliness of their processions to set themselves off clearly from
the much rowdier crowds of banner-waving craftsmen or firemen also
commonly found in antebellum parades. In particular, militia members
used military funeral parades—both real and symbolic, both types fully
under their control and authority—to cement their position as chief
arbiters of the most solemn and impressive forms of patriotic behavior.
Antebellum militia members successfully claimed a special and unique
patriotic authority through the “precision of the march to the cemetery”
while wearing fancy dress uniforms and accompanied by bands, gongs,
and rifle salutes at graveside.12 Militia members in 1874 were able to
draw on both traditions in their quest to establish their new companies
in the hearts and minds of their communities.
By 1874 these prewar conventions were so well understood that
reporters in Springfield reviewed the procession to the monument dedi-
cation against this standard. They knew that what they saw was a civic
pageant with widely understood meaning and roles. Reporters noted that
the residents of the city had dressed the set with care, draping their city
in bunting and flags and constructing six triumphal arches around the
center of the city. Each of the five divisions marching in the parade pro-
vided the music of at least one band—marching, brass, or drum corps.13
The local reporters particularly enjoyed the band that accompanied the
African American Springfield Zouaves. The local audiences also judged
the militias’ efforts, seeking signs of seriousness and military bearing and
style in both costumes and well-drilled marching. Local reporters reflect-
ed these conventions when they admired the nearly 300-strong
University Cadets and “their neat, unpretending uniform.” Reporters
also noted that the Sherman Guards were “one of the great features of
the processions . . . made up exclusively of veteran soldiers, commanded
by old officers, [they] wore the uniform of 1861–5, and the manual of
arms and drill in use during the war.”14
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The parade marked the first public appearance of the Governor’s
Guard, re-formed out of another defunct Springfield company only a
month previously. The new Governor’s Guard won the honor of directly
escorting (preceding) President Grant, Vice President Wilson, Secretary
of War Belknap, and other VIPs to the ceremony. One local reporter
wrote, “Not withstanding its youthfulness, [the Governor’s Guard] made
a creditable and dashing appearance, with its seventy-six men in impos-
ing uniforms, and gaily caparisoned staff and drum corps.”15 Altogether,
the reporter from the Daily State Journal concluded, “The procession
made a most imposing appearance. The military with their fine uniforms
. . . together with the other societies, went to make up a picture worthy
of the pencil of an artist.”16
The reporters of 1874 were alert to the diversity of men—Irish,
German, native-born, Civil War veterans, college students, and African
Americans—who were members of the militia companies and military-
style clubs in 1874, and they made much of the variety of ethnicities and
ages. In many antebellum cities, socially prestigious militia organizations
had sought to define patriotism beyond the reach of the masses when
they paraded in expensive uniforms with expensive guns. In Springfield
in 1874, the much wider range of men who marched used this same form
to illustrate their own claims to patriotic leadership and meaningful cit-
izenship. These men embraced this older strategy for claiming their space
in the public pageant with uniforms, guns, and orderly performances
because in the postwar years this option appeared readily available to any
male group that could organize itself into a military-style company and
join in the march. In 1874, university students seeking a connection
with the all-important manhood experience of soldiering, reenacting
veterans recalling their own wartime experiences, and African American
men reinforcing the link between their service in the Union Army and
their citizenship, all used the authority of brand-new, state-associated
militia companies to publicly claim their identities as men and as
citizens.17
Militiamen Become Gentlemen
Militia members used their membership in a militia company to link
their existing patriotic authority to a new social and cultural authority.
For example, in March 1875, as a fund-raising and publicity-raising
event, the Governor’s Guard of Springfield staged the play Color Guard
in the Springfield Opera House. According to the advertisement that ran
in the papers, the play abounded in “thrilling situations, beautiful
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Tableaux, Striking Military Scenes, Drills, Marches, Exciting Battles,
&c., and is the most perfect and life-like representation of army life dur-
ing the great rebellion, ever written.” The advertisement went on to
boast that the play would be performed by “the best amateur cast ever
put on the stage in the city of Springfield.”18
A traveling theatrical manager, W. H. Gunn, and the “Dutch
Comedian,” Charles Collins, assisted the Governor’s Guard with the
production, and at several points in the play directed the entire compa-
ny, some seventy members strong, to take the stage to perform drill rev-
olutions. The play opened to encouraging reviews and, according to the
papers, improved with each performance. The high point of the run was
on the fourth night, when the female lead, Miss Emma Hickox, repre-
senting the “Ladies of the city,” presented a U.S. flag to the company
before the curtain rose, and Governor Beveridge, in attendance to
accept the gift, offered thanks on behalf of “his” company.
In speaking on behalf of the community, Emma Hickox was a new fig-
ure on the American scene and a far cry from her antebellum sisters, who
had appeared in public only as mute figures, dressed as Lady Liberty but
rarely granted significant speech.19 Hickox spoke not as a vague feminine
symbol, but rather as the representative of the very specific women of
Springfield. Hickox also claimed patriotic authority for herself, when she
declared: “In the confident assurance that I entrust [this flag] to the
keeping of brave men and true; that, should the ‘long roll’ ever hurry you
from peaceful pursuits to form in earnest in the serried ranks of war, your
record as soldiers will be as honorable as it now is as business men and
citizens.”20 Having taken for herself the power to recognize respectable
and honorable men and citizens, and to honor them with the gift of the
flag, Hickox assured her listeners that she had made the right choice of
recipients, and the flag itself was proof of her words. “In this unshaken
faith and trust, in behalf of the ladies of the city of Springfield, as a tes-
timonial of their respect for you as gentlemen, and their appreciation of
your admirable proficiency and soldierly bearing as a military organiza-
tion, I now have the honor and pleasure to present to you this flag.”21
With the flag, Hickox recognized and rewarded the admirable qualities
and the gentlemanly status of the members of the Governor’s Guard.
In his reply to Hickox, Governor Beveridge concluded his long and
gracious thanks on behalf of “his” company with a warning about the seri-
ousness of their endeavor, and an injunction to do their best with it.
Drawing on his own identity as a Civil War veteran, Beveridge contrast-
ed civilian training with the harsh realities of wartime service, “[w]hether
in civil or military life; whether parading in your armory or in camp;
whether marching in the streets of your city or upon the field of strife;
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whether you are decked in your bright uniforms or are clothed in the
nation’s blue, all dirty, worn, tattered and torn; whether your bright mus-
kets are resting in their racks, or, powder-burnt, are under your head for a
pillow, as you lie down to dreams upon the battle-field, waiting for the
coming of the bloody morrow.” Despite the contrast between war and
civilian life, Beveridge, like Hickox, assured his listeners that he fully
expected them to shine under any circumstances, as long as they remem-
bered to “be true to yourselves, be true to your country, be true to your
God, be true to that old flag, and be true to the ladies of Springfield.”22
Governor Beveridge and Miss Hickox together reiterated the antebel-
lum linkage between gentle birth and certain types of public volunteer
soldiering, but they reinterpreted it for the conditions of the 1870s.
Rather than gentlemen claiming exclusive patriotic authority, as in ante-
bellum communities, here in the Springfield of 1875, Governor
Beveridge and Miss Hickox implied that patriotic military exhibition
itself could establish an acceptable claim to the status of gentleman.
They clearly believed that the volunteer soldier was by definition an
admirable man, worthy of respect and deference.23 Miss Hickox, repre-
sentative of the ladies of Springfield, played a traditional role in placing
a symbol of the nation (the flag) in the care of recognized defenders of
the home and hearth. She also took it upon herself to grant all members
of the troop clear manhood status and social rank as gentlemen.24
More interesting, Miss Hickox and Governor Beveridge also stressed
the interchangeable qualities needed to perform well the roles of both
soldier and citizen. Miss Hickox assured the militia members of her belief
that their “record as soldiers will be as honorable as it now is as business
men and citizens.” She, and the ladies of Springfield, gave the flag as a
testimony of “respect for you as gentlemen, and their appreciation of your
admirable proficiency and soldierly bearing as a military organization.”
The governor urged his listeners to bring the same convictions to their
soldierly activities that they would “in every circumstance in life,” that
they be true to their belief in themselves, their community, their faith,
the nation, and “the ladies of Springfield.” Miss Hickox and Governor
Beveridge saw no contradiction or potential conflict in the roles of citi-
zen and soldier. In their construction of the identity of the militiaman,
they believed that citizen and soldier could coexist in harmony, each
relying on the same attitudes and behaviors of self-discipline, honor, and
personal integrity.25
The governor also used his status as an acclaimed veteran of the Civil
War (he had commanded a cavalry unit at Gettysburg before being pro-
moted to the rank of general) to speak to the younger men about the
mysteries of warfare they had not as yet experienced for themselves. Even
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here, though, and following in the footsteps of fellow Illinoisan John
Logan, the governor implied that those same values of civilian life would
serve well on the battlefield.26 The governor, the militiamen, the ladies
of Springfield, and the theater crowd all drew on memories of war-torn
Civil War battlegrounds as they listened to the governor’s description of
the dreams of the “coming of the bloody morrow.” In this context, the
audience and the militiamen appear to anticipate that the citizen will
become the soldier in a distant geographic space, where the values of
honor and personal integrity that serve him at home will also see him
through the turmoil of war. The speeches, and the play itself—a Civil
War drama—all served to present the community with a unified figure
of the citizen soldier, honorable man at home, honorable warrior on the
field. Illinois men, it turns out, could meet the governor’s challenge to
be true by donning the uniform and preparing, however awkwardly or
theatrically, to be soldiers should the nation ever need to call on them.
New Companies Build on Antebellum Militia Traditions
The burst of growth in the Illinois Militia between 1870 and 1876 was
dramatic and had far-reaching consequences for the Illinois militia and
for the broader militia resurgence nationwide. At first, Illinois militia
volunteers relied on antebellum models and practices as they rebuilt old
companies or created entirely new ones. Gradually, the new militiamen
discarded many of the older practices in favor of developing new forms
that better suited their needs and concerns. They lived in a rapidly
maturing urban and industrial society that demanded ever more sophis-
ticated and professional structures for managing ever-larger enterprises,
and they needed an organization that suited their times.
In 1870, five volunteer militia companies existed in Illinois.27 These
scattered companies represented tremendous effort and devotion on the
part of their members. As companies were completely voluntary, first a
man and his friends had to decide they wanted to try to form a compa-
ny; then they had to canvass their community for the thirty or so mem-
bers necessary for a minimum-strength organization.28 Once gathered
together, the new members chose a company name, elected their offi-
cers, located an armory, and then, if still together and if so desired by the
majority, authorized their officers to apply to the state for membership in
the organized militia. (Not all such companies, before or after the Civil
War, desired or sought a spot in the organized militia.) “Membership”
was, at best, a tenuous connection to the state in 1870. Under the
Illinois state law of 1845, a company was recognized when the governor
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issued commissions to the officers. Noncommissioned officers and pri-
vates took no oath of office, there was no official mustering in of new
companies, and only the members’ own inclinations kept them active
from one month to the next. As late as the early 1870s, the governor’s
recognition of a company could provide very little beyond the occasion-
al loan of ordnance in the form of outdated weaponry. As a result of these
conditions, the connections between state governments and military
companies were so vague that in 1870, Illinois officials reported to the
federal government that they currently recognized no active militia
organizations, even though according to the state roster of 1874 there
were at least five volunteer companies (then or later) affiliated with the
state active at that time.29
As the 1870s progressed, an increasing number of determined citizen-
soldiers braved the difficulties attendant on starting a local militia organ-
ization and maintaining state recognition. For example, in 1872, The
Grand Army Zouaves, the Mulligan Zouaves, the Sheridan Guards, the
Rantoul Guards, the First Battalion of Whiteside County Militia (made
up of the Sterling City Guards and the Rock Falls Zouaves), the McLean
County Guards (colored), and the reorganized Ellsworth Zouaves all
joined the state militia.30 These new companies represented 400 men,
with an average company strength of fifty-three members. In 1875, the
Chicago papers recognized the Clan-na-Gael Guards, the Alpine
Hunters, the Irish Rifles, the Montgomery Light Guards, the Mulligan
Zouaves, and the Hannibal Zouaves, along with six new companies in
the Chicago First Regiment, for a total of twelve militia companies in
Chicago alone.31
The popularity of Zouave companies highlights the persistence of
antebellum practices common to many companies formed in the early
1870s. In 1859, Elmer Ellsworth of Chicago initiated the pre-Civil War
Zouave craze with his company, the United States Zouave Cadets. He
trained the Zouave Cadets in the gymnastic drill of the French-African
Zouave regiments, which he had picked up from a veteran of those corps
a few years earlier. Essentially, under Ellsworth’s direction a Zouave unit
was a drill team with an emphasis on athleticism and group precision in
both marching and marksmanship. The flashy and distinctive Zouave
uniform consisted of a red cap, short jacket, sash, and baggy trousers.
Ellsworth drilled his company so well and was so encouraged by the result
that in 1860 he took it on a successful twenty-city tour, and Zouave com-
panies sprang up all over the country in his wake. There were many
Zouave regiments during the early years of the Civil War, in both armies,
but they never made headway with the professional officer corps and
quickly disappeared.32 In Illinois, however, the Zouave model retained its
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fascination and romance for militia volunteers even after the war.33 The
Springfield Zouaves, the African American company based in
Springfield, marched in the parade honoring Presidents Grant and
Lincoln in 1874. Highlighting the vagueness of “official” status until a
new militia law came into effect in 1877, the Springfield papers accord-
ed the Springfield Zouaves the same recognition as the other militia
companies present that did have state-commissioned officers, even
though the adjutant general listed the company as “disbanded” in 1872.34
In Chicago as late as 1875, there were still at least two companies of
Zouaves. The Zouave model remained popular long after other forms
more closely tied to the U.S. Army became the norm among volunteer
militia companies.35
Upcoming Centennial Pushes Company Formation, 1874–76
Thirty-five new companies entered into state service between October
1874 and December 1, 1875.36 Momentum continued to steamroll
through the first half of 1876, and thirty-eight more new companies
were accepted into the Illinois militia and their officers commissioned
between January and July.37 The sheer size of the increase in member-
ship, from under 900 members to more than 5,000, is remarkable, as was
its wide geographical distribution throughout the state.38 (See appendix
J.) Despite the presence of new companies in thirty small towns around
the state, the urban character of most guardsmen is also apparent. In
1876, twenty-one militia companies located in Chicago officially
belonged to the Illinois State Guard, and several smaller cities, includ-
ing Sycamore, Peoria, Pontiac, and Quincy boasted at least two active
companies.39
The catalyst for this statewide burst of company formation was the
upcoming centennial celebration.40 Certainly the brand-new First
Regiment of Chicago had high hopes for their participation in the July
1876 celebrations. “The drill of some of the companies, owing to careful
handling, is really excellent, while in others it is not so good, but it is
believed that the entire regiment can be so drilled between this and July,
1876, as to allow them to enter into a contest with the eastern regiments
for supremacy.” The best contests were far away, and therefore a “move-
ment is . . . on boat, looking to the sending of the 1st regiment to
Philadelphia, during the centennial next year. The state officials and
centennial commissions have pledged to work for this end, and it is
believed that some aid can be secured from the state to assist the move-
ment.” The reporter added, “[i]t is known that nearly all the states of the
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union will be represented by companies or regiments at Philadelphia, and
the city of San Francisco has subscribed toward sending forward a regi-
ment. It is estimated that 30,000 or 40,000 militia will be assembled in
Philadelphia for a couple weeks during next year, and grounds for the
purpose have been set apart.”41 To this reporter, the absence of the
Chicago Regiment from these patriotic celebrations and competitions
seemed a sad prospect indeed.
The leadership of the Illinois State Guard appeared to agree. In his
third General Order of 1875, Brigadier General Ducat established a com-
mittee of senior officers to report any plans to participate in the National
Jubilee in Philadelphia. Garrison equipment was to be furnished by the
centennial commission for all military organizations visiting
Philadelphia on or before July 4, 1876; but the various committees
involved needed to be notified well in advance.42
No companies from Illinois actually made it to Philadelphia, but the
Fourth of July, 1876, was the focus of their attentions nonetheless. The
First Regiment, Illinois State Guard, was invited to Madison, Wisconsin,
along with many other companies and regiments from the surrounding
area. There they paraded through the city in the morning, and in the
afternoon they performed on the drill ground, and companies competed
for the drill “Championship of the Northwest” and money prizes. The
Second Regiment, Illinois State Guard, which was identified as Irish and
wore the uniform of the famous New York 69th (also Irish, and with great
Civil War renown), had Chicago to themselves and provided a day-long
schedule of activities in honor of the centennial. In the morning, they
paraded in Chicago to the enthusiastic cheers of their many supporters,
and in the afternoon and evening they performed drill revolutions at the
Exposition building. The evening show was apparently the highlight of
the day for this regiment.43
The celebrations of the centennial marked the peak of the 1874–76
growth of the Illinois State Guard. In his autumn 1876 inspection report
on the First Regiment, H. B. Maxwell wrote, “[i]t appears to me, there is
not as much interest taken in the organization as there was a year ago.
The excitement about the presidential election may be the chief cause;
many of the members holding position of officers in the torch light
marching societies necessitates their giving much time to the latter at the
sacrifice of the regiment.”44 The decline of interest in the new regiment,
and the Illinois State Guard in general, after the centennial celebrations
and in deference to the upcoming election is another measure of how
strongly militia members felt the patriotic motivation for involvement in
the local centennial celebrations in 1875 and 1876.
It is important to note that Maxwell did not link the new companies
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of 1875–76 to any particular political party, nor did he link the members
to one or the other of the dominant parties in Illinois. The political con-
nections of individual members or specific companies did not give the
statewide militia a particular political identity. Chicago itself could hold
the First Regiment, which self-consciously strove for social prestige; the
Irish and working-class Second Regiment; and the Socialist-identified
Bohemian Rifles.45 Nonetheless, the general importance of membership
in a militia company to political identity is highlighted by Maxwell’s
comment that many members were also leaders in active political organ-
izations. The similarities between the methods of patriotic display adopt-
ed by militia members as they celebrated the centennial and the meth-
ods of late nineteenth-century political parties to garner and hold sup-
port also serve to illustrate a link between militia membership and the
role of citizen.46 Just as men demonstrated their political identification
through party activities, they could demonstrate their patriotic and
national identity through membership in a local militia company and
participation in their public events.
The Creation of the First Chicago, and a New Model for
Illinois Militias
In 1874 Adjutant General Higgins wrote, “the approach of our centen-
nial anniversary is increasing the military spirit of our State. During the
coming year a large number of militia companies will be organized, pro-
vided liberal provisions are made by the General Assembly . . . At the
present time there is being organized in Chicago a regiment composed
of the elite of the city, which, from indications, will become a permanent
organization.”47 The story of this regiment’s formation provides a glimpse
of the individual and community effort and dedication needed to get a
militia organization up and running in the early 1870s. These men’s
interest in militias was a response to a felt need for a new organization
that would tie men to their community and their nation through the
model of military service.48
The first organizational meeting for the proposed troop was held
toward the end of August 1874. “We, the undersigned, desire to form a
military organization to consist of at least 100 and not more than 1,000
persons, subject to such regulations as may hereafter be determined upon
by a vote of the whole.”49 Organizers rapidly decided that there were
enough interested recruits to justify organizing an entire regiment of
eight to ten companies, rather than one or two companies, or even the
four to six companies that would form a battalion. A prominent Chicago
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businessman and political figure, Guerdon S. Hubbard, Jr., made the lofts
of his building on State Street available to the new regiment, free of
charge.50 On September 8, the first three companies of the new “First
Regiment Illinois State Guard” were enrolled. Unlike any other compa-
nies then in the state militia, these three companies were assigned only
letter designations A, B, and C, indicating the seriousness of their inten-
tions to be a modern military organization. These companies continued
the tradition of electing their officers, however, and the seniority of the
three captains was determined by lot.51 These first officers were commis-
sioned by the state that same day.52 When a fourth company, D, was
enrolled, a “General” Frank T. Sherman was elected major by the entire
battalion.53
According to Holdridge O. Collins, one of the founding members of
this new regiment, Governor John L. Beveridge and various leading local
citizens pledged to support the new regiment almost from its inception.
There was some criticism in Chicago about this new regiment at the
time, however, and the governor himself claimed to have looked on the
early efforts of the regiment’s founders with “indifference, not to say dis-
favor. But when he saw the young men who joined the organization per-
severed so untiringly, and seemed bound to make it a success, he felt his
heart going out toward them and he resolved to exert his influence as an
executive officer, and do his best for them.”54
When news of potential public support and government supplies got
around, several existing Chicago-based companies applied for member-
ship in the new regiment. However, “[a]s their tenders of service were
accompanied . . . with the demands that they be accepted with their indi-
vidual uniform, and take rank in the Regiment according to the date of
their Captain’s’ commissions, etc., etc., it was not thought expedient to
receive any old commissioned company.”55 Class and ethnic differences
also had something to do with the reluctance of the founders of the new
regiment to accept existing companies, several of which had strong Irish
ethnic and working-class connections. The new regiment hoped to
appeal to the city’s elite for support, and judging by the following 1875
reports, they succeeded. A Harper’s Weekly correspondent wrote, “[the
Regiment] is to-day as great a favorite in Chicago as the ‘Seventh’ is in
New York, for like the last-named Regiment, it is composed of men of
high standing, whose great aim is to excel.”56 A reporter from The Chicago
Times noted that the “only thing to be regretted concerning the display
[a parade] was, that it occurred at a season of the year [July] when a large
number of the members of the regiment are absent from the city, on their
summer vacation, causing the number participating in the parade to be
much smaller than it otherwise would.”57 The reporter claimed that
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almost 200 members (out of some 500) were absent that day. A rough
count of membership lists suggests that almost 60 percent of this regi-
ment were clerks and bookkeepers who, according to the Chicago
Tribune, could not afford their own uniforms. An alternative explana-
tion was that these members were at work, and unable or unwilling to
take a day’s vacation for the parade.58
With the October 1874 addition of eighty-four new members in two
companies, E and F, the regiment began to drill, and the members decid-
ed that the issue of uniforms was crucial. As the regimental leaders did
not intend for its members to outfit themselves, they relied on “assur-
ances” that sufficient funds could be raised from Chicago residents
through a subscription drive and the support of the Chicago Tribune. The
Chicago Citizens’ Association, an organization of business and commu-
nity leaders devoted to civic improvements and good government, was
called on to review the regiment and give its recommendation for sup-
port, which it did.59
The Citizens’ Association judged the regiment against standards that
reflect the contemporary understanding about the nature and function
of militia companies. First, the members of the Citizens’ Association
were interested in the physical size and vitality of militia members.
“From our observation and inspection, and from what we can gather in
reply to our inquires, we do not hesitate to report that the materiel com-
posing the First Regiment Illinois State Guard, is excellent, both physi-
cally and morally, in the military acceptation of that word.”60 This inter-
est in size and appearance turns up again and again in commentaries on
militia companies and reflects a broader concern with the physical con-
dition of American men.61 Along with judging the men, or “materiel,” of
the regiment against current measures of physical fitness, the committee
members also looked for attitude and enthusiasm. They reported “that
there is an evidence of quiet, determined ambition to excel as citizen sol-
diers, of willingness to undergo the ordeal of drill and discipline, that
cannot fail, if proper encouragement be given them, to make them into
a good and serviceable Regiment, worthy of the sympathy and support of
our citizens, and we cordially recommend them to your favorable consid-
eration and that of the Community at large.”62
Judging by the language they used in their report, the committee
members seem to have been looking for taller and broader men who
would avoid the classic temptations of the soldier, including alcohol and
rowdiness, and who showed a willingness to accept military discipline as
a personal challenge. That these were the committee members’ preferred
qualities suggests that for them, the first role of a militia organization was
to be a successful performance and social group in the context of the
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local community. The members needed to be attractive, and to be
responsible about learning and playing their assigned roles.
With the recommendation of the Citizens’ Association in hand, the
captains of the six companies formed a committee to organize the can-
vassing of the city—“visiting all the more prominent citizens.” By late
December 1874, the Chicago Tribune reported that there were already six
organized companies of 84 men each. In an editorial supporting the new
organization and seeking public donations to assist them, the paper
claimed that the “personnel of the regiment is excellent . . . all young
men from 20 to 30 years of age, of respectable parentage, education, and
of personal good habits and character.” The editorial continued, “[t]o
organize a regiment of soldiers is attended with considerable expense,
and more so than these young men can reasonably be expected to bear.
. . . It costs, on average, to uniform these men $50 each. The young men
give their time and services without pay, but the tax for uniform is more
than all can stand . . . there would be no lack of men to fill all the ten
companies—each 100 strong—were it not that the purchase of a uniform
is beyond the reach of those who will join it.”63 The Chicago Tribune edi-
torial appealed to “those of our citizens who can afford to do so to con-
tribute of their means; let each furnish a uniform for one, two, three or
ten men, and thus get the six companies already organized into uniform.”
The editorial writer insisted that this “is not an appeal to public charity;
it is an appeal to the self-interest of property-owners as well as to public
spirit and pride . . . Can property-holders afford to refuse the necessary
assistance and encouragement which this military organization
requires?”64 These efforts were so successful that “[a] sufficient fund was
raised by the personal solicitation of members of the Regiment to war-
rant the renting of a permanent Armory and to purchase the uniform.”
Chicago residents eventually pledged $13,468.50 toward the equipment
fund, and members of the Regiment contributed $2,349 to their own
maintenance.65
At this point, it would seem that the organization was off to an excel-
lent start. However, following in the long American militia tradition of
electing officers from the ranks, the rules members of the First Regiment
adopted in September of 1874 mandated that elections for all officers
were to take place annually. Accordingly, the members held new elec-
tions on December 2, and eight of twenty offices changed hands.
Stability of command would not mark the early years of this regiment at
any level. A variety of reasons for the revolving nature of commissions is
suggested in Collins’s book, but the time conflict between the demands
of career and regiment was most often put forward as the reason for
resigning.
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At the December 1874 meeting, the regiment also voted to break its
own resolution and admitted the Ellsworth Zouaves to membership. The
Ellsworth Zouaves in turn agreed to become Company G and don the
gray uniform selected by the regiment. There are some indications that
this company was composed of better-off men, which may have made
them more acceptable to the First Regiment than were other, preexist-
ing militia companies in Chicago and, of course, that more than rank
was at stake in the initial decision to reject other extant Chicago com-
panies.66 In March 1875 an eighth company, H, joined, and the regiment
had the minimum companies to elect a colonel. The last two companies,
I and K, joined later in the year.67
The regiment first appeared on the Chicago streets in May of 1875,
escorting the Grand Army of the Republic to its annual meeting. Their
first formal parade was July 28, 1875, when Governor Beveridge;
Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan, United States Army; and
Brigadier General Arthur C. Ducat, Illinois State Guard, reviewed the
troops. The parade excited so much local attention that it was written
up in Harper’s Weekly of August 21, 1875. “At its first parade, [the First
Regiment, Illinois State Guard] was enthusiastically received by the cit-
izens and distinguished visitors from abroad, and from Gen. Sheridan
and other military men received high commendation.”68 The next day’s
headline in The Chicago Times read, “PLAYING SOLDIER. The Gallant
First Marched to the Field for the First Time Yesterday. By the Aid of the
Railroads the Warriors Reached It Very Comfortably.”69 The headline is
a little mocking, but the general tenor of the article is more positive.
In his speech after reviewing the Regiment on July 28, Governor
Beveridge spoke openly about his initial apprehensions about the forma-
tion of this Regiment. However, he pronounced them quite over, owing
to the dedication and superior performance displayed during the inspec-
tion and revolutions. The governor then went on to compliment the
“boys of the regiment on their splendid physique, their tasty uniform, the
perfect order and neatness of each individual member, their efficiency in
the school of the soldier, and the care and correctness with which they
performed the most difficult evolutions in the battalion drill, and the
success of the organization generally.”70 The governor’s (or the reporter’s)
ordering of the fine qualities of the regiment begins by praising the indi-
vidual members, laying stress on their physical vigor and attractiveness,
their good taste in uniforms, and their discipline as soldiers. The gover-
nor praised the contribution of each to the performance of the whole
only after noting the vitality and personal appearance of each member.
This ranking offers another reading on the popular conception of the
personal rewards and benefits for a man, young or old, contemplating
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joining a militia organization. First, the body is improved. The reporter
began by recognizing each individual for seizing the opportunity to attain
a “splendid physique,” which in the image of the day meant visibly mus-
cular. This emphasis on physical vitality and strength was emerging as
one of the most important aspects of what it meant to be a man in these
years. During these decades of intense industrialization and urbanization,
commentators and the public alike became consumed by worries that
American men were losing their manhood. In response to that worry, in
fits and starts, more and more men turned to shaping their outer bodies
as a reflection of the man within. The militia proved to be one more
place where men could acquire and display these outward signs of
strength and vitality that were increasingly being connected to a healthy
and strong manhood. The Chicago Times reporter (and the governor)
next noted the neatness of the presentation and the “tasty uniforms,”
again an issue that was frequently addressed in advice books of the age
when advice givers sought ways to encourage men, young and old, to
present themselves as men before a skeptical world.71 The militia, to
these observers, was an excellent vehicle for demonstrating these visual-
ly desirable characteristics of manhood.
The physical skills of the soldiers, especially with regard to marching in
complicated patterns and as part of a unified whole, attracted the reporter’s
praise. In this regard, the militia performance bears a close resemblance to
the rise of team sports, both professional sports and the vast numbers of
amateur leagues, in these years. In the case of the militia, alone or in com-
petition against other companies, the whole “team” also served the com-
munity as a model for vigorous, manly comportment and loyal patriotic
duty. All aspects of the military performance were graded and judged by an
audience well aware of the categories and the standards for achievement.
The linkage of manly vigor and patriotic authority certainly had its roots
in the antebellum model, but it was in many ways ideal for the new con-
cerns of a new era, including fears of failing physical vitality in an urban
and sedentary environment, the lost sense of possibility for individual
independence for every man, and at the same time the fears of social anar-
chy set loose by the anonymity of the city.72
Class, Ethnic, and Racial Diversity
Not every new organization had it so comparatively easy. Prokop Hudek
was commissioned captain of the Bohemian Rifles, located in Chicago,
on August 9, 1875. The story of this company is quite different from that
of the First Regiment, which was comparatively wealthy and “appealed
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to prestige-seeking property-holders.”73 The adjutant general issued the
company eighty Enfield rifles for drill purposes, but their available drill
space was so small that they had been forced to break up into two
detachments, headquartered in different buildings, for weekly drilling
purposes. Company members had put great effort into these spaces, how-
ever, and built locked gun racks to hold state property. As the company
was already fifty dollars in debt for the purchase of fatigue uniforms for
the men (the cheapest blouse and cap combination) and rent for the
armory spaces, these racks represented a considerable investment of time
and care. In 1876, ING inspection officer Maxwell noted, “A monthly
assessment of 25 cents is levied on each member of the company for the
purpose of paying rent of armories, &c., but the assessment is too small
for the purpose . . . The members are poor, and cannot stand a larger
assessment than 25 cents per month. I am informed it is very difficult for
many of the members to pay even this sum.”74
At the time of the first general inspection of the Illinois militia in the
fall of 1876, Captain Hudek informed the inspecting officer that the
company had only lately re-formed. Presumably, the company collapsed
between August 1875 and June 1876 owing to the difficulties attendant
on maintaining an organization under such trying circumstances. The
inspector was nevertheless pleased by the “good sized” men and their sol-
dierly bearing, and wrote of the officers, “I was much pleased with [their]
appearance . . . They are justly entitled to great credit for accomplishing
so much in so short a time and without aid or assistance from any quar-
ter.” Without much else to praise in this impecunious company, Maxwell
placed his emphasis on the size, appearance, and attentiveness of the
men as qualities valued by the militia. Inspector Maxwell concluded his
report on the company on an upbeat note. “I would respectfully state
that I was agreeably disappointed at the condition in which I found [the
company], and I would earnestly recommend that the organization be
fostered and encouraged in every possible way.” Maxwell went on to
offer that, if “new uniforms could be provided for its members and small
sum of money raised from some source to pay the rent of a proper armory,
I am assured that the company could be quickly recruited to its maxi-
mum strength, and I believe that in a short time it would compare favor-
ably in drill and discipline with any other in the city.”75 For Maxwell, at
least, neither the poverty nor the ethnicity of this company stood
between them and admirable service.
In the early 1870s, along with native-born men and recent immi-
grants, African American men created state militia companies. In histo-
ries of these companies, later members of Illinois African American reg-
iments explained that African Americans created companies in the
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1870s because a militia company was a tangible demonstration of inde-
pendence and self-reliance.76 As Eric Foner has argued, one freedom
African Americans sought after the Civil War was the freedom to do the
same kinds of things white people could.77 And one thing white Illinois
men were doing in the early 1870s was raising and sustaining militia
companies.78 By doing the same thing, African Americans demonstrated
their belief that equality of military service could carry with it equal cit-
izenship. With equal citizenship would come many rights, among them
equal access to the public space. In public spaces, namely city streets,
African American militiamen could perform in one common act of
responsible citizenship and disciplined manhood—the formal military
parade. African Americans actively serving in militia companies also
provided a forceful reminder to Illinois residents, both black and white,
of the importance of the role that African American troops played in the
Civil War. Not only did African American troops tip the balance toward
victory for the Union Army, but as Frederick Douglass put it, “Once let
the black man get upon his person the brass letters, U.S.; let him get an
eagle on his button, and a musket on his shoulder and bullets in his pock-
et, and there is no power on earth that can deny he has earned the right
of citizenship.”79 Even if many whites remained skeptical of this argu-
ment, many African Americans put their faith in it. The connection that
Douglass drew between the uniform, weapons, and citizenship highlights
the importance of a recognized militia company for African American
men in the 1870s.
The idea of citizenship itself was under great stress in the late nine-
teenth century. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments shattered
the previous linkage of whiteness and citizenship. The continuing pres-
sure of the women’s movement challenged the necessary maleness of cit-
izenship. Militia volunteers across Illinois saw their organizations as inti-
mately involved with the issue of redefining citizenship in this new era,
repeatedly stressing the ability of the militia to recognize, foster, and
even create model citizens and manly men. Like Governor Beveridge,
they believed that the role of the citizen-soldier in civic pageantry, espe-
cially parades, and the responsibilities of the citizen-soldier for national
defense and maintaining order placed the militia squarely in the midst of
the general debates about who was a citizen, what responsible citizenship
was, and how a citizen might be made. By parading publicly as members
of the state militia, African Americans secured their own place in the
larger public dialogue about who was a representative, responsible
citizen.
In 1870 and 1871, African Americans formed the Hannibal Guards
in Chicago, though like many local companies in these early years their
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formal tie to the state militia forces remains ambiguous.80 In the state
capital, the adjutant general commissioned officers for the African
American Springfield Zouaves sometime between 1870 and 1872. This
company may have evolved from Company C, an African American
company recognized by Governor Palmer in July of 1869.81 In 1872, the
McLean County Guards (colored), formed by residents surrounding
Bloomington, joined the state militia.82 On October 15, 1874, the
Springfield Zouaves were among the five companies more or less asso-
ciated with the state that marched in the procession leading U.S.
President Ulysses S. Grant to the unveiling of the statue of Abraham
Lincoln in the Oak Ridge Cemetery, in Springfield. The Springfield
Zouaves were listed as disbanded by the state in 1872, but the company
must have re-formed sometime before this occasion, though without
seeking new commissions for its officers. Regardless, the Springfield
papers accorded it the same recognition as the other companies with
state-commissioned officers.83
In late February 1875, there were “riotous demonstrations . . . direct-
ed more especially against the treasury and building of the Relief and
Aid Society” in Chicago.84 Militia companies mobilized all across
Chicago to protect the Relief and Aid Society from attacks by putative
“communists.” Among the militia companies were the Hannibal
Zouaves, which were very likely the same as or a version of the Chicago-
based Hannibal Guards.85 In time the Hannibal Guards (or Zouaves)
became known as the Cadets.86 Like the Hannibal Guards, the Cadets
never formally belonged to the state militia, though the newspaper
reports do not make this distinction.
The brief, flickering existence of these ethnic and African American
companies offers a testament to the interest and willingness on the part
of their members to serve, and on the part of the state militia to accept
their service. These brief histories also highlight the importance of
money to the continuing existence of any state militia company.
Paying for an Expensive Hobby
The myriad needs of the average militia company—armories, uniforms,
weapons, supplies, and special activities, like the 1875 Springfield
play—had to be paid for. As the state had no funds to offer, the money
could only come from the members’ own pockets or from those of their
neighbors. To raise the money to pay for their activities, militia members
had to present a compelling case to their communities and, in time, to
the state legislature, and they had to devote significant time and energy
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to these nearly constant fund-raising activities. They began with them-
selves. In 1874, Illinois companies required members to pay annual dues,
ranging from a dollar twenty to twelve dollars. However, the amounts
raised this way never came close to providing for a company’s total
expenses, which varied widely among the several militia companies rec-
ognized by the state. In 1874, expenses per company ranged from $285 to
$2,075, depending on the size of the company, the cost of the uniforms,
and the amount needed to rent the armory space. Each company select-
ed its own uniforms, resulting in huge variations in taste and expense. For
some, the uniform of the private was as simple as a blouse and a cap,
which could be had for as little as five dollars per man. For one Chicago
company, a private’s uniform cost forty dollars in 1874,87 and the First
Regiment assumed a cost of fifty dollars per man. 
The state provided no funds for its troops during these early years.
Under the operative 1845 militia code with 1874 amendments, the annu-
al military outlay was barely sufficient to cover the salary and expenses of
the office of the adjutant general. The position of adjutant general, or
AG, was that of chief administrator of the state military department. The
AG’s duties included overseeing the militia and forwarding all pension or
disability requests from resident veterans of national service to the War
Department in Washington, DC.88 The only support the state offered to
the individual companies was the loan of guns and a limited supply of
ammunition. Many guns owned and loaned by the state were so obsolete
that the adjutant generals regularly proposed selling them off at a public
auction just to get them out of the way.89 Even these small measures were
unreliable, dependent as they were on Illinois’ share of the annual feder-
al militia appropriation of $200,000, established in 1808.
However, in the 1870s Illinois was receiving no money from the fed-
eral government. War Department accountants charged $163,674.40 to
Illinois’ portion of the annual distribution for supplies issued to state
troops in 1863, 1864, and early 1865. From the 1860s through the 1870s,
the $200,000 annual federal appropriation was apportioned based on the
number of congressional representatives, and in 1872 Illinois was receiv-
ing only an $8,760.58 annual credit against its overdrawn account.90
Because of this debt, Illinois was receiving no guns or other ordnance
supplies from the federal government in the early 1870s. Between 1872
and 1874 the efforts of AGs Dilgar and Higgins were rewarded by the
subtraction of $65,000 as “improperly charged,” and AG Higgins claimed
that with a further search in the records, the remaining $41,125.20 could
also be removed, giving the state a positive balance of $60,000.91 His cal-
culations are difficult to follow and, in any case, were never performed.
In 1878 Illinois was still listed as $98,674.40 overdrawn.92 As a result of
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these problems, the companies of the state militia had to supply them-
selves with armories, uniforms, and weapons from their own pocket
and/or raise the money required from the local community.
Financial issues were paramount to a company’s success in these early
years, and financial concerns drove a large portion of any company’s
daily and weekly calendars. The imperative to earn money for its own
support, and to get whatever money it could from state and federal cof-
fers, far more than any other single concern, affected the health of any
company.93 If the company could not pay its bills, it could not stay alive
as an organization. As a result, the success of any individual company
was entirely dependent on the enthusiasm of the members and the skill
and leadership provided by their elected officers.94 It should not come as
a surprise that the half-life of most companies was little more than a year.
In 1874, of the twenty-four companies listed on the rolls, four were dis-
banded; four more failed to report, leading the adjutant general to sus-
pect they were disbanded in actuality if not formally; and one company
had failed to complete organization, fizzling out before it ever got going.
The oldest active company dated to 1869, and the most recent had been
in existence barely two months. Adjutant General Higgins suspected
that the state militia included only about 850 active volunteers.95 Of
those volunteers, Higgins remarked, “It would be difficult to find an
equal number of men in the service of the State willing to donate their
services without compensation, at a cost of over twenty dollars per man.
The cause of four companies disbanding and four failing to report this
year is plainly to be seen from this report.”96
Most of the new companies of 1875 and 1876 were located in small
towns, and some were created by ethnic groups—Irish, Bohemian, and
African American. The militia was a sufficiently flexible institution that
its appeal spoke to men of different backgrounds and living disparate lives.
The militia connection between the individual and the state, both Illinois
and the Union, carried across class and ethnic background the opportuni-
ty to participate in representative citizenship in highly personal and
evocative ways. The inspector general reports filed during 1876 indicate a
broad range of background and economic standing of the militia as a
whole. Almost all rural companies had poor attendance at weekly drills.
But they reported they had no trouble with attendance for parades or state
occasions. As always during this time, inspectors noted the men’s physical
size and the general appearance of the uniforms and the men whenever
they could. Where any indication is made of the members’ occupations, it
seems to be primarily as clerks, skilled tradesmen, or small merchants.97 If
indebtedness is one marker of less elite membership, then most companies
were made up of common men. Many companies, especially those located
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in rural towns, had difficulty paying for all they felt they needed, from uni-
forms to armories. At the end of 1876, the new Second Regiment, formed
in Chicago by primarily Irish ethnic companies at the end of 1875 and
early 1876, was $8,700.00 in debt for uniforms and rent.98
A Larger Militia Leads to a New Militia Structure
By 1875, the Illinois militia was quickly growing beyond the ability of the
governor and the adjutant general to oversee it on top of all their other
duties. In 1874, an addition to the old militia code (1845) was approved,
giving the governor power to appoint an unlimited number of major and
brigadier generals. This new power had serious implications for patronage
offices, but because the sitting governor was a cautiously serious supporter
of the militia, in 1875 he chose to appoint only one brigadier general and
delegated to him the authority to organize the rapidly growing state
forces.99 On June 8, 1875, Governor Beveridge commissioned Arthur C.
Ducat brigadier general of the Illinois State Militia. Ducat, who achieved
the rank of inspector general of the Army of the Cumberland during the
Civil War, was an able officer and organizer. In August he issued his first
general order to the state militia, creating one brigade and appointing his
staff officers. By December the militia had grown from 895 members when
Ducat took office to more than two thousand.100 In December, General
Order 4 reorganized and consolidated the then greatly expanded state
forces. General Ducat also established the office of Inspector General of
Illinois, and he received the first ever inspection reports of the ING in
1876. He announced that the regulation drill would be that of the U.S.
Army, eliminating the Zouave drill from formal, but not informal, use by
any recognized ING company. Governor Beveridge, who had publicly
claimed a deep personal interest in the success of the state militia forces,
also appointed a new adjutant general in 1875, Hiram Hilliard. Hilliard,
like Ducat and Beveridge, was a Civil War veteran. The efforts of Generals
Ducat and Hilliard represented the first implementation of any sort of
organizational plan in Illinois that included not only rank charts and orga-
nizational tables, but actual systems of staff officers to track and teach the
new companies and maintain and improve the old. This introduction of a
new ethic of military professionalism learned during the Civil War marks
a significant turning point in the development of the Illinois militia, away
from the older antebellum volunteerism and toward the new forms of civic
engagement emerging with a maturing industrial capitalism.101
l
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Between 1870 and 1876 a new generation of men entered the Illinois
Militia, slowly at first and then with gathering steam as the centennial
drew nearer. This rush of new members gave the larger organization the
clout it needed to seek out changes in current militia law, and to begin
to organize their forces in new, modern ways. The pattern of growth in
Illinois, clearly preceding the centennial celebrations of 1876, suggests
that the dramatic growth of state militias in other midwestern states may
have also been spurred by the centennial and not by the strikes of 1877
as has been long argued.102
The new Illinois militia members first replicated the small, antebel-
lum militia companies, but they quickly began to dream of bigger, more
organized, and more dynamic militias that would capture the imagina-
tion and the financial support of larger communities. Toward that end,
these new militiamen crafted elaborate public performances to engage
and teach their audiences that these new members embodied a national
patriotism and manly attributes. The roots of the militia resurgence in
Illinois in the 1870s are to be found in individuals who flocked to the
revived militia and the communities that came to the support of their
local companies.
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CHAPTER 2
Manhood and Citizenship
on Display
The review on Illinois Day, in the presence of representatives from
every civilized nation, was the largest and most imposing martial
display during the Fair, and the troops elicited the highest commen-
dation from military officers, the press, and the people for their dis-
cipline, precision of movement, and soldierly bearing.1
—Alfred Orrendorf, Adjutant General of Illinois
Over the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the ING attracted tens
of thousands of new members by offering men the opportunity to play
dramatic civic roles while placing themselves at the center of communi-
ty social life. As responsible citizen soldiers and public men, militia mem-
bers claimed the right to parade and perform in patriotic ceremonies.
These ceremonies proved powerful and effective popular vehicles for cel-
ebrating traditional manhood while also embracing a newfound modern,
professional discipline. At the same time, militia members filled their
communities’ social calendars by hosting lectures, balls and dances, sup-
pers, and amateur theatricals. Many companies also turned their armories
into clubhouses for themselves and for members of the private associa-
tions that helped to support them financially, providing space for infor-
mal socializing of all varieties. In Illinois and across the nation, militias
grew and prospered because they offered new members an opportunity to
cast themselves as dashing and responsible men at the center of commu-
nity social and patriotic life. Militia members and their organizations fit
firmly into the panorama of late nineteenth-century responses to the
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challenges to identity and position, especially male identity and posi-
tion, posed by the rapid pace of change by offering a clear, and powerful-
ly attractive, vision of modern manhood. 
National Guard members seized social occasions as prime opportuni-
ties to present themselves in the full panoply of military glamour, to each
other, to potential recruits, and to their larger communities that offered
them financial support. Fund-raising was inextricably linked with these
performances of manly glamour, and it was in part the always pressing
need for funds that drove the unending whirl of social activities. At
social events, guardsmen buffed their image as handsome and manly sol-
diers and active and responsible citizens, while showing the community
that their organization was worthy of the community’s support by pro-
viding impressive and satisfying entertainment. Guardsmen also made a
point of showing off in front of women. Women played crucial parts in
crafting and hosting the myriad of events put on by the average compa-
ny, not least, by dressing up in their best and dancing the night away in
the arms of dashingly uniformed men. Although dining and dancing had
their pleasures, they were not the only public venue for guardsmen to
demonstrate their worth and importance. In addition to parties, parades,
drill competitions, and drill displays, civic ceremonies and public funer-
als also offered guardsmen opportunities to impress on civilians and
potential recruits that the Guard was the home of responsible citizens
who honored their nation, their communities, and their brethren with
solemn, patriotic ceremonies. These public performances, social and
civic, were especially important to the African American companies of
the Illinois National Guard. African American guardsmen struggled not
only financially, but also against great social barriers as they secured and
held their place as manly and responsible citizens through the medium
of the ING, and their public events were an essential part of their strat-
egy for success.
Self-Respecting Manliness
The occasion of dedicating a new armory was a special event in the life
of an ING company before the turn of the century, especially if the
organization had been lucky enough to have an entire building erected
solely for its use. For ING companies, a new armory represented consid-
erable fund-raising success in these years before state and federal funding
caught up to militia needs, for members and their supporters paid for spe-
cialized armory construction out of their own pockets.
In 1890, the First Regiment of Chicago opened their new, privately
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funded armory, and in celebrating the building, they also celebrated the
citizen-soldiers whom it would house.
Let us, then, to-day dedicate this new armory to a ninety-nine years’
struggle for supremacy in military efficiency: dedicate it as the home
of the highest discipline; as the center and inspiration of a regiment
which shall combine reliability with dash, conservatism with enter-
prise, culture with athleticism—a regiment whose gayety shall be but
eddies in the current of devotion to duty—whose bonhomie and good
comradeship shall be the foam lightening up the surface of its
patriotism.2
The dedication speeches preserved in the Souvenir Album and Sketch Book:
First Infantry I.N.G. of Chicago reflect the conscious attempt by members
to capture the essence and the importance of their experiences in the ING.
At the turn of the century, of Chicago’s regiments the First appealed the
most to the middle and upper classes, with almost 70 percent of the mem-
bership professionals, merchants, salesmen, clerks, or students. Even so,
more than 330 members were skilled tradesmen, factory workers, or labor-
ers.3 (See appendix A.) Their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Henry L.
Turner, drew no distinctions in his dedication between the men in his reg-
iment. Turner continued in the tradition of the 1877 editor of the National
Guardsman, who declared, “We believe in the advantages which a mem-
bership in the National Guard confers; and it is our purpose to set those
advantages truthfully and clearly before the youth of the land, to the end
that they may avail themselves of the privileges so conferred.”4
In his dedication, Turner promoted the formal intent of ING members
to achieve supremacy in military efficiency and to exhibit a serious and
responsible patriotism by doing so. Turner’s vision of masculinity was at
once traditional—embracing reliability, conservatism, culture, and devo-
tion to duty—and modern. Turner openly celebrated some of the more
exciting and desirable newer benefits membership in an ING organiza-
tion conferred on an average young man—dash, enterprise, athleticism,
gayety, bonhomie, and good comradeship. Turner explicitly linked mem-
bership in the First Regiment with promoting his vision of manliness:
Let us remember that vulgarity and bravado are fashioned out of infi-
nitely cheaper material than manliness and courage, and that if we
would enroll in our membership able men, cultivated men, men who
will be an honor to us, we must give them manly, cultivated men for
associates. Let us be athletic, reckless, wild—what you will—yet
never drop below the level of self-respecting manliness.5
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“Able men, cultivated men, men who will be an honor to us,” men who
could be “athletic, reckless, wild . . . yet never drop below the level of
self-respecting manliness”; for Turner, this was the ideal guardsman. It
was also an overtly romantic ideal. Turner believed that membership in
the First, and by extension any ING company, could confer these tradi-
tional, romantic qualities on the willing, the dedicated, the loyal man in
a state uniform. In this desire to model a manhood equally available to
all men, the state militias bear a strong resemblance to the volunteer
firemen of earlier decades, men who also espoused an ideal of civic man-
liness that had no class or ethnic divide.6
Once they demonstrated their ability, cultivation, dash, athleticism,
and the rest, by joining up, ING members put it all on display for their
public. Militia volunteers did so to prove to potential recruits, and to the
communities that supported them financially, that they were who and
what they claimed to be. They were, first and foremost, military organi-
zations that trained young men in the rudiments of military skill, and
most of their claims to responsible manhood rested on this patriotic duty.
To provide military training, they needed money and willing recruits.
Money they raised in an endless round of solicitation and fund-raising
social events. They raised their recruits by offering young men an active,
exciting, and fun vehicle for demonstrating their adulthood, their citi-
zenship, their manhood, and their romantic and sexual appeal to the
audiences that observed and applauded all of their parades and parties.
Social events and parades were the heart and soul of most companies,
most of the time, for without them, ING companies would have ceased
to exist.
Social Events and Fund-raising
Militia and National Guard companies, in Illinois and around the
nation, hosted an amazing array of social events, including parties,
dances (often called “balls”) both public and private, suppers, festivals,
plays, “entertainments,” banquets, amateur theatricals, lectures, picnics,
and private dress parades. The range and variety of events attests to the
importance of these activities in a militia company’s yearly schedule, and
to the importance of militias to their communities’ social calendars.
These social events were important for fostering an esprit de corps
among the members of a company, and as companies lasted only as long
as their members stayed interested, this interest was essential. The repu-
tation for putting on good parties, like a winning competitive record,
could also be good advertising for a company in the never-ending quest
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for fresh recruits and for continued public and private financial support.
Most companies charged admission for their various entertainments as a
form of fund-raising, though doing so did not always net them very much
money. These events did, however, make it possible for militia volunteers
to create and foster the social ties necessary to asking for the large dona-
tions that their companies required to function.
Social events, from parties to dances to plays, also gave members
opportunities to flaunt and enjoy their status as citizen-soldiers and freed
them from the more serious work of training or active duty. Perhaps
equally important, social events were a great deal of fun. In many ways,
in their pursuit of the social side of life, ING members differed very little
from any of the other wide variety of social, fraternal, and service organ-
izations that flourished in the later nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies and relied on social events to bond them together. Militia volun-
teers around the country devoted so much of their time and energy, eas-
ily far more time than they spent at drill practice, to maintaining a steady
and full calendar of social events because it was in these situations that
they nurtured the ties that bound them together and to the community
that helped to pay their bills. As Wisconsin National Guard Colonel
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Figure 1
First Infantry football team, 1897. Courtesy of the Chicago Historical Society.
Photographer: Unknown. iCHi-39232.
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Allen Caldwell put it, “Make your organizations the leader in social
events and your citizens will patronize you and I venture to say the
financial standing of the company will be rated A-1.”7
It is impossible to extricate fund-raising from the social calendar of
militia companies of the late nineteenth century. Throughout the last
three decades of the nineteenth century, militia and National Guard
companies in Illinois, as elsewhere in the nation, were constantly
strapped for cash. Their home communities were the only funding
source available to companies beyond the combination of the scanty fed-
eral and state appropriations and their own pockets. To maintain and
increase community interest and financial support, militia members cre-
ated opportunities for the kinds of public displays of patriotism and mil-
itary skills provided by parades and competitions that brought them new
members, and also set the stage for the personal informal interaction
necessary to ask for money. Companies regularly charged admission to
their events in order to raise funds, and smaller companies could produce
a steady, if small, stream of revenue this way. For this strategy to work,
however, company members had to put on events that many people
would attend. To earn money from admission fees over the course of
many years, companies had to create a reputation for themselves as
skilled promoters and hosts of social events.
From the inception of a new company, the members needed to raise
money, and to do that, they needed to create a positive reputation for
the company. Social events were key to both activities. Take, for exam-
ple, Company I, Seventh Infantry, ING, also known as the Mason City
Guards, founded in September 1877. The company’s minute book
details their business meetings, during which the members managed
their finances and planned and organized their social and fund-raising
activities. Like the members of most companies just starting out, the new
members of Company I spent their first business meetings electing offi-
cers, amending their constitution and by-laws, changing their drill
night, and selecting uniforms. These activities occupied the first two
months, and then at the November 11, 1877 meeting, Captain Amos
Trout opened the discussion “to see if we can give an entertainment for
the benefit of the company.”8 The company members decided to hold a
general invitation ball on Thanksgiving, and charge $1.00 admittance to
the public and $.50 for members. Six committees were set up to get ready
for the ball: arrangement, printing, music, floor managers, doorkeepers,
and tickets. At this time, the company did not yet even have a uniform.
The members apparently considered the ball to be a success, for on
November 30 the committees reported a net of $12.15, and two weeks
later, on December 11, they decided to host a second ball, on Christmas
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Eve.9 The total receipts of the Christmas ball were $71.70 and expenses
were $24.00, leaving a net balance of $47.70.10 Together, the two balls
raised over $60.00 for the Mason City Guards during their first ten weeks
as an active organization.
The Mason City Guards, like all other ING companies at that time,
needed to raise money to pay for facility rental and purchase uniforms, if
nothing else. For their parties to pay—financially and socially—
guardsmen had to earn a reputation for putting on successful entertain-
ments, and so they devoted a tremendous amount of their time and ener-
gy to planning and hosting a wide variety of events. The Mason City
Guards put on at least one entertainment of some sort almost every
month during the four years they were together. Their third ball was held
on January 17, 1878, and netted $42.15 for the company funds.11 In
February the company sponsored a lecture by a Mr. Josh Billings, which
raised $84.20, $40.00 of which went to Billings as his lecture fee.
Company members also contracted with a Mr. Viegard of Galesburg to
produce a “military play,” using the company as the cast, for a four-day
run in mid-February.12 Mr. Viegard was not available until March, so in
the meantime, the company planned and held a “masked ball.” The play,
The Dutch Recruit, ran for four performances March 26–29, 1878, for a
total gross of $158.43.13 By April, members were already planning to host
a drill competition with several nearby companies on Memorial Day, and
the company was drilling twice a week. Possibly as a result of the busy
month of March and the upcoming competition, on April 24, the mem-
bers decided to hold only an informal “social dance” after the next
Wednesday’s drill.14 On May 8 and May 18, members used their business
meetings to make arrangements for their upcoming competition. At the
meeting on May 8, the members divided the city into four quadrants so
as to canvass the city for provisions for the competition and ball and,
possibly, for board arrangements for all the visiting militia members. The
members then created a committee to confer with city officials about the
plans for Memorial Day. The members next decided to hold a “grand
ball” on the evening of May 30, with music provided by the “Walker
Brothers” for the entertainment of the visiting companies. The ball was
to be public, with an admission price of $1.00 per couple, with no spec-
tators admitted without paying, though members of the invited compa-
nies could attend for free. At least seventy-five couples attended the
“grand ball” (the gross was $75.00) and the net for the company was
$51.50.15 Earning over $200.00 in something like ten months, the com-
pany had what could only be called a successful debut season.
The money earned at social events that doubled as fund-raisers was
vitally important in the life of a small-town company. In the 1870s, the
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state provided almost no monetary support for company maintenance.
In the 1880s, state funds increased, but to go from nothing to something
still did not go very far. Companies had to pay for rent of their armory
space, for upkeep on their armory, and for uniforms, and they had to pur-
chase whatever supplies they needed for training exercises and summer
camp. For example, Company I, Seventh Infantry, paid twenty dollars a
month for their armory space from 1878 to 1881, and $12.50 per uniform
in 1878.16 All of these expenses grew over time, for all ING companies.
In the 1870s, the top floor of a livery stable or a merchant’s warehouse
could function as an armory with little or no improvement. Once he had
modern breach-loading Springfield rifles to distribute, however, the
Illinois adjutant general insisted that the weapons, accoutrements, and
ammunition be stored in properly constructed and locked cabinets.
Armory modifications became another company expense.17 As the vari-
ety and amount of state property distributed to companies grew, so, too,
did state regulations concerning proper storage facilities for such items as
blankets, caps, overcoats, and eventually uniforms. With increased state
property and money came increased demands from the state adjutant
general for improved record keeping.18 Companies gradually needed for-
mal office space to maintain their records of enlistment and equipment,
correspondence files, and financial reports.
In time, not just any big, empty indoor space would do as an armory
without serious improvements in the form of offices and equipment stor-
age facilities. Accordingly, the rent for specialized space went up, as did
the cost of maintaining the armory. Some companies attempted to solve
the problem by building a specialized armory of their own for their per-
manent use, but this was a very expensive proposition. Although some
states, like New York, offered significant help to their state troops, the
Illinois General Assembly offered no financial support for armory build-
ing until well after the turn of the century.19 Instead, nineteenth-centu-
ry Illinois companies that wished to have their own armory built had to
turn to their communities for the funds.20 This is just one example of the
upward spiral of costs that constantly drove ING companies back to
their communities in search of financial support.
Company I, or the Mason City Guards, kept up the steady flow of
activity in their second year, which might be said to truly begin with
their second annual Thanksgiving Day Ball.21 In addition, they repeated
their run of the Dutch Recruit early in November 1878.22 The company
sent out 250 printed invitations for another, quite formal, ball on
Christmas Eve 1878, featuring two bands, including a string ensemble
(the company also did not net very much, possibly because they decided
to let members in for free).23 Apparently quite bitten by the acting bug,
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members contracted with Viegard again and put on a second play, The
Spy of Shenandoah, in February 1879, and hosted another public ball.24 In
March the company held a “club dance.” By this time, the members had
established an entertainment committee for each month, rather than
creating new committees for each special event.25 In March, the compa-
ny also hosted another lecture, this one by a Mr. Burning. The company
hosted a parade and “Jubilee Ball” on Memorial Day 1879, inviting the
Havana Guards and the Delaware Guards to march with them, and held
another ball on July 4, 1879.26 In December, the company decided to
hold a competitive rifle target practice and invited the Delaware Blues to
meet with them on December 30 to shoot for a medal (not to exceed
$5.00 in value) and afterwards to attend a New Year’s Eve ball.27 In
February 1880, the company held another masked ball. Members with
masks or in uniform were admitted free.28 The company minutes stop
naming each entertainment at this point, but continued listings of
receipts and expenses suggest that they did not slow down their social
calendar; it had merely become so integral to the company’s life that a
new secretary made no special mention of it in the minutes. One of the
company’s last entries, in February 1881, concerns the cancellation of an
entertainment with a hired producer, something called “True Blue.”29
The Mason City Guards were unable to survive the resignation of their
first captain, Amos Trout, in November 1880.30 Company I, Seventh
Infantry ING, was disbanded May 9, 1881.31
During its brief life, Company I must have been at the center of the
social life of Mason, Illinois. Not all ING companies were as successful as
the Mason City Guards in creating a steady flow of social activities, but
the companies that survived over the course of years or decades were
equally or more successful. Company histories and souvenir volumes
stress the importance of the social schedule to the life of a company and
of their communities. Newspaper accounts of picnics, armory dress
parades, and the like reinforce the significance of these activities in the
life of an average ING company.32 The historian of the Governor’s Guard
of Springfield, Charles Headenburg, recalled that the “work of drilling
and the social features which had heretofore formed the life of the
‘Guard,’ went forward as usual, as the records show no happening of
unusual importance,” placing drilling and social activities on an equal
footing in his summary of the early 1880s.33 Further, Headenburg chose
to highlight only social events under one company administration, rein-
forcing the significance of this aspect of company life for the members
and the community alike: “On December 21, 1886, John S. Hurt was
elected Captain and H. M. Wolf First Lieutenant. During this adminis-
tration the Company held its well established social and military posi-
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tion, playing a very important part in the social life of our city. The series
of brilliant parties and receptions given by them are remembered still
with pleasure by the participants.”34 That Headenburg included so many
memories of parties and receptions of the Governor’s Guard in his brief
history emphasizes that these events, as much as or more so than the mil-
itary goals of the company, created their identity within their
community.
Headenburg was not alone in his choices. The historian of Company
E, First Infantry, tells of an organization that “has always been noted for
its weakness for the social amenities of life, [and in 1883] gave a recep-
tion to the governors of Illinois and Wisconsin during the encampment
at Lake Geneva.”35 The historian of Company A, First Infantry, record-
ed in 1890 that, “its discipline, drill, athletic, and social records compare
favorably with those of any other similar organization.”36 And from
Horace Bolton, historian of the Second Infantry, ING:
For nearly four years after its experience of active service in the stock
yards district [1894] the Second led an almost uneventful existence,
the social side of the organization being most in evidence, the only
events worthy of note being this presence in 1896, at the inaugura-
tion of Governor John R. Tanner. During the annual encampment
of that year General Merritt, commanding the Department of the
Lakes, was the guest of General Wheeler, the Brigadier.37
All these historians of various companies at different times and from all
over of the state of Illinois included a record of the social life of a com-
pany because social activities played such a critical role in sustaining a
viable militia or national guard organization.
In the 1870s, some ambitious companies rolled several social events
into one glorious event. In 1875, the Chicago Inter Ocean reported, “The
Hannibal Zouaves (colored) Captain R.B. Moore, will give a grand mil-
itary entertainment at Burlington Hall, on next Monday evening,
August 2nd. The entertainment will consist of drills, speaking, sham
battles, cotillions, etc. and a supper. The proceeds will go for buying arms
for the company.”38 In 1877, Company I, Seventh Infantry, hosted a
competition, a picnic, and a grand ball on a single day.39 In 1879, “grand
entertainment” was held “for the benefit of Co B, 16th Battalion ING,”
at the Exposition building in Chicago. “The Summer Guards of St. Louis
were in the city on a visit, and of course, there was a great time general-
ly among the colored population. After a competitive drill in which the
Chicago company compared favorably with the St. Louis organization,
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there was a ball at which a large number of the ladies and gentlemen tar-
ried well into the small retreating hours of the night.”40 Social events like
these were both the lifeblood of companies and the reward for the labor
and commitment of militia members. By the 1880s and later, events
often grew too elaborate to manage more than one at a time.41
Female Appreciation and Admiration
Unlike many of the other social, fraternal, and service activities that
drew people together in the late nineteenth century, most formal militia
socializing was resolutely, powerfully heterosocial. Social events not only
created a role for women in the life of a company, they demanded female
participation—and appreciation. Women were vital contributors to most
of the social events on the calendar. They served as bakers and cooks,
hall decorators, dancing partners, and fellow actors in amateur theatri-
cals. At particularly important ceremonial occasions, they served as cen-
tral actors in the dramatization of the social and national importance and
value of militia and National Guard companies, and of membership in
those organizations. In all of these activities, women were perhaps most
important because militiamen regarded and described, coyly to overtly,
female recognition, appreciation, and desire as one of the ultimate con-
firmations of their dashing and manly selves. Guard historians imbued
much of their writing of the social and public side of their organizations
with a rosy glow of romantic conquest.
Women were the intended audience for much of a company’s public
display, and at the same time, women were solicited for help in provision-
ing, decorating, and organizing balls, picnics, and suppers.42 In 1877, the
secretary for Company D, Seventh Infantry, recorded in their minute
book, “A committee of nine be appointed to assist the Ladies in getting
of the festival.”43 And “the company attend[ed] the supper to be given by
the Ladies of Peoria.”44 And a “committee of three [was appointed] to
obtain six Ladies to solicit delicacies for festival and to wait upon Miss
Kate Immel.”45 In 1884, Captain W. V. Jacobs, First Regiment Calvary,
assured that his command’s winter ball would be one “of the most suc-
cessful combinations of camp and parlor ever made in the west” through
his “personal solicitation” of “a great number of Chicago’s representative
society ladies” as patronesses, who in turn supervised the guest list and
received a listing of their names in the Chicago Tribune.46 At a “brilliant
reception” in Aurora in 1894, hosted by Brigadier General “Andy”
Welch for the officers of the Illinois National Guard, the Ladies Guild of
Trinity Episcopal Church served 450 suppers.47
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At key moments, women were also featured performers themselves.
Women’s speeches on the occasion of delivering a gift of colors (or flags)
preserve for us contemporary images of the ING, and the roles they
hoped to play in the lives of their members and their communities.
Women, by virtue of being outside the membership, could speak as
appreciative recipients while also noting the reciprocal relationship of a
military and the larger society it aimed to preserve. In 1877, for exam-
ple, Mrs. W.C. Rand presented a stand of colors to the Oakland Rifles at
their first ball. She began with an apology for interrupting the festivities
and then moved on to the purpose of this particular fund-raiser. “The
truth is, sir, while we knew of the intention to devote the proceeds of the
entertainment to the purchase of a stand of colors, we thought the
opportunity so good a one for what you would doubtless term a flank
movement, that we have been tempted to put it into execution.”48 Then
she offered a testimony to the work of the company, noting all the hard-
ships of training and service, and indicating that she was fully aware of
the company’s financial need.
We desire your command should know that the devotion shown by
them in attendance upon the exacting duties of drill, often at no lit-
tle personal inconvenience and expense; their soldierly deportment;
their perseverance in maintaining their organization in the face of
grave obstacles; and especially their ready response to a recent call
from the State to active duty, are fully recognized by the communi-
ty in which they live.49
In conclusion, Mrs. Rand linked the company, the community, and the
nation. “I have the pleasure of tendering to the Oakland Rifles, as a gift
from the citizens of the delightful suburb in which all feel so just a pride,
this stand of Regimental colors, and we are sure that these emblems are
consigned to men who will gallantly guard and defend, under all circum-
stances, the National honor which they represent.”50 Mrs. Rand neatly
toed all the traditional marks in this speech, distinguishing the compa-
ny members as gentlemen, noting their devotion to duty and their patri-
otism, and recognizing their role as national defenders by gifting them
their new flags.
The responsibility of women supporters of a company or regiment for
supplying flags became so cemented over time that the following notice
appeared in an 1890s souvenir of the First Infantry in Chicago. “The
Souvenir wonders—and at every parade the wonder grows—that the
ladies of Chicago do not see how ragged and forlorn our colors have
become. We are proud of them, it is true, for the long service they rep-
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resent, but some of these days we shall be literally drifting under bare
poles unless some kind providence (feminine gender) comes to our
relief.”51 This comment comes at the end of histories of the various com-
panies of the regiment and of the regiment as a whole that boast of the
regiment’s fiscal strength and positive balance sheets. The regiment
could have purchased new flags at any time. Flags obtained on the mar-
ket however, clearly did not have the meaning and symbolism of flags
made and given by women. Flags made (or paid for), presumably loving-
ly, by women supporters of the regiment and presented with proper pomp
and circumstance clearly carried a weight and significance far beyond the
fabric of the flags. By publicly recognizing and honoring the role of the
militias and praising the men who made the militias their avocation,
women also explicitly acknowledged and rewarded the adult manhood of
all the volunteers.
Toward the end of his Souvenir history of the First Infantry, ING,
Lieutenant Colonel Turner wrote:
To that most important and most highly prized portion of the com-
mand which does not appear on parade, and whose names do not
grace our roster—our wives and sweethearts—The Souvenir desires
to make most ample acknowledgments. While it is true that the pro-
noun “our” is used purely in the editorial sense, and does not indicate
possessory rights, yet The Souvenir appreciates fully the sacrifices
which this unseen yet potent branch of the service is called upon to
make. It will serve to even up matters in any sense, The Souvenir will
make this agreement with you, Mesdames, Le Colonel, Le Majeur, Le
Capitaine and ze Mesdames Lieutenant, Sergeant and Corporal; if
you will allow these gentlemen to be colonels, majors, captains, ser-
geants, what not, down here at the armory, The Souvenir will accord
you the right to wear the eagle, the bars and the chevrons at home.52
Despite the somewhat heavy-handed humor, Turner is also acknowledg-
ing the centrality of women to the affairs of any militia or National
Guard organization. Women were vital members of the communities that
supported and maintained guard companies.
In perhaps their most important task of all, women rewarded the dash-
ing manliness of guardsmen by responding to their sexual and romantic
allure. In 1889, Henry Barret Chamberlin, historian of Company C,
Fourth Infantry, ING, wrote: “Interest in the Battalion has been main-
tained in many ways . . . the social features, when the armory became a
ballroom, and the right arm of those new blouses were—never mind
where.”53 Chamberlin’s coyness only emphasized, as he no doubt intended,
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his perception of women’s susceptibility to the sexual allure of men in uni-
form. In company history after company history, ING members boasted of
their romantic conquests. At the same time, they delicately suggested that
these same conquests were available to any man who would choose to put
on the ING uniform. “It was on this occasion [a July 4 encampment in
Lake Geneva, WI] that we fully came to understand the wonderful power
of fascination exerted upon the fairer portion of our country cousins by a
well-burnished row of brass buttons.”54 Or, “As a finale (breathe in not
in————) the dainty stationery, bearing the Amboy postmark tells the
story of the conquering march of the Oakland Rifles more eloquently than
words can express.”55 This female fascination with the appeal of men in
uniform was shared by eager guardsmen, who hosted ball after ball after
ball, shamelessly exploiting every opportunity to put on their dress uni-
forms and dance the night away with all the pretty girls they could round
up. The historian of Company C, First Infantry, recorded his organization’s
first “grand military ball” in glowing terms. This affair introduced “the
fresh ‘militia man’ in all the glory of his new uniform to the admiration of
the fair, and the envy of the sober citizen, a committee had elaborated a
most select programme, and on the evening of May 13, 1875, the music of
the orchestra and the delight of the dance fairly drowned the thought of
forthcoming assessments.”56
In the 1890s, Lieutenant Colonel Henry L. Turner of the First Infantry
was famed for his skills as a host of glorious receptions and glittering balls,
events where the “maneuvers last evening were directed by Cupid, who had
dispensed with his quiver and wore the sword and other destructive imple-
ments of the Illinois Militia.”57 This particular ball, held during the dedica-
tion ceremonies of the Chicago World’s Fair, was so glamorous that the New
York Times carried a report of the festivities. “Fully 10,000 people thronged
upon the floor of the armory of the First Infantry to-night in response to the
invitations issued by Lieut. Col. Henry L. Turner of that regiment.” The
Times reported that the “armory was tastefully and elaborately decorated
with flags and bunting . . . and when the festivities were at their height the
great room, with the bright costumes of the ladies and the dark blue and gold
of the military guests presented a handsome appearance.”58 From the multi-
tude of uniforms and absence of civilian dress among the guests, the Chicago
Tribune reporter concluded that it “was distinctively a military ball and the
military men had the balance of power. The women who went there to see
the military knew it, and the military was there to be seen.”59 
If uniformed National Guardsmen were observed to appeal to women
before 1898, service during the Spanish American war only increased the
impact, for women and reporters alike. On July 17, 1898, the Illinois State
Journal published a large elaborate line drawing featuring a tall, handsome,
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uniformed and mustached Guardsman dancing off with the belle of the ball,
under the noses of a row of tuxedoed and wealthy gentlemen, all of whom
clearly lack the Guardsman’s handsome physique and sexual appeal.60
Dancing in uniform continued to excite the admiration of the fair,
and perhaps envy among others, and ING histories steadily record balls
and other elaborate entertainments up through well after the turn of the
century.61 Charles Headenburg, captain of Company C, Fifth Infantry,
boasted, “The Company gave its annual ‘military ball’ on January 29,
1902. Many officers from other companies attended and the affair was a
grand success. Former Captain M. F. O’Brien led the grand march. The
hall was elaborately decorated with flags, Chinese and Japanese lanterns,
bunting, festooning, military groups and pictures.”62 Captain Headenburg
went on to note that the “organization is in good condition; but will be
strengthened soon. Another military ball will be given by the members
March 26, 1902.”63 In 1914, the Eighth Illinois finally received their own
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“Off with the Old Loves and On with the New,” Illinois State Journal, July 17, 1898. 
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state-built armory in the Bronzeville section of Chicago, the heart of the
African American Community.64 The armory represented many things
to African Americans in Chicago, not the least of which was state com-
mitment to their formal equality and full citizenship, and they chris-
tened their new armory with a New Year’s ball.65 Guardsmen used mili-
tary balls to put their best, most attractive side on display. Handsome,
gallant, athletic men in formal military uniforms with rows of shiny but-
tons showed themselves and their institutions at their manly best, and
the best reward was female appreciation.
If the admiration of women was a sweet reward, to be fought over by
women was sweeter still, and John Skinner, historian of the Fourth
Illinois USV, included in his history of his unit’s experiences in the
Spanish American War an exchange of poems between the girls of
Savannah, Georgia and the girls of Matoon, Illinois. The series began
when a ‘Savannah, Georgia girl’ issued a Warning to Illinois Girls.
Listen young ladies of Illinois
To a story I’ll tell of your charming boys
Who came to our city in ’98
To guard its citizens early and late.
They guarded our town, and captured the hearts
Of maids and matrons down in these parts
By their pluck and zeal, and manly ways,
And well the Fourth deserves the praise.
How well they marched on the grand review,
So well, indeed, that the president, too,
Said to their colonel, standing near,
’Tis the best drilled regiment passed by here.
And oh, how we cheered our boys that day;
And oh, how we wept, when they sailed away,
While since they are gone our girls are blue,
And talk of going to Cuba, too.
The author went on to warn the women of Illinois that if they scolded
the “boys” for flirting with the Savannah girls,
We’ll bring them back to our city fair,
Then every day’ll be “Thanksgiving” here;
And we’ll be so kind, and good and true,
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They’ll never go back again to you.
The author then offered praise of specific individuals.
Now think of the boys you’d make exiles,
Delightedly basking in southern smiles.
First Willie McKnight, a charming lad,
Next in the procession then comes Dad.
And after him comes trooping others,—
Rolla and Babe, and Kincade Brothers;
And right in line is our bonnie son Beam,
And all the men on the foot ball team.
There’s many more I might mention yet,
Of the gallant Fourth, whom our girls have met;
Whom the girls all love, esteem and admire,
To sing their praises we never tire.
The poem concludes:
Don’t threaten the lads with ire and wrath,
Lest Savannah girls may stand in your path,
To protect the Fourth with their lives they would,
The Fourth, so brave, so true and good.66
Once this poem was published in the Matoon Gazette, another poem
appeared, this one “a northern girl’s reply to a southern girl’s poem.” In
this poem, the “northern girl” defends herself and her sisters as more
beautiful, charming, caring, willing, and kind than the Savannah girls,
concluding:
But the girl of the north-land,
The Illinois Fourth Land,
Is queen of her own special throne,
And she’ll keep not a part of,
But just the whole heart of
Her hero in “Illinois’ Own.”67
In June, 1899 the “girl from Savannah” replied in defense of her sisters,
proclaiming their true love for their own and praising one final time the
character of the citizen-soldier.
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Tho’ we frankly acknowledge your boys to be brave,
Our hearts to our own boys, we long ago gave,
Who are loyal and loving, brave, honest and true
As the Fourth or any who wore Uncle Sam’s blue.68
Guardsmen in Illinois, Skinner and other ING members suggested,
could reasonably hope that by joining their local company, they would
be recognized by the girls they admired as boys who were loyal and lov-
ing, brave, honest, and true.
Social events were central activities for ING companies. Social
events supplied appreciative audiences, fund-raising opportunities, and
the chance for members to enjoy their membership status beyond mili-
tary training and patriotic parading. Social events established that mem-
bers were participants in something special; their dress uniforms, speech-
es, colors, dances, and plays were the tangible rewards that made mem-
bership worth the expense of their time and their money. The impor-
tance of social events also makes plain that companies could not have
survived without the support of women. The social calendars of guard
companies, more than anything else they did, recognized the contribu-
tions and importance of women supporters. Balls, dances, dinners, plays,
and opportunities to participate in the civic dramas that surrounded the
existence of any guard company were aimed directly at the women in the
community. Social events created and fostered not only esprit de corps
within a company and for a company in its community, they welcomed,
and even depended on, the active participation of women. Most of a
company’s social and ceremonial life would have been meaningless with-
out women as symbols, as objects, as partners, as providers, and as the
final guarantors of the sexual and romantic appeal of men in uniform.
Patriotic Performances and Public Parades
Militia companies paraded regularly in public throughout the United
States, and throughout the nineteenth century. They paraded on patri-
otic holidays, during civic celebrations, for funerals, on their way to
competitions, at summer camp, and for the entertainment of their
friends and families. Companies paraded so often because parades put
them most squarely in the public eye, and they were utterly dependent
on the public for their survival. Companies needed members and money
to continue from one year to the next, and from the 1870s until well
after the turn of the century, both came primarily from their local
communities.
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Militia parades and the exhibition drills that often served to end short
parades have a distinctive history of their own within this larger American
public parade tradition, a history which contributed to the success militia
members had in holding onto their place in the civic eye.69 Early in the
nineteenth century, volunteer companies and militia companies seized
leadership in creating patriotic parades on significant national holidays,
successfully linking patriotic celebration to the militia tradition and the
role of the citizen-soldier.70 A good portion of the authority of antebellum
militia members to establish their dominance derived from their members’
ability to embody the most respectable, most orderly and disciplined end
of the spectrum of parade behavior at a time when other groups still
embraced a much rowdier public tradition.71 Militia members capitalized
on the basic advantage drilled marching gave them to present an orderly,
even flashy appearance during civic and patriotic events. They also used
the long association of military marching to music to their advantage. As
the century progressed, the vehicle of the volunteer militia, because of its
public visibility, proved interesting to an ever-growing number of men
hailing from an ever-wider array of social and cultural backgrounds.
German and Irish immigrants sought out the militia forms to prove new-
found American-ness, while nativist groups used their militia companies to
defend a homegrown ideal of American manhood and citizenship. Poorer
men used their connections with elite officers to further their own careers,
and elite volunteers used ever more selective membership lists and ever
more elegant and expensive branches of the military to illustrate their own
status.72 All these new militias enthusiastically embraced the parade tradi-
tions of the first volunteer organizations and for much the same reasons,
because seizing a place in the parade also worked to solidify public claims
to responsible and orderly citizenship and respectable manhood.
Following patterns developed in the late antebellum period, the post-
war Illinois militia drew on a very broad base of men throughout the late
nineteenth century. In the 1870s men from a variety of ethnic and racial
groups, classes, and regions flowed into the ranks of the state militia. By
1880, the officer ranks of the Illinois militia were filled by men from
every walk of life, from laborers and factory workers, through skilled
tradesmen and professionals. Close to 80 percent of all officers were mar-
ried and owned their own homes in 1880, a percentage that was nearly
exactly reversed for enlisted personnel. In the early 1880s the state mili-
tia was home to companies made up entirely of African Americans, and
heavily of Scottish, Irish, and German members, and many more men of
various ethnicities were scattered throughout the ranks.73 At the turn of
the century, the strong diversity among members by race, class, and eth-
nicity remained fully in place. (See appendixes A and B.)
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By the 1870s, state militias had become part of the official culture of
patriotic memory, and civic authorities mobilized militias to mark the
national events that helped to bind the nation together again after the
Civil War. Community leaders who organized the most resplendent of
parade spectacles were so eager to incorporate militias in 1876 to cele-
brate the centennial that scores of men created militia companies just to
have one to march. Fourth of July parades, like many annual civic
events, celebrated events in the nation’s past, and these annual events
were part of an ongoing negotiation about which events merited memo-
rialization and how they ought to be commemorated. During the ante-
bellum heyday of the urban parade, parades that took the whole commu-
nity for their parade routes, the Fourth of July parade could encompass
the entire urban population as both representative performers and as an
enthusiastic and participatory audience.74 As ethnicity increasingly came
to be an organizing principle in urban social and political life, establish-
ing a militia company was one more way for ethnic groups to indicate
their desire to be political and cultural actors on the larger stage. As
parades themselves splintered into smaller, more localized and somewhat
rarer events, the militia splintered with them, managing in this way to
maintain a military presence in almost every significant public ceremo-
ny.75 Rather than diluting the power of the military in civic events, this
splintering worked to increase the reach of the ING and other militias
as men from a wider variety of communities adopted the form for
themselves.
One of the most powerful ways National Guard and militia compa-
nies of postwar Illinois laid claim to public authority was through their
participation in annual patriotic parades. July Fourth celebrations pro-
vided staple performance opportunities for ING companies. The follow-
ing is a sampling of newspaper accounts of ING participation in July
Fourth festivities in the 1880s and 1890s. In 1880 The Chicago Tribune
reported “several companies of the Sixth Battalion [celebrated] the
Fourth out of town, or have already done so. Companies A and D went
to Wilmington with the Regimental Band and colors; Company C went
to Joliet; and Company E to Sycamore.”76 In 1882 the Monmouth
Guards, or Company M, ING, participated in the Monmouth
Independence Day celebrations, while the Sublette Guards paraded in
Dixon and Springfield had a military parade.77 In 1883, four military
companies staged a military parade and followed it up with competitive
drills in Rock Island, Illinois, while Companies A and B of the Second
Regiment of Chicago and their regimental band paraded with the
Freeport militia company, held an exhibition drill and planned a sham
battle (which was omitted because of the heat). The Freeport Company
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finished the day by hosting a ball. In Decatur, the ING company con-
tributed the fireworks display.78 On July 4, 1892, Company I, Sixth
Infantry, paraded in Moline and Rock Island, and on July 4, 1894 the
company marched in Sterling with several companies from neighboring
towns.79 This listing is hardly a complete record of the participation of
ING companies in Fourth of July celebrations during these 14 years, but
it does suggest the naturalness of militia participation in Independence
Day celebrations by the mid-1880s.
Military parades and exhibition drills served to mark special occasions
in the late nineteenth century because the militia’s historic role in patri-
otic celebration had made them into valuable patriotic actors, a tie so
strong that companies created just for the Centennial continued long
afterwards. In 1885 the city fathers of Grand Rapids, Michigan, organ-
ized a parade to mark the erection of a new courthouse, a symbol of civic
pride and of economic growth, and invited the militia company from
Springfield, Illinois, to help commemorate the occasion. Their choice to
invite to an outside militia company to honor the new building helped
mark the importance and significance of the occasion. In choosing a
militia company with a strong performance reputation, the ceremony
organizers drew on the historical role of militia display to link the city,
the courthouse, and the nation through the figure of the citizen soldier,
who defended and maintained them all by force of arms. The celebration
organizers’ choice reinforced the ideal of civilian control over the mili-
tary by asking a military company to honor, literally, the house of the law.
A successful military parade also honored the community that sponsored
it, or in this case, two communities—the home community of Springfield
and the city of Grand Rapids—through a performance that celebrated
shared values and patriotic ideals.
This particular parade ended with an exhibition drill designed to wow
the crowd and earn their approval.
Division street was cleared opposite the government lot, and the
Springfield Company [Company C, Fifth Infantry, ING], with six
sets of fours, made its appearance for an exhibition drill. The manu-
al was gone through with, both with and without numbers, with
good effect. When it came to marching, the Company moved off
with a spring that showed wonderful drill, and all their alignments
were made in such a way that the military men present broke into
rapturous applause. Other features which were applauded were the
marching to the rear, and the loading in ten motions. This last was,
perhaps, their best exhibition of the manual, the snap of the closing
of the breeches of the twenty-four Springfield rifles being like the
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snap of one gun. The Company were heartily applauded at the close
of the drill.80
The Grand Rapids audience judged Company C’s performance of mili-
tary skill against a familiar scale and rewarded their success with
applause. Within the larger audience, the reporter identified “military
men” as especially important observers whose approbation—expressed
by “rapturous applause”—was particularly valuable. While the implica-
tion that these “military men” were Civil War veterans is hard to resist,
it is important to remember that the professional military had yet to
establish full control over rank and title. In the antebellum years and
after, many men claimed military ranks and titles they had not earned,
gave themselves in civilian life promotions that they felt mirrored their
appropriate (or desired) rank in society, and generally behaved as if mil-
itary titles were up for grabs.81 Twenty years after the Civil War, “military
men” could, and most likely did, also refer to other National
Guardsmen, current or past, and veterans of military service at home or
abroad in the years between the Mexican-American War and the 1880s.
Nonetheless, the idea that the audience held knowledgeable
observers who approved of the performance was clearly important to the
reporter. With such public applause, one group of men, veterans, recog-
nized and approved the military skills of another, younger group of
citizen-soldiers. In recognizing successful individual and group mastery
of the drill revolutions, the members of the audience granted the mem-
bers of the company the chance to share in their status as military men.
Military men were, first and foremost, respected adult male members of
their communities who actually or figuratively tied themselves to the
nation through their service in arms, past, present, or potential (or even
entirely fictive).82
For the Springfield ING company, the parade and exhibition were
occasions for the members of the company to demonstrate mastery of a
complex set of athletic skills, both marching in unison and handling
their weaponry. Mastery of these traditional military skills indicated a
seriousness of purpose and a high degree of discipline on the part of each
member of the company. Mastery of parade drilling also broadcast the
success of a company organization able to command the serious commit-
ment of time necessary to the attainment of specialized parade drill
forms, a reputation, in this case, good enough to garner an invitation to
perform for a distant community. Militia members also embraced their
history as they worked to live up to and build on the patriotic pageantry
of the past in this kind of parade and exhibition. During a parade, each
company member also enjoyed an opportunity to display the many desir-
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able qualities associated with military men, including patriotism, manli-
ness, and status as respected adult members of the polity. By earning
applause, company members basked in otherwise difficult to obtain pub-
lic recognition and praise.
When read as dramas of social power, these exhibition drills also pro-
vide a revealing glimpse of some of the ways the traditional military dis-
play could be adapted to the demands of modern society. The central
tension in the drama of the drill manual is that of subordination to high-
er authority combined with the crucial component of extreme individual
effort. While this deference to authority derives from much older tradi-
tions, it could be, and was, reconstituted in an industrializing world to
meet new situations and new demands for obedience to commands. The
success of a military performance depended on each player knowing his
part perfectly and perfectly subordinating himself to the group for the
attainment of a shared goal. The approval of the military men, and the
larger crowd, demonstrated that in 1885, Company C reached that goal.
Of course, ending the military demonstration with “the snap of the clos-
ing of the breeches of the twenty-four Springfield rifles being like the
snap of one gun” vividly reminded the audience of the power of state
authority backed by the instruments of war, and the vital role of citizen-
soldiers in corralling and controlling that same power of the state.
Parading for Civic Legitimacy
Performing in a military parade legitimized a company in the public eye
in a way few other events could match, and guardsmen made much of
their parades for that very reason. Both early historians of the First
Infantry ING cite the first two public parades of the Regiment, in May
and July 1875, as foundational moments in the early history of their
Regiment. In May 1875, the eight-month-old First Infantry escorted the
Grand Army of the Republic to their annual meeting in Chicago. “The
showing made was phenomenal,” gloated regimental historian (and
eventual colonel) Henry Turner. “Eight months previously there was not
a man, a uniform or a gun on hand as a nucleus, but on this day the reg-
iment turned out with ten companies fully organized, armed and
equipped, and showing some five hundred and twenty muskets in line.”
In Turner’s judgment, the best part was that “the effect on the citizens
was in the nature of a genuine surprise party, and as a result the regiment
sprang at a bound into the great popularity which it has ever since
retained.”83 Charles Diehl remembered, “When the Regiment made its
first public appearance, in its dress outfit, led by its drum corps, and its
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own band, the spectacle was so brilliant and unexpected, that even the
caustic press surrendered. Every daily paper, without exception, printed
a leader, declaring how proud the city was to claim so fine a command.”84
While the formal history of the regiment begins in September 1874, the
history of the regiment as a successful organization began on May 15,
1875, with public approval of the First Infantry’s demonstration of mili-
tary bearing and parade skills as the First honored the veterans, the mil-
itary men, of the last great war. In honoring, and being invited to honor,
the Grand Army of the Republic, the young members of the First were
also able to draw a direct connection between their service and that of
the volunteers of 1861–64.
The First Infantry paraded again in July 1875, in a formal review for
the governor of Illinois.85 On this occasion, the First paraded, and then
at the end of the march performed drills from the manuals of arms on the
parade, or reviewing, ground in Hyde Park. Governor John L. Beveridge,
himself a Union general in the Civil War; Lieutenant General Philip H.
Sheridan, U.S. Army and military commander of the district headquar-
tered in Chicago; and Brigadier General Arthur C. Ducat, ING, looked
on from the viewing stand. The news of this parade even made Harper’s
Weekly. “At its first parade, [the First Regiment Illinois State Guards]
was enthusiastically received by the citizens and distinguished visitors
from abroad, and from Gen. Sheridan and other military men received
high commendation.”86
As with the news accounts of the 1885 parade in Grand Rapids,
Michigan, this reporter also recorded the approval of military men, this
time high-ranking officers with distinguished Civil War records. When
General Sheridan, General Ducat, and Governor Beveridge acknowl-
edged the members of the First Infantry as comrades in arms by receiv-
ing and publicly approving the military drill performance, they conferred
their sanction on the First as a serious military organization. They also
extended their reputations and their history in the Civil War to embrace
the young volunteers of the First as members of the same tradition. They
granted each of the volunteers recognition and status as fellow “military
men,” a status carrying connotations of bravery, discipline, honor,
courage, loyalty, and patriotism that was simply unavailable in civilian
life. Such status wasn’t even necessarily available to all members of the
professional branches of the U.S. military in these decades.87 Both early
historians of the First rely on these two parades to establish the basis for
claims by the members of the First to patriotic authority, public honor,
and social and political glamour as manly and upstanding citizen sol-
diers. Glamour was also very important to these historians, and parades
like this one epitomized military glamour, with gleaming uniforms and
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arms and the power of cadres of men moving in unison, responsive to the
beat of the drum and the commands of their officers, to the approval of
genuine military heroes.
The 1902 Souvenir History: Governors Guard: Company C, Fifth
Infantry, Illinois National Guard also uses parades as evidence for the suc-
cess of the early organization from which the Governor’s Guard traced
their history. According to the Souvenir History the earlier company, then
known as the Springfield Zouaves, marched in a procession to lay the
cornerstone for the new state capitol building. Later, the History reports
that the Springfield Zouaves traveled to Normal, Illinois to “assist in lay-
ing the corner stone of the Soldiers’ Orphans’ Home.” In 1874 the com-
pany officially changed its name to the Governor’s Guard and reorgan-
ized. Once reorganized, the company announced its new formation by
marching in the parade to the unveiling of a statue of Abraham Lincoln
in the Oak Ridge Cemetery on October 15, 1874. As the first parades of
the First Infantry of Chicago would do the following year, the first parade
of the new Governor’s Guard marked the inception of their new public
life and gained for them legitimacy and stature in a way no other public
performance could. When the Governor’s Guard escorted President
Grant, Vice President Wilson, and the Secretary of War to honor
President Lincoln, they, like the First, publicly linked themselves to the
military history of the Civil War and to all its heroes, alive and dead.
When they escorted the president and his party, members of the
Governor’s Guard also marked themselves as manly enough to lead and
protect the leader of the nation.
The parade to Oak Ridge Cemetery was only one of ten parades in
which the Governor’s Guard marched during their first year under their
new name.88 The historian of the company boasted of their public
parades that first year because parading marked the formal existence of a
company and illustrated its status and respectability in the public arena,
a need that did not fade with the age of the company. Later Governor’s
Guard parades significant enough to warrant a mention in the history of
the company included an 1876 parade in Rockford to lay the cornerstone
for a new county court house; an 1879 parade escorting President Hayes
and General Sherman to the Illinois State Fair; and an 1880 parade
escorting officers of the ING to a military convention in Springfield. In
1880 General Grant visited Springfield a second time, and the
Governor’s Guard once again performed escort duty. Also in 1880, the
company traveled to Atlanta, Georgia, “to participate in the laying of
the cornerstone of the armory of the ‘Gate City Guards.’” In 1881 the
company again escorted ING officers, this time to the inauguration of
Governor Shelby Cullom, and on July 4, 1885, the company traveled to
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Grand Rapids, Michigan, to participate in the cornerstone-laying cere-
monies there.89 This list includes only the most significant of the parades
that Company C, the Governor’s Guards, marched in during the ten
years between 1874 and 1885. Escort duty to particularly notable public
figures and Civil War veterans, and the honor of participating in the
dedication of significant buildings, made the reputation of the
Governor’s Guard. Meanwhile, Company C spent only six days in active
service, during the railroad strikes of 1877, less than a quarter of the time
they spent traveling to parades and drill competitions during the same
years.90
In a souvenir volume dedicated to the Eighth Regiment, ING (ini-
tially the independent Ninth Battalion), Harry McCard also called
attention to parades as a vehicle for establishing the legitimacy of a com-
pany, or in this case battalion-strength, organization. The legitimacy and
potency of the Eighth was particularly crucial, as it was the only African
American organization in the ING during the 1890s. “The Ninth
Battalion [their first number] was the Negroes’ West Point. Nothing
marked their Freshman, Sophomore and Junior years save many nights
of hard drill, several brilliant parades, and now and then a solemn march
when a comrade was borne to his final resting place.”91 The independent
Ninth Battalion, struggling to survive until it secured a place in the
ING, was especially in need of the public approval that could be won by
putting on a good parade.
African American Men in the ING
On July 1, 1877, a new militia code became effective in Illinois, and among
the provisions of this law was a section prohibiting any private companies
from marching with weapons (meaning guns) without the express consent
of the legislature. The following spring, African American men organized
two Chicago-based companies, developing from the core of the older and
unaffiliated Cadets. Their intention was to create an African American
battalion within the framework of the new Illinois National Guard. The
organizers reached their goal in the spring and summer of 1878, when the
Sixteenth Battalion, ING, entered state service. The Sixteenth included
companies A and B in Chicago, the Clark County Guards of Marshall, and
in October the battalion gained the Cumberland County Guards of
Greenup. The major, Theodore C. Hubbard, along with the battalion staff,
was commissioned in September 1878.92
The Sixteenth Battalion, ING, remained active and on the state’s
rolls for three years, through 1882. Then, during the first months of
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1882, a new adjutant general reorganized the state’s militia, working to
eliminate inefficient, undermanned, or virtually disbanded companies.
At that time, the Sixteenth Battalion was mustered out of the state serv-
ice.93 The black community in Chicago, and in particular the members of
the Sixteenth Battalion, were outraged at losing their place in the state
forces. They held a number of meetings to express their dismay and sent
a delegation to the Governor and to the adjutant general to plead for
their place in the Illinois National Guard.94 In response to their appeals,
Alexander Brown was commissioned captain of a new African American
company in Chicago on July 12, 1882, as was his first lieutenant.95 Brown
served previously with the Sixteenth Battalion. Brown’s company is not
listed on the register of state militia companies of 1882 or July 1883, but
by December 1883 the company appears on the strength tables as the
Chicago Light Infantry (Colored) with a total membership of 68 men
and officers.96 The Chicago Light Infantry, under Brown, lasted for
almost five years, until May 2, 1887, when it, too, was mustered out of
the state service. The historian of the future Eighth Illinois USV, W. T.
Goode, wrote of this otherwise low moment for African American mili-
tary organizations in Illinois that, nevertheless, “the colored men were
undaunted. It was not their intention to be discarded.”97 So, in the early
summer of 1890, African American men in Chicago gathered once again
to start up a volunteer military organization.
On June 5, 1890, a group of determined organizers held a meeting to
establish a new African American military organization. Their goal was
to create several infantry companies and find them a place in the
Illinois National Guard as a battalion-strength organization.
Enthusiasm was high in the black community in Chicago in 1890, and
a battalion-sized (from two to six companies) organization formed and
applied to the state for membership in the Guard. Governor Joseph
Fifer denied the application, apparently on the grounds of shortage of
funds, though prejudice and politics both played a part.98 Fifer made it
clear that the only way blacks could serve in the Guard was as unat-
tached companies or as a separate battalion or regiment-strength
organization. Others were more supportive, especially in Chicago. In
August 1890, the Chicago Tribune announced (somewhat prematurely)
that the “Ninth Battalion, composed of young colored men of the
South Side, became last night a permanent part of the militia of
Chicago.” The report, like so much newspaper coverage of the militia,
noted approvingly that the members “are a lot of wide-chested, broad-
shouldered young men who ought to make a good-sized regiment pret-
ty tired.”99 Drill-master and editor of the Illinois Guardsman Henry
Barrett Chamberlin supported the Ninth and worked as an instructor
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with the new companies, assisted and later succeeded by Lieutenant
George W. Bristol of the First Infantry.100
Determined to gain a place for the Ninth in the ING, John C.
Buckner, major of the still-private Ninth Battalion, ran for state repre-
sentative for the Sixth District in 1894 and won. Born and educated in
Illinois, Buckner completed two years of college at Northwestern
College in Naperville before settling in Chicago, where he worked first
for a foundry and later for a “well-known caterer, H. M. Kinsley.” He
joined the Ninth as a captain while it was still a private organization,
and in time he rose to the rank of colone1.101 Once a member of the
General Assembly, Buckner framed and worked to pass a bill creating a
vacancy in the militia and making an appropriation to fund it. The
movement to find a space for the Ninth in the ING was undoubtedly
assisted by Governor Altgeld’s campaign promise to also find a place for
the Chicago-based Hibernian Rifles, another organization seeking mem-
bership in the ING.102 As the bill was moving through the legislature,
Buckner approached Governor John Peter Altgeld, “who was impressed
with and friendly to the scheme, [and] endorsed the movement, giving
it his earnest efforts and support, and by orders emanating from his exec-
utive chamber, the Ninth Battalion of Chicago became the Ninth
Battalion, I.N.G.”103 So, on November 4, 1895, four companies of the
new Ninth Battalion, ING, were mustered into service, and on January
27, 1896, state representative John C. Buckner was commissioned major
of the new Ninth Battalion, ING.104 By September 1896, the Ninth
Battalion boasted 18 commissioned officers and 407 enlisted men.105
That the battalion had managed to stay together for five years with-
out any governmental support, money, loan of arms, or rent subsidies
speaks volumes for the determination of the African American commu-
nity in Chicago to make this battalion succeed. All financial support
had to come from within the community, and all members had to sustain
enthusiasm over the long haul without access to the shooting ranges or
participation in summer camp that provided some of the main draws for
ING membership in genera1.106 The maintenance of the Ninth
Battalion was all the more remarkable given the relatively tiny popula-
tion of African Americans in Chicago to fill its ranks and pay its bills.
In 1893, in a city with a population of over one million, there were just
over 15,000 African Americans in residence in Chicago. A substantial
proportion of the single young men between the ages of 18 and 30 were
required to be active to keep the battalion going, and yet they managed.
Fortunately for the Ninth, the African American population of the city
was growing very quickly, and by 1900 there were 30,150 African
Americans in the city.107
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Once accepted into the ING, the Ninth Battalion entered fully into
the life of a state militia organization—the weekly training, the manual
of arms, the parades, the whirl of social events, and the excitement of
training camp during the summers of 1896 and 1897.108 Although in the
judgment of various inspecting officers the Ninth was in need of much
work, they saw much promise in the battalion as well.109 Some members
of at least the First Regiment were willing to celebrate the success of the
Ninth in entering the ING when they posed for some group “at ease”
shots at summer camp in 1896.110 Writing about the 1890 formation of
the Ninth Battalion, Goode recalled, “The formation of such an organi-
zation, it was thought by many, would in time prove a beneficial and a
social advantage to the colored residents of Illinois.”111 The benefits and
social advantage that the African American community derived from
supporting an African American military organization were several. A
military organization publicly demonstrated the cohesion and determina-
tion of the entire community that created and supported it. Socially, a
guard company fostered a situation in which African Americans were
accorded respect that, in language if not in practice, was the same as that
Manhood and Citizenship on Display 69
Figure 3
White and African American members of the First Division, ING, at Camp
Lincoln, ca. 1895. Courtesy of the Chicago Historical Society. Photographer: D. H.
Spencer. iCHi-26577.
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accorded to whites.112 As the nineteenth century progressed, state mili-
tias, including the ING, and other fraternal organizations increasingly
dominated formal civic ceremonies, especially the parades that marked
important public holidays. African American guardsmen could capital-
ize on this tradition to make their own public claim to full membership
in the civic body.113 An African American militia organization also con-
firmed and kept alive the Civil War military experience, which many—
then and now—believed was an essential element toward securing the
Fifteenth Amendment, the citizenship of African Americans.114
Emphasizing the connection to the Fifteenth Amendment and its guar-
antees for African American citizenship, Chicago-based African
American companies held drills, parades, and balls to mark the anniver-
sary of the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment and the end of the
Civil War.115 Just as the parades and participation in other important
civic ceremonies confirmed the importance of the national guards,
African American national guard companies could use their symbolic
weight to add significance and luster to those civic commemorations
that were particularly meaningful to the African American community.
Funeral Parades and Honorable Citizenship
Funeral parades were one of the most solemn and symbolically laden
civic events in which militia companies participated. As the historian of
the Ninth Battalion recorded, militia companies marched in funeral
parades, to mark the passing of national leaders and for their own. The
1874 Springfield procession leading to the unveiling of a statue of
Abraham Lincoln falls into this category of military parade. The military
funeral procession, with or without the presence of the dead, was a par-
ticular form of public parade for antebellum and post-Civil War volun-
teer militias alike. Susan Davis notes that “precision of the march to the
cemetery” accompanied by the sounds of bands, gongs, and rifle salutes
at graveside was a particularly impressive and solemn way to demon-
strate patriotic authority on the part of militia members.116 The 1874
Springfield funeral parade, elaborate as it was, paled before the opportu-
nities for solemn ritual and patriotic authority National Guard members
seized after the death of President James A. Garfield on Sept. 19, 1881.
President Garfield died of complications from a wound received during
an assassination attempt in July 1881. Like Mrs. Lincoln before her, Mrs.
Garfield chose to have her husband buried at home, in Cleveland, Ohio.
The funeral processions lasted for more than a week and began in Long
Branch, New Jersey, where President Garfield died; continued to
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Washington, D.C., where the funeral began; and finally traveled on to
Cleveland, where the funeral was completed and Garfield was buried.
National Guard companies took part in the processions in both cities,
along the train route, and in many smaller cities around the country.
Along the route from Washington to Cleveland, companies of the
Maryland and Pennsylvania National Guards gathered to observe and
salute the passing funeral train.117 In Cleveland, militia and National
Guard companies from Ohio, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania,
and Illinois marched in the first division of the funeral procession.118 The
company from Illinois, Company A, Fifteenth Battalion, ING, from
Alton, obtained a place in the Cleveland procession and so secured for
the ING an important, national role.119 Elsewhere in the East, companies
of the New York and Pennsylvania National Guards participated in local
mourning observations.120 City officials in San Francisco, California also
made plans for a grand funeral procession that would include both civic
and military organizations.121
Small and large communities throughout Illinois also held local cere-
monies to mark Garfield’s funeral and to participate locally in an event
of national importance. The ING in turn dominated many local civic
ceremonies held to mark the funeral all over Illinois and in the surround-
ing states, claiming patriotic authority and leadership in a moment of
national mourning. Illinois National Guard companies marched in
funeral processions in Mount Vernon, Paris, Centralia, Decatur,
Galesburg, Joliet, Rock Island, Paxton, and Morrison. Companies in the
ING also marched in Indianapolis and Evansville, Indiana; in La Crome,
Janesville, and Whitewater, Wisconsin; in Jackson, Coldwater, and
Lansing, Michigan; and in Dubuque, Davenport, and Des Moines,
Iowa.122 President Garfield’s funeral was the most solemn national civic
event to take place since the funeral procession of Abraham Lincoln, and
militia companies took the lead in many of the civic ceremonies mark-
ing the burial of the president in Cleveland.
In Chicago, civic leaders and militia officers put on a terrific display
of solemn mourning that rivaled that in Cleveland itself, using the occa-
sion to demonstrate the significance and wealth of their city, and the var-
ious Chicago ING organizations led the parade. The parade extended
about one and a half miles, and some 15,000 men, in six divisions repre-
senting all of the military and civic organizations of the city, took part.
The ING marched on the right of the line, and the veterans marched on
the left. The First Cavalry marched dismounted (150 members turned
out, more than they had horses) in five companies, preceded by their
corps of buglers. The Second Infantry was next in line, led by a twelve-
member drum corps, with ten companies and some 250 men. The Sixth
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Infantry followed, with another 250 men in ten companies. Some com-
panies of the Sixth Infantry were predominantly ethnic Scots and
marched in a formal kilt-style uniform. Battery D, with eighty men and
four field pieces and a Gatling gun—all five polished and draped with
mourning crepe—marched ahead of the Sixteenth Battalion. The
Sixteenth—the African American militia organization in the city at
that time—turned out some eighty men in two companies headed by
Major Samuel W. Scott, Quartermaster Williams, Captain Lloyd
Wheeler and a Lieutenant Card. The Sixteenth’s band and drum corps
led off their section of the procession. The First Infantry concluded the
militia portion of the procession, with 350 men marching with their reg-
imental band and drum corps. Altogether, some 1,200 ING members
took part in the Chicago funeral procession.123
Symbolizing national unity in a powerfully modern way, the proces-
sion was timed to begin at the same hour as the actual funeral cortege in
Cleveland carrying the body of President Garfield from the ceremonies
to the cemetery.124 All along the parade route, Chicagoans had draped
their buildings with crepe, hung mourning banners, and otherwise dec-
orated as befitted the grand occasion. Many buildings sported portraits
of President Garfield, President Lincoln, and President Washington—
Garfield’s shrouded in black, the other two in white. According to the
papers, Chicago merchants sold some two million yards of black and
white materials for decorative purposes. The Tribune Tower alone was
hung with 9,000 yards of black muslin and 3,000 yards of paper decora-
tions, at a cost of something close to $1,200.00.125 Altogether, it is hard
to question the Tribune’s assessment that “[i]t was without doubt the
most imposing parade which has ever taken place here, or perhaps else-
where.”126
Organizations reflecting all the major members of the community
participated in the parade, following the old democratic parade tradi-
tions laid down in the early part of the nineteenth century. But where in
antebellum parades the social and commercial elites led off the proces-
sion, indicating their superior status, in 1881 the military had taken that
role for itself.127 The military, veterans, and militia volunteers led the
procession, veterans on the right of the line and current militia members
on the left. Side by side, two generations of military men marched to
honor their fallen leader. The Masons had the special privilege of escort-
ing the catafalque that represented the presence of the body of the pres-
ident. The rest of the panoply of civic, governmental, and ethnic associ-
ations were relegated to the back of the procession. The parade, fantas-
tic spectacle that it was, followed closely in the footsteps of antebellum
parades, where each unit of the polity had representative members (all
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male) in the procession, and the route was lined with an audience who
understood the corporate symbolism on display. However, in 1881 the
uniformed military in all its branches—active duty, veterans, and militia
members—was rising to the top of the ceremonial heap in national com-
memoration and claiming rights of precedence for themselves. In a clear
contrast to the class and ethnic organization of antebellum parades
described by Mary Ryan, veterans’ groups and the ING were both part of
national organizations whose membership was not limited to men of a
particular ethnicity—though individual companies or lodges might have
a prevailing ethnic identification—the regular military and the National
Guard were generally open to most white men.128 The precedence given
to veterans and the ING in Chicago, across the state, and beyond offered
Illinois guardsmen the opportunity to stress again their identity as exem-
plary citizens of the United States who could be counted on to model the
best kind of respectful, manly behavior for their communities and for the
nation as a whole.
Memorial Day and the ING
Illinois National Guard members played in a visible role in another
movement that became part of larger efforts to unite the nation—
Memorial Day.129 By embracing Memorial Day, ING members formally
drew the Civil War into the annual ceremonial calendar of events dedi-
cated to honoring the nation’s past. For example, in 1880 the Mason City
Guards held a ceremony to mark Memorial Day, and in 1883 ING com-
panies participated in Memorial Day celebrations in Chicago, Ottawa,
Rockford, Moline, and Monmouth, despite the steady rain.130 In the
1890s, the entirety of the Chicago-based ING marched in several large-
scale Memorial Day parades, sharing the glory with the grizzled members
of the Grand Army of the Republic.131 By the 1890s, ING companies
were extending Memorial Day celebrations to include their own col-
leagues as well: “One of the sights which always stirs the patriotism in
every breast may be seen on the last Sunday of May, in each year as it
rolls around. The ‘Veteran Corps,’ [veterans of Company C] in connec-
tion with the ‘Governor’s Guard,’ make their yearly pilgrimage to Oak
Ridge, our ‘City of the dead,’ and cover with flowers the graves of those
of the Guards who have ‘crossed the bar’ and gone over to the silent
majority.”132 In extending Memorial Day celebrations to cover their own,
militia members were able to legitimize and enhance their connection to
veterans of the Civil War.
Militia and National Guard funeral processions were not limited to
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Memorial Day observances, or to nationally important figures. Militia
companies held military funerals to honor local leaders, veterans of the
local company and most especially members of companies who died
before finishing their terms of enlistment. Twice in 1887, Company C,
Fourth Infantry and the Oakland Rifles marched in funeral processions
that concluded with “Taps” at a graveside. They marched in June for
Corporal E. G. Clark and in September 1887 for Sergeant Frank C.
Byram. Both men drowned in summer accidents in the first year of the
organization’s existence.133 Company C, Fifth Infantry, ING, the
Governor’s Guard, also marked the passing of members of their organi-
zation: “November 18, 1880, for the first time was the Company called
upon to perform the sad duty of burying, with military honors, one of the
active members, Harrison G. Fitzhugh, enlisted September 5, 1879, died
November 16, 1880, of typhoid pneumonia.”134 With no major parades
to report during the first three years of the companies’ history, authors of
souvenir historical sketches included these solemn moments as testimo-
ny to the serious purpose and intense commitment on the part of the
members of the companies. These quieter funeral processions echoed the
more dramatic processions to honor national figures even as they ren-
dered the significance of membership for the public, in public cere-
monies. During funeral performances for their own, Guard companies
demonstrated to their communities the dignity and honor that Guard
membership conferred was permanent. Companies also showed their
communities that once a guardsman, a man always had a place with sig-
nificance in the world; he would not be soon forgotten or his member-
ship disregarded.
Parades, celebratory, solemn, national, or local, all helped to shape
the public image about the militia and militia members. Militia parades
drew on decades of traditions to solidify militia members’ claim to stand
as a link between individual, community, and nation. In their parades
they presented themselves as selfless volunteers, willing to serve the
nation with all the dedication and discipline at their command. Militia
volunteers invested moments as diverse as dedication, national holidays,
and private funerals with powerful images of patriotic sacrifice, national
celebration, and the importance of individual subordination to the calls
of community and nation. They also used these occasions to show them-
selves as attractive, athletic, manly men who represented the best their
communities had to offer as responsible citizens and rightful inheritors
of the valor and status of citizen-soldiers past.
Military parades not only established the legitimacy of a militia or
National Guard company, they also confirmed National Guardsmen as
key actors in the polity. By retaining and improving on the role estab-
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lished by volunteer militia companies in the antebellum era, the ING
companies of the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s solidified their claims to pub-
lic authority on ceremonial and patriotic occasions. As parades in gener-
al diminished, militia parades emerged as significant simply by virtue of
surviving into the new public ceremonial era of spectacle featuring elab-
orate performances by a few and for larger, largely passive audiences.135
The public territory claimed by the militias through parading and
exhibitions bore fruit in both classic and new ways. First and most tradi-
tionally, as the militias paraded to establish legitimacy, they also secured
a base for political action on behalf of their organization, and for them-
selves. Irish and African American organizations found the militia a par-
ticularly appealing vehicle to push forward their own claims to hold
manly and respectable citizenship. Militia access to state funds increased
as their representatives in Springfield and Washington, D.C. were able to
point to these demonstrations as proof of the importance of and popular
interest in a stable and orderly militia organization.136 Militia members
also were able to use parades to make a case for their new role as organi-
zations that could model ideal forms of behavior for the public, and espe-
cially for young men aspiring to positions of adult respectability. Illinois
National Guard parades were opportunities for members to demonstrate
the outcome of the training process, to show that personal and individ-
ual commitment to the group and subordination to authority resulted in
a visually and aurally powerful performance of disciplined manhood sym-
bolically and practically linked to the power of the state.
Manly Citizens
A staple paradigm of U.S. history holds that the final decades of the
nineteenth century were filled with turmoil, uncertainty, and social
chaos. Most historians of the turn-of-the-century United States also
broadly agree that Americans responded to the temper of their times by
attempting to impose meaning and stability through institutions dedicat-
ed to determining appropriate social behavior for every particular cir-
cumstance. Many of these responses, formal and informal, have been the
focus of excellent scholarship: professional associations, women’s clubs,
progressive reform associations, churches, families, fraternal organiza-
tions, and the working man’s saloon, to name a few.137 Not many histori-
ans of the era have counted the state militias among these types of social
institutions, despite the central and highly visible role most militia
organizations played in local public performances of civic order and dis-
cipline, or their function as popular social clubs—especially for younger
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men. These public, social roles have been largely missed, because militia
actions in industrial conflict have received so much negative criticism
and analysis, obscuring the day-to-day public life of these companies.138
Despite the challenges and the occasionally negative press, the citizen-
soldier held a powerful, and growing, allure for men of all ages and all
across the nation over the last three decades of the nineteenth century.
Between 1870 and 1898, on top of whatever drilling they were doing,
ING companies marched in numerous parades and performed exhibition
drills, in all weathers, of all sizes, and on occasions from the most solemn
to the most celebratory. Illinois National Guard members also hosted
company dances, dinners, and picnics; produced amateur theatricals
starring the company members; sponsored lectures and informal talks on
a range of military topics; and generally enjoyed the social side of com-
pany life as thoroughly as they could. These public social events were so
important to company members that in their company and regimental
histories, they proudly recounted lists of parades, elegant dances, and
glittering receptions for dignitaries of all stripes. They also preserved and
shared treasured anecdotes of pranks and good times.139 With these
events, and the stories about them, ING members celebrated their man-
liness, their honor, and their embrace of civic responsibility.
Social events gave members the chance to show off their handsome
and gallant uniformed manliness to adoring crowds—and as they fre-
quently noted in their histories—particularly to crowds of attentive and
responsive young women. Members of the ING were not only aware of
their attractiveness to the opposite sex; they boasted of it, and they used
it to entice new members to join in the fun. Social events could also be
occasions for members to display their military honor and their good cit-
izenship to potential recruits, and to the wider community that support-
ed companies socially and financially. Militia organizations depended
primarily on their local communities for financial support throughout
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Without the donations
given freely by the local community, the admissions fees, the willingness
to canvass for subscriptions or join the private associations that support-
ed an active company, ING companies foundered and ultimately
disbanded.
Social and ceremonial events, far more than the private training ses-
sions, shaped the public face of the ING within their communities, and
the public face is what earned the financial support and the new mem-
bers that were essential for any ING organization’s survival. Between
parading on important occasions and providing a wide array of social
events, guardsmen crafted a place for themselves as patriotic, responsi-
ble, and above all, dashing and manly citizens. As manly citizens they
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could command a steady flow of new members, and of private and public
dollars. With members and money, they built their organizations from a
handful of small, scattered companies in 1874, until, by 1897, the ING
boasted some 7,000 members annually and had established for itself a
strong base both in the state government and within their local
communities.
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CHAPTER 3
Confused Missions: 
The First Twenty Years of
Strike Duty, 1870–90
Next to serving the government there is no more patriotic manner
of paying tribute to the flag than in that of serving the state faith-
fully and loyally under all circumstances.1
—Rufus S. Bunzey, private, ING
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Illinois militia companies
attracted new members and local support based on their presentation of
manly men and responsible citizens. Guardsmen demonstrated their
responsible citizenship largely through local performances of respectable
patriotism and practice soldiering, performances that their local commu-
nities generally greeted with approval and applause and supported with
community funds. However, in the later nineteenth century, the respon-
sible citizenship of guardsmen also carried with it the potential call to
riot and strike duty, and such duty turned out to be a controversial activ-
ity that earned the militia criticism and complaints rather than applause.
In the early years of the militia revival in Illinois, some guardsmen
embraced strike duty as a mission that was central and important to the
militia and its future, and many more accepted the maintenance of order,
if not the suppression of strikes, as an integral aspect of their civic
responsibilities. Even then, though, enthusiastic supporters of strike duty
were rare, and by the mid-1880s, guardsmen were expressing growing
frustration with strike duty and its attendant difficulties.
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Since Shays’s Rebellion in 1786, state governors had deployed their
active militia organizations to deal with civil unrest. Although few were
completely happy about this, most citizens and militia members consid-
ered such service to be appropriate and useful.2 At first glance, civil
unrest triggered by strikes or labor disputes in the middle and later nine-
teenth century seemed to be the same sort of duty. By the end of the
1880s, however, most militia members in Illinois had come to see that
policing strikes was quite different. For one thing, strike duty for the
ING, and for most other state militias, could and usually did coincide
with the failure of the strike. Many observers, focusing on this much-
publicized activity, did form the idea that strike breaking was the primary
function and purpose of the state National Guard. This idea left National
Guardsmen in the difficult position of attempting to disprove what peo-
ple believed they saw with their own eyes. It also left guardsmen strug-
gling to satisfy competing constituencies. They had to respond to the
state government that contributed—however insufficiently—to their
upkeep and in exchange asked them to respond to moments of public
unrest. Defending and maintaining public order was also an obvious act
of responsible citizenship. At the same time, guardsmen in Illinois sought
to avoid any service that rendered them little more than a private force
for corporate ends, which would jeopardize their stance as responsible
and representative citizens. Guardsmen needed to keep their reputation
for military training and sociability focused on the positive rewards of
admirable citizenship and on an honorable manliness, or they risked
recruiting and fund-raising failures. Strike service inevitably placed these
needs in direct conflict with each other.
Strikes and Strike Duty in Illinois
Striking was endemic in the late nineteenth century in the United
States, and no industry or region of the country was without labor walk-
outs over the conditions or wages of work.3 However, the overwhelming
majority of strikes held in Illinois—and throughout the nation—were
resolved at the local level, without appeal to the state government for aid
or for intervention. In the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s, twenty-six of forty-
five state militias went into action in strike-affected regions, during
moments of extreme crisis, during times when local authorities felt they
did not have the power or the ability (or perhaps the willingness) to calm
angry crowds and face down private security forces. Such service repre-
sented only a little more than a third of all state militia and National
Guard instances of active duty, but strike duty was performed on a larger
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scale, and for a wider audience than almost any other single type of
active duty. The ING, located in the heart of the central coal fields, had
the greatest number of instances of strike service of any state militia
between 1877 and 1900.4 On the thirty-three occasions that ING mem-
bers performed strike duty between 1870 and 1908, they found them-
selves grappling with situations that had already strained the ability and
resources of local authorities. (See appendix C.) They also found them-
selves in situations for which they had no training and no real power,
and in which it was difficult to determine fault and responsibility. To
make matters even more frustrating for ING members, they often bore
whatever political fallout could be pushed onto their shoulders—an out-
come that was clear to them ten years before they figured out how to
finesse the problem.
When Illinois governors did turn to the state militia to intervene in
strikes, they sent the ING into service at the scene of a strike to restore
a public order that local authority was temporarily unable to sustain.
Guardsmen were ordered to restore order in whatever way they could,
remand any captured “criminal elements” into local police hands, and
then return to their homes. After that, state officials expected the local
authorities to carry on themselves. It is in this simple, highly visible nar-
rative that many, then and since, have read the interests of state author-
ity in maintaining state military organizations to preserve public order
and so have implied backwards that, therefore, this must be the reason
why such organizations came into existence.5 Critics of the assaults on
organized labor have also tended to read in this narrative the clear rela-
tionship between industrial managers and the state governments that
protected their investments.6 Given the relative rarity of the call to the
ING to police strike-related disorders, this reading has come much too
quickly. Strikes that turned into community confrontations that led to
state National Guard interventions were extraordinary moments and
they do not, cannot, serve as a vehicle for understanding the history of
strikes in general, the role of the state in labor/capital disputes, and these
interventions definitely do not reveal much about the origins or purpose
of National Guardsmen.7
The simplest narrative of state-supported strike-breakers also obscures
the wicked undercurrents of local politics and disputed situations. The
process of even acquiring state aid in a strike was complex. Local
authorities—in the body of the county sheriff or city mayor—had to
confess to the governor their inability to handle the strike situation and
had to ask the state to intervene in their county (or city) to restore an
order that they were unable to maintain. In essence, the request was
itself an admission of weakness, if not of total incompetence. Even then,
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it was up to the governor to decide how to respond, and the governor did
not have to send troops. In fact, Illinois governors often showed little
inclination to rush troops into an unsettled local situation, learning over
the course of the 1880s and 1890s that there was no political good to
come from such involvement. Quite the contrary, it was often nothing
but trouble, not to mention being quite expensive. Instead, Illinois gov-
ernors could and often did choose to send a supply of state-owned
weapons for deputy sheriffs, a personal observer, or some combination of
the two rather than actual troops.8 When governors did send troops,
uncertain relationships between local and state authorities, illustrated by
the frequent disagreements among the various parties concerned about
when or even if disorder had taken or would take place, regularly com-
plicated the situation on the ground even further.9 The history of ING
service in strike-related locales is fraught with tension between the local
sheriffs and the ING commanders who arrived in their jurisdictions to
assist in order restoration. Once on the ground, commanders regularly
encountered uneasy local alliances and continual local bickering about
the legitimacy of the need for state troops. Public opinion, local,
statewide and national, was divided on how, or if, to police disputes
between capital and labor.10 Public sentiment was in a contentious and
unsettled state about striking and strike policing, and about what role, if
any, the state should play in those disputes. Nonetheless, ING officers
found themselves in situations where, by default, they were expected to
act clearly and decisively. Those who lived in strike-affected regions rec-
ognized, even agonized over, the problem that strikes were not a simple
good vs. evil—labor vs. the state—situation. They also had a clear inter-
est in limiting any disruption to their own daily lives. The simple narra-
tive that casts ING strike service, and all state militia service in strikes,
as tools of the emergent corporate class in their effort to squash labor
organization is to miss both the political complexity of strike service,
and, always, its relative rarity.11
Chicago Militias and the Relief and Aid Society, 1875: 
Hints of Future Troubles
Toward the end of February 1875, the Chicago newspapers were report-
ing that Socialists were threatening to march on the Chicago Relief and
Aid Society to demand that the society change its policies to better
respond to the desperate need created by the ongoing economic down-
turn.12 Critics charged that the overseers of the Relief Society were mis-
managing something between $300,000 and $1 million in resources and
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yet were denying relief to those who applied for help.13 Some protestors
even gave dramatic speeches about storming the society’s building and
seizing the funds. Many Chicagoans became convinced that civil war
was going to break out over the dispute.14 According to Holdridge
Collins, writing some years later, “riotous demonstrations . . . directed
more especially against the treasury and building of the Relief and Aid
Society” posed a significant threat to local order and required a strong
response.15 Opponents of the so-called Communists mobilized all across
Chicago.16 The police stockpiled weapons in preparation for anticipated
demonstrations in front of the society’s building. The First Regiment,
which then consisted of six companies, on its own initiative assembled
at its armory to drill in preparation “to sally forth at a moment’s notice,”
as Collins later described it. According to the Chicago Times reporter,
Lieutenant Colonel McClurg of the new First Regiment did not “feel
over confident that the troops under him [would] be called upon; never-
theless, he [had] felt it proper to make preparations for any emergency
that may occur, and [was] determined to have the men in good condi-
tion for actual service, provided it [became] necessary to use them.”17
Several other military companies located in Chicago also assembled
at their armories to drill and otherwise gird themselves to defend the city
from riot and war. The companies that readied for duty included the
Clan-na-Gael Guards, the Alpine Hunters, the Irish Rifles, the
Montgomery Light Guards, the Mulligan Zouaves, and the Hannibal
Zouaves.18 All these militia members took it upon themselves to prepare
for action in defense of the Relief and Aid Society; there was no larger
brigade or division organization in Illinois at that time. Individual com-
panies reported directly to the adjutant general and the governor, and no
orders issued from either of them about the situation in Chicago. It is not
even clear if all the companies listed in the papers who were reported
prepared for action were formally connected to the state, especially as an
official connection in 1875 consisted of little more than a commission
for a company’s officers.
Although the existence of a formal connection between all the vari-
ous mobilizing military companies and the state government is unclear,
the daily newspapers in Chicago made no distinction between the
organizations along those lines. It is unlikely that the general public was
able to do any better. Nonetheless, the inability of the governor or his
appointed generals to mobilize, demobilize, or control all of the military-
style companies in Chicago that would have liked to participate in some
sort of domestic order maintenance action in 1875 would not have
shielded them from being held responsible by the majority of the gener-
al public for the outcome of whatever actions taken by these companies.
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The vision of barely disciplined companies sallying forth with the
“newest and best arms known to modern warfare” into a riot must have
given Governor Beveridge a variety of nightmares. At the very least,
when he had the opportunity later that spring to address the members of
the First Regiment, he explicitly warned them against unauthorized
activities in the name of the state. He announced that he was glad their
“warlike” movements “meant nothing beyond display” until they were
called to serve. But, in “time of peace,” he desired them to “bear in mind,
they had no authority to act, except by direction of the civil authorities—
the mayor and the police officials [my emphasis].”19 Beveridge touched
here on tensions that were the result of the tenuous and semilegal ties of
the militias to the state. There was nothing the governor could do to pre-
vent the militias from acting as a posse comitus except revoke the com-
missions given to the officers and demand the return of state-owned
armament. That the officers of the First Regiment were not equally con-
cerned by the vagueness of their claim to act as soldiers of the state or
their potential personal liability should the state disclaim them is clear
from Collins’s memories of these events. Collins wrote that his regiment’s
preparations “probably [sic] had a greater effect than any other cause in
preventing an outbreak of the communistic element at that time.”20 The
attitude of Collins and others like him lay at the root of Governor
Beveridge’s warning to the militias, the First Regiment in particular. It
also marks the first of many differences in opinion, even among guards-
men and their friends and supporters, regarding the proper role and
stance of militias toward intervention in domestic order issues.
The Great Strike of 1877 and the Illinois National Guard
Illinois militia members seized on the dramatic growth of the volunteer
forces in 1875 and 1876 to revise the Illinois laws that governed the state
forces. By the end of the 1876–77 session of the General Assembly, militia
members had succeeded in securing the passage of a new bill, and the
entire state militia was mustered out on July 1, 1877, in preparation for a
complete reorganization of the state forces. National events intervened
soon after, pushing all organizational concerns into the background. The
Great Railroad Strikes of 1877 were about to begin. The economic down-
turn that began in 1873 and triggered the problems at the Chicago Relief
and Aid Society in 1875 had deepened into a terrible depression by 1876
and early 1877. Railroads suffered particularly badly during these years and
turned to massive rate cutting programs to keep business up, though many
railroads failed despite this tactic. In order to continue paying dividends to
The First Twenty Years of Strike Duty, 1870–90 83
Hannah_CH3_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  2:53 PM  Page 83
shareholders of 2 to 8 percent, railroad managers repeatedly cut wages
across the board by 10 or 20 percent. Railroad workers did not take these
cuts passively. They struck often, and a series of strikes in December 1876
and early 1877 on eastern railroads had successfully pressured management
to reinstate the most recent wage cuts. The successes of some railroad
strikes was not shared across railroads or in other industries, and the strikes
served ultimately to harden the position of industrial managers around the
nation, on the theory that concessions had only yielded further trouble.
Further, labor disputes had been anything but calm and orderly in the
1870s. The anthracite coal regions of Pennsylvania had been torn by spec-
tacular violence for years. On June 10, 1877, several alleged members of
the Molly Maguires, a suspected terrorist association with Irish nationalist
overtones believed to be one of the most violent of the secret labor asso-
ciations in the Pennsylvania coal fields, were hanged for labor violence.21
Beginning in June and July 1877, yet another 10 percent wage cut
went into effect on a number of large eastern railroad lines. On July 16,
workers on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad struck in Baltimore to
protest the further cut, with little immediate effect. However, down the
line in Martinsburg, West Virginia, striking railroad employees were far
more successful in stopping railroad traffic and tying up miles of freight
trains.22 By July 18, rail traffic was backed up two miles east and west of
Martinsburg, and the strike had already begun to spread to other ship-
ping trades and to other cities.23 Strikes spread rapidly across
Pennsylvania, and on the weekend of July 21, the worst riots to date
erupted in Baltimore and Pittsburgh. State governors began calling up
their militias. In Baltimore, a Maryland militia regiment marching
toward the train station fired on the crowd and at least ten bystanders
and onlookers were killed outright, and dozens more were wounded.
Then on the night of July 22, a score or more people were killed in
Pittsburgh by Philadelphia militiamen. The militia were vainly defend-
ing themselves from being burned out of the roundhouse where they had
taken shelter for the night after being unable to find crews to run trains
on newly opened tracks. Rioters torched oil carriers and ran them down
the grade into the roundhouse itself, starting the fires, and at eight
o’clock on Sunday morning the militia regiment was forced to abandon
the shelter to the fire.24
The horrifying news spread rapidly across the country, and Illinois
authorities watched the progress of the strikes with increasing apprehen-
sion. Chicago seemed a powder keg, and several unions with far more
ambitious programs than those of the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers were attempting to gain control of the various labor activities
and forge a general strike. The Workingmen’s Party of the United States
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mobilized in Chicago in an attempt to provide leadership for what up to
that point had been mostly independent strikes. The WPUS held a
meeting on Sunday, July 22, as news from Baltimore and Pittsburgh
reached Chicago, followed by a rally on Monday evening with some
6,000 in attendance. Albert Parsons, Philip Van Patten, and John
McAuliffe led off the oratory. The leading speakers announced resolu-
tions calling for the nationalization of the railroads and support for trade
unionism. Railroad executives in the city professed calm, but tensions
were seething throughout Chicago.25 Describing the feeling several years
later, Collins wrote: “Sunday and Monday, July 22d and 23d, were days
of feverish uncertainty and repressed excitement at Chicago, Peoria,
Galesburg and East St. Louis.”26 Late Monday night, a group of switch-
men working for the Michigan Central line declared themselves on
strike.27
On Tuesday, July 24, two days after the riots in Pittsburgh, Chicago
workers began walking out. According to Holdridge Collins, “It was evi-
dent that unless the troubles were checked at this point, the Country
would be thrown into a revolution. The time had come for the Militia to
show whether it were capable of the stern duty and exacting discipline of
the soldier.”28 Collins was apparently oblivious to the irony of his senti-
ments. Of the dozens killed and scores more wounded in the rioting up
to July 22, rifle-toting militiamen were responsible for most of the deaths.
Several of the riots were triggered by the appearance of militia troops on
the streets. The Pittsburgh roundhouse was specifically targeted because
the Philadelphia militia had taken shelter there. A militia regiment
attempting to leave their (very poorly situated) armory and march to the
railroad station provoked the killings in Baltimore. Eleven people killed
by Pennsylvania militia in Reading were members of the crowd harassing
militia progress toward the railroad station in that city. Although a few
militia members were killed and dozens more wounded by rioters with
guns and stones, the militia killed randomly, shooting into the crowds
and hitting a variety of strikers, bystanders, and even a few policemen.29
Only three or four men known to have been associated with the railroad
strikers were killed by any militia troops, firing randomly into hostile
crowds. There is no doubt that the crowds were quite hostile and would
have liked to do more damage to the militia than they did. Militia troops
fired in the belief that they were protecting their own lives, a belief that
witnesses and militia officers did not see as unjustified. Nevertheless,
their superiority of firepower gave them the killing advantage. At this
late date, it is difficult to understand why Collins could not see the mili-
tia as potentially fanning the flames, but he, and many, many others like
him, did not.
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Worried that the situation in Chicago could explode at any moment,
city and state officials moved to prepare for possible violence. On July
23, Illinois Adjutant General Hiram Hilliard summoned the brand-new
Brigadier General of the Illinois State Guard, Alfred Ducat, back to
Chicago from his vacation in Wisconsin. Ducat was in the city by 4:00
P.M. but was informed by Mayor Monroe Heath that the services of the
militia were not wanted just yet. A Republican, Monroe Heath was then
in his second term as mayor. Elected in 1876 after a series of election
scandals and charges of corruption in the previous administration,
Heath won his second term by campaigning on a pledge for honest gov-
ernment and reduced taxes.30 According to Ducat, “His honor informed
me that he was desirous of suppressing the disturbance without the aid
of the military, if possible, and for the present he did not want a soldier
seen on the streets, as he believed the military had much to do with
exasperating the people of Pittsburgh, a few days before.”31 Given the
events of the previous weekend in Maryland and Pennsylvania, Mayor
Heath’s observation was sound, though General Ducat did not share it.
On the morning of July 24 Ducat telegraphed the governor, “I don’t
think the authorities here fully appreciate the gravity of the situation.
Although the city was quiet last night and this morning, I believe trou-
ble will occur here about tomorrow.”32 General Ducat grew increasingly
concerned about the situation in the city as more and more shops were
closed down on the 24th and 25th, but the mayor still refused to call the
troops, and until he did so they could not act. Ducat did all he could by
way of preparation. Revealing his own strong class and ethnic biases, he
disarmed the two companies of Bohemian Guards, reporting later that
“some of their officers [were] found in full sympathy with the riotous por-
tion of the populace.”33 He made plans with the superintendent of police
to have the bridges across the river opened, so when he had the use of
his troops he could guard the approaches, and keep the crowd out of the
central downtown districts. He ordered his Chicago-based troops to
guard their armories in heavy rotations. He asked Governor Shelby M.
Cullom to request the aid of six companies of U.S. Army Infantry who
were currently in Rock Island, and Cullom did as Ducat requested.
After being assembled in their armories on the evening of the 24th,
Ducat had his troops move across the city to better accommodations on
the following evening, the predominately Irish American Second
Regiment to the Michigan Southern Depot and the First Regiment to
the Exposition building. During the day of the 25th, Ducat continued to
ask Mayor Heath for permission to use the troops, which Heath contin-
ued to refuse, preferring instead to rely on the regular police, supple-
mented by “several hundred specials” paid for by a “prominent citizen.”34
CHAPTER THREE86
Hannah_CH3_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  2:53 PM  Page 86
Given the events in Pennsylvania, Heath had every reason to fear the
provocation for violence sending the Illinois Militia into the streets
might prove to be. He also had good reason to distrust the reaction of the
Illinois militia troops themselves, as the majority of the deaths in other
states were the result of militia fire power. Ducat was clearly growing frus-
trated, and gangs of men continued to shut down the city, putting into
effect a kind of general strike, and the railroad blockade continued to
grow. Strikers in Galesburg took up the movement. By this time, some
600 Civil War veterans were drilling in Chicago with breechloaders, the
police were breaking up crowds with clubs, and the militias continued to
wait in their temporary armories. Police confrontations with the crowds
grew more violent during the night, with more and more gunfire
exchanged, though no reported casualties.35
As tensions mounted and sporadic violence erupted, on July 26 Mayor
Heath replied to Ducat’s latest request to use the militia: “You are here-
by authorized to use whatever military you have in this city subject to your
command to suppress the riots now in progress in different parts of this
city, subject to my orders [sic].”36 The same day that six companies of the
Ninth Infantry, U.S. Army, arrived in the city from Rock Island, several
citizen-organized, military-style companies were ready to render service,
including an artillery battalion. Ducat had called up a volunteer militia
cavalry company and posted the veterans’ company around the city. The
U.S. Army troops went to the stockyards to prevent any disturbances
there, and they were then broken up by company and posted to various
locations deemed important by Ducat (though the troops were not under
his control, he suggested the placement to the U.S. Army officer in
charge).37 During the night, the Second Regiment, Illinois Militia was
stationed on the Halstead St. viaduct and bridge near the stockyards.
They fired two volleys, about an hour apart, over the heads of the crowds
that were harassing them with stones and pistols. Although there were
fears that the whole city would be burned (the 1871 fire was hardly a dis-
tant memory in 1877), nothing came of them. The following day, hun-
dreds more police “specials” were sworn in, amounting by some reports to
5,000 men working as temporary law enforcers. The total forces stationed
in the city smothered the protests by sheer numbers. The U.S. troops
never even engaged the crowds and were used to guard industrial proper-
ty.38 By the end of July 27, “the Chicago riots melted away.”39 The price
was high, however. At least eighteen men and boys, many onlookers,
were killed by police or militia gunfire. Scores more were wounded, many
brutally beaten, by club-wielding police.
Illinois was not past the crisis, however. The strikes spread throughout
the state, just as they had in Pennsylvania. The governor himself handled
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militia operations in East St. Louis. The Second Brigade of the Illinois
militia was called into action on July 27. The four regiments of the Second
Brigade reported to Alton, and on the 28th, the brigade moved on to East
St. Louis, where the governor was already in place. A crowd reported to
be 10,000 strong was congregated at the Relay House, and so the militia
headed right for the scene. They were able to disperse the crowd “without
the loss of life or the shedding of blood.”40 Companies were stationed
throughout the city, holding strategic points. Civil authorities, with detec-
tives and police, arrested many perceived crowd leaders. On Sunday, the
first attempt was made to get a mail train out of the city; it ended with the
brutal beating of the engineer and fireman by the crowd. The second
attempt went forward under heavy guard. A company escorted the engine
to the roundhouse, where the train had been left by the switch engine.
There a large crowd, “estimated at several thousand,” announced a “deter-
mination to prevent this the first train, from moving out at any sacrifice”
which “was openly and loudly proclaimed by a large majority, who were
generally well armed and displayed their weapons.” Five companies sur-
rounded the train, and the rest of the command was ordered into line
around the train yard. The militia kept the crowd away from the train
until it was clear of the other trains, and “with sufficient open space for
action,” the train sped away. The troops previously surrounding the train
turned at a signal and surrounded those who had been closest to the train,
disarmed them and marched them away as prisoners. “The consternation
of the crowd covering the cars, buildings, and lots in the vicinity was com-
plete, and the panic which prevailed dispersed the crowd in all directions
without even the slightest attempt to release the prisoners, who were safe-
ly delivered into the custody of the civil authorities.” With constant
patrol, the city returned to business, and the militia troops were dismissed
to their homes on July 31.41
Meanwhile, General Ducat turned his attention to strikes and race
riots in Braidwood and Joliet. Braidwood was a coal-mining town, and
the striking miners there seized the opportunity presented by the gener-
al confusion to stage a race riot. The governor informed Ducat that the
strikers had “driven the colored miners, with their families from the city,
that the poor people had been violently treated and robbed, and were
without food or shelter on the prairies and in the woods,” and that the
strikers “were about fifteen hundred strong, well organized, armed and
desperate.”42 Worried that striking miners from Streator and Joliet might
reinforce the Braidwood strikers, Ducat rushed to get to the scene with
two regiments of militia. Arriving on the evening of the 28th, Ducat and
some 700 militiamen faced about 500 rioters. Ducat ordered the mayor
to tell them to disperse and return the arms stolen from the African
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American mining families within twenty-five minutes. The crowd dis-
persed, but the guns were not returned. Ducat then marched in and
established control of the city, instituting a search for the missing guns,
which he found and gave to the mine superintendent. During the night
some shots were fired at the pickets, and fire was returned, but as far as
Ducat knew there were no casualties.
The next day, trains came into town with some 350 of the African
American refugees. They were returned to their pillaged homes, and
Ducat gave them a day’s rations, “notifying the owners of the mines that
hereafter they would have to provide for them.”43 The same day, the gov-
ernor ordered Ducat to detail companies to Matoon and Galesburg to
protect the black miners at those spots and to leave a company in
Braidwood “to protect property until colored miners are allowed to work
unmolested.” The orders for forces from Ducat’s command to go to
Matoon and Galesburg were later rescinded, but a company from Peoria
did serve, briefly, in Galesburg, quieting the crowds mostly by marching
through the streets.44 By July 30, order was sufficiently restored that,
according to Ducat, all local authorities felt able to cope. All currently
activated militia companies were then dispersed to their homes.45
Strike and riot duty proved chaotic and confusing, combining wildcat
walkouts, race riots, and an organized general strike, and ING officers
were not able to draw many shared conclusions to guide their future
activities when they were called in to protect lives and property. In
Chicago itself, riots resulted in the deaths of at least eighteen people,
some from the rifle volleys fired by Illinois Militia members on the night
of May 26, 1877. In East St. Louis, disciplined general strikers faced
troops under the direct command of Governor Shelby M. Cullom, him-
self a Civil War veteran, and no rioting broke out. In Braidwood, miners
turned the confusing situation into a race riot and terrorized and evicted
all the African American miners and their families in the town, and the
state militia restored the refugees to their homes. Ethnic and racial ten-
sions also affected service in Chicago itself. In the midst of the crisis,
General Ducat disbanded one company for their “sympathy” with the
strikers, and he ignored the offers of service made by the African
American Hannibal Guards, much to their displeasure. “This caused the
members of our organization to feel somewhat ‘miffed.’” . . . I can assure
you . . . and all who may see this, that a good battalion of colored men
could have been mustered together had it been necessary for them to
bear arms against mobs in the protection of our citizens and our homes.”
The commander of the Hannibal Guards, R. E. Moore, came just shy of
accusing ING leadership of overt racial discrimination when he conclud-
ed that “[f]eeling that recognition in time of peace is an assurance of
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recognition during time of war, and also feeling determined to discharge
our duty as becomes all law-abiding citizens and soldiers, I sincerely hope
this will satisfy the minds of many of our inquisitive friends.”46
Moore was not the only critic of Ducat’s handling of the 1877 crisis
who skirted an open discussion of the ways racism impacted the unfold-
ing events. Nearly two years later, in 1879, the Chicago Tribune was still
recording the lingering effects of the controversy created by the gover-
nor and Adjutant General Hilliard’s decision to send troops to
Braidwood to protect the black miners there. “There as been consider-
able discussion, since the time of the riot, upon the subject of
Braidwood, and the fact that a small army was moved down in front of
that small city in order to terrify its inhabitants into an unconditional
surrender.” It seems that the critics felt that the white inhabitants did
not deserve to be “terrorized,” despite their attack on the black inhabi-
tants of their town. The paper quoted “a trustworthy source” who
claimed that generals Ducat and Joseph T. Torrence believed that a mere
twenty-five ING troops would have sufficed to quell the disturbance.47
When writing his own report at the end of 1877, General Duct did not
sound like a man who thought less was more. He proposed a massive,
ten-thousand-strong militia armed with Gatling guns to face down strik-
ers.48 He was soon replaced, suggesting that neither Governor Cullom
nor the rest of the Illinois militia leadership thought that was a good
idea, and certainly not an idea anyone appeared willing to pay for. In the
end, no formal changes as a result of the 1877 strike service were made
in the Illinois militia’s structure, training, or public funding. 
Types of Strikes in Illinois
Between 1877 and 1908, twenty-two of thirty-three strikes (or 67 per-
cent) in which Illinois governors sent militia troops were strikes or walk-
outs called by bituminous coal miners in dispute with the operators of all
the mines in a given region or across the state. Another nine strikes (or
27 percent) were related to railroad disputes. The remaining two inci-
dents occurred in Chicago: the ING served briefly in the Union Stock
Yards in 1886, and again in the Sanitation District in 1893. 
Patrolling railway strikes presented specific challenges to the ING
and to all state militia forces. In Illinois, railway strikes were usually
focused in the two large rail hubs located in the two significant urban
areas of the state, Chicago and East St. Louis. Strikes in these locations
often quickly spread to related industries, and then to general trades in
the urban environment, shutting down increasingly large areas of the
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affected cities. The combination of the excitement of the strike and the
larger-than-usual numbers of people milling about on the streets had a
frightening way of shifting gears and developing into an urban riot only
tangentially related to the original intentions of the strikers and their
unions. Rail strikes could also spread across the industry as members of
the various brotherhoods struck in sympathy. Crowds would gather to
block the tracks out of rail yards and to discourage, often violently, any
man willing to run the trains past them. The ING’s job in these situa-
tions was to break up these crowds to allow the trains to get through, and
to guard the trains until they were safely out of the city. Making matters
still more difficult for National Guardsmen, their presence in these urban
strikes often acted as a goad to the crowds, turning previously nonviolent
crowds into frightening mobs.49 Urban crowds could outnumber the
Guard companies by the hundreds and even the thousands. These crowds
presented special challenges because the only real training guardsmen
had for dealing with large, hostile forces was military—despite the name
“riot duty”—and yet firing lethal weapons into the crowds was possible
only as a last desperate resort, owing to the fear of killing unarmed par-
ticipants by the score.
Despite getting most of the historical interest, the ING was called to
rail strike duty only nine times. The ING was far more likely to find
itself, during strike duty, in coal-mining country. In the twenty-two
cases from 1877 to 1908 when county sheriffs turned to the governor to
request state troops to intervene in coal mine strikes, they asked for
assistance because of physical violence, ongoing or potential. Such vio-
lence was generally focused around striking miners attempting to shut
down operations that were continuing to work and/or to prevent strike-
breakers from either working or arriving to work. Illinois coal mines
tended to be located in rural areas, usually on the outskirts of small
towns, but sometimes near nothing at all but the railroad tracks laid to
the mine itself. Thus, ING leadership generally focused their activities
around the mines themselves, though general “order maintenance”
duties could involve patrolling, eventually with the aid of something
close to martial law, neighboring towns as well. Any actual confronta-
tions in these localities tended to be limited to strikers, their support-
ers, the various private guards and strikebreakers hired by the coal oper-
ators, and the militia volunteers. Illinois National Guard officers quick-
ly developed the practice, during mine strikes, of literally inserting
their troops between the opposing parties and enforcing a cooling-off
period, a practice that was largely useless in the larger, urban environ-
ments because the Guard itself was so likely to become one of the com-
batants.50 In all twenty-two cases of mine strike duty, the state com-
The First Twenty Years of Strike Duty, 1870–90 91
Hannah_CH3_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  2:53 PM  Page 91
manders on the ground and their superior officers in Springfield,
including the governor, refused to sanction the use of troops as guards
for private property or in aiding the direct importation of strike break-
ers, and did so only under the rarest of circumstances.51
In Illinois, the governor’s staff of militia officers, as well as the indi-
vidual officers who commanded each strike policing expedition and, as
far as may be determined, the membership at large, together sought to
preserve a formal neutrality on the issues of the strike when called upon
to intervene in a locality stressed by strikes.52 This was the only possible
response to the varied conditions and issues that confronted the ING
when they were called into service if they were to retain the ability to
function effectively, both during the strike situation and afterwards as an
institution that relied on community and public support for its own
future maintenance. Each strike had its own history and each strike
locality its own political and economic tensions that predated the strike
itself. The challenges faced by the guardsmen in handling themselves in
such a manner as to be regarded as neutral in intention if not result were
extremely difficult to overcome, and the ING rarely managed to do so.
Because ING leadership failed to overcome these difficulties directly, in
time they moved to redefine those situations that required state militia
involvement and simultaneously to more explicitly define the responsi-
bilities and tactics available to local authorities when they were faced
with “disorderly,” as opposed to “violent,” situations.
In many cases, the ING commanders on the ground were critical,
indeed often scathing, in their judgment of the behavior of the county
sheriff and his inability or unwillingness to handle the tensions himself,
and they regarded state intervention as something that ought to have
been unnecessary. And in fact, during the vast majority of strikes, even
mining strikes, throughout Illinois during the forty years covered by this
project as a whole, participants did not seek or require intervention by
the state. For example, in early May of 1886 a wave of strikes peaked,
and between May 1 and 3, 64,000 workers in Chicago went on strike.
Despite the massive walkout, the ING was not called to strike duty in
the city of Chicago in May 1886, and local authorities managed without
militia intervention.53 Illinois National Guard commanders came to
resent being placed in situations that required delicate negotiation but
not necessarily sizable military forces. They regarded the tendency of
some county sheriffs to rely on the Guard to restore order, because doing
so relieved them of the burden of making locally unpopular political
choices, as a direct assault on the very premises on which the state mili-
tias were based. They also resented such service as an uncalled-for drain
on limited ING finances. The active-duty pay, the supplies, and the
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transportation required to put and keep the state militia in the field while
policing strike-related events all came out of the annual militia budget,
and when expenses went over that sum, the Guard and their creditors
often had to wait two or more years for the next session of the General
Assembly to receive their payment. As a result, other items in the mili-
tia budget—like summer camps, new uniforms, and new armament and
ordnance supplies—all had to be deferred as well.54
Madison and St. Clair Counties: 1883 Mine Strike
On the night of Wednesday, May 23, 1883, the striking bituminous coal
miners of Madison and St. Clair counties, surrounding East St. Louis in
southern Illinois, held a mass protest and strategy meeting. As the
“machine miners” in the area remained unwilling to strike, those tradi-
tional miners who had walked out May 1 decided to close the “machine
mines” by force. About two o’clock in the morning of May 24, some 400
strikers—marching to the music of fife and drum—surrounded the
machine miners’ boarding house at Abbey Mine No. 4, a few miles out-
side Collinsville, and demanded that they join the strike. When the 150
machine men refused, the strikers physically removed them from the
boarding house and force-marched the machine men at gunpoint the
twelve miles to East St. Louis. Any machine miners who objected to this
proceeding were assaulted. The strikers further threatened to kill any
men who returned to work. Throughout Thursday, strikers ranged
throughout the area, forcing the rest of the Abbey machine mines to
close. Early Friday morning, the strikers returned to the area to satisfy
themselves that the Abbey miners had stayed away.55 On Friday, May 25,
the deputy sheriffs of Madison and St. Clair counties, the mayor of
Collinsville, a justice of the peace, representatives of two coal mining
operations, and a prominent local citizen wired to the governor:
We the undersigned, testify that there are from 250 to 400 men
armed with revolvers, clubs and stones, threatening the peace of this
and adjoining towns. That they are preventing men employed in the
mines here from pursuing their lawful business and threatening the
public peace, and that further, in our opinions, the sheriff is not able
to provide the necessary protection to life and property and the exi-
gencies of the case demand the interference of the state militia.56
In the second half of the nineteenth century, bituminous (or soft) coal
was mined throughout the state and shipped by rail to St. Louis or
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Chicago and beyond. Coal mining districts throughout the nation were
notorious for harsh conditions, frequent strikes, and strike-related vio-
lence. Illinois coal fields were no different, and 1883 was another bad
year for management-miner relations in several mining operations sur-
rounding Belleville, Collinsville, and Troy, all in Madison or St. Clair
counties. There were two types of mining operations in the area sur-
rounding East St. Louis. The majority were traditional coal mines, and
the rest, a small number of newer mines, were known as “machine
mines.”57 Owing to disagreements between the traditional miners and
the operators of traditionally worked mines over wages and, more partic-
ularly, over the manner in which wages were assessed, some 2,000 coal
diggers went out on strike on May 1.58 The striking miners had already
won a concession of a 1/2 cent increase in the piece rate per bushel, but
they were unhappy with the manner in which the coal was weighed and
wanted scales at each mine entrance rather than the single scale locat-
ed at a midpoint between the mines and East St. Louis, as was then the
case.59 They also wanted to have a miner-selected scale checker to ensure
the honesty of the coal companies.60 The striking miners were deter-
mined to stick to their resolutions and to continue the strike until their
demands were heeded.61
The counties had remained calm until May 23, when the striking tra-
ditional miners decided to force the issue with the nonstriking machine
miners through a direct assault. Even then, the sheriff and his deputies
declined to define the situation as disorderly, until it was clear that the
striking miners would not allow the evicted machine men to return to
work. It was only at this juncture that the deputy sheriffs turned to the
state to request military aid in restoring the evicted miners to their jobs.
In this particular case, order was related to the sheriff’s ability (or will-
ingness) to protect the lives of those machine miners who still desired to
work in the face of the strike, and to protect the property of the machine
mine owners. When leading local men became concerned that the sher-
iff was no longer able to adequately protect the interests of property
owners and mine managers and to protect the lives of mine employees
who were continuing to work in defiance of the strike, they requested
outside assistance.
Colonel Barkley of the Fifth Regiment, ING reported to the governor
that there were no further disturbances in Collinsville after the arrival
of the militia on Friday night; and on Saturday, 110 machine miners
returned from East St. Louis and started back to work. With the mines
back at work and no “mobs” in evidence, Barkley “felt that the civil
authorities should from this moment on, preserve order unaided by the
militia.”62 Order, in this case, is synonymous with conditions prior to the
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specific events of May 23–24, and not conditions prior to the event of
the strike itself. At least in this case, order was not the prestrike condi-
tion; rather, it was all conditions under which local authorities are able
to prevent or punish harm to life or property on their own. So once the
specific instance of the forcible closure of the Abbey machine mines had
been rectified, order was once again under the jurisdiction of the local
authorities, and the militia’s duty had been performed.
When solicited by E. J. Crandall, president of the Crandall Mining
Company located outside Collinsville, to keep the militia in the area,
Governor Hamilton refused. Hamilton explained in his letter to
Crandall that the “militia cannot be kept there to guard your mine indef-
initely. Civil authorities must use the powers of the militia promptly if
needed to disperse rioters and arrest them & turn them over to civil
authorities for commitment to jail.”63 However, “[a]t the earnest solicita-
tion of some of the mine operators and citizens . . . [Barkley—the com-
mander on the ground] consented to remain till Sunday evening, as [he
and his troops] could not have left East St. Louis before that time, at any
rate.”64 Barkley had a strategy up his sleeve for determining if tensions
had truly cooled enough for the ING to return home. He believed that
the strikers were unlikely to cause any disturbances where the National
Guard companies were in place. So Barkley loaded his men onto a spe-
cial train Sunday night and pulled them out, letting the public assume
they were going home. In reality, the train stopped at a switching station
a few miles away. There, the militia companies waited out the night and
then returned to the Abbey mines outside Collinsville early the follow-
ing morning—where everything was quiet. The train passed machine
mines at Confidence and Troy as well, and again, all was quiet and all the
men at work, so the train went on to East St. Louis with all the militia
aboard.65 Because in the judgment of their commander the militia’s
responsibilities in this case had been fully discharged, he prepared to
relieve the men of active duty and send them home. Order, or those con-
ditions predating the specific outbreak of violence that compelled the
local sheriffs to turn to the state for aid, was restored.
Events then took an unexpected turn for the worse Monday after-
noon, May 28, just after Barkley and his three companies arrived in East
St. Louis. While the men were waiting for trains to their home stations,
Barkley received an urgent request for immediate help from Sheriff
Ropiequet in Belleville, St. Clair County. “Cannot master mob at
Reinecker Mine, No-1 on L. & N. R. R. There are about 300 men and
fifty women that want to destroy pit. I just received telephone by L. &
N. R. R. to ask you for militia & I hope that you will send a company
immediately on special train to Birkner Station, about one mile from pit,
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or to pit itself if you can do so.”66 Barkley also received personal appeals
from employees of both the Reinecker Mine and the L. & N. Railroad.
The Reinecker employee told Barkley that the strikers had taken
Reinecker himself prisoner and trapped his miners inside the mine, and
were threatening to burn the shaft and “leave [the] work-men at the bot-
tom to the mercy of the flames.”67 (The story in the Chicago Tribune
claimed that an “Amazon Mob” had trapped Reinicker in his house and
were threatening to tear it down around him.68) Once he was apprised of
the sheriff ’s request, the governor sent word to Barkley to take whatev-
er speedy action he felt was advisable, but he added the proviso, “Sheriff
must take command and capture as many as possible to be turned over
to the civil authorities.”69
In Collinsville, the forcible, and potentially lasting, closure of a pre-
viously working mine prompted the county authorities to declare the sit-
uation disorderly without any actual confrontation between the local
authorities and the strikers. In St. Clair County, by contrast, the Sheriff ’s
request for state aid came in the midst of a large-scale attack on men and
property that the county sheriffs did not have sufficient manpower or
authority to handle alone. In particular, sheriff deputies used the pres-
ence of female strike supporters at the Reinecker mine attack to suggest
a spectacular break with order, and as such, demanded an equally spec-
tacular response on the part of local authority and state military aid.
They clearly identified the disorder as ongoing violent actions and
threats, in this case to the lives of trapped miners.
Spectacular was what they got. Because of a (deliberate?) misunder-
standing, the engineer running the special train taking the ING troops
to the Reinecker mine did not halt the train one mile away from the
mine entrance and allow the troops to disembark and proceed on foot.
Rather, he ran the train right up to the mine entrance and into the mid-
dle of the hostile crowd. While the troops were attempting to get off the
still-moving train, shots were exchanged in the confusion, and one strik-
er was killed and one was wounded by militia fire.70 This action broke up
the crowd, and the male strikers fled into the woods and down the
tracks. Many of the women, however, refused to abandon their position
at the mine entrance. “Deputy Anthony went up to the shaft and called
on the women to disperse and go home. They refused to do so and he
was obliged to take a club away from one of them who threatened him.
He called on me [Barkley] for assistance; I went up to the shaft, where
the women had possession; I spoke kindly to them asking them to dis-
perse and go to their homes; which they finally did under protest, and
taking their own time in with-drawing slowly.”71 After the women left,
the trapped miners were allowed to leave the mine, and the detained
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mine manager/owner was released. The crisis past, the county authorities
were assumed able to resume sole responsibility for order, and the troops
left the area shortly thereafter.72
Growing Frustration
The precipitating events in Madison and St. Clair counties in 1883 are
the outside poles on the range of situations that prompted county author-
ities to request state militia intervention. (See appendix D.) In Madison
County, deputy sheriffs and local leading men turned to the state for aid
in reopening forcibly closed mining operations. Sheriff Ropiequet of St.
Clair County begged state intervention to quell an attack in progress on
miners and mine property that he was unable to disperse alone with the
aid of his few deputy sheriffs. Because of this wide range of situations,
there was often significant local disagreement on the moment when, or
if, conditions warranted an appeal to the state for help. The variety of
people who appealed to Illinois governors for aid is one reflection of
these multiple perspectives on local strikes. For example, in the 1883
mine strike in Collinsville, one of the first people to urge the governor to
intervene was George Parker, president of the St. Louis, Alton & Terre
Haute Rail Road Company. Parker wrote to Governor Hamilton to com-
plain that Sheriff Hotz of Madison County was failing to preserve order
because Hotz was “either afraid to take action, or, what is more probable,
is in sympathy with the strikers.” Parker informed the governor that the
strikers were attempting to close down the railroad lines, like his own,
that were continuing to transport coal from machine mines into St.
Louis, and that Sheriff Hotz had declined to interfere with these activi-
ties of the striking miners.73
Parker’s 1883 letter did not lead Governor Hamilton to inquire direct-
ly of the sheriff of Madison County for an account of the local situation.
Rather, Hamilton chose to send a militia colonel to personally inspect
the local situation and report directly back to him.74 Colonel Barkley, the
man Hamilton sent into the area, did not arrive in Collinsville until after
the strikers forcibly evicted the “machine men,” and events pushed local
leadership to act quickly. As a result, it is difficult to predict what
Barkley’s role might have been in the particular situation without such a
provocative action on the part of the strikers. It is telling, however, to
note that Barkley must have been involved with the decision to request
state aid, though exactly what role he played will never be known.75
Reports suggest that subsequent Illinois governors also used this method
of information gathering (personal militia representatives), both to
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determine the seriousness of the situation and to prevent local leaders
from turning too quickly to the state for military intervention.
According to at least one adjutant general, and despite the 1883 case,
the presence of ING officers as observers worked against local desires to
turn to the state for militia aid in difficult situations and toward some
“peaceful” settlement of the issues under contention.76
Back in 1883, however, Colonel Barkely criticized the local sheriff,
George Hotz, in his report to the governor, saying that Hotz was “not
able to provide the necessary protection to life and property.”77 Whether
Sheriff Hotz was even party to the decision to ask for state intervention
is unclear, though the absence of Hotz’s name on the request for state aid
is a meaningful omission in this context. At least one newspaper
reporter noted that “the Sheriff and his posse early threw up the sponge,
and the citizens, miners, and operators were placed in great bodily dan-
ger.”78 When Colonel Barkley wired Sheriff Hotz to ask for instructions
once the request for state intervention had been made by Deputy Sheriff
Lanham, Sheriff Hotz replied:
I feel unable to come, Please consult with Deputy Lanham.
George Hotz, Sheriff Madison County79
Hotz’s apparent unwillingness to participate in any measures aimed at
constraining the activities of the strikers in forwarding their cause rein-
forces the significance of his failure to personally request state aid.80
Barkley wired him again to urge his speedy arrival. Hotz answered: “Will
be down as soon as we can get there according to your order.”81 Barkley
wired again to make it perfectly clear that he had no intention of letting
Hotz off the hook, “Am here to act under your orders in assisting you to
preserve the peace [my emphasis].”82 Nevertheless, Hotz failed to arrive
in Collinsville until well after the ING had established itself at the
Abbey mine and the evicted miners were back at work.83 Whatever role
Hotz played locally, it was not in collaboration with the state troops sent
to his county.
In several subsequent cases when the Illinois militia intervened in
counties threatened by strike-related violence, the sheriffs did not actu-
ally request state intervention, either; what they requested was the loan
of state arms for use by deputy sheriffs. The state did lend arms to coun-
ty sheriffs on request until they no longer had arms to lend, at which
point, if in the judgment of the adjutant general and the governor the
situation warranted it, they ordered troops into the county.84 On other
occasions, the county sheriffs were in regular contact with the state
authorities, apprising them of the situation from day to day and reserv-
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ing judgment to themselves on when or if they needed state intervention
in their jurisdictions.85 On still other occasions, the sheriff repeatedly
asked for assistance in dealing with mobs, but the ING officers on the
scene felt that the sheriff was looking to get out of doing his job and
rebuffed the requests for as long as they could.86
Disagreements over “if or when” state intervention was absolutely
necessary could, and frequently did, extend from the local all the way to
the state level. Community members and striking workers protested that
militia troops were unneeded, and city authorities argued with county
officials or corporate representatives over the need for troops.87 Illinois
National Guard officers frequently contested the legitimacy of interven-
tion requests when in their judgment the county sheriff had not done all
that he could have to prevent the outbreaks of violence that ultimately
required militia presence. They also complained when they believed the
sheriff exaggerated what threat there was in order to secure state aid in
policing a situation for which he would rather not be held responsible.88
Perhaps the most dramatic example of this belief in exaggeration came
during the railroad strike in East St. Louis in 1886, when Sheriff
Ropiequet of St. Claire County insisted for weeks that he could do noth-
ing to stop the mob. Even the ING officers on the scene, up to and
including Adjutant General J. M. Vance and Governor Richard J.
Oglesby, were convinced that there was much more the sheriff could do
to ensure the peace. They continued to feel that way, right up to the
evening of April 8, when shooting broke out between strike breakers and
strike supporters and poorly armed deputies, and seven people died.89
Over time, ING officers grew more and more willing to argue that some
sheriffs, like Ropiequet of St. Claire County, failed to exhaust their full
resources in the task of order maintenance in their jurisdictions, and to
place full responsibility squarely on the sheriffs’ shoulders for what harm
to persons or property subsequently occurred.
Despite the efforts of ING officers to shift blame for bad situations
onto the heads of uncooperative county sheriffs, they could not escape all
criticism. Feelings could run very deep about the conflicts during strikes.
For example, after the events in Collinsville in 1883, J. D. Miner wrote
a personal letter to the governor, in which he passionately declared that
“it is now 20 years since we fought for freedom of the African Slavery
which there was 1,000,000 men sacrificed there [sic] lives and we are as
white Slaves in the hands of a few Capitalists which has crushed us to a
starvation point these are the reasons for us standing out to try and bet-
ter our condition.”90 Miner went on to call the working machine miners
“scab,” and to charge that “when [the militia] arrived here they seen
there was no use for them so they went into the City of Collinsville and
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some pertook of Ice cream but most of a good Stomach full of Beer &
Whiskey in which they have been keep over dozed with the Stimulant
from Sunday 27th until Monday 28th ult [sic]. . . .91
Miner was not the only critic to cast aspersions of alcohol abuse
toward the ING. In 1882, Jas. Magie drew on a popular conception of
the militia as heavy drinkers in his condemnation of the state militia
when he wrote “It is very fortunate for these poor sick soldiers that, in
addition to all other pay, that state pays their medicine bills. There are
many soldiers who, when they meet each other, need some medicine. If
they don’t happen to have their bottle with them it makes no difference,
Fleury or Weinberger keep bottles, and fill them with medicine when
required, and the languid soldier after dress parade can have his droop-
ing energies revived by the medicine which are thus furnished.
Generous, noble state of Illinois!”92 ING officers were obviously con-
cerned about the issue of drinking and in their reports stressed that there
was no drunkenness or “vice” among the men on active duty.93
To kill someone while policing strike-related disorders brought the
most violent kinds of condemnation down on the heads of the ING and
the governor as commander-in-chief. The death of miner Henderson at
the Reinecker mine confrontation in 1883 was exactly the type of out-
come that militia officers spent much time trying to avoid in subsequent
years with their search for new tactics and strategies to calm confronta-
tional scenes. When the worst came to pass and shooting did break out,
the commander’s first reaction was to stop the firing on the part of their
troops. Once the firing was stopped, Colonel Barkley’s next act was to
assure himself that it had been no breach of discipline on the part of his
men, but rather their proper response to a direct order from local author-
ity. “The deputy sheriff, Anthony, then at my request, in the presence of
General Reece, Col. Mills, Major Culver, Captain Ridgley, Captain
Wilson, Captain Fahenstock, Captain Crooker and myself repeated the
statement that he, Anthony, after calling on the mob to surrender in the
name of the people, and being fired upon by the rioters, had returned
their fire himself and ordered the men to fire upon them. I had this done
in order to show clearly that the men had merely acted under the direc-
tion of the civil authorities.”94 These steps were dramatic in their formal-
ity, but fearing the likely consequences of the death of the striker,
Barkely acted quickly before the deputy sheriff had time to reconsider
the act of publicly and officially accepting responsibility for the striker’s
death. 
Barkley’s efforts notwithstanding, the death of the striking miner at
the Reinecker Mine was the focal point for criticism that rained down
on Governor Hamilton and the Illinois National Guards in the after-
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math of the ING’s 1883 strike-policing activities. In his letter to the gov-
ernor, Miner blamed the alcohol, claiming that “in there [sic] Drunking
[sic] state [the militiamen] fired on the strikers without orders and killed
a young man woman & child.”95 Local residents held mass meetings to
denounce Governor Hamilton and the Illinois National Guard for the
killing and to demand that the company(s) responsible be discharged
from the state militia. The resolutions at one such meeting contained the
following points:
Resolved, That we condemn the massacre of miners by the State
Militia of Illinois, and declare it a lawless and mean crime and mur-
der, committed on the orders of the coal monopolists, by which the
Government of Illinois has proved itself the servant of capital.
Resolved, That we demand the discharge and punishment of the compa-
ny of State Militia concerned.
Resolved, That we charge the coal miners not to give up a single point
of their rights, and to organize themselves into groups, etc., for the pur-
pose of opposing a solid front to such uniformed murderers in the future,
and that we oblige ourselves, single as well as common, to avenge the
brutal murder of our comrade Henderson.96
Barkley’s attempt to clear the ING from all blame and get a public state-
ment to the effect that the order to fire came from local authorities after
receiving fire from the strikers themselves obviously failed to convince
Miner that the ING had no political or economic agenda.
Conclusion
In the 1870s and 1880s, Illinois militia volunteers joined local companies
and then sustained their membership with their own initiatives, by their
own enthusiasm, and largely with their own money. They created and
maintained their companies from a mixed set of personal goals; includ-
ing a desire to acquire some military skills, to demonstrate their patriot-
ism, to prove their manliness, and to show the world that they were
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admirable and responsible citizens. National Guardsmen chose to be cit-
izen soldiers because they wanted their friends and neighbors to view
them as manly men and as worthy citizens who would serve their nation
with honor and distinction. Strike service complicated and destabilized
this program.
During strikes, guardsmen found themselves in violent, unhappy sit-
uations in which they were cursed, kicked, and shot at. Rather than pro-
viding an opportunity to serve as model citizens defending order and
community, strikes offered the ING chances to argue with local sheriffs,
appear to be the tool of abusive corporations, and to be the killers of pre-
viously inoffensive fellow citizens. Much as individual guardsmen were
frightened by civic unrest and violent riots, and believed that the state
could and should use all the power at its command to prevent or quell
such outbursts, the periods when guardsmen found themselves trying to
bring about local order illustrated just how difficult a task this was. It was
also not a task guardsmen were well equipped to handle, but it was not
one they yet had a way to reject.
The history of the Illinois militia in the 1870s—explosive growth and
development triggered by the centennial celebrations, followed almost
immediately by deployment in a politically and emotionally charged
strike—was to shape the evolution of the Illinois National Guard for the
next thirty years. The Illinois militia grew and sustained itself prior to
1877 out of a combination of patriotic enthusiasm and growing worries
about achieving and displaying honorable and true manliness in the
modern world. Dramatic growth and the first legislative overhaul of the
militia system in Illinois all happened prior to the riots of 1877. This fact
should finally put to rest the limited notion that the National Guard was
solely created through collusion between business and political interests
aiming to smother rebellion out of the “Dangerous Classes.”97
Maintaining public order was an important concern of Illinois militia
members and most other state forces and their governments, of course,
but only after militia companies willed themselves into existence and
sought opportunities to demonstrate their worth and importance. The
roots of the militia resurgence in Illinois in the 1870s are to be found in
individuals who flocked to the revived militia and the communities that
came to the support of their local companies.
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CHAPTER 4
New Training Practices,
Drill Competitions, and
the Rise of Sharpshooting
As the trained soldier is the real weapon of modern warfare, then
see that you demand he receive the means to make him the best
trained and most effective weapon that can be produced.1
—Lieutenant J. H. Parker
From 1870 onward, Illinois guardsmen held creating a body of knowledge-
able and trained citizen-soldiers, ready to support their state or nation in
time of need, as their formal objective.2 Though their objective stayed the
same, the ways in which guardsmen, in Illinois and around the nation,
went about providing the necessary training to meet that objective
changed dramatically between 1870 and 1916. In the 1870s and early
1880s, in Illinois and elsewhere, militia companies provided military
training through unpaid, private, weekly drilling in their local armories
and during sporadic summer training events. As the Illinois National
Guard grew in size, financial health, and professional ambition in the late
1880s and the 1890s, officers added regular annual summer training
encampments and increased access to shooting ranges to the training
schedule. After the turn of the century, with another big increase in fed-
eral funds in hand and additional support from the regular Army, militia
training in Illinois and across the nation grew still more professional and
rigorous. Although the changes came slowly enough to feel incremental,
the combined weight of change ultimately had a profound impact on the
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nature of the ING, on guardsmen themselves, and on their relationships
with the communities that had supported them for so long. The ING
joined with state National Guards around the country in its quest for
greater military efficiency, guardsmen sought rewards that were more per-
sonal than public, and communities were gradually left behind through
greater attention to national service and national goals.
The cumulative impact and significance of the changes in training
practices are most visible in the changing nature of intraguard competi-
tions. Throughout these decades, guardsmen competed against each
other, testing themselves and their skills against absolute measures and
against fellow guardsmen. From the 1870s through the 1890s, militia
competitions in Illinois and around the country generally featured com-
pany members performing the various drill routines before a team of
judges, and before large local audiences, for prizes ranging from inexpen-
sive medals to purses worth hundreds of dollars. Beginning in the 1890s,
marksmanship slowly gained ground as the central competitive sport for
militia members, and by the early 1900s, inter- and intracompany com-
petition was almost entirely focused on marksmanship, and company
drill was reduced to an occasional public display.
The gradual rise of marksmanship as the central competitive event
masked how profoundly different it was for guardsmen, in terms of their
understanding of themselves and for their presentation to their commu-
nities. One change was spatial. Drill competitions regularly took place in
central public spaces, squares, parks, or campgrounds serviced by public
transportation. Marksmanship competitions took place in isolated, spe-
cialized spaces. Another change was in the reward structure. While the
team prizes for both types of events ranged from simple ribbons to
medals, trophies, and prize purses, marksmanship added the element of
individual scores and individual ranking. This shift in focus from drilling
to marksmanship, though seeming perfectly natural and rational as it
occurred over the course of about fifteen years (1890–1905), in retro-
spect signaled a deep change in the nature of the ING and National
Guards around the country. Over the course of twenty years, National
Guards changed from organizations focused primarily on serving their
communities as models and creators of manly citizenship to a much more
individually focused form of self-improvement and national duty.
In the 1880s and 1890s, guardsmen in Illinois and elsewhere present-
ed a compelling case that what they did was mold manly men and
responsible citizens who served their communities as models of patriot-
ism and defenders of local order. The political and economic difficulties
attendant on strike duty that emerged in the 1870s and 1880s encour-
aged the ING, and other state militias, to embrace their national defense
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mission as their primary form of patriotic service and reduce their polic-
ing function as far as possible.3 At the same time, the expectations of
what it meant to be manly in the complex urban and industrial world of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century began to drift away from
responsible citizenship as a central attribute of manhood.4 In slowly shift-
ing their attention from local and community concerns to individual and
national ones, the members of the National Guards were not unique;
rather, they were simply one of many groups whose members were grap-
pling with how to align modernity with the values they held dear. These
changes did not take place overnight, and guardsmen were able to
accommodate and reflect them in their own training and competitive
practices with both enthusiasm and satisfaction. They competed for local
and national prizes throughout the period, and they continued to train
once a week. But the guardsman of the early twentieth century was in
many ways far removed from his 1870s predecessor in terms of his under-
standing of who he was and what he was supposed to be doing, and
nowhere is this more clearly marked than in the change from drill com-
petitions to marksmanship as the central skill that emerged from guard
training.
The Evolution of Military Training
In the early 1870s, militia companies in Illinois and elsewhere generally
tried to meet once a week for what they called “drill.” Drill was derived
from books like The Manual of Instruction for the Volunteers and Militia of
the United States: With Numerous Illustrations, by Major William Gilham,
first published in 1861. This particular manual covered everything from
the structure of the military to the basic responsibilities of the soldier—
from marching through care and maintenance of his arms.5 By the early
1880s the most basic drills had been reduced to a series of instructions
that could be printed on small cards for ease of reference, like those
printed by the New Hampshire National Guard.6 How much of “the
manual”—as most militia members referred to it—a company worked
through at any one time is hard to say; limitations of space, supplies,
materials, and weapons existed for nearly all companies and varied by
company as well. Inspecting officers also regularly noted that poor atten-
dance at weekly drills remained a challenging problem for company
cohesion and skill acquisition through the 1890s at least.7 In the 1870s
and 1880s, most militia companies functioned on a financial shoestring
with little to no aid or support from state or federal agencies, mostly
because the agencies that might have helped them did not yet exist. The
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ING and the officers of other state militias had little power to compel
drill attendance or discipline infractions, either. So to survive, ING offi-
cers could not alienate their members with too much discipline or lose
the support of their communities by avoiding their public functions.
Drill time was further limited in the 1870s and 1880s because company
members also had to use the time they gave to their companies to raise
money for armory rents; to make whatever modifications those spaces
required; to uniform themselves; to supply themselves with modern arms
and equipment if they were unhappy with the old and broken equipment
that was the best the state could supply; even to purchase their own
copies of the Manual of Instruction.8
Tensions gradually appeared around and within the ING and other
Guards because all the parades, competitions, and social events so com-
mon in the 1880s and 1890s were the direct result of the conflicting
interests and needs of Guard companies. Parades played a key role in the
history of Guard companies because it was during parades that they were
able to make the most convincing case for their importance and useful-
ness to the largest possible audiences. The need to make that case per-
suasively kept most guard members focused on parade drills during their
training, despite the torrents of criticism that rained down on them from
professional observers as a result.9 Competitions allowed participants to
explore both the military training they received by measuring them-
selves against each other and the possibilities of violent display for them-
selves and for larger audiences. Drill competitions also celebrated mili-
tary pomp and circumstance, and the balls that often concluded compe-
tition days rewarded everyone present with an evening of military glam-
our and excitement. However, the need to parade and to compete kept
Guard companies focused on marching and group weapon handling. It
constrained the ability of guards to adopt more modern training prac-
tices and manifestly did not encourage officers to take the military side
of their administrative responsibilities with much seriousness, especially
at the battalion or regimental level. Social events took up an incredible
amount of time and effort that might otherwise have gone into a wider
variety of training programs. To the irritation or consternation, or both,
of senior ING officers and U.S. Army officers who foresaw a need for a
well-trained reserve military force in the future, the demands of the var-
ious nontraining activities were often given primacy in the life of many
companies, even the best companies, because without these events,
companies could not have raised the money to keep themselves in oper-
ation. Once more money did become available to the ING and other
national guards after the turn of the century, their training and compet-
itive practices did begin to change.
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It should not be surprising that the training that took place as a result
of the interest and rewards for preparing for the competitive summer sea-
son was inconsistent and varied, not just across companies, but during
the year within companies. Although inspection reports are not able to
record regular drill practices, inspectors did record in their semiannual
evaluations how well the various companies measured up to the stan-
dards set by the Manual of Instruction. In the late 1870s and early 1880s,
inspectors from the Illinois adjutant general’s office were consistently
underwhelmed with the performance of most companies, suggesting that
training was just as erratic and inconsistent as one would suspect, consid-
ering the conditions under which the ING had to function.10
Beginning in the 1870s, an important cadre of professionally minded
National Guard officers began working to promote and develop their
institution as a serious military organization, ready for federal or state
duty whenever called. These activist officers generally did not seek to
create a full-time militia. They remained committed to the ideal of
citizen-soldiers who voluntarily trained together outside the obligations
of their jobs and their families in order to be available to answer a call
from state or federal authorities in the case of emergencies. These dedi-
cated militia officers usually stood in opposition to those men who
sought commissions in the state militias for more personal political,
social, or sporting reasons.11 Officers who viewed the Guard as an oppor-
tunity for socializing or for advancing personal political carriers via con-
tacts cultivated through the militia, or increasingly as an organization
through which to compete nationally for marksmanship trophies, were
rarely among this dedicated cadre. Sometimes, too, they were one and
the same. National Guard promoters were not limited to those men who
made the ING a lifetime avocation and chose to serve in the National
Guard for years or decades at a time. Officers with shorter tenures could
also be committed to and promote the guard’s interests as a military body,
as opposed to only a social or sporting club. What marked these militia
officers as a group was their dedication to military-style missions and
training. They were committed to becoming as much like the regulars as
possible, despite the repeated calls on the state militias to function pri-
marily as a state police force with a domestic order maintenance mis-
sion.12 These officers were remarkable for their dedication to following as
closely as possible at the state level the development of a modern army
in form and function, occasionally even leading the regular U.S. Army
in adopting new innovations pioneered by other national armies, even as
they pushed for more formal recognition and larger public support for
their mission.13
From the early nineteenth century forward, military reformers, militia
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enthusiasts, and professional military officers had been urging Congress
to pass legislation more firmly organizing a reserve army out of the mili-
tia system and to completely overhaul the 1792 militia act, an act whose
detailed provisions for arms and equipment were outdated within twen-
ty years of its passage.14 While this movement initially had few interest-
ed followers, much less active members, in time more and more military
enthusiasts took an interest in the federal system of organization for the
state militias. Militia officers committed to the idea of state militias as
formal military organizations were active from the beginning of the mili-
tia revival in Illinois and elsewhere in the country in the early and mid-
1870s. These officers undoubtedly had a range of reasons for their com-
mitment to this ideal, but one common factor among the earliest state
militia officers in Illinois in this study was the high number of Union
Army veterans of the Civil War.15 In 1890 an historian of the First
Infantry, ING recorded of his regiment that their “present commander,
like all his predecessors, has been chosen from the ranks of our old sol-
diers.”16
In the 1870s, veterans of the Civil War strove to put the new First
Regiment of Chicago on as strictly military a basis as possible from the
inception of the organization. From the birth of the First in 1874 on, the
men in charge insisted that they would form a regiment with companies
identified by letter as in the Union army, as opposed to a conglomera-
tion of imaginatively titled, company-strength organizations that was
then the prevailing norm among the Illinois state militia companies.
They selected a uniform for the entire regiment modeled after the West
Point Cadet uniform, expressly and visibly linking themselves to the fed-
eral military establishment.17 Beyond the First Regiment, key figures at
the state level throughout the 1870s, including Governor John L.
Beveridge, Brigadier General Arthur Ducat, and Adjutant General
Hiram Hilliard, all served in the Union Army. General Ducat, a partic-
ularly able officer and organizer, propelled himself up the ranks of the
Union Army to Inspector General of the Army of the Cumberland dur-
ing the Civil War. As Brigadier General of the Illinois State Guards,
Ducat was responsible for reorganizing and consolidating the state forces
from 1875 to 1876. He established the office of Inspector General of
Illinois and received the first-ever inspection reports of the Illinois State
Guard in 1876. The efforts of Generals Ducat and Hilliard represented
the first implementation of any sort of organizational plan in Illinois that
included not only rank equivalency charts with the federal forces, but
also organizational tables and systems of instruction and inspection.18 In
the 1870s, these and other veteran Union Army officers in the Illinois
state militia created a formal military organization modeled on the
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Union Army and worked to ensure that militia practices followed those
of the regular army as closely as was possible or practical in their situa-
tion. Working in the winter of 1876–77, Ducat and Hilliard established
a system that assumed the Illinois militia was, first and foremost, a mili-
tary body, and one with a reserve army mission.19
Throughout the 1880s and 1890s, with the difficulty of effecting
change at the federal level overwhelmingly apparent, National Guard
enthusiasts turned their focus inward to build on the development of
their various state organizations as established by the Civil War veterans
in the 1870s. In these decades, National Guard officers shepherded
through a number of crucial developments at the state level around the
country. More and more states adopted the regulations and protocols of
the regular army for training and inspecting their troops. Summer train-
ing encampments became a standard feature of most state organizations,
with more and more state legislatures purchasing a camp specifically for
the purpose of holding summer exercises for their state militias.20 Illinois
acquired a state campground, christened Camp Lincoln, in 1885.
Throughout the 1880s and 1890s, state governments were also gradually
induced to lease, build, or purchase one or more rifle ranges for the use
of their National Guards in practice and competition. Camp Lincoln,
which opened in 1886, was constructed with a modern rifle range, and in
1888 the Illinois General Assembly purchased ground and approved the
construction of a rifle range outside Chicago for the use of the various
regiments based in and around the metropolitan area.21 Many rural com-
panies established makeshift rifle ranges near their communities as well.22
Increasing numbers of states mandated a standard uniform, more or less
matching the standard uniforms of the U.S. Army. Illinois did so in 1884.
Finally, state appropriations for National Guards significantly increased
over the twenty years between 1877 and 1897, to around $3 million a
year from the states alone at the end of this period.23 In 1897 the Illinois
General Assembly appropriated $314,547.01 for the use of the ING over
the next biennium.24
While identifying the committed volunteers who supported and
pushed for these developments is difficult, it is possible to seek out all
those men who stayed in the ING for longer than the basic three-year
commitment expected of all members. Out of 3,668 officer slots available
in the ING between 1874 and 1904, only 932 officers had held their cur-
rent rank for more than three years. Men who found in the ING an avo-
cation occupied every rank, from second lieutenant through general, and
many who held higher ranks had spent several years moving up from pri-
vate to commissioned status. Many of these committed volunteers also
spent time as staff officers at the regimental, brigade, or divisional level.
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It was these men who held the institutional memory of the ING and
who shaped its identity and its future.25 (See appendix F.) Although it is
impossible to attribute the same motivations to all these men, those who
became active at the state and national level were committed to the
reserve army mission.
The regular Army had ignored state militias as much as they could
over the decades, and when they did notice them, they had nothing par-
ticularly nice to say about them and much to criticize.26 However, in
1885, the traditional judges of the efficiency and success of ING train-
ing practices—the state inspection officers and other National Guard
companies against whom they competed in drill—were joined by regu-
lar Army officers. Beginning in the 1880s, and in 1885 in Illinois, the
regular Army began to take a more active role in creating closer ties to
the state militias, prodded along by requests for their services from state
governors. At the governors’ requests, the War Department detailed
supernumerary and retired officers as inspectors and advisors to state
adjutant generals on a fulltime basis to observe and report on the readi-
ness of the state militias. These inspectors attended regular drills and
inspections and also attended summer training camps. In time the Army
also arranged for joint militia–regular training maneuvers and made
courses at some of the specialized schools—artillery in particular, but
also engineers and medical and signal corps—available to National
Guard officers under certain conditions.27 The role state militias played
in policing strikes in 1877 and afterward also had some effect on the
Army’s somewhat begrudging interest in the National Guards. Another
factor was the growing size of the National Guards and their increasing
clout in their various state legislatures. Further, some senior Army offi-
cers, for example, Generals William T. Sherman and Philip Sheridan,
recognizing in the Guard the men who would fight in any future war,
actively sought ways to support and encourage the state forces.28
Enthusiastic and ambitious militia members created a national lobby
in 1879, and in 1887 the National Guard Association secured the dou-
bling of the annual federal appropriation ($200,000 annually to
$400,000) for the state militias.29 As long as the National Guard existed
and had access to federal funds under the terms of the 1792 militia law
and the 1887 increase, Congress was unlikely to abandon the National
Guards in favor of an entirely federal reserve force—especially in the face
of a growing interest in militias and their upkeep across the country—no
matter how much the War Department might have preferred to substitute
some force more fully under their control. So, as the National Guards
grew and established themselves ever more firmly in their states, commu-
nities, and families, the War Department and the U.S. Army had to find
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a way to accommodate itself to the existence of the National Guard. They
did so by detailing invited inspecting officers to observe and teach; later,
by sending officers to three- and four-year terms of duty with various state
militias; supporting the NGA and their lobbying efforts in Congress; and
welcoming, after 1885, National Guard officers into the Military Service
Institution of the United States.30 Once regular Army officers began to
engage with the state militias, they introduced where they could far more
ambitious training exercises, including extended details that involved
long marches and temporary camps, and invitations to attend joint
schools for specialized skills.
The U.S. Army had very different expectations and standards for
judgment than any of the other audiences the National Guards were
used to. Not only were regular Army observers inclined to be highly crit-
ical, but their standard for judgment was the same ideal that they held
up for the performance of the regular military establishment. Army offi-
cers, retired or unassigned, and detailed to the state National Guards,
looked for a professional approach to military training, and this was
their primary measure for National Guard performances. The regular
officers were not impressed by a great parade, an honorary salute, a play,
or a picnic. The views of these regular Army inspectors became impor-
tant because through them, the regular Army became the guarantor of
acceptable practices in the National Guard in the eyes of the congres-
sional committees responsible for crafting the military budget bills.
They wanted to see evidence of serious training by the rules established
by them for their own services. The ING faced their first inspections by
regular Army officers in 1885 and 1886.31 By 1908, regular Army inspec-
tors were both judge and jury for assessing the national value of the
National Guards.32
Inspectors from the regular Army shared the gloomy assessments of
the state inspectors regarding the regularity and quality of weekly train-
ing when they began inspecting ING regiments and companies after
1885.33
The 3rd and 4th regiments showed the most want of instruction, but
when it is remembered that the companies are largely made up of
recruits and were never assembled for battalion exercises except at the
annual encampments one wonders that they do not blunder more
seriously and frequently. . . . That skirmish drill forms an important,
in fact indispensable, part of military instruction did not seem to be
fully recognized. . . . The manner in which men and officers per-
formed guard duty, zealous as they doubtless were and commendable
though their progress certainly was, left much to be desired. In the
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matter of salutes the performance of the sentinels was especially
faulty.34
Despite their concerns, most inspectors, like Colonel Theodore Schwan,
U.S. Army, took great pains to include positive comments about the
efforts, dedication, and abilities of the militia volunteers with whom
they came into contact. Such inspectors were always painfully aware
that the voluntary nature of the institution precluded unremittingly
harsh criticism lest it drive away volunteers and local support.
Tensions on Parade in the 1890s
By the mid-1880s, ING members—and other National Guardsmen around
the nation—had begun to model themselves much more explicitly on the
regular Army, even as that organization was striving to modernize along
new professional and technological models.35 By 1886, shooting ranges
became more widely available and marksmanship rankings became increas-
ingly important to companies as a measure of their successes in training, in
recruitment, and in popularity. All of this more rigorous and specialized
training began to divert ING members’ attention from their traditional
bread and butter activities of regular parades, competitions, and social
events. Parades had not yet, however, lost their significance as moments to
secure public approval and support, or to demonstrate to friends and fami-
ly, as well as to the members themselves, that what they were up to was
important and significant, and tensions began to rise as a result. Two ING
parades that marked special occasions in the 1890s illustrate militia mem-
bers’ continuing faith in the public benefits of parade performances to
establish legitimate claims on the public good and the public purse coming
into direct conflict with their role as a subordinate national military force.
In late October 1892, a large and elaborate three-day ceremony was
held in Chicago to dedicate the partially completed grounds for the
upcoming Columbian Exhibition, and Illinois Guardsmen were eager to
take part in an event with national importance. The leadership of the
ING wanted very much to use this occasion to parade the entire ING
command all together and in public for the citizens of the state to see
and appreciate.36 However, for reasons of his own, the often-irritable
General Nelson A. Miles, chief marshal of the dedication exercises,
decided that the military exercises would take place inside the fenced
Exhibition grounds. He decreed that the military would parade from
Jackson to Washington Parks along the Midway Pleasance, according to
the Chicago Tribune, on the grounds that “the military [were there] to do
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honor to the national and State dignitaries, and in no way to contribute
to the pleasure of the people.”37 Miles was even unwilling to let the entire
ING join in the military parade and demonstration and requested that
two, and later three, regiments be detained for “police duty” outside the
fence. The ensuing negotiations showed no official—either military or as
part of the Columbian Exhibition authority—in his best light. The con-
flict even made the pages of The New York Times.38
In the end, through stratagems of dubious honor, the entire ING did
parade as a whole in front of the national dignitaries present, proving to
itself that it was as important as it hoped to be. Brigadier General Charles
Fitzsimons of the First Brigade, ING resorted to the position of never
receiving any formal order from Miles after receiving his own orders from
the adjutant general of Illinois officially placing him in command of the
ING for the purposes of parading the whole ING at the dedicatory exer-
cises. As Fitzsimons never did receive any orders asking for his troops to
be stationed elsewhere, he got them all to the parade ground on time.
Once they were there, confusion continued to reign. The parade was dis-
organized; no one appeared to Fitzsimons to be in charge of indicating in
what order all the various military organizations would march; and then,
in an affront to military dignity that irritated Fitzsimons beyond polite-
ness, commands where given out of order and for the wrong steps.
The lines were not presented to the reviewing officer, orders to pass
by the President en masse were given en route instead of taking wheel-
ing distance and were disobeyed by some of the regiments, and prop-
erly disobeyed by the Illinois, the colonels well knowing that a review
en masse defeats the object, which is to “review” or see the troops. In
column of masses only the right of each company is en-review, and
there is no warrant in General Miles or any other officer to mar or
change a ceremony so clearly laid down in regulation.39
Fitzsimons’s distress with the resulting parade was still fresh a week later.
“I regret to say that the review was a dismal failure in a military sense,
and was only redeemed from utter absurdity by the intelligence of the
commanding officers of regiments and the “get there” spirit of western
soldiers.”40 Fitzsimons also sought to deflect the criticism he and his com-
mand received in the press following the disastrous parade.41 The acting
commissary, E. A. Potter, summing up the fray, recorded his opinion that
“the atmosphere surrounding the higher military officials (in the ‘stars’)
seems to be rather lurid.”42 Despite the fray at the top, there were mem-
bers of the ING who remembered the 1892 parade fondly, and in the end
the Chicago Tribune approved wholeheartedly of the entire spectacle.43
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Fortunately the parades held in 1893 were much smoother affairs,
“culminating on Illinois Day [August 24], at which time the Governor
and his staff and the entire organized military force of the State partici-
pated in a parade through the streets of the magic White City.”44 This
parade, which included only the ING, was handled completely by the
state, without any recourse to federal military authority, or for that mat-
ter, General Fitzsimons, who was by then replaced by a General H. A.
Wheeler.45 “The review on Illinois Day, in the presence of representa-
tives from every civilized nation, was the largest and most imposing mar-
tial display during the Fair, and the troops elicited the highest commen-
dation from military officers, the press, and the people for their disci-
pline, precision of movement, and soldierly bearing.”46
The ING continued to participate in ceremonial and dedicatory
parades after the World’s Fair ended, both at home and away. In 1895,
for example, the First Regiment participated in the dedication exercises
of a monument erected at Oakwood Cemetery to the Confederate sol-
diers who died in prisoner of war camps, which led in November that
year to a trip to Georgia. The First Regiment served as a military escort
for the Chicago & Southern States Association on a visit to the Cotton
States and International Exposition. The regiment received some criti-
cism for these activities, but members insisted that they were part of the
continuing process of memorializing all the soldiers of the war as part of
national reconciliation efforts. Members also crowed about the smashing
success of their parade as a symbol of all that was excellent about
Chicago, their regiment, and their service.47
Increasing Rigor and Professionalism after 1898
National Guard officers in the Interstate National Guard Association
(INGA) used National Guard service in the Spanish American War to
make their case for the primacy of the reserve function of the National
Guards. Congress and public more or less accepted this claim, and agreed
to foot the bills for a dramatic refurbishment of the National Guards.
After passage of the Dick Act of 1903, Congress, through the Army, pro-
vided millions more dollars in cash and military goods than the National
Guards, especially the ING, could ever have raised from their states or
their local communities. By the early twentieth century, the ING, and
National Guards across the country, were shaping many of their perform-
ances to satisfy the expectations of the professional military establish-
ment, and through them, Congress. National Guardsmen were willing to
make the necessary changes in their daily activities required by the new
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standards because they seemed to mark the fruition of their own long-
term goal to become the first-line reserve army for the United States.
That they ultimately weakened the bonds between the ING, and more
broadly the bonds of National Guards in general, to their states, their
municipalities, and their local communities was a gradual, little-noticed,
and seldom-mourned consequence.
With the critical focus of the Army squarely on their performance
after 1898, National Guards began to change their practices and their
performances to better meet the requirements and expectations of this
new audience based in Washington, D.C. Training in general became
more regularized, and more in line with professional army practices.
Parade marching was out, and skirmish and extended order drills were
in during weekly training sessions. Expectations for military discipline
regulating militia behavior went up, and tolerance for the more casual
relations of the past went down. The ING refined the practice of exam-
ination for advancement in ranks, so that only men who had passed the
examination for the office could stand for election to that office.
Summer camp became a time for more serious training than was previ-
ously the case, as each camp had regular Army observers, inspectors, and
training advisers. With increasing frequency, the Army even offered
selected National Guard regiments the chance to participate in joint
maneuvers with regular Army regiments. ING officers were given the
opportunities to hone their increasing professional skills at the camps
for specialized skills—artillery, medical, signal corps, officer school—
offered by the regular army. These camps or schools were most common-
ly joint operations; that is, both regular Army and National Guard offi-
cers took part. These schools also emphasized the increasing specializa-
tion within the guards, with medical corps, signal corps, engineering
corps, and naval brigades as well as the traditional infantry, cavalry, and
artillery companies. This specialization mirrored changes in the regular
Army. The regular Army observed it all, as they had been from 1885
onward, observing, critiquing, teaching, and sometimes praising all of
these activities.48
Summer Camp
One solution to the problem of a lack of modern, professional training in
the 1870s was summer training camps. The militias and National Guard
of Massachusetts first established summer training programs before the
Civil War, and the practice gradually spread to the militia organizations
of other states.49 Summer camp was designed as a training exercise, the
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better to mimic the conditions of active military duty. Summer camp
gave both men and officers the opportunity to practice the full range of
military skills that constituted the daily regimen of military service—
from setting up and policing a camp to following the routine of camp
life, with responses to bugle commands and working out-of-doors in both
small and large groups, from detail to brigade, with various schools for
officers at all grades and for various specialized branches.50 Summer camp
provided members of the guard the opportunity to learn and practice
new military skills. It afforded both state and federal inspection officers
the chance to see and assess the discipline and training of the various
companies of the ING.
Summer camp also offered daily dress parades, constant opportunities
for guard companies to measure their performance against each other,
huge audiences, sham battles, and a nearly endless round of socializing,
dinner giving, and general entertainment for ING members and the
public alike. As seriously as much of the ING membership undertook
their training at camp, the chief reward for most participants resided in
the opportunities to cement the social, ceremonial, and political ties cre-
ated by parading, competing, and community-based socializing—an
issue commented on with increasing concern by many critics as the cen-
tury drew to a close.51
Between 1875 and 1900, Illinois did not offer ING members summer
camp every year, though some wealthier companies managed to hold
them on their own in the years the adjutant general could not offer it
to the entire militia. As state financing improved, summer camp
became a more reliable feature of the ING calendar. The years 1885 and
1886 marked a success for the activist officers, when the state acquired
a permanent campground for use during the summer training sessions.
Christened Camp Lincoln, it was (and still is) located directly north-
west of the capital city of Springfield. The first sessions were held there
in 1886, and camp was held almost annually thereafter until the
1920s.52
The central object of summer camp, of course, was military training.
A typical week of camp during the 1880s and 1890s consisted of three to
seven days in camp for each regiment or, occasionally, brigade (made up
of two or three regiments during most of this time). Each day followed a
strict routine laid down in general orders and more or less following stan-
dard U.S. military practice. The mornings were broken into half-hour
segments for a variety of official business from reveille at 5:00 A.M.
through breakfast, sick call, morning drills, and assemblies, to dinner at
noon. The afternoon was generally an unscheduled block of time from
around 1:00 to around 4:30 and was reserved for a variety of larger drills,
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sham battles, field exercises and maneuvers, various specialized schools
for the officers, or time on the rifle range. Generally, after supper there
was a dress parade and then taps between 10:00 and 11:00 P.M. ING
members guarded the camp throughout the week, seizing the opportuni-
ty to practice those skills as well. Because for many of the smaller down-
state companies this was the only time in the course of a year that they
drilled in formations larger than that of a company—in the view of some
more cynical inspection officers, it was the only time some drilled the rel-
evant military skills at all—while for the Chicago-based regiments it
could be a chance to try new techniques and more exciting, warlike
training exercises, the results from a training standpoint were generally
something of a mixed bag.53
On the whole, the various inspecting officers adopted a tone of mod-
erately hopeful despair, even with the real improvements that they
acknowledged came over the years and with increased practice and stan-
dards of company discipline. Federal and state inspectors consistently
recognized and applauded individual and company enthusiasm for mili-
tary drill and practice while bemoaning the shortness of the time, the
lack of preparation for the more advanced work of camp and the prob-
lems caused by the steady turnover of junior officers, both commissioned
and noncommissioned, on whom so much depended. In the early 1890s
inspectors were still noting that “every year, after the companies are
assembled in camp for regimental drills, it is found necessary to devote
much of the valuable time to company training in discipline and guard
duties, and in teaching the company officers the close-order battalion
formations.” As a result, “very little more can be done, and several of the
colonels told me that if their regiments reached the point where they left
off the year before, they felt that under the circumstances they ought to
be satisfied.”54 Nevertheless, most inspection reports concluded on a
hopeful note. For example “The spirit with which [the men] received
instruction showed them ambitious to reach a higher standard, and their
zeal proves them worthy of the great State that has done so much for her
‘citizen soldiery.’”55 And over the years ever more ambitious training
maneuvers and field exercises were attempted, and with slowly increas-
ing success.56 By the early twentieth century, boredom with the routines
demanded by the relatively small space available at Camp Lincoln led
ING officials and their regular Army advisers to plan ever more challeng-
ing field exercises. In 1908, 1909, and again in 1913, either together or
by regiment, ING troops set off on marches across parts of the state for
their summer training rather than stay put in Springfield.57 Federal
inspection officers continued to note many problems during these ING
training events, but they attributed most to lack of practice that could
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not be obtained in armory training anyway (setting up tents, for exam-
ple) and generally concluded that the men and officers were able and
would, if needed, serve admirably.58
Socializing at Summer Camp
The increasing professionalization and specialization of skills fostered by
camp training should not, however, overshadow the continuing empha-
sis on socializing and community celebration that Guard companies fea-
tured as they appealed to membership and the greater public alike for
continued financial and emotional support. Summer camp featured ban-
quets, balls, and elegant entertainments at, if anything, a greater rate
than the rest of the annual calendar. The daily dress parade alone was a
regular and enduring feature of camp life, albeit one whose military util-
ity was somewhat obscure. As one federal inspector noted of ING
encampments in 1896, “The field work was merely an incident of camp
routine and did not interfere with drills and ceremonies on the same
day.”59 Of that same year the historian of the second regiment ING, who
normally never mentioned summer encampments at all, included the
information that General Merritt, commander of the U.S. Department
of the Lakes, was the guest of Brigadier General Harris A. Wheeler at
that year’s summer encampment.60 An important dinner guest counted
as a memory-worthy moment while on the whole, training exercises did
not. In fact, most nineteenth-century historians of ING companies are
as silent on the subject of summer camp as they are of all training prac-
tices, except when they are able to record the unusual social coup or the
humorous story of schemes and pranks.
Along with such notable military figures, other guests of the ING
companies at camp included such statewide important figures as the gov-
ernor and his staff, who attended camp quite regularly in the 1890s,
often bringing with them large crowds of wives and other female guests.
Not only did the governor make official visits, but he and his wife also
responded to social invitations extended by officers during their stay in
camp. For example, in 1897 the officers of the First Illinois Cavalry gave
a tea for the state’s first lady, Mrs. John R. Tanner, and her friends. The
event featured a dress parade followed by tea and a band concert. A pho-
tograph of the event pictures almost two dozen of Springfield’s eligible
young women and Mrs. Tanner decked out in lovely summer dress in the
company of several officers in front of a tent.61 Local dignitaries from
both Springfield and the home communities were regular guests at din-
ner on Sundays.62 And finally, whoever wanted to see the sights of the
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Figure 4
Members of the Third Infantry, playing cards at Camp Lincoln, 1903. Courtesy of
the Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library. Photographer: Guy Mathis, Guy Mathis
Collection.
Figure 5
Ladies visiting the Third Infantry at Camp Lincoln, 1903. Courtesy of the Abraham
Lincoln Presidential Library. Photographer: Guy Mathis, Guy Mathis Collection.
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encampment also visited regularly. Daily visitors could add up to a quite
significant figure. According to a newspaper report of a single day in
1896, “People kept coming and going during the entire day and evening,
and on the whole the attendance amounted into the thousands.”63
Sundays were particularly busy days, as both out-of-town visitors and
Springfield residents went to the camp to see the sights.64
One traditional feature of military practice that encampments espe-
cially seemed to encourage well into the twentieth century was the bur-
lesques on military conventions. Melon thefts, baseball games, and din-
ner parties were also common highlights of summer camp memories and
were recorded more often than the specific training exercises in compa-
ny and personal memoirs.65 Aside from notable dinner guests, the histo-
rian of Company I, Sixth regiment ING, provided only one other men-
tion of camp activities––a long anecdote about stealing watermelons
from a nearby field when returning from camp on the train.66 Mock drills
and mock court-martials were considered good fun and even made the
local papers. Guardsmen and reporters alike found mock parades to be
particularly hilarious events.67 Guardsmen regularly posed for photo-
graphs while playing cards, boxing, lounging around, and goofing off.
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Figure 6
ING members in costume (many in ladies’ undergarments) at Camp Lincoln, 1904.
Courtesy of the Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library. Photographer: Guy Mathis,
Guy Mathis Collection.
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They also posed for pictures in oddly costumed “Pony Clubs,” in skirts
and while wearing ladies’ undergarments.68
Summer camp fit seamlessly into the annual rounds of training, parad-
ing, competitions, and socializing for most of the Guard membership.
Indeed, summer camp was for many members one of the main attractions
and rewards of guard membership. In 1896, an astute reporter wrote that
“the ‘boys’ came down to do their duty, of course, but to have a good
time. To many it has been their vacation—the one week away from
unpoetical business during the year. They left their workshops, their
counters, and their desks to be the guests of the State for seven whole
long summer days. . . . In his military trappings and flanked by his fellows
the most ordinary man carries with him an inspiration.”69 ING historian
Rufus S. Bunzey wrote:
Camp week is looked forward to, for months. It is the one incentive,
urging the men to extra work, in preparing themselves to appear
before the public as soldier. It is the only break in an otherwise
monotonous, un-remunerative, voluntary service and is very benefi-
cial to the troops, bringing the officers and men of the regiment in
contact with each other, where discipline and obedience are not only
expected, but demanded, teaching the men that a soldier’s life is
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Figure 7
Captain Clarke’s Midway Squad, Company E, First Regiment, Camp Lincoln, ca.
1895. Courtesy of the Chicago Historical Society. Photographer: Unknown. iCHi-
39236.
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based upon those two principles, also teaching them the duties of a
soldier in many ways. The knowledge thus gained being invaluable,
and attainable in no other manner.70
Cary T. Ray, of the First Infantry, recalled going “to camp at Springfield
that year [1895], with all that such Tours of Duty meant to us. Two
weeks, or about that time, of outdoor life, Camp Cooking, etc. meant
much to the Boys from Offices, Stores and shops.” Ray’s fond recollec-
tions of camp life included the daily dress parade, which was a “colorful
occasion, and one looked forward to by most of the personnel of the
Regiment,” and holding camp fires down along the Sangamon River,
with sandwiches and beer. “All Company Officers were there. Also the
‘Glee Club’ and how that good old Song—‘Tenting Tonight’ rang
through the woods!” Ray also remembered visiting the sites of
Springfield with passes to the city, including the former home of
President Lincoln, and the monument dedicated in 1874.71 Scores of
photographs taken at Camp Lincoln in the 1890s and 1900s capture
images of men at camp, formally posed or relaxing in hammocks, play-
ing cards, drinking beer, standing in the mud, marching through the
woods, and goofing off in casual dress and in elaborate costumed per-
formances, particularly while dressed in drag.72
Bunzey, of the Sixth Regiment, went on to stress that at camp, com-
panies appeared “before the people of the state, and the Governor, their
commander-in-chief,” audiences that were “ever ready to criticize,
reflecting on the fitness of this or that officer for the position he holds.”73
Certainly, throughout the late 1890s and first decade of the 1900s,
Springfield photographer Guy Mathis recorded a steady stream of visi-
tors to Camp Lincoln, families and dignitaries alike.74 Audiences for pub-
lic performances, training related or simply to justify or sustain the
importance of continued military reserve training, ultimately decided on
the long-term viability of the ING and national guards in general. If the
people of the state and the nation decided that the national guards were
not performing up to standard, they would stop paying for them, and
that would end the movement. Guardsmen had to continue to impress
their audiences with their importance, their seriousness and their mar-
tial abilities, or their institution would not have survived.
Competitive Life of ING Companies
One of the most dramatic changes in the practice of the national guards
after 1900 was the virtual elimination of drill-marching training and
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competitions in favor of marksmanship competitions and training.
Traditional drill-marching competitions continued into the early twenti-
eth century in the limited form of specialized drill teams, but competitive
shooting events grew increasingly popular within the ING—and
National Guards more generally—throughout the 1890s.75 In the years
after 1900, drill team displays were reduced to occasional parade or per-
formance attractions. The focus of intra- and intercompany competition
became marksmanship scores. In marksmanship competitions, individual
skill took precedence over shared group skills featured in drill-marching
competitions. Even in those events that were considered team competi-
tions, final scores were compiled from individual scores to determine the
winning “team.”
Competitions were very popular with militia members and the public
alike, and they had been for a very long time. Like parades, intercompa-
ny competitions were an antebellum tradition of the volunteer compa-
nies that gained in popularity after the militia re-emergence in the 1870s
and 1880s. Like parades, competitive events provided militia companies
with opportunities for the display of military skills, the physical discipline
of the skills on display, the vigor and athleticism of the individual mem-
bers, and military rituals of formality and deference, all surrounded by the
glow of military glamour and the sweat of competition. Companies
earned respect and admiration from their audiences and from each other
for their military bearing and physical skills when they entered into a
competition. Competitions also celebrated military prowess and explicit-
ly explored the possibilities of disciplined military violence; the aura of
risk, bravery, and sacrifice were never far from a generation raised in the
long shadow of the Civil War. Competitions brought to the forefront of
public attention the basic purpose of the militias, to prepare for an actu-
al combative encounter.
Elliot Gorn and Warren Goldstein claim that the rise of vigorous,
rugged sports in the post-Civil War period was a reaction to the increas-
ingly stifling restrictions of Victorian propriety and industrial Capitalism.
They suggest that the field of sport was both a release from the strictures
of industrial labor and the moral equivalent of war, a war in which the
participants contested not only the outcome of the game, but also each
participant’s sense of personal dignity and manhood. At particular stake
for many participants was manhood or manliness, as they sought a stren-
uous life dedicated to the opposite of the corrupting feminine qualities of
commercial life and material consumption.76 Militia competitions, as
much as any other, embodied the popular notion of sport as a battlefield;
after all, the object of the competition was to determine which groups
most closely adhered to the rigorous demands of preparing for an actual
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field of battle. At the center of the military training was absolute obedi-
ence to commands, an obedience that not only depended on under-
standing the order, but also required absolute faith that fellow company
members would do their part. It was this knowledge and this dependence
that was tested in the competitive drill.
The ritual of staging a competition began when one company decid-
ed among themselves to host a competitive event and so invited one, or
more, other companies to meet them on the field. Once the host com-
pany set a date, usually in the summer months as the competitions were
held out-of-doors, they sent formal invitations to those companies they
decided would provide the best level of competition. Once the opponent
companies accepted the invitation and agreed to participate, the host
company went into a flurry of planning for the great day. Once the day
of the competition dawned, and the weather was fair, the invited com-
panies began to appear, usually by train. The host company would have
designated locations on the “parade ground” for the invited companies
to set up a “camp” of more or less permanence, and the visiting compa-
nies would be escorted to their “home base” for the day.77
Meanwhile, crowds would gather around the parade ground, ready to
be entertained and ready to judge.78 The competitions could begin in the
morning or the afternoon, depending on the number of companies com-
peting and on the range of events. In the 1870s and 1880s, and even into
the 1890s, the central competitive event was to go through a variety of
drill maneuvers to determine the most proficient.79 The drill was broken
into three parts, the school of the soldier (1) with and (2) without arms,
and (3) the school of the company. The following list of exercises is
taken from a competition in 1875:
The School of the Soldier (without arms)
Forms squad in column of files—single file.
Side step to the right and left.
Rest and attention.
Wheel from a halt to the right and left—halting and aligning after
each movement.
Face to the right, left, and about, resuming the front.
March in line to the front.
Change step during march.
Change into column of files, and again form in line—halt and align.
March by the flank, and change direction of column.
Marching in column, change direction by the left flank.
In line, march oblique to the right and left to the front—halt and
align.80
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The competition concluded with “Fire by company, file, obliquely and
kneeling.”81
Sometimes the competition portion of the day might be followed by
an exhibition drill by those companies that still kept up the Zouave drill,
which involved both running an obstacle course and trick target shoot-
ing, as well as more conventional marching and rifle handling.82 Often
the day began or ended with a formal dress parade by all the attending
companies. In the later 1880s, and especially in the 1890s, marksmanship
and other target shooting events began to be added to the “revolutions
of the manual” as competitive events.83
The drill competition was formally judged and scored by a committee
selected before the competition began.84 Informally, the audience also
judged the event. Late nineteenth-century audiences were familiar with
the manual drills performed by the militia and guard companies both
from experience and because the newspapers would sometimes publish
descriptions of the various maneuvers. Audiences looked for the same
qualities that the formal judges did. They expected precision in the drill
formations, unison in the various movements, an appearance of youth
and vigor on the part of each member of the company, athleticism and
strength in performing the physical moves, and an appealing and attrac-
tive presentation overall.85 Audiences judged the competitors not only
on their adherence to the prescribed physical forms, but on their cos-
tumes and their practice of elaborate military formalities as well. The
prize given at the end of the day could vary from a simple certificate of
the win, to a trophy of more or less elegance and size, to officers’ swords
engraved with the date, to prize purses for the top finishers.86
Competitions, like parades, could be held to mark days set aside for
patriotic celebration. For example: Company I, Seventh Infantry, ING,
or the Mason City Guards invited the Havana Guards, the Beardstown
Guards, the Virginia Guards, and the Harris Guards to a competition on
May 30, 1878, Memorial, or Decoration (meaning to decorate soldiers’
graves), Day.87 On July 4, 1883, militia companies from Muscatine,
Moline, Ottawa, and Rock Island participated in a competitive drill in
Rock Island. The Muscatine Company won the first prize purse of two
hundred dollars, the home company taking the second prize of seventy-
five dollars, “losing the first by nine-tenths of one point.”88 On July 4,
1878, Companies A, C, H, and G of the First Infantry, ING, competed
for prizes in Terre Haute, Indiana; Company C won, Company H took
second, and Company G placed third.89 Competitions held on patriotic
holidays were a natural extension of the drill exhibitions that often
ended military parades. If more than one company was marching and
drilling, the urge to compare the performances easily bled over into overt
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competition. Once prizes were established, from blue ribbons to silver
cups to prize purses, the competitive drive was impossible to ignore.
Intercompany drill competitions were held all summer long, but
many of the most prestigious drill competitions were in September,
timed to come at the end of the summer drill season. In September 1878,
the Company C, First Infantry, ING, won first prize and $750.00 in prize
money. In September 1887, Company A, First Infantry, ING, won the
second prize of $500.00 in gold at the Inter-State Competitive Drill at
Evansville, Indiana.90 As the prize purses increased in value, so did the
seriousness of the competition. In the 1880s, ambitious companies cre-
ated smaller drill squads or teams for competition and sent these teams
all over the state and even the country to compete for cash prizes and
prestigious awards.91 One Texas company, the Houston Light Guard,
took home almost $30,000 in prize purses and trophies valued at $10,000
over about ten years of competition in the late 1880s and early 1890s.92
During drill competitions, militia members from different companies
gathered to share their enthusiasm for their military avocations, to judge
each other’s proficiency at military drill, and to create a community
beyond their armory walls. Competitions fostered and reinforced shared
militia and National Guard values of athleticism, vitality, discipline,
physical strength, military rituals, and gentlemanly gallantry and honor.
It was during competitions that the tensions between the social rewards
and the professional aspirations for military prowess were most buried,
and robust performances of a vigorous civic manhood were most fully on
display. Competitions celebrated the outcome of the training process in
ways that satisfied most observers and apparently virtually all of the par-
ticipants. After the competition was completed, the day often ended
with a picnic or even a military ball, a celebratory reward for the mili-
tary skill on display earlier in the day.
The Rise of Sharpshooting
Accuracy with a rifle was difficult for most American soldiers, full- or
part-time, to acquire through the middle years of the nineteenth centu-
ry for a variety of technical reasons, including the difficulty of producing
rifles in the large quantities armies demanded; the slow development of
breech loading and repeating fire mechanisms; and the unwieldy size and
weight of the military rifle. But, as the nineteenth century progressed
and industrial developments made it possible for large numbers of sol-
diers to be armed with modern rifles for a relatively low cost, officers
responsible for military training brought the scientific practices of obser-
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vation and measurement to bear on the old art of rifle shooting.93 At this
point, rifle marksmanship was not only a desirable skill in soldiers; it was
also something that could be fostered on a large scale. Of course, for mil-
itary authorities to truly encourage marksmanship among soldiers and
National Guardsmen, they had to provide each soldier with a modern
rifle, plenty of ammunition, quality instruction, and sufficient practice
time on a modern rifle range.94 These requirements were not forthcom-
ing in Illinois during the early years of the ING. In a very lengthy Chicago
Tribune article in the summer of 1887, the author argued for the absolute
necessity of training guardsmen in the use of their weapons and insisted
that Congress should foot the bill for doing so. The author charged that
while “plenty of energy [was] manifested in the discharge of other por-
tions of the education of a soldier; prizes are offered by citizens for supe-
riority in manipulation of the piece—seldom for execution with it.” He
continued: “Company commanders study hard and drill assiduously in
order to win these trophies. The rivalry between companies and individ-
uals is for manipulation of the piece . . . the popular companies are those
possessing the ability to act in concert. Emulation is based on preemi-
nence in motions and movements. Little or no effort has been made to
excel in marksmanship.” As further testament to the inadequate atten-
tion that marksmanship was receiving from ING members, the author
pointed to the wholly inadequate shooting galleries of the First and
Second Regiments, one relegated to the attic and too small for more than
two shooters, the other in an unused hallway accessible only by a trap-
door.95 A later ING historian recalled:
Very little attention was given to target practice for several years. The
cause for the lack of enthusiasm in this respect was accounted for in
the difficulty in securing the necessary ammunition and ordnance
supplies with which to carry on a successful shoot, saying nothing of
the expense connected with the building of rifle butts, etc., for which
the men were compelled to secure funds without expense to the State.
The officers higher in command of the troops evidently took but lit-
tle interest in this matter which today [1902], is considered a very
essential feature in determining the efficiency of the National
Guard.96
National Guardsmen hosted marksmanship competitions as early as
the late 1880s, and the first Illinois State Rifle team was created in
1890.97 Nonetheless, these early marksmanship competitions did not
completely replace the drill competitions until after the Spanish
American War, which suggests that marksmanship came to dominate
New Training Practices 127
Hannah_CH4_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  2:54 PM  Page 127
intercompany competition for a variety of causes, only some of which
were technological or financial. The social and cultural impact of
marksmanship on the ING was that it rewarded emphasis on individ-
ual skill at the expense of certain group skills. This distinction between
the individually honed skills required for successful rifle shooting by all
members of a company as opposed to the drill-marching group skills is
central to the timing of the shift in performance paradigms favored by
the ING.
Marksmanship gradually became a crucial component of the ING’s
program to impress their new federal audiences after the 1885–86 arrival
of federal inspectors. Marksmanship was valuable to the ING, and to
National Guards in general, because it had a prima facie quality when it
came to notions of professional military training. It was just so obvious
that soldiers should be well trained in the use of their weapons that no
one could argue that marksmanship practice was a waste of time or
resources. Quite the opposite, in fact, most officers concerned with
training both professional soldiers and the National Guards insisted that
marksmanship was a vital component of any training regimen.98 A focus
on marksmanship was useful to the ING in winning continued and
increased state and federal financial support because it was such an easy
matter to demonstrate continued improvement through the hard, statis-
tical evidence of marksmanship rankings and seasonal scores. The adju-
tant general of Illinois began reporting marksmanship scores on a bien-
nial basis in 1882, and by 1904 the adjutant general was devoting the
bulk of the biennial report to rifle practice returns and military inspec-
tions.99 Guardsmen could use these scores to demonstrate the measura-
ble improvement of the National Guard from one fiscal cycle to the
next. Improving scores showed that National Guardsmen were more
accurate with their weapons and demonstrated their seriousness and
dedication to the school of the soldier.
National Guardsmen also discovered that they could continue to
accommodate their traditional urge to compete between companies and
among individual members while meeting new demands for increased
professionalism through marksmanship competitions. Competitions
were a basic component of ING activities prior to 1898–99 for a variety
of reasons, but especially because they helped companies create a repu-
tation as a desirable company to join and to support. So, turning rifle
shooting into a game with medals, prizes, and published rankings for
both individuals and companies successfully accommodated the expec-
tations of many of the audiences important to the continued existence
of the ING.100
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Manly Sport
During the late nineteenth century, ING officers made a series of claims
about the desirable moral and civic characteristics fostered by National
Guard membership, alongside the admirable physical skills acquired
through military training. They claimed that membership in the ING
would not only improve the physical qualities of National Guard recruits,
but also mark their coming of age as republican citizens and manly men.
They expected that, in the midst of all their other activities, ING mem-
bers would “not . . . lose sight of those other duties and obligations which
rest upon us as citizens . . . to maintain the liberty and equality of citizen-
ship under law.”101 ING officers argued that their training created men
out of boys. Thus, as marksmanship absorbed ever more time and inter-
est among National Guardsmen, ING officers either had to find a way to
show how marksmanship demonstrated the traditional qualities associat-
ed with National Guard membership or find new desirable qualities for
National Guardsmen to have that marksmanship could demonstrate to
interested audiences.
This task was difficult for a host of reasons, but certainly among the
most dramatic was the difference in press coverage between parades, drill
competitions, and marksmanship contests. Newspapers rarely reviewed
shooting meets as they once did parades and drill-marching competi-
tions; rather, they reported the range scores and ratings in much the same
way that professional and college sports were reported. All descriptions
of the men, the uniforms, the athleticism, and the style, disappeared in
favor of the hard statistics of marksmanship scoring. For example, see this
early report of a shooting competition:
Scores at all ranges for two days of shooting:
Jackson 464
Fenton 458
Browne 451
Warren 447
John Rigby 444
Laired 441
Joynt 438
Fisher 424102
The team affiliation of the men is not even included in the brief report
excerpted above. If the reader was not already familiar with both the
composition of the teams and the intricacies of marksmanship scoring,
this report is pretty meaningless. The reporting even moved to the sports
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columns in many papers, and away from the front of the paper and
“news.” In contrast to the style of coverage of other National Guard
events like parades or drill competitions, National Guardsmen were not
described in careful detail as individual actors, and then as members of a
specific group performing drills for a large and knowledgeable audience.
Under the regime of marksmanship reporting, National Guardsmen
were reduced to little more than the sum of their marksmanship scores
for the year. Anonymity was hard for some to accept, of course, and as
late as 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt scolded National Guard offi-
cers for continuing to waste time on traditional drilling and parades at
summer camp. Roosevelt wanted guardsmen to concentrate on marks-
manship and rifle shooting.103
National Guard officers needed to establish tangible rewards for
behaviors they valued, and this was one of the prime forces behind the
development of the medals and published rankings of sharpshooting for
all members of the National Guard. The critical importance of these
rewards for dedication to the acquisition of difficult technical skills is
reflected in the letter books of ING companies in the first decade of the
twentieth century. Captains from “shooting companies,” those compa-
nies with reputations for excellent sharpshooting scores, and captains
from companies that ranked near the bottom of the ING in terms of
marksmanship all devoted a significant amount of their correspondence
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Figure 8
Soldiers firing with “Texas grip” at Camp Logan, Winthrop Harbor, Illinois, 1899.
Lt. Cary T. Ray, standing; five men of the Second Infantry, firing. Courtesy of the
Chicago Historical Society. Photographer: Unknown. iCHi-39219.
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with regimental and division headquarters to marksmanship issues, tar-
get practices, target frames, practice supplies, scoring problems, and most
important of all, the published rankings and delivery of medals and
awards.104
Between the lack of audiences for actual shooting events, held at isolat-
ed and noisy rifle ranges and not in central public spaces, and the dramatic
change in coverage of ING activities, National Guardsmen could no longer
easily demonstrate the desirable qualities of personal character that they
had previously put on display during parades and drill competitions. In
parades and drill competitions, they had shown off their patriotism, manli-
ness, athleticism, vigor, and gentlemanly gallantry and honor. With marks-
manship, National Guardsmen celebrated qualities that could be indicated
with rifle scores—qualities like self-discipline, dedication, and deadly accu-
racy with long-range weapons. Even the increasing anonymity of National
Guard members within their communities could be made to work for the
National Guard once ING officers, and National Guard officers across the
country, established a system of rankings that valued and rewarded individ-
ual skill, professional dedication, and a commitment to the nation. By 1912,
Walter Merriam Pratt could write, “The National Guard is an organization
wherein its members learn self-control, get self-confidence, improve their
bodies and develop their minds.” He continued, “It is one means by which
can be shown your patriotism to your country, your loyalty to its institu-
tions, and by which you can repay in a measure what you owe for its protec-
tion and the liberty you enjoy.”105 The National Guard provided these
rewards by offering “a vast amount of healthy, honest sport which will
improve the mind as well as the body. Unlimited opportunity is given for
target shooting (the cleanest and best sport in the world), and a compan-
ionship exists among soldiers such as can be found nowhere else.”106
Of course, with new activities came new opportunities for abuse.
Where the National Guards had once put up with complaints that they
were nothing but overdressed drunks playing at a serious game with no
talent and no skill, they now were accused of harboring men who joined
the National Guard only to have access to the premier shooting compe-
titions in the nation.107 These new rifle hobbyists did find a home in some
National Guard companies despite their refusal to attend weekly train-
ing sessions or summer camp because of the traditional competitiveness
within the National Guard. Where National Guard companies had once
used their reputations as successful drill teams as a recruiting tool, they
now used their rifle teams’ performance to draw new members into their
orbit. These abuses, real as they were, received less criticism than the
drill-marching competition did for all the reasons that rifle practice was
considered to be good for military training in general.108
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Modern Guardsmen
The Guardsman of the early twentieth century no longer found his def-
inition of manhood and citizenship in performances for the local com-
munity, such as in parades and drill competitions. Rather, the
Guardsman of the early twentieth century saw himself as a soldier. He no
longer considered his primary duty to be a protector of public order and
a leader in patriotic display; he was a soldier who served at the pleasure
of the nation. Continuing deficiencies in training and financial support
notwithstanding, Guardsmen increasingly saw themselves as more than
dashing and patriotic men; they knew themselves to be professional sol-
diers in training, and they could point with pride to their marksmanship
scores to prove it. In a December 1898 speech to the Interstate National
Guard Association, Lieutenant H. P. Parker declared, “[A]s the trained
soldier is the real weapon of modern warfare, then see that you demand
he receive the means to make him the best trained and most effective
weapon that can be produced.”109 The modern National Guardsman
knew himself to be a weapon in the hands of a great nation.
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CHAPTER 5
Death, Manhood, and
Service in the Spanish
American War
We have taken up “The White Man’s Burden.” We have done with
“Childish Days.” We go to face new problems in lands beyond the
seas. In the first rank stands the Regular, but behind him is the
Volunteer, the bulwark of “Old Glory” in time of sorest need.1
—Dedication by the Illinois National Guard
When the U.S. Congress declared war on Spain on April 25, 1898,
National Guardsmen eagerly seized the opportunity to demonstrate to
themselves, their supporters, their communities, the nation, and most of all
the professional Army that they were well-trained soldiers ready and will-
ing to do their duty.2 After President McKinley’s decision to accept some
200,000 volunteers via the existing National Guard regiments, guardsmen
rushed to prove the seriousness of their claims to the titles and history of
the citizen-soldier. That the record achieved by the National Guards while
in federal service was uneven at best—some state regiments or companies
received high praise, others nothing but the most serious condemnation for
their gaps in training, supply, and discipline—was ultimately less important
for the National Guards than the experience of national service itself. The
lessons guardsmen learned during the war, from the day-to-day realities of
camp living to the politics of command and the complexities of logistics,
served to forge a stronger identity for the National Guard as the nation’s
reserve army, distinct from the burdens of state policing and the joys of
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public spectacle that previously constituted their most public face. The
opportunity for large numbers of guardsmen from many different states to
gather and undergo shared privation and tribulations, hardship and glory
led them to conclude that the wartime experience was the vital turning
point for the National Guards as an institution, as well as for themselves
as individuals.
The Illinois regiments in the United States Volunteers experienced
the full range of the opportunities and challenges facing National
Guards in 1898. Two Illinois companies actually saw combat, and briefly
at that, in Puerto Rico. After the two days of major combat had passed,
eight out of eleven regiments from Illinois served in Cuba and Puerto
Rico for varying lengths of time. Illinois volunteers endured the terrible
conditions in the large southern training camps early in the war, thou-
sands suffered from illness and hundreds died, some mutinied, and more
served to honor and distinction during garrison duty in Cuba and Puerto
Rico.
One of the more impressive successes for the National Guards in gen-
eral, and for the ING in particular, was the highly praised performance
of the African American Eighth Illinois United States Volunteers
(USV). When Governor John M. Tanner persuaded President McKinley
and the U.S. Army to recognize and commission the African American
officers of the Eighth Illinois Infantry on the same terms as the rest of
the regiments of the ING, he put the honor and manliness of the entire
ING on the line.3 The War Department rose to the challenge and
ordered the Eighth to Cuba in August 1898. In time their colonel was
made governor of the province of San Luis and commander of the post,
eventually becoming the senior officer of the Twenty-Third Kansas USV
and Ninth “Immunes” USV as well.4 The members of the Eighth met
and mastered the challenges of their assignment and left Cuba after nine
months of duty, with the praise of the inspector general of the U.S.
Army, among others, ringing in their ears. The Eighth’s achievement
was all the more notable in that observers at home and abroad described
it as a path-breaking experiment. The Eighth Illinois United States
Volunteers was one of the first regiments in the history of the U.S. Army
to be commanded entirely by African American men. Their colonel,
John Marshall, was among the first African American colonels ever in
federal service. African American men had struggled since the close of
the Civil War to retain and build on the symbolic and practical impor-
tance of soldiering for the Union. The Spanish American War gave
African American men their first real chance to do so in the public eye.
They did so via the National Guard. As a result of all these circum-
stances, the war and the Eighth’s role in it was of especial importance
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not only to the African American community in Illinois, but to the
broader National Guard movement as well.
Illinois sent nine infantry regiments and one cavalry regiment into
the United States Volunteers. When the members of these regiments
looked back on their war experiences, they read them as significant
benchmarks in the life of the companies and regiments to which they
belonged. Where they had been untested boys, they were now men;
where their organization had been dismissed as youthful play-acting, they
now had combat scars to prove their seriousness. Illinois guardsmen
pointed proudly to their war service to downplay the messy business of
police work during strikes, and to celebrate their role as citizen-soldiers
and honorable men, voluntarily taking up the serious and honorable
business of training in peace for war. Many guardsmen even drew some-
what strained analogies to the experience of Civil War veterans, so eager
were they to prove their own manhood on the field of battle. With serv-
ice in the Spanish American War behind them, Illinois guardsmen were
able to solidify the National Guards’ position as the nation’s reserve by
taking leading roles in the national association lobbying for stronger and
newer militia legislation. This association and its members were also able
to lay the groundwork for the centralization and intensified training of
the state militias that would prove essential for their service in World
War I.5
When they returned home from Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines,
and bases scattered across the southern United States, veterans of the
United States Volunteers told stories of manly valor and heroism, of ded-
ication and purpose, of desperate illness and logistical confusion, of ulti-
mate triumph and dramatic patriotism. These stories reflected the ways
in which these patriotic and professionally minded members of the
National Guards wished to understand and share their experiences.
These men generally understood their wartime service as a rite of pas-
sage, one that marked a distinction between youth and manhood for the
institution of the National Guards as it moved the soldiers themselves
from boy to man. In doing so, they deliberately echoed one the most
common popular understandings of the role the Civil War played for its
veterans.6 They also seized on the popular language about the war that
cast the United States in the role of the manly savior of a passively beau-
tiful and helpless female Cuba.7 Had the war been only short and easy,
their attempts might have fallen utterly flat, and as it was they were
largely hyperbolic. Nevertheless confusion, privation, sickness, and
death stalked the early days of the United States Volunteer Armies of
1898. The chaos and resulting morbidity of the early days of mobilization
lent solemnity, grief, and righteous anger to the tale of federal service
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that otherwise might have suffered from the same jingoism that pro-
pelled men to volunteer by the hundreds of thousands in the spring of
1898.8 From these experiences, ambitious and committed guardsmen
were able to craft and tell stories that ignored their reputation as strike
police and instead constructed a persuasive history of a trial by fire that
tempered and strengthened the institution and its members, proving
beyond question their manhood and their citizenship, and secured their
place as the reserve army of the United States.
Preparing and Mobilizing for War
In a paper delivered before the officers’ convention of the National
Guard of Missouri in 1897, Brigadier General Milton Moore, National
Guard of Missouri, observed that in “any future conflict in which the
United States may become involved the National Guard will form part
of the ‘first line.’ This statement requires no argument. Volunteers
entirely untrained, un-uniformed, and unarmed could not be gotten
ready for the field in less than six months.” He pointed out that under
“modern conditions a campaign might well be decided in that length of
time. Any enemy that may confront us will be one with a large force of
trained soldiers and its movements will be rapid.” To him, the conse-
quences of these observations seemed clear. “Our government will be
compelled to meet it with the best trained troops at its command which
will be the regulars and National Guard.”9 General Moore was stating
the obvious. In 1897, in comparison to European armies, the 28,000 reg-
ular soldiers of the United States “did not represent an army in any oper-
ational sense of the word,” and General Moore’s assessment of the mili-
tary readiness of the United States was widely shared. In the late nine-
teenth century, professional military strategists and unofficial military
watchers alike recognized that if the United States should enter into
war, any war, with any opponent, the only partially trained reserve avail-
able to the United States existed in the body of the state militias.10
Events in 1898 proved General Moore’s words prophetic. The United
States went to war with Spain over events in Cuba, and the president
and Congress called the state National Guards into service as the best-
trained reserve troops at their command. The leadership of the state
National Guards, ING leaders among them, seized this opportunity to
prove that they had indeed created the body of well-trained reserve
troops they had been claiming all along. The war also gave the ING, and
the rest of the state troops, the opportunity to demonstrate that the
citizen-soldier could still function well in a modern war, and to prove the
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critics in the regular Army wrong. ING members also embraced wartime
service because it provided them with the occasion to put their ideals of
responsible citizenship into action, to show that citizen-soldiers would
indeed take the plunge, leave their businesses and farms and employers,
and come when the nation called; and to show that well-trained citizens
would become soldiers at need. Nearly all Illinois guardsmen valued this
opportunity to demonstrate their active citizenship to a skeptical world,
and African American ING members were extremely dogged as they
sought to use their peacetime training and wartime service to reaffirm
their own citizenship. Finally, ING members saw in their service proof
not only of their organization’s utility and value, and of their citizenship,
but also of their own manhood—at last the equal of the generation that
fought the Civil War.
Illinois guardsmen had been seeking just such an opportunity for years.
In the winter of 1892, for example, when tensions with Chile seemed close
to breaking out into open conflict, many guardsmen eagerly sought the
war: “‘Hurrah for the war! Let’s wade right in and punch the impudence
out of Chile!’” screamed the newspaper leaders. General Fitzsimons and his
officers in the First Brigade boasted that the state could provide 4,000 well-
drilled and well-equipped men on forty-eight hours’ notice. According to
one reporter, the members of the still-independent Ninth Battalion, all
African American, were “fairly wild with enthusiasm. They want to go
down to Chile at once.”11 All of the men were eager to go into action to
prove wrong the charge that “boys who enlisted in the National Guard did
it for the social advantages it offered and that they [were] neither fit nor
anxious to go into actual service.” On the contrary, said Fitzsimons, they
did it “for the love of things military, and not for things social.” What all
Illinois militiamen, and militiamen across the country, so desperately need-
ed was a chance to prove their claims. 
On February 15, 1898, the U.S.S. Maine—in Cuba as part of the
McKinley administration’s policy of attempting to encourage the
Spanish government to find some way of negotiating peace with the
Cuban revolutionaries—exploded and sank in Havana harbor, taking
with it 266 American sailors. The most sensational American papers
immediately blamed the disaster on a Spanish mine or torpedo.12 From
all over the United States, popular expectations of war with Spain burst
forth directly after the tragedy of the Maine, undoubtedly primed by the
preceding three years’ worth of press coverage of atrocities on the island
that heavily favored the Cuban revolutionaries over the Spanish Army.
In Illinois, Governor John Tanner sent a message to the General
Assembly on February 17, 1898, requesting that before they ended their
session the state legislature authorize him to offer the president “what-
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ever moral and material support may be necessary in this emergency to
maintain the honor of the American flag and prevent or punish any
attempt at hostile invasion of our common country.”13 Both houses of
the General Assembly granted the authority without delay. As Jasper
Reece, adjutant general of Illinois, wrote in his biennial report to the
Governor for 1897–98, “[t]he thunders of a nation’s resentment filled
the air, while millions demanded that full punishment should be meted
out to those guilty of this wholesale murder.”14 These sentiments and
preparations were not isolated or unique to Illinois or to members of
state militias or state legislatures. Newspapers were filled with stories
detailing the preparations of the Army and Navy, supplemented by
careful comparisons of the Spanish and the American military estab-
lishments.15 However, all the indignation and the preparations were
tempered by the sentiment expressed in Governor Tanner’s request to
the General Assembly. Tanner asked to be able to help the president to
“prevent or punish an attempt at hostile invasions of our common
country.” In no minds but those of the most rabid expansionists was
Cuba a common country of the United States. All in all, public senti-
ment may be summed up in the words of Chicago’s Daily Inter-Ocean:
“Spain can’t whip us on this side of the Atlantic, that’s sure: we shall
not fight on the other side.”16
With the generally perceived public hesitation to openly attack Spain
without clear provocation in mind, as well as other considerations of
domestic politics and foreign interests, the McKinley administration
proposed a course seeking a diplomatic solution to the crisis precipitat-
ed by the Maine tragedy. Nevertheless, war was welcomed and even
sought by a rough coalition of expansionists and supporters of Cuban
independence during weeks of frenzied press speculation and accusations
and wild rumor mongering. The one issue holding the public in check
seemed to be the wait for the publication of the reports of the Spanish
and American boards investigating the sinking of the Maine. Once the
American report was made public, with its—unstated but implicit—
conclusion that the Maine sank as the result of the detonation of an
underwater mine, public demands for war reached a fever pitch, and
conflict was only weeks away.17
National Guard officers across the country welcomed the opportuni-
ties presented by the war and the unpreparedness of the U.S. Army to
fight it.18 The total strength of the regular army in 1898 was set at 30,000
men and officers, but the army rarely had more than 28,000 total mem-
bers. Until 1897, the regular army had been scattered across the nation
in more than two hundred small posts, and none had more than a single
regiment in residence. This small frontier constabulary was not in a
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strong position to take on the much larger, if hard-pressed, army of Spain.
It was obvious to most officers in the National Guards that their organi-
zation was the only body capable of providing the men that the nation
now required.
On April 25, 1898, Secretary of War Russell A. Alger notified gover-
nors around the country of the number and type of regiments that each
state would be responsible for raising. Graham Cosmas argues that the
“powerful” National Guard lobby—possibly the Interstate National
Guard Association (INGA), but most likely the National Guard
Association of the United States (NGAUS)—was instrumental in
arranging for the format of the volunteer army in such a way that almost
all the existing National Guard regiments across the country would be
accepted into federal service intact, up through the regimental officers.19
It must be noted that at least some governors did not choose to deploy
their existing state troops and instead chose to raise new regiments
specifically for the war with Spain.20 Nonetheless, the number of Illinois
units requested by Alger matched the number of National Guard regi-
ments that Illinois maintained. Alger cabled that it was “the wish of the
President that the regiments of the National Guard or State Militia shall
be used as far as their numbers will permit, for the reason that they are
armed, equipped and drilled.” Alger’s telegram informed Governor
Tanner that Illinois would be responsible for providing seven infantry
regiments and one cavalry regiment.21
It rapidly developed that all their best intentions and hopes aside, the
claims of the National Guard officers about the war readiness of the
National Guards were unequal to the emergency. Alger’s assumption, fos-
tered by National Guard officers in Illinois and across the nation, that
the militias were “armed, equipped and drilled,” was overly optimistic at
best, profoundly misleading at worst. Weapons were all too often the out-
dated single-shot Springfield rifle, for which no state had an adequate
supply of munitions or complete “kits”—bayonet, cartridge boxes and
belts, cleaning supplies, and so forth. Artillery companies made do, for
the most part, with muzzle-loading weapons rather than modern steel
breech-loading pieces. National Guards across the country were uni-
formed in the sense that uniforms had been purchased at various times by
the states or the units themselves and at some moment handed out to
their members, but by 1898 those uniforms often turned out to be worn
out, improperly cared for, and incomplete. Few states had included over-
coats as part of their uniform requirements, and none issued knapsacks as
standard equipment. State purchases rarely included boots of sufficient
quality to survive much serious use, and at any rate, few, if any, had re-
shod their entire guards recently. Certainly, Illinois had not. Tents, camp
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equipment, and transport wagons were discovered be in an equal state of
undersupply and poor repair. Few state guards had ever made provisions
for mess kits or other individual cooking supplies or trained their men in
the use of such implements. (Illinois was typical in this case; many, if not
most, companies messed together at camp on food often prepared for
them by hired professional cooks—a development not yet standard in
the regular Army.22) On top of all their material inadequacies, few
National Guard companies or regiments were recruited to their full
strength when the Maine sank, with the result that the units that actu-
ally served were often half or more filled with new, entirely untrained
men. Enthusiasm for the war was incredibly high, and after President
McKinley issued his call for 125,000 state volunteers on April 23 for
$13.00-a-month pay, more than a million men presented themselves to
the various militia recruitment officers around the country.23 Between
old members who failed the physical exam for federal enlistment and
members freshly accepted to complete regimental rosters, probably half
or more of the men in the National Guards/United States Volunteers
were little more than raw recruits. Illinois was no exception.
The War Department initially mustered into federal service each reg-
iment as soon as it was ready—meaning uniformed and equipped—to
take the field. For this reason, Alger urged state adjutant generals around
the country to work on supplying their regiments one by one. All seven
of the ING infantry regiments and the cavalry regiment arrived in
Springfield by noon on April 27, two days after Governor Tanner
received Secretary Alger’s orders. Even as he ordered the various
colonels to bring their regiments to Springfield, Illinois Adjutant
General Jasper N. Reece telephoned “wholesale grocers, bakers and
butchers, urging them to increase their working forces so that subsis-
tence stores of all kinds could be at the State Fair Grounds by noon
Wednesday.”24 Over the next four weeks, until the last of the eight regi-
ments responding to the first call for troops were mustered into federal
service, Reece and his staff worked feverishly to equip the ING regi-
ments for the war and supply them while in camp. Reece “telegraphed
every supply house in the country from Boston to Omaha, and purchased
everything on hand in lots from a dozen hats to two hundred leggings
and three hundred blouses, and upwards, that could be found . . . [and]
took options so far as [could be gotten], to be delivered in ten days, per-
haps sufficient to supply the seven regiments.”25 And by “sending agents
to Chicago and St. Louis, [Reece and the ING] picked up enough hats,
leggings, shoes, ponchos, and blankets, to not only relieve the most
pressing needs of the troops, but to fit them out fairly well for practical
field service.”26 Reece also struggled to get enough blankets for the troops
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“in the raw and inclement weather,” and “although the limited number
of blankets in the [open retail] market [had] nearly all been purchased by
agents of the Government,” he was successful in acquiring several thou-
sand.27 The problem Reece faced over blankets—competition with the
War Department for supplies—appeared in almost every category of sup-
ply and equipage that Reece struggled to secure for the ING. “It must be
remembered that the United States, and every State in the union, were
buying clothing and equipments for their troops; that the amount of
these articles that were on hand had been purchased at the first intima-
tion of war, and that now it was conceded to be almost an accommoda-
tion on the part of the manufacturer to listen to proposals of any kind.”28
Illinois Troops Enter Federal Service
On May 7, 1898, the Third and the Fifth ING—the first two Illinois reg-
iments with minimum-strength organizations and completely outfitted
with uniforms, weapons, and camp equipage—were mustered into feder-
al service after all their members passed the physical examination. They
were followed relatively quickly by the Sixth (May 11), Battery A (May
12), the First (May 13), the Second (May 16), the Seventh (May 18),
the Fourth (May 20), and finally the First Cavalry on May 21. The Fifth
and the Third not only had the honor of taking the federal oath ahead
of all their ING colleagues; on May 13 they were also the first regiments
to leave Illinois for Camp Thomas in Chickamauga, Georgia. Thereafter,
the various regiments were sent to one or another of the several training
camps in the South, including Chickamauga, Camp Alger outside
Washington, D.C., Camp Cuba Libre outside Jacksonville, Florida, and
the main embarkation point in Tampa, Florida.29
From the moment Illinois regiments entered the federal service, the
race was on to see which would get actual front-line service. The honor
and privilege of being ordered to Cuba or Puerto Rico was one that reg-
iments schemed and fought to attain. Reece reflected popular views
about the desirability of front-line service when he wrote of ING Battery
B’s unsuccessful attempts to be mustered into the Volunteers: “officers
and men . . . persistently pursued every honorable method within their
reach or power to be included in the volunteers from this State, and that
it was only as the result of the peremptory refusal on the part of the
National Government to accept additional troops, that they did not go
to the front with their more fortunate comrades.”30 Reece wrote these
words even after the terrible conditions of the camps and the tremendous
number of men who had fallen victim to disease were public knowledge.
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Illinois regiments that made it as far as one of the large camps were
desperate to take the next step. When the Fifth Illinois USV’s place in
the Puerto Rico expedition was given to a regiment from another state,
the third time they had lost a chance to leave Chickamauga, the officers
sent the following telegram to Governor Tanner from Chickamauga
Park, GA, on July 30, 1898.
We thank you in behalf of the 1,300 men we command for your
prompt expression of confidence in the Fifth and denial of sensation-
al lies of an irresponsible reporter. The regiment is the same loyal,
obedient and disciplined regiment it has ever been. NO orders have
been disobeyed, every duty has been performed promptly and cheer-
fully. Colonel Culver has our loyal obedience, confidence and
respect. Men and officers are disheartened and discouraged at treat-
ment they can not understand and the responsibility for which they
can not place; but they are soldiers and aside from the charge of tak-
ing about twenty dollars’ worth from hucksters by stragglers on the
march, there is not even a shadow of foundation for the sensational
lies sent to the press from here. We want you to use every effort to
put us back in our just place in the Porto Rican expedition.31
Colonel Culver himself wired Tanner with a personal “plea for justice”
for the Fifth and their moment in the sun, and the Springfield papers fol-
lowed the travails of their unit with passionate interest.32
Tanner wrote to the War Department about the Fifth and in reply
received a telegram from U.S. Adjutant General H. C. Corbin—
according to most historians of the war, the real force in the War
Department in managing the American military during 1898 and
1899—explaining the reasons for the Fifth’s loss.
Replying to your telegram asking that the Fifth Illinois Volunteer
Infantry be sent to Porto Rico you are informed that it was no fault
of the regiment, or anyone connected with it, that it was not sent.
The facts are that the First, Third and Sixth regiments of Illinois vol-
unteers were ordered to active service when it was noted by the
Department that other states had none, notably your neighbor,
Indiana. In view of this fact the commanding general at
Chickamauga was ordered to substitute an Indiana for an Illinois
regiment, and in the exercise of this discretion he selected the Fifth.
This may be and doubtless is a hardship for the regiment. It had to
be done, however, to give scant justice to the State of Indiana, and
you will say it is but fair.33
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The only infantry volunteers from Illinois who saw service outside
the United States before hostilities ended were two companies of the
Sixth Illinois USV, who took part in the Puerto Rican campaign. The
Sixth Illinois was part of the Fifth Army Corps that sailed for Cuba on
July 5 and arrived around July 15. On July 21 at least two companies
of the Sixth, I and E, were part of the expedition that sailed for Puerto
Rico. The invasion force put ashore in Guánica on July 25. Early on
July 26, the companies were involved in a brief skirmish with some
Spanish troops, with no reported casualties on either side. On the
28th, the men from Illinois marched fifteen miles east and participat-
ed in the capture of Ponce. On August 9, General Miles, commanding
the Puerto Rican expedition, who had previously arranged his troops
into four columns, ordered them to break camp and begin their assault
on the Spanish forces concentrated in San Juan on the northern side
of the island. The two Illinois companies were part of the column sent
through the interior across the mountains on a newly discovered trail
that led from Guánica to Arecibo. An armistice ended the fighting on
August 12, and the companies E and I stopped in Utuado, were they
stayed until the 25th, when they received orders to return to Ponce
and await orders to head for New York. The orders arrived on
September 6.34
The rest of the Illinois regiments served between July 1898 and May
1899 in a variety of postings at home and abroad.35 In brief, the First
Illinois just missed seeing combat in Cuba and served in a garrison
there from July 9 until August 29, when, burdened by illness, they
were relieved by the Eighth Illinois. The Second Illinois went to Cuba
in December of 1898, after spending six months at camps in
Jacksonville, Florida, and Savannah, Georgia. They stayed through
April 3, 1899. The Third Illinois was in Puerto Rico from July 31
through November 9. The Fourth Illinois had the distinction of hav-
ing spent the longest amount of time in federal service, almost a full
year, from May 20, 1898, to May 2, 1899. The Fourth Illinois arrived
in Cuba in January of 1899 for garrison duty and left on April 5. The
Fifth and the Seventh Illinois, along with the First Cavalry, never left
the United States. The Eighth served in Cuba from August 16, 1898
to March 15, 1899. The Sixth also served briefly in Puerto Rico, July
25 through September 13, as did Battery A.36 (See appendix G.) The
two most dramatic wartime experiences, however, belonged to the
First and the Eighth. The First limped home almost decimated by dis-
ease, and in their place, the Eighth earned high praise for the behav-
ior of their officers and men.
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Tragedy for the First Regiment
The First Regiment, ING, of Chicago paid the highest price for active serv-
ice in 1898. The First was sworn into federal service as the First Illinois
United States Volunteers on May 13, 1898, at Camp Tanner. Three days
later, the First left Springfield for Chickamauga Park, GA and arrived on
May 19. For the next two weeks, the First endured firsthand the disarray cre-
ated by the sudden mobilization. Thirty-five thousand volunteers had
arrived in Chickamauga by May 21. The ordnance and commissary bureaus
of the War Department almost collapsed under the strain of attempting to
supply and feed such a large number of men. Although the War Department
eventually sorted out its supply problems, it would not be until almost the
end of June that logistics were running smoothly. In the meantime, the First
was moved several times, unfortunately from one bad situation to another,
especially from a medical point of view. The Army, in general, was unpre-
pared to cope with large troops of men ignorant of the most basic health and
sanitary precautions, and some general officers were unprepared for the
number and seriousness of the infractions. From a medical perspective,
Chickamauga and Tampa were two of the unhealthiest camps, and the
members of the First began to fall ill even before they left for Cuba.37 On
June 4 the First arrived in Tampa, and on June 8 relieved a regular infantry
regiment stationed on Picnic Island, Port Tampa.
On June 30, the First embarked for Santiago, Cuba, and arrived on
July 10. Once in Cuba, the regiment spent a week in the trenches sur-
rounding Santiago, then it moved into the San Juan Hills and began
guarding Spanish prisoners on July 22. During their two months of serv-
ice in Cuba, members of the First were increasingly vulnerable to the
true killers of the Spanish American War, diseases—mostly malaria and
dysentery, with increasing incidence of yellow fever, though all forms of
illness related to bad water and unsanitary conditions were rampant. By
early August, men were dying in every company, and the sick lists were
growing.38 As Cosmas wrote, “disease wrecked the Fifth Corps at
Santiago almost before General Shafter could consolidate his victory
over the Spaniards.”39 Out of twenty thousand U.S. troops in Cuba on
July 27, four thousand were in the hospitals. By August 1, the Fifth
Corps was dying at the rate of fifteen men a day. Thousands of men died
of yellow fever, and thousands more suffered through malaria. Malaria
rarely killed the soldiers who contracted it; it only left them weak and
feverish, unable to digest their food. Often found in combination with
dysentery, malaria left its victims emaciated and hollow eyed as well.
Most of the sufferers from malaria and related illnesses never reported
sick; they just stumbled through their duties as best they could.40
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The First was harder hit than any Illinois regiment in Cuba, and before
their service with the USV Infantry was over, eighty-seven men out of 1,300
had died of disease or injury (see appendix H).41 At one point, only forty-four
of some 320 men of the First detailed to Siboney were able to answer at roll
call.42 The commander of the First appealed to Governor Tanner and to the
War Department to release his men from constant exposure to diseases and
death. United States Adjutant General Corbin himself wrote to Governor
Tanner that the “main trouble with our troops now in Cuba is that they are
suffering from exhaustion and exposure incident to one of the most trying
campaigns to which soldiers have ever been subjected.”43 The War
Department offered Illinois the chance to replace the First with another reg-
iment if one was willing to go immediately to Cuba to take the place of the
First.44 Even then, some members of the First, like Pvt. Cary T. Ray, remained
frustrated by their “missing out” on more impressive duty: “Held back on the
way to Tampa, by circumstances beyond our Control, and POSSIBLY jeal-
ousy on someone’s part . . . we did NOT have the opportunity given anoth-
er or two Volunteer Infantry Regiments.” And, “don’t forget this: THE
FIRST ILLINOIS VOLUNTEER INFANTRY, did everything it was
ALLOWED TO DO, in the Campaign.”45
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Figure 9
Fourth Infantry leaving Savannah, Georgia, for Cuba, January 3, 1899. Courtesy of
the Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library. Photographer: Unknown.
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Triumph for the Eighth Illinois
The tragedy of the First Illinois provided the Eighth Illinois with its
golden opportunity. If the declaration of war with Spain presented wel-
come challenges to National Guardsmen in general, it presented far
greater opportunities to the African American companies of the
National Guards. Laboring under the handicaps of prejudice, oppression,
and disinterest, African Americans nevertheless had managed to hold
volunteer companies together in almost all states for longer or shorter
periods of time, and many of these companies managed to secure a place
in their respective state’s militia organizations.46 African American men
in Illinois maintained an almost steady military presence for the thirty
years from 1870 to 1900, both within and outside of the state militia
structure. By 1898, African Americans were supporting a four-company
ING battalion located in Chicago.
When the first call for Illinois National Guard troops for service in
the federal army issued in April of 1898 did not include the Ninth
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Figure 10
First Infantry troops entering their Armory, returning from the Spanish American
War, September 10, 1898. Courtesy of the Chicago Historical Society.
Photographer: E. Hergt. iCHi-39625.
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Battalion, many in the African American community feared that
between prejudice, racism, and the recent, highly politicized court mar-
tial of their Colonel John Buckner, the Ninth would be left out of the
spoils of war.47 A committee headed by Captain John R. Marshall, Co A,
Ninth Battalion ING, approached Governor Tanner, and was somewhat
reassured when Tanner explained that the War Department had request-
ed seven regiments from Illinois for service in the United States
Volunteer Army, and as the ING had seven full regiments already, there
was no place for an unattached battalion. Tanner nevertheless promised
that if there should be a second call for troops from Illinois, he would
allow the Ninth to recruit a full regiment, and he would call that regi-
ment first.48
The president issued a second call for more troops on May 25, and
Tanner kept his word to the Ninth and summoned them to Springfield.
Unofficial recruitment had been going on for some weeks, but now it
began in earnest. On July 1, 1898, the new Eighth Regiment, ING
arrived at Camp Tanner, outside Springfield, and commenced the final,
frenzied efforts to bring the new regiment up to full strength. Goode
noted in his history of the Eighth that the full regiment could have been
recruited out of Chicago, but the adjutant general decided that six com-
panies would come from Chicago, and six from various locations down-
state. John Marshall was acting colonel of the Eighth Infantry, ING, but
after the regiment was sworn into U.S. service, there was a period of con-
cern about who the final staff officers would be. Marshall, born and raised
in Virginia and trained as a stonemason, moved to Chicago in 1880,
where he worked for many years for a large contractor. He joined the
Ninth Battalion early on and believed he had been instrumental in
securing their place in the USV, and he very much wanted the top job.49
There were a number of other African American aspirants for the posi-
tion of colonel of the new Eighth Illinois USV as well, including recent-
ly suspended John Buckner and Charles G. Young of Ohio—one of the
early African American graduates of West Point. There were also white
men who sought commissions with the Eighth in the hopes of going to
the front sooner, and with an important commission, “but, believing that
this race should have the opportunity to show the country at large
whether or not its members possessed the ability to govern themselves,
and in a spirit of ‘fair play’ [Governor Tanner] determined, and carried
into effect [his] idea the Negroes could, and in this case should, be com-
manded by Negroes.”50 Ending all further speculation, on July 23, 1898,
John R. Marshall was sworn in as a colonel in the United States Army
along with his staff, all African American men.51
The commissioning of Marshall was a truly significant departure from
Death, Manhood, and Service 147
Hannah_CH5_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  2:55 PM  Page 147
previous practice and was recognized as such by all concerned. The adju-
tant general of Illinois wrote that the “Eighth Infantry organization is
composed of men of the Afro-American race throughout, from the
Colonel to the last name on the roster of Company M.”52 The newspa-
pers hailed the remarkable step, as did the governor himself. Tanner
addressed the Eighth after the regiment had joined the USV forces,
telling them, “even from the very doors of the White House have I
received letters asking and advising me not to officer this regiment with
colored men, but I promised to do so, and I have done it.”53 Even the
“men who raised provisional regiments in Chicago” and who were des-
perate to join the war effort conceded “that the colored troops should
have preference” when the second call for troops came.54 Not all
Illinoisans were quite so supportive, and the editor of the Illinois State
Journal chastised critics of the Eighth for their treasonable instincts and
their “outrageous and wholly unjustifiable attacks” on the “character and
conduct of the volunteers who have enlisted in the colored regiment
now at Camp Tanner.”55 Now all that the Eighth needed was a trial by
arms to prove that faith in African American officers had not been
misplaced.
When the news of the ailing First reached Illinois, it was the moment
the Eighth had been waiting for. Colonel Marshall immediately ten-
dered the services of the Eighth to replace the First, and the War
Department promptly accepted the offer. “The Secretary of War appre-
ciates very much the offer of the Eighth Illinois Volunteer Infantry for
duty in Santiago, and has directed that the regiment be sent there by
steamer Yale, leaving New York next Tuesday.”56 So on August 9, 1898,
the Eighth regiment received orders directing them to Cuba.
Meanwhile, the First was moved back from the front lines, and on
August 25 the regiment boarded a boat for home, arriving back in
Chicago on September 10, 1898. In the end, eighty-seven men of the
First Illinois Volunteer Infantry died of illness acquired while in the fed-
eral service.57
One reason that the offer of the Eighth Illinois was accepted was the
popular (and quite false) notion that certain types of people, in particu-
lar African Americans, would be less susceptible to the kind of illness
rampant in Cuba because of their supposed acclimation to the sun and
heat and their general physical hardiness.58 As it was, the Eighth Illinois
indeed stayed quite healthy, especially in comparison to other Illinois
units that saw service in Cuba or Puerto Rico.59 The health of Marshall’s
command was the result of a happy confluence of events. The Eighth
Illinois never spent any time in the large southern training camps estab-
lished for the volunteer forces that became epicenters for spreading all
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types of camp diseases. They arrived in Cuba after the logistics of supply-
ing an occupying army had been worked out by the War Department,
and exposure to the various tropical diseases had given army doctors time
to acquire much-needed experience in treating them. Finally, Marshall
demanded an extremely high standard of camp sanitation, which worked
to keep his men alive during their stay in Cuba.60
The Eighth arrived at Guantánamo Bay on the morning of August 14,
1898, and the regiment disembarked in Santiago the following after-
noon. On the 17th of August, the First Battalion of the Eighth Illinois
USV left for San Luis to take charge of the Spanish prisoners there, and
the rest of the regiment followed a few days later. Once there, Colonel
John Marshall was appointed governor of the province of San Luis and
commander of the post.61 Later, a detachment under Major Robert
Jackson, made up of two companies, was sent to Palma Soriano, a largish
town some 20 miles into the hills from San Luis, to keep the peace there
between the Spanish and the Cubans. The two companies performed
garrison duty in Palma Soriano until February 1899, though Major
Jackson returned to the main body of the regiment after a few weeks.62
Meanwhile, in San Luis, Colonel Marshall moved the regiment into
the old Spanish barracks in town and began to institute the policies of
the American occupation, including sanitation and Capitalism
American-style. McCard and Turnley wrote that as payday for the troops
was regular and large amounts were spent among the local merchants,
soon “listlessness and stagnation gave way to activity and life. The store-
keepers commenced to put on their shelves delicacies and foods that
would tickle only an American’s palate. American beer was soon to be
had on every hand.”63 Eight members of the Eighth married Cuban
women (though at least two left their wives behind when they returned
to the States).64 At least two officers’ wives, Mrs. John Marshall and Mrs.
Robert Jackson, joined their husbands in Cuba, along with at least one
of their children.65
It was never far from the minds of the soldiers of the Eighth that they
were constantly being judged as representatives of their race, and as the
test case for the honor and merit of their African American officers. Dr.
Curtis, first lieutenant and company surgeon, wrote home: “The state-
ment heretofore made that colored officers could not command colored
soldiers will never be made again. If it is, our only reply will be to point
to the Eighth, and to examine her records as kept in the imperishable
archives of the War Department . . . We realize the fact that we are mak-
ing history for our race, and we are willing to make the sacrifice.”66
Thus it was all the more distressing for members of the Eighth when a
disturbance caused by members of the Ninth Immunes USV, an African
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American volunteer regiment raised from four southern states and com-
manded by white officers, was laid at their door. The Twenty-third
Kansas USV, an African American battalion that also had African
American officers except for its colonel and lieutenant colonel, and the
Ninth Immunes were stationed at San Luis with the Eighth Illinois. The
Eighth was billeted in the town of San Luis proper, and the Twenty-third
Kansas and the Ninth Immunes were encamped nearby. Some enlisted
personnel of the Ninth Immunes got into a shooting fight with a few
Cuban policemen, and Colonel Marshall was the officer who intervened
and put a stop to further conflict. The situation was “thoroughly inves-
tigated” by Major General Henry W. Lawton, who reported to
Lieutenant General Henry C. Corbin that there was “no foundation
whatever for [the] report” of disorder in the Eighth Illinois at San Luis.67
For his good judgment and prompt action, Colonel Marshall’s position
as provisional governor was extended to make him commander of the
post, or the senior officer to the colonel of the Ninth Immunes, as well.
The result of this action was to have word go out that at Colonel
Marshall’s post, soldiers were disorderly and undisciplined.68 Another
result was a new policy that placed all United States soldiers in camp
some three miles from San Luis proper.69 Nevertheless, despite having at
least one senior army officer in Cuba whom Goode believed was dis-
posed to find the Eighth always problematic, Colonel Marshall retained
the confidence of his immediate superiors and kept his offices until the
Eighth left Cuba.70
The Eighth uniformly impressed all the visitors who made an effort to
see them. A correspondent from a New York paper quoted by Goode wit-
nessed a dress parade held one evening for the benefit of a visiting
English officer and reported that “the men presented a splendid appear-
ance. They have mastered the intricacies of the drill. Their even mili-
tary movement is a thing of beauty.”71 On the subject of African
American officers, the reporter noted, “[t]he man who thinks the Negro
will not obey officers of his race has but to visit the camps of the Eighth
Illinois.”72 The reporter suggested that one reason for the success of the
command was that there was “no prejudice here on account of a man’s
color, the Negro soldier is treated the same as other soldiers are.”73 The
reporter also had praise for Colonel Marshall: “I found him an affable,
pleasing military gentleman, unaffected by the grave responsibilities
resting upon him and void of the arrogance assumed by the average
white officer.”74
On the occasion of their last inspection by the Inspector General in
Cuba, the Eighth outdid themselves. General Breckenridge, U.S.
Inspector General, and Brigadier General E. P. Ewers inspected the
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Eighth on March 6, 1899. When the inspection was complete, “General
Breckenridge said to our Colonel, ‘It is a shame to muster out of service
such a regiment. It is as fine a volunteer regiment as was ever mustered
into the service.’”75 General Ewers said that the planning of the camp
outside San Luis was among the finest in Cuba, and the medical inspec-
tor complimented the surgeons on the sanitary conditions prevalent in
their wards.76
Manhood and Wartime Service
After the men from Illinois were mustered out of federal service, many
turned their attention toward recording the history of their wartime duty
before the passage of time faded their memories. Several of the regiments
or companies published one or more books or articles containing their
service histories, and others produced individual memoirs of their expe-
riences. One of the most common images that are shared by many of
these memoirists and writers is their vision of Spanish American War
service as marking the border between youth and adulthood, for them-
selves and also for the Illinois National Guard as an institution. Chaplain
H. W. Bolton, in his history of the Second regiment, boasted, “[T]he old
warriors of the Civil War were constrained to acknowledge that their
experience could recall no examples of loftier enthusiasm, more vigorous
manhood, more complete forgetfulness of self than were shown by the
boys of ’98.”77 By exhibiting their “vigorous manhood” as they marched
to war, the boys of the Second showed themselves on the cusp of adult-
hood even as their forgetfulness of self demonstrated their grasp of the
essentials of republican citizenship. In the same vein, Chaplain John R.
Skinner of the Fourth regiment wrote that the “composite of this regi-
ment is of the young blood and sturdy manhood of central Illinois, com-
ing from the fields of her thrifty farmers, the shops, stores, and officers of
her provident towns.”78 These writers celebrate images of youth and man-
hood, united in ING guardsmen on the cusp of war, a war that would turn
them into men.
Many Illinois guardsmen firmly believed that the war, especially the
hardships and death, turned Illinois boys into men the equal of the Civil
War generation. A somber collection of photographs published by the
First Regiment of Chicago in 1899, all taken by Claron S. Wagar, a mem-
ber of the regiment who died during his term of service, show increasing-
ly rough and lean soldiers who have fully made the transformation from
youthful jauntiness to hardened adult veterans during their painful term
of service.79 The collection of images stands as mute testimony to the
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hard-won experiences of wartime. John F. Kendrick, himself a victim of
yellow fever while in Cuba, wrote a long memoir entitled “The Mid-
Summer Picnic of ’98,” offering a “slap at those who don’t understand
that a short campaign in a short war can be deadly.”80 Lieutenant J. H.
Parker, also of the First Infantry, offered the following praise to his fel-
lows at a banquet in December 1898, just a few months after they
returned from Cuba, calling them “men who are sweet to see again with
the realizing sense that having quitted themselves like men and soldiers
they are now returned to the bosoms of their families and to the enjoy-
ment of the laurels they have so justly won.” He went on, “we were com-
rades, and we are bound by the dearest ties of mature manhood—ties
that were formed on the field of battle where we faced together all the
dangers of that awful time of sickness and suffering in the siege of
Santiago.”81 The dangers, the sickness, the suffering, and the death of the
Spanish American War turned the youthful males of Illinois into mature
men.
Extending the metaphor of growing up from the soldiers to their
organization, Skinner described the “childhood and youth of [his] mili-
tary organization” prior to their embarkation for southern training
camps, and the service that would mark its passage into adulthood.82 R.
S. Bunzey echoed Skinner when he referred to the “infancy” of the
Illinois National Guard during the 1870s and 1880s, especially in com-
parison to its status after returning home from wartime service.83 The
historians of these Illinois companies and regiments all concluded that
wartime service had ultimately made their organizations stronger. In
writing of their wartime service, these guardsmen historians seized the
opportunity to make the case for the respect and praise they believed
their organizations had justly earned through their service to their state
and their nation during wartime. Bolton included admiring press reports
of the Second that echoed his sentiments. From the Chicago Evening
Post, the members of Second Regiment “have shown themselves to be
well-disciplined and true soldiers.”84 The maturing effects of wartime
service proved enduring. Writing two years after returning home, Bunzey
of the Sixth Regiment noted approvingly the way “the military spirit
which had enveloped and swayed our people from one end of the coun-
try to the other during the late war, had left its effects on the youths
through the land and they were anxious to become connected with the
State troops.”85 These youths wanted the connection to the mature men
who had returned, and the organization they served with, because it
could make men of them, too.
If white guardsmen felt their identity as men and citizens was at stake
in their participation in the United States Volunteers, for African
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American guardsmen the situation was far more acute. They believed
that war service would not only test their manhood, it would display it
for the world in a way that they hoped it could never be questioned
again. W. T. Goode opens his history of the Eighth Illinois U.S.
Volunteers, “Far back in the early seventies the desire for military organ-
ization first began to inspire the hearts of the leading colored men of the
state of Illinois. . . . As early as 1870 this military spirit and feeling bub-
bled up in the hearts of the colored men in Illinois, and like the subter-
ranean activity of a passive volcano, kept constantly bubbling, burning
and boiling up until it reached the crater of their ambition. The lava of
aspiration, overflowing the open apex of the mountain of ‘Success,’ crept
down its steep slopes until its warmth had animated the ambition of the
entire colored population of the commonwealth.”86 These images dra-
matically capture the powerful feelings harnessed to military symbols and
membership by late nineteenth-century Americans in general, and by
African American men in particular. For African American men, the
symbolism of military service was especially evocative because of the her-
itage of the African American troops who fought in the Civil War, for
the Union Army and for their own freedom from the stifling confines of
slavery.
Tanner’s actions on their behalf were not forgotten by the men of the
Eighth, and he received much praise from them for his decision to insist
the U.S. government take African American officers along with their
men into the federal service. “To his Excellency, John R. Tanner, the able
and fearless executive of the great State of Illinois, who believes and who
has the courage of his convictions, that it is the heart, the brain, the soul,
not the skin, that go to determine manhood; who acting upon this belief
and upon the fundamental principle of this government that ‘taxation
without representation is tyranny,’ had the manhood to appoint colored
officers to command a Colored Regiment, this book is affectionately ded-
icated.”87 Harry McCard and Henry Turnley presented the experience of
the Eighth Illinois USV during the Spanish American War as the final
and unanswerable argument that African American males had manhood
the equal of their white comrades in arms, up to and especially including
the ability to command themselves and the obedience of others.
Honorable wartime service was regarded as the final proof of African
American manhood, to which there was no possible rational or serious
reply. The linkage of the ability to command obedience, the expectation
of being treated equally and fairly under the law, and service in war
expressed by McCard and Turnley in the dedication of their memorial
souvenir volume about the exploits of the Eighth Illinois indicates the
complexity of the ideas and feelings that surrounded military service in
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general and the citizen-soldier in particular. This complex of ideas
expressed by McCard and Turnley suggests that what was at stake was
not manhood as the opposite of womanhood, but manhood as the oppo-
site of childhood. Adult men voted, paid taxes, and served in the
nation’s armed forces, all on an equal basis. As African American men
voted and paid taxes, it seemed only just that the third of this basic
litany of the responsibilities of citizenship should be open to African
American men. To be allowed to serve only as enlisted personal was an
obvious stigma that symbolically and practically limited the citizenship
extended to African American men to that of dependents, children
unfit to make decisions or command authority. To serve as officers,
therefore, would symbolically extend full citizenship to a group long
denied recognition as fully adult members of society.
McCard and Turnley elaborated on the challenges faced by African
American men within the armed forces to achieve recognition for
accomplishments as leaders as well as followers of men. Although it had
been assumed since the Revolution, and proven decisively in the Civil
War, that African American men made ideal private soldiers, theirs
“heretofore, was to obey, not to command. They were always to be led,
never to lead. Though his shoulders were broad, they were too narrow to
bear the gilded shoulder straps. Though his hands were strong, they were
too brawny to wield the commander’s glittering sword.”88 But with the
commissioning of Marshall and his staff, Governor Tanner forced the
U.S. Army to indulge in an unprecedented experiment. The only
remaining question was whether or not the Eighth would ever have the
opportunity to serve the nation outside its borders, or whether members
of the regiment would be condemned to languish in camp for the dura-
tion of their service and with no opportunity to demonstrate that the
faith in them had not been misplaced.
The consequences of the historic events surrounding the Eighth
Illinois were profound on both the personal level and the institutional
level. On a personal level, Marshall himself was able to parlay his expe-
riences to an appointment as a deputy sheriff of Cook County. Several
of the junior officers of the Eighth were so keen on their military expe-
riences that they accepted lieutenants’ commissions in the regular army
and joined the fighting in the Philippines with the African American
regiments there, and several enlisted men also joined the regular army.
Institutionally, the Eighth secured a permanent home in the ING that
was never challenged again, and the Army itself, though slowly and with
much foot dragging, began to commission African American men as
officers on a more regular basis.
The efforts of the volunteers to make true soldiers of themselves were
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not always applauded during the Spanish American War, but as their
service lengthened, guardsmen were able to make an ever-stronger case
for the importance of their prior training to the well-being of the nation’s
military system. Even if their term of service was not all that they hoped
for, or close to equaling the experiences of the Civil War veterans,
guardsmen were firm in their conviction that they had proven their met-
tle as men and soldiers. The guardsmen themselves saw their story as one
of coming of age, of a time when they proved themselves men and sol-
diers, citizens and warriors. In the words of Colonel Francis A. Riddle:
A hero, loving his kind, scorning outrage and defying despotism,
stood beneath our victorious banner in the plain of Mars. Born in the
new world, educated in her common schools, he grasped the standard
of our blood-bought republic, and with no purpose but to set the
stranger free, he had carried it with added lustre upon a mission as
sacred as any in which men of high courage and exalted sentiment
ever enlisted.89
From their wartime service, guardsmen were at last able to earn the insti-
tution of the National Guards the long sought official recognition for
their efforts to become citizen-soldiers.
Passing the Test of War
After the end of Reconstruction in 1877, the U.S. Congress, despite
repeated calls to develop a new military structure for the nation, returned
to antebellum traditions of maintaining a very small standing army while
simultaneously ignoring calls for any serious reform of the militia system.
Professional strategists, regular military officers, and unofficial observers
had been complaining about the state militia system for decades, to little
avail. They had developed dozens if not hundreds of schemes to improve
the militia system to better meet the need for effective and efficient
training. As a result, there was a variety of proposals for what the state
militias could and should be floating around Washington, D.C. and var-
ious state capitals. These plans ranged from a completely federalized
reserve army in training; to temporary troops to hold the line until vol-
unteers could be raised, supplied, and trained; to a coastal defense league
consisting primarily of heavy artillery battalions.90 Some in the military
had also proposed altogether new federal reserve systems as alternatives
to the state militias.91 But no one reform proposal gained momentum,
and after 1899 these and other alternative missions and their attendant
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political positions and recruitment strategies fell by the wayside, and the
National Guards emerged as the nation’s active reserve army.
National Guardsmen emerged from the Spanish American War
heady with triumph that they had produced the first-line reserve forces
for the nation. They believed that they had demonstrated to the world
that they could perform, more or less, as advertised—and certainly as
well as the regular army itself. By the late 1890s, National Guardsmen,
particularly in western states like Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Michigan,
had been calling for public and private support and new members for
more than two decades, on the grounds that they were training the boys
who would be the men who would serve the nation in need. They had
managed to achieve incremental growth of state and federal militia
budgets, and forge ever-closer ties to the federal army via inspectors and
instructors. The money and the training had produced visible results in
increasing professionalization and standardization among the National
Guards. Pointing to their real achievements, dedicated National
Guardsmen around the country insisted that they had indeed become a
reserve army even before the war with Spain.92 The most potent chal-
lenge to their claim was the charge that they were little more than play
soldiers, boys who knew nothing of real war.93 The Spanish American
War offered National Guardsmen the opportunity they had been seek-
ing to prove that they, and their institution, were indeed the reserve
army they believed themselves to be.
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CHAPTER 6
Lessons Learned: 
The ING and Strike
Duty, 1894–1916
As to the general situation . . . it appeared that the local authorities
had made no effort to control the situation.1
—Captain C. C. Craig, Artillery Battalion, Battery B, ING
From 1877 onward, members of the Illinois militia accepted strike duty
as a normal component of their civic obligations and a reasonable
exchange for the support they were given by their communities.
Nonetheless, in 1900 the Illinois adjutant general proposed mechanisms
to remove the Illinois National Guard from strike duty in the future. A
number of different developments combined to lead Illinois guardsmen
to the conclusion that strike duty was best avoided. In part, guardsmen
pulled away from strike service because of the ongoing professionaliza-
tion of their training practices. Beginning in the 1870s, guardsmen cele-
brated their role as a reserve army in training, with explicit training for
war the center of their weekly regimen. As their training practices grew
more professional and rigorous throughout the 1880s and 1890s, so did
their focus on themselves as members of a reserve army.2 Strike duty
became a distraction, miring guard units in messy local political situa-
tions for which their training was mostly useless and in which they could
not hope to shine. Further complicating matters, in Illinois, guardsmen
recruited and raised money based on their presentation of themselves as
dashing and patriotic citizens, and not as uniformed strike breakers,
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home invaders, or, on rare occasions, killers; these were thankless tasks
that fell their way during strike duty in the 1880s and later, tasks that
compromised their presentation as worthy and honorable men. Finally,
strikes themselves also changed, growing more charged, more acrimo-
nious, organized, and bitter, and in some cases far more violent than any-
thing guardsmen had encountered in the 1870s.3
Strike service in 1894, from 1898 to 1899, and again from 1904 to
1905, dramatically illustrated the unbridgeable gulf between what
guardsmen wanted to be doing and the messy realities of strike duty.
Illinois National Guard officers began actively questioning their part in
strike service during the mine strikes of 1894, which overlapped with the
strikes that radiated outward from the infamous events in Pullman and
led to a banner year for ING active duty. Their stance hardened further
after service during particularly bitter coal strikes in Pana and Virden in
the period from 1898 to 1899, and in Ziegler from 1904 to 1905. Based
on these experiences, ING leaders developed the firm conviction that in
many instances of strike service, they were being used to cover for cow-
ardly local politicians, feckless county sheriffs, and craven mine opera-
tors who had failed to do their jobs, and they resented the cost to them-
selves in terms of reputation and money. After the events in Ziegler in
1904 to 1905, Illinois National Guard officers managed to evade being
called out for strike duty through 1916, while still professing their devo-
tion to protecting public order.
Growing Criticism of Strike Duty
Over the two decades between 1877 and 1898, ING officers grew more
willing to critique county sheriffs or other local law enforcement offi-
cials, namely, U.S. marshals, for their behavior prior to and following the
request for state military intervention. Illinois National Guard officers
began to argue that militia presence more often than not indicated an
unacceptable breakdown of local law and order maintenance through
the willful abdication of authority by local officials. When they made
this argument, ING officers had a long list of strikes to point to as exam-
ples. (See appendixes C and D.) Collectively, ING officers had more
experience with strike duty than those of any other state militia in these
years, mostly owing to the many labor struggles in the coalfields of cen-
tral Illinois, and their attitude reflected that experience.4 Before 1893,
ING officials never expressed an official judgment on the job the sheriff
did or failed to do in handling the events in his jurisdiction himself,
though the officers did find cause to criticize. Even then, ING officers
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recorded their frustration with the way in which some sheriffs requested
aid and then declined to even show up to provide the formal leadership
by civil authorities that the ING sought in their early experiences polic-
ing strike-related disorders.5 After 1894 ING officers never hesitated to
critique sheriffs if they felt it was warranted.
Beginning with the calls to police mine-strike–related turbulence in
1894, ING officers grew much bolder in expressing their opinions about
the poor jobs sheriffs had made of handling strike-related events prior to
issuing a call for state aid. In the twelve strikes dating from 1894 where
they offered judgments in the biennial reports, officers praised sheriffs for
fully exhausting their resources before turning to the state for military
intervention only four times. In six cases, officers stated that the sheriff
had failed to act promptly or with enough force to prevent outbreaks of
violence, and in two cases, ING officers did not endorse either position
but expressed doubt about the sheriff ’s actions prior to the appeal for
state aid. By 1905, with nearly three decades of experience policing
strike-related disorders behind them, ING officers reached the conclu-
sion that most calls for their aid in strike situations ought to have been
unnecessary and were reflections on the poor ability or failure of will on
the part of local authorities to act to prevent disorder within their juris-
dictions. To be sure, such a conclusion was self-serving. It blamed others
for problems that the ING was not well equipped to solve and suggested
that they should not get involved in these difficult situations in the first
place. It shifted responsibility from the state down to the county or city
and removed the ING from the question of the proper role of the state in
responding to contentious labor disputes.
The officers in charge of these strike-related periods of active duty
may have shared increasingly critical attitudes about strikes and local
sheriffs in their official reports, but they did not question the role of the
state in responding to what they did view as dangerously volatile situa-
tions. In 1892, Colonel William S. Brackett, inspector general for the
ING, published a paper entitled “The Rising Menace Against the Peace
of American Society,” in which he insisted that the National Guards
stood between “ignorant and unguided men” and the safety of American
society.6 Brackett went on to argue that “the National Guard, as the pre-
server of peace and public order, has proved itself to be the ‘security of a
free state.’ The state troops of New York, of Pennsylvania, of Illinois, and
of Wisconsin, have again and again, and yet again, enforced the mandate
of the sovereign power that there must and shall be peace [sic].”7 Brackett
concluded, “There are thousands of ignorant and misguided men in a
great city like Chicago, who fondly believe they could establish their
propaganda of revolution if they could but once thoroughly ‘down the
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police’ and the First and Second regiments of the city. Little do they
dream what the military power of the United States is.”8 Like most other
commentators of the time, Brackett drew careful distinctions between
struggling but honest men and the minority of immigrant radicals who
would lead them astray, and he roundly condemned the “game of grab”
that motivated the nation’s corporate elite.9 Nonetheless, he placed the
highest possible value on orderly means to resolve difficulties, and he
staunchly defended the possible role of the military, both regular and
state troops, in keeping the peace.
The most that can be said of officers’ views of strikers is that they
were complex. The attitudes of enlisted men are more difficult to deter-
mine, but some, at least, had no need to appear gentle with regard to
strikers. Some embraced strike duty as a central part of state-soldiering.
In 1883, after the shooting at the mine in Belleville, Thomas J. Morton,
sergeant, Company F, Fifth Regiment, was featured in the following
news story.
[Morton] states that he and another Sergeant were on the platform
of one of the cars as the shooting began. His Captain, Fahenstock,
was on the lower step, getting down, and just at that moment
Morton saw a man fire deliberately with a revolver at the Captain.
The bullet sped high, and Morton says both he and the other
Sergeant felt or heard the sharp whistle as it passed over their heads.
Morton immediately raised his gun and fired at the man, but missed
him. The man ran off a little distance and turning, fired again, and
then ran for the bluff. Morton, having slipped another cartridge in
his gun, took deliberate aim at the fellow and fired again. The man
dropped dead. Morton says other shots were fired at the same time,
and he does not know that he killed the man, but he does know that
he shot at him, and would do it again under the same
circumstances.10
Like Thomas Morton of the Fifth Regiment, historian of the Second
Regiment Horace Bolton believed that strikers and rioters were inter-
changeable, and that they deserved what ever they got. Bolton made his
own sympathies plain when he wrote of the 1894 Pullman Strike: “the
aid of the all-powerful American Railway Union was invoked, with the
result that in a short space of time the entire railroad system was tied up,
a reign of terror had been established, and the utmost efforts of the civil
authorities to establish order were fruitless.”11 For his fellow members of
the Second, Bolton had nothing but praise. “In fact it is difficult to
determine which merited the greater approbation, the steadiness, cool-
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ness and self-possession of the Guardsmen while the commands of their
Captain held them in check, or the dash and resolution with which they
took the offensive when their commander decided that bloodshed could
no longer be avoided.”12 Of his service with the First Regiment during the
1894 strikes, in Pana and then later that summer in Pullman, Cary T. Ray
wrote that it was “an attempt to stop all traffic, and something President
Grover Cleveland could not tolerate. He said—THE MAIL MUST GO
[sic]. And then U.S. and National Guard troops were ordered into
action.”13
On another occasion, in 1898, during strike service in Virden, the
engineer assigned to the train that was to carry the first troops to the
scene of the firefight refused to drive the train, out of sympathy with the
strikers. The ING officer in charge quickly discovered that he had among
his membership a former engineer who was willing to take over the run-
ning of the train to get the troops to the scene. Although there is no
other information about the ING member, it is certainly suggestive of
general ING member attitudes that he no longer felt any obligation to
the striking miners, if he ever had, or at least, not enough to override his
commitment to the ING.14 On the other hand, Ray of the First Regiment
recorded that at the start of his company’s service in Pullman, their sec-
ond lieutenant, W. G. Adkins, resigned, having “decided not to contin-
ue in the Service.”15 Ray doesn’t offer more than this explanation, but the
timing is certainly interesting.
Of course, much as some of the ING members who wrote about their
experiences during strike duty praised their own efforts, disparaged the
strikers, and saw their service as “impress[ing] upon the rioters that the
community would and could be protected against their lawless attempts
to overthrow the safeguards thrown around it by the strong arm of law
and justice,” they performed strike duty because they had to, not because
they sought it out.16 Bunzey, the historian of the Sixth Regiment, digni-
fied strike duty with only the story of a slain pig—and of the panicked
young man who feared briefly that he had murdered someone. Bolton of
the Second Regiment did manage to include a much longer complaint
that forty-nine cents a day was not enough to convince men with “good
positions, commanding good salaries, to stand guard and perform other
irksome duties during riots or other disturbances for the pay of the regu-
lar army man.”17 On the issue of pay, Bolton reported with some satisfac-
tion that in 1886 the legislature raised the per diem strike duty pay to two
dollars a day per man.18 Concluding his tale of service in 1894, Ray wrote
that “aside from all frivolity, ‘foreign service’ is preferable to Strike
Duty—if prolonged, and rough.”19
Conclusions from these scattered personal impressions are hardly
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definitive. Another measure of the impact of strike-related duty on the
attitudes of enlisted men might be the changes in enlistment figures over
time. However, there is no correlation between strike-related active duty
and the variation in membership over time. (See appendix E.) The lack
of correlation suggests that strike service played little or no role in indi-
vidual decisions about whether or not to volunteer or to stay active over
time. The few dramatic changes in the size of the ING were legislative-
ly mandated (as happened in the early 1880s), and, later, the result of
the 1900 reorganization of the ING following their participation in the
Spanish American War from 1898 to 1899. Taken together, then, ING
officers and enlisted men appear to have viewed strike duty as an obliga-
tion at best, a thankless duty at worst, and, with some exceptions, they
did not embrace it as a central part of their purpose or their identity.
1894: Turning Point
By 1894, Illinoisans were beginning to suffer from the recession-related
cutbacks of the early 1890s, and unionized miners walked out in the cen-
tral Illinois coalfields as early as mid-April.20 Around the state, more and
more miners rapidly joined in, and before the end of the strike, 25,207
out of 25,817 coal miners in Illinois walked out. Illinois was not the only
state affected by the coal mine strike, which was truly national, with
180,000 miners out across the country in June of 1894. Along with the
ING, state troops from Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan,
Ohio, and West Virginia served in mining areas in response to violence
or potential violence.21 With this many men out of work and participat-
ing in organized protest marches and rallies even as mine operators
sought to bring in scab labor to keep the coal moving, tensions escalat-
ed rapidly across Illinois. On May 24, 1894, the sheriff of LaSalle County
telegraphed Governor John P. Altgeld for help. Initially Altgeld refused,
but later that same day he relented after learning of threats to storm the
jail to release men arrested after an earlier strike meeting ended in a
brawl. Illinois National Guard companies arrived late that night and
stayed in LaSalle for seven days. The same day Illinois troops also went
to Centralia, and stayed for three days. The next few weeks were very
busy for Illinois guardsmen. Illinois National Guard troops went to Pana
on May 26 for two days because the sheriff there reported rumors of a
threatened “invasion” of miners from Indiana planning to close four
working mines—an invasion that did not occur. On May 27 the ING
went to Minonk for three days after reports of a train seized by strikers
who blockaded the tracks. On June 5, the ING went to Carterville for
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three days after strikers prevented strike breakers from working. After
direct conflict between sheriffs and strikers that resulted in one death
and a “destroyed” mine, the ING was called to Pekin on June 7 and
stayed for seven days. On June 8, the ING went back to Pana for anoth-
er three days because the sheriff was once again worried about an “inva-
sion” of strikers (appendix D).22
Guardsmen felt unwelcome in most of these cities, and more so in
June than in May. Pana, in particular, became the center of very ugly
confrontations between strikers and imported strike breakers, con-
frontations that eventually put everyone there on edge. Crowds in
Pana responded to the militia’s second appearance in June by yelling
abuse at them, and guardsmen responded to the provocations by
searching and arresting protestors “for being ‘strangers,’ ‘insulting the
troops,’ ‘hostile movements,’ and ‘jeering at the soldiers.’” One Frank
Bardowsky, arrested by the militia in Pana during their June service
there, “urged the crowd to attack the militia” in retaliation for his
arrest, even as his wife ran alongside the arresting party, pleading for his
release.23 Tensions between guardsmen and residents were worse by July,
and selected companies spent nine days in Spring Valley that month
Lessons Learned 163
Figure 11 
Company I, First Infantry, at Calumet during railroad strikes, 1894. Courtesy of the
Chicago Historical Society. Photographer: Unknown. iCHi-39229.
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before the authorities were satisfied that conditions allowed them to be
sent home. Illinois National Guard officers had not disputed the need
for their services in the coal fields at the end of May, but by June they
were beginning to resent being called into situations that they claimed
should have been quelled by local authorities. This frustration may
have made things more difficult, and by July in Spring Valley, a place
the ING commander did not think initially needed them, troops began
forcing their way into miners’ homes looking for weapons and stolen
property, and generally terrorizing the residents. At least three people
were killed during these weeks, but it is not entirely clear if the ING
was responsible or if it was regular Army troops riding on trains being
cleared from Chicago.24
The Pullman strike of 1894 soon upstaged even this unprecedented
level of service. The Pullman strike remains among the most infamous
railroad strikes in Illinois, or the nation, between 1878 and 1916, though
Illinois and the ING were hardly alone in suffering the effects of the
strike. State troops from twelve different states were sent to quell vio-
lence stemming from the Pullman strikes as they radiated out across the
nation.25 In Illinois both federal and state troops were called to Chicago
and to various locations downstate. The Pullman affiliate of the
American Railway Union (ARU) struck on May 11 after the corpora-
tion refused to negotiate about the union’s grievances with regard to
rents, prices, and pay in Pullman proper. Initially public sympathy lay
squarely with the strikers at Pullman, but the corporation stood firm in
their refusal to negotiate. In response, in late June the national body of
the ARU declared a boycott of all railroads using Pullman sleeping cars,
bringing traffic between Chicago and the West Coast nearly to a stand-
still by July 1. On July 2 a federal court handed down an injunction
declaring the strike illegal, and on July 3 President Cleveland ordered
federal troops into Chicago.26 The mayor of Chicago, the sheriff of Cook
County, and the governor of Illinois all believed this action was unwar-
ranted and protested it vigorously on the grounds that it would lead to
violence rather than prevent it, but to no avail. 
The fears of Illinois officials were realized when rioting subsequently
erupted in Chicago. The governor, his military staff, and the mayor of
Chicago were quick to point out that the city of Chicago was calm until
after the arrival of federal troops on July 3, 1894, at which point, they
said, the crowds reacted violently to the appearance of the U.S. Army
troops on the streets, and serious rioting and property damage ensued.
Mayor John P. Hopkins of Chicago finally requested state intervention
on July 6, 1894, after it was clear to him that the federal marshals and
regular troops were not going to be able to either restore order to the city
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or lift the blockade on the mail trains. The governor immediately sent
the ING into the streets of Chicago. According to Illinois Adjutant
General Alfred Orrendorff, Illinois guardsmen were able to restore order
within a day or so of their arrival in Chicago.27 The delay in calling out
the ING to Chicago allowed Altgeld and ING leadership to blame the
federal troops for all that went wrong and to take for themselves all praise
for restoring order (a position regular Army officials did not accept and
the press did not respect, blaming Altgeld instead for the violence).28
The ING stayed on duty in Chicago for thirty-three days (decades later,
Cary Ray remembered it as sixty days), mostly serving in Pullman itself,
though smaller detachments were regularly sent out with the trains.29
Mayor Hopkins of Chicago did not want troops, but as the effects of
the Pullman boycott spread outward through the state and nation at the
end of June, some downstate officials did seek state aid. On July 1, 500
rail passengers trapped at Decatur because of the strike telegraphed the
governor seeking help in moving out, and the general counsel of the
Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad Company notified the governor
that no mail trains had moved out of Danville for forty-eight hours.30
Altgeld, like Illinois governors before him, did not act without official
local requests despite having the authority to do so, and he telegraphed
the respective county sheriffs and asked them about their respective local
situations. The sheriff of Macon County (Decatur) replied that he had
been able to preserve order to date, but he now felt he needed troops.
The sheriff of Vermilion County (Danville) replied that if the state could
send him 100 rifles and ammunition, he would “try to protect the C. &
E. I. R. R. Company’s men and property.”31
After assuring himself that troops were wanted or needed, Governor
Altgeld sent the ING to intervene in Decatur and Danville. Altgeld
sent three infantry companies and one cavalry troop to Decatur, where
they moved the trains and dispersed “several mobs.”32 The Decatur ING
Company (Company H, Fifth Regiment) itself was called up early in the
morning of July 2 and served until three outside companies—from
Delavan, Lincoln, and Peoria—arrived at 10:00 A.M. Once the new
companies arrived, the commanding officer relieved the Decatur
Company from duty in their hometown and sent them on to duty in
Danville that evening, along with the Decatur cavalry troop. On July 5,
two of the companies in Decatur were sent home after three days of
service, and a fresh company arrived on the 6th and left on the 7th,
leaving the last company to ensure that the trains continued to run
freely until the 13th, when that company, too, was ordered home.33 In
Danville, five infantry companies under the command of Colonel J.S.
Culver and the cavalry troop arrived on the evening of the 2nd and
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repeated the process of clearing the tracks of stopped freight and pas-
senger cars and guarding the trains once strikebreaking engineers could
be found to run them out of the city. On July 5 Colonel Culver left
Danville with two companies and the cavalry troop and headed for
Springfield, where more trouble seemed to be brewing—however, that
came to nothing, and the troops were relieved and dismissed before
they arrived. The remaining three companies stayed on in Danville
until July 16, when they, too, were relieved of duty.34
Troops, state or federal, were never universally welcome. Union
members and other strikers regularly objected to the appearance of state
troops in the 1880s and 1890s, for no matter the intention or cause, the
arrival of troops nearly always resulted in the end of the strike on terms
unfavorable to the union, mostly because once troops were on the scene,
strikebreakers could go to work. Once strikebreakers were on the job, the
strike, for all practical purposes, was over.35 Local and state-level officials
also objected when they believed that troops were thrust upon them,
making a bad situation worse. In 1894 the mayor of Chicago, the sheriff
of Cook County, and the governor of Illinois all strenuously objected to
the arrival of federal troops in Pullman and Chicago. They complained
vociferously about the way in which railroad management inveigled
President Cleveland into ordering federal troops into Chicago without
prior consultation with state authorities of any kind.36 Outside of
Chicago, authorities also complained that they did not need state troops,
and like Mayor Hopkins and Governor Altgeld, they blamed the
unwanted soldiers for sparking the violence that came hard on their
heels.37 Federal troops riding the train cars after July 3 drew popular
anger outside of Chicago as well as in it.38
Along with the disagreements between the governor and the presi-
dent, and between county sheriffs and the governor, strike service in
1894 also served to remind ING leaders that when strikers or bystanders
died, they were always to blame, regardless of cause. They were blamed
for the men who were killed by soldiers riding the trains, they were
blamed for the deaths during a riot in Chicago before their arrival, and
they were blamed when an artillery piece blew up in Chicago, killing
three members of the ING.39 When ING officers and troops were sent
into strike situations and ordered to protect property and lives, they
entered highly contentious and potentially explosive situations in which
there were no clear rules of engagement. They had to grapple with local
disputes about whether or not they were even welcome, they had to
meet their obligations to the state government that contributed to their
upkeep, and they had to do so in a way that did as little damage as pos-
sible to their long-term survival or to their ability to attract members
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and private funds. After 1894, most ING officers seemed convinced that
the best strategy was for the ING to stay as far away from such situations
as possible.
New Tactics for Strike Service
The stated purpose of the militia while called out for strike duty hardly
wavered over the years. In 1877 the state militia was ordered to Chicago
to “protect the lives and property of the people.”40 In 1904 two compa-
nies of the ING were sent to Ziegler “to protect life and property of the
citizens of that county.”41 Despite the similarity of mission, the conditions
the militia faced and the options open to them in carrying out their mis-
sion were quite different in 1877 and in 1904. In 1877 the Illinois mili-
tia was in the midst of a complete reorganization of command structure
and had a wide variety of arms and accouterments, uniforms, and drill
proficiencies; had no real experience in civil order maintenance duties
and none in strike-related situations; and was, in fact, at that particular
moment entirely demobilized. By 1904 the Illinois National Guard had
a formal command hierarchy backed with examinations for promotion,
uniform training, weapons, and command procedures, and had the results
of experience from nearly thirty years and thirty different strike-policing
actions, more than any other state militia, combined with their wartime
experiences of 1898–99, on which to draw in “protecting life and prop-
erty.”42 In 1877 the militia was thrown into a variety of entirely new sit-
uations, ranging from infant general strikes to race riots, amid general
fears of class warfare. By the 1890s, the strikes in which the state was
asked to intervene were called by formal unions with specific grievances
against specific corporate managers, who often worked diligently to
oppose the interests of the strikers at the local, state, and federal levels.
These later strikes generally took place in environments where there was
a little to a lot of local sympathy for the plight of laborers and their fam-
ilies, alongside much concern about threats to persons and property
and/or convenience.43 Within these changing circumstances, the militias
always tried to position themselves so as to “protect life and property” in
as nonpartisan a manner as possible, if only to ensure their own future
funding from the state legislature.
Illinois National Guard officers struggled to develop new tactics for
use while policing strike-related disorder; doing so would help them to
achieve both their stated aims and their private purposes, which likewise
evolved over time and in response both to their growing experience and
to changing outside conditions. Illinois National Guard officers grappled
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first with the problem of how to protect private property threatened by
the confrontations between strikers and management without giving the
impression that the ING were merely lackeys for company interests.
They began by refusing to be in the position of guarding property with-
out the presence of a real, immediate threat, and they wanted to be the
ones to determine when and what threat was serious enough to warrant
their presence. In the 1883 call to police a mine-strike–related situation,
Governor Hamilton resisted all efforts to reduce the militia to mere
mine guards, despite the fact that the militia outside Collinsville was
actually camping in a boarding house owned by the Abbey Mine. In
response to a request from the sheriff of St. Clair County for one hun-
dred men to be detailed to his command, the governor notified the ING
officer present: “Sheriff Ropiequet, St. Clair, has heretofore reported his
entire ability to keep the peace in that county, and has not called on me
for assistance. When you have restored the peace and dispersed the mob
in Madison County withdraw troops as ordered to-day.”44 And Governor
Hamilton wired Sheriff Ropiequet of St. Clair County, “I cannot furnish
troops to guard property. Troops will be supplied to put down and dis-
perse rioters where it is demonstrated that civil authorities cannot con-
trol them. Troops will be held in Madison County and [missing word]
until tomorrow.”45 And to E. J. Crandall, president of the Crandall
Mining Company located outside Collinsville, Hamilton sent a wire
explaining that the “[m]ilitia cannot be kept there to guard your mine
indefinitely. Civil authorities must use the powers of the militia prompt-
ly if needed to disperse rioters and arrest them & turn them over to civil
authorities for commitment to jail,” and that the colonel present, he
stressed, was “ordered to use his discretion about withdrawing.”46
Eleven years and six strike-policing actions later, on May 26, 1894,
General Order No. 8 was issued to the entire ING, stating that “it is not
the business of soldiers to act as custodians or guards of private property.
The law authorizes them simply to assist the civil authorities in preserv-
ing the peace, quelling riots and executing the law. Whenever troops are
ordered, and an owner of property feels it necessary to have it guarded,
he must do so at his own expense, and in such case troops should be sta-
tioned near enough to promptly quell any disturbance, if one should
occur.”47 The adjutant general at the time noted that “[t]his order met
with the universal approval of the National Guard, who, under it, could
no longer be used as mere private watchmen.”48 Troops still occasionally
set up camp on mine property, but after this time they mostly selected
baseball fields, city parks, or open land near the city or between the
affected properties for their encampments.49 In 1898 Governor Tanner
insisted that troops were sent to preserve order, and not sent to protect
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mine property.50 By 1899 the Colonel commanding a strike-policing
action in Carterville had to wire the governor to receive special permis-
sion to move the ING camp onto mine property.51
Along with the issue of where to pitch camp without jeopardizing
their nonpartisan stance, the militia had to develop new tactics for deal-
ing with large crowds without causing injury or harm. Doing so present-
ed a serious challenge because the only weapons the bulk of the militia
was armed with were rifles, and the only tactics they knew were designed
for the battlefield. As a result, what tactical theory there was for strike
policing was based on weapon use or nonuse. For those who recommend-
ed weapons, artillery fire was often suggested as a way of clearing the
streets—it was also never used that way in the United States. Tactics not
involving weapon use tended to focus on early crowd psychology theo-
ries and recommended highly visible massed forces, or increasingly, the
use of mounted cavalry for dispersing crowds. Ironically for the ING, all
of this prescriptive literature was aimed at the large-scale, largely urban
general strike. The central assumption in all of these published tactical
theories was that the strikes the guards faced would be located in the cen-
tral cities and accompanied by large crowds of onlookers, supporters, and
general passers-by.52 The vast majority of the strikes for which the ING
mobilized were located not just in small towns, but often outside these
towns, at the mines themselves.
Fortunately for the ING, the presence of guardsmen in a strike-torn
region was often all that was needed to convince crowds to disperse with-
out resorting to physical confrontations, though troops did sometimes
find it hard to endure the “blackguarding” and other verbal harassments
that came their way.53 When marching into town alone was not enough
of a display of force to encourage strikers to back down and disperse their
crowds, ING officers followed the primary tactical advice of the day and
turned to their bayonets as the weapon of choice for poking and prodding
people to move along. Also, when setting up and manning guard posi-
tions and walking patrols, ING officers recommended that their troops
make quite a display of their rifles and bayonets for the purposes of intim-
idation. For the same reason, artillery battalions were instructed to haul
their Gatling guns with them while policing strike-related situations.54
One innovative ING commander, Colonel J. S. Culver of the Fifth
Regiment, ordered his dismounted cavalry to wade into an angry crowd
and start using the flat of their blades to “spank” strikers and other
bystanders, and so encourage them to head for home. During the railroad
strike policing action in Decatur in 1894, Colonel Culver asked the
county sheriff to “present my compliments [to the crowd gathered] and
say, ‘That I would be over in an hour and spank them until they would
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eat their hash standing for the next week.’” In his official report, Culver
concluded that “the sheriff had delivered my message, and as many of
the miners and toughs at Tilton had been in the reception committee I
met at Danville Junction on the morning of the 3rd, they lost interest in
the movement of the troops and went home before my arrival at
Tilton.”55 Culver considered this a tremendous advancement over the
bayonet as a crowd-dispersing tool. This tactic caught the interest of a
number of ING officers because it was potentially effective and yet
inflicted very little serious damage. Illinois National Guard officers
developed these approaches as alternatives to actual firing of their rifles,
which was only a last resort, but there is no evidence that their innova-
tions were widely adopted in Illinois or outside of it. 
Illinois National Guard officers sought out alternatives to rifle fire
because whenever guardsmen fired into masses of people they were quite
certain to injure and usually kill outright some member(s) of the crowd.
In 1883 militia fire killed at least one person, and at least six more were
killed by on-duty guardsmen in 1894.56 The question of the legitimacy of
rifle fire as a viable tactic while policing strike-related events did have
its defenders in Illinois. In the aftermath of the 1877 strike involvement,
Arthur Ducat, the senior officer of the ING at that time, recommended
a guard 10,000 strong and the use of Gatling guns, after fair warning, to
clear the streets.57 In 1883, at least two infantry men involved in the
shooting that resulted in the killing of the striking miner told a news
reporter that they had fired deliberately into the crowd and that this act
was justified because they were fired upon.58 In the 1894 shooting
episodes, including those where people were injured or even killed,
guardsmen again insisted that they fired only because they believed
themselves to be in danger, and that their use of firearms was justified.59
Illinois National Guard officers’ attempt to deflect blame and defend
their choices at the same time was an artfully chosen course of action, a
course selected to protect the integrity and the future of the ING.
Governors and their military staffs wanted to respond quickly to situa-
tions that threatened to develop into large-scale social unrest, and they
did not want the troops to kill anyone. In later years, when weapon fire
was exchanged between strikers and the state militias, the adjutant gen-
eral expected a full explanation, and in 1889 and again in 1894 there
were formal inquiries into the causes and outcomes of such exchanges.60
Gunfire was the one tactic no ING officer wanted to be held responsible
for, and yet it was always their responsibility in last resort. In 1898, in
Virden, Captain Craig of Battery B promised, “I hope I shall not have to
use my Gatlings, but if I do there will be nobody left in the vicinity but
us.”61
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Strike Service Goes Long-Term: Pana, Virden, and Ziegler
Members of the ING reached the point of total frustration with county
sheriffs despite, or perhaps because of, the violence that could accompa-
ny confrontations between strikers and their opponents. Their frustra-
tion led them to usurp more and more local control and authority, until
they had no one to turn the situation back over to so they could leave.
One unintended result was that the length of time the ING spent on
individual strikes skyrocketed. In 1898, 1899, and again in 1904, ING
companies patrolled some locations for as many as five months at a time.
These much longer terms of service fundamentally changed the nature of
the task the ING was facing. Whereas in the earlier strike situations the
ING functioned as quick responders, rushing in to corral violent offend-
ers and remove them from the scene as they, too, exited, now the ING
put itself in the position of guaranteeing a public order that, by their own
observation, local officials were incapable of maintaining.
In 1898 and 1899, the coal fields that had been the site of so many
bitter strikes in 1894 were again the location of strike service. Miners
in central Illinois struck again in late 1897 and early 1898, once again
largely stemming from disputes about the rates they were being paid.
The miners were unionized and disciplined, and they succeeded in clos-
ing or rendering nearly useless many mines across the central part of
the state. They sought out the new arbitration offered by the state gov-
ernment, but the operators refused to reopen the closed mines at the
price set by the board of arbitration.62 In Pana, by July the sheriff and
his deputies were providing “around the clock” protection for the few
nonunion miners who were willing to work, and they had arrested at
least ten union men who had attempted to block the way for nonunion
miners headed for the shafts.63 The managers of several mine opera-
tions, among them the Pana Coal Company, the Penwell Coal
Company, and the Springside Coal Company, decided, rather than to
accept the price set by the arbitration board, to try and break the 1898
strike by importing African American miners, previously almost com-
pletely excluded from the region, up from the mines in Alabama. By
mid-August, striking miners and their families were actively harassing
the few local men still willing to work, and strikers and the imported
strikebreakers were exchanging gun fire.64 After these events, the mine
operators began locking out the union men. The mine companies built
stockades around their shafts, enclosing the mines and boarding hous-
es for the new miners. In protest over the arrival of the African
American miners, several local businessmen refused to serve as deputies
when called for service and were arrested.65 Over the next few weeks,
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the new African American miners took to parading in the streets while
visibly armed, drawing the ire, and gunfire, of furious residents.66 On
September 28, tensions crested, and the strikebreaking African
Americans lined up on the streets of Pana facing union miners, both
sides armed with pistols and rifles, and firing commenced.67 After this
incident, the sheriff of Christian County requested aid from the gover-
nor, who ordered Battery B and two new provisional companies of the
ING to Pana, where they stayed for the next four months.68 Once in
Pana, ING troops concentrated their efforts on assisting sheriff ’s
deputies in keeping the approaches to the mines safe for the miners
who were working, keeping the strikers from converging on the strike-
breakers when they were off mine property, and policing neighboring
communities. Guardsmen patrolled both inside and outside of the
stockade built by the managers of the Pana Coal Company. Guardsmen
also assisted in the enforcement of temporary or permanent bans on
public carrying of weapons and on alcohol sales, and in the arrest of
violators.69
In nearby Virden, to keep the new African American miners and
the mine itself safe from the depredations of angry strikers, Chicago-
Virden Coal Company managers, like those at Penwell and Springside,
enclosed the mine and fifteen acres holding the mine-operated dormi-
tories with a wooden stockade, complete with sentry boxes and topped
with barbed wire.70 To protect the new African American miners from
assault, the managers then hired about seventy private detectives from
St. Louis and laid in a supply of arms and ammunition and prepared to
bring in more trainloads of African American strikebreakers.71 The
train carrying African American miners arrived on September 25, but
at least sixty of the one hundred new arrivals decided to return to
Alabama after hearing appeals from the local United Mine Workers
officers.72 To prevent the importation of still more strikebreakers, strik-
ing miners and their supporters (up to 3,000 by some estimates) from
neighboring districts assembled outside the stockade over the next few
weeks. When a heavily guarded train carrying another two cars of
strikebreakers reached the outskirts of Virden on October 12, 1898, fir-
ing broke out between the private train guards and the strikers and
continued for the last mile of the trip to the stockade entrance. During
this exchange, two occupants of the train were killed and several were
wounded, including the engineer, and the local newspapers put the
total at ten fatalities and twenty-five injured.73 Once the train arrived
outside the stockade, the private guards inside joined the firefight, and
one private guard died and six or seven were injured. Outside the
stockade, thirteen strikers and strike supporters were killed outright
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and twenty-eight wounded, four of whom later died of their injuries.
The strikebreakers refused to leave the train, and only a few private
guards made it inside the walls. The engineer finally started the train
and took it on to Springfield. 
On October 13, 1898, the ING arrived in Virden in response to the local
sherrif’s plea concerning this sudden escalation in the ongoing confronta-
tion between striking miners and mine operators. The militia arrived on the
scene well after dark on the evening of the 13th, creeping slowly down the
track from Springfield, with skirmishers out front and Gatling guns ready on
a flatbed car. When they reached the stockade at Virden, the militia hailed
the men inside and got them to open the gates. They learned there that if
the leader of the private guards had not just then been killed by a stray shot,
he had intended to order his men to fire on the ING, thinking that the hail
was a ruse on the part of the attacking strikers.74
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Figure 12
Pana-Virden strikes, ING members escorting a train, 1898. Courtesy of the
Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library. Photographer: Unknown.
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Captain Charles C. Craig of Battery B, the artillery battalion that
went to Virden, included scathing commentary on the sheriff ’s execu-
tion of his responsibilities in his report to the adjutant general.
As to the general situation at Virden and the causes, which made the
presence of troops finally necessary, it appeared that the local author-
ities had made no effort whatever to control the situation. When we
arrived the sheriff was not there and did not appear until two days
afterward. It was said that he was sick. There was but one legally
appointed deputy in the town that we could find. Two hundred rifles
and the ammunition sent to Virden by the State authorities on req-
uisition of the sheriff had not been used and the boxes in which they
had been shipped had not even been opened as we found when we
came to take possession of them. General Reece with but one hun-
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Figure 13
ING members patrolling the stockade at Virden, 1898. Courtesy of the Abraham
Lincoln Presidential Library. Photographer: Unknown.
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dred and twenty-eight men, all strangers to the locality, the people
and the general conditions prevailing, took the town from the posses-
sion of the mob and restored order in a few hours. In a county of the
size and population of Macoupin it ought to have been an easy mat-
ter to have enrolled twice that number of deputies to enforce the law.
We were informed by Col. McKnight of the Governor’s staff, who
lives in the neighboring village of Giraud, and who met us on our
arrival, and by other reputable citizens, that a posse could easily have
been organized to preserve the peace.75
The company managers had a different version of what took place in
Virden. Managers held Governor John Tanner and the ING responsible
for the violence because they had repeatedly requested state troops to
guard the importation of black miners—something Tanner explicitly
refused to do in a public speech and in private communication with the
mine owners in the days preceding the catastrophe in Virden. Fred W.
Lukins, manager of the mine and spokesman for the absentee owner, held
that Tanner invited the lawlessness when he refused to support mine
owners and managers in their move to import labor from the South.
Lukins swore at the inquest that neither he nor any of the hired guards
fired first, and that the guard who was shot just before the ING entered
the mine stockade—an ex-police lieutenant from Chicago—was cut
down by militia fire after opening the gates. “The blood of every man
shed here is on the Governor’s head. He is absolutely outside the law and
has no justification whatever in refusing to send troops. If this train had
come before the interview with the Governor was printed there would
have been no bloodshed.”76
Republican Governor John Tanner followed the model of his prede-
cessors in office when he refused in no uncertain terms to allow the ING
to serve the interests of owners and managers in labor disputes. He force-
fully and repeatedly argued that the deaths and injuries in Virden were
all on the heads of the mine management, who disregarded his warnings
and acted recklessly to endanger not only their own employees, but the
unfortunate strikebreakers who had not been given any idea of the dan-
gerous situation into which they were being shipped. “I, therefore, charge
the owners and managers of this company as being lawbreakers and
morally and criminally responsible for the bloodshed and disgrace to our
State, and I further charge every man in their employ as detective or
guard in the stockade or on the train who participated in this fiendish
outrage as guilty of murder, who should and I believe will be indicted by
the grand jury of Macoupin County and tried for murder.” He went on to
defend his decision not to send troops in earlier because had he “done so
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I would have been using the State as an agent to further the interest of
the mine owners, as the moment the troops had been landed they would
have dispersed the idle miners, and of course the avaricious mine own-
ers could have landed their imported labor without difficulty, thus
accomplishing their end.”77
Tanner stumbled into another controversial issue when he initially
categorized the African American miners as “drawn largely, if not
entirely, from the criminal class, ex-convicts who learned their trade
while doing terms in the penitentiaries of Alabama.”78 This description
later turned out to be an inaccurate picture of the miners and the fam-
ilies who accompanied them to Illinois, but it did accurately reflect
long-standing prejudices among white miners in Illinois.79 Tanner later
gave several statements to the effect that African American workers
and their families were welcome in the state at any time if they came
freely looking for work at competitive wages; it was only when they, or
any other class of laborers, were shipped in by the locked carload that
he objected.80
The ING stayed on duty in Virden for twenty days, and as in Pana,
the guardsmen imposed something close to martial law as they worked
to keep the peace. Once the ING was in place in Pana and Virden, as in
Homestead, Pennsylvania in 1892, operators were able to import more
strikebreakers, who went to work and reopened the mines. Local ten-
sions did not ease quickly in Pana, however, and though the ING troops
finally left in February 1899, they were back in place by April 10 because
of the resumption of sporadic nighttime gunfire, and the Guard stayed
on another five months. The ING was also called out to Carterville over
a miners strike in 1899, but troops were able to leave after only thirty-
three days.
The ING avoided strike duty altogether for the next five years, but in
late 1904 they were summoned again. The situation in Ziegler was eeri-
ly similar to that in and around Virden and Pana in late 1898. Faced
with a long-term strike, the mine owner, Joseph Leiter, built a stockade
around his mine and began to import willing workers. Unionized strik-
ers gathered outside the stockade and on the edges of the corporate town
to discourage strikebreakers from either starting or continuing to work.
By late November, tensions had reached the point that residents were
reporting nightly gunfire, and on November 26, at the request of the
sheriff of Franklin County after a shooting incident at a local church,
Governor Richard Yates sent Company F, Fourth Regiment, to Ziegler,
followed two days later by a second company.81 On December 2, the
sheriff insisted that he “was absolutely unable to preserve order,” and so
Governor Yates complied and left the two companies in place.82 With
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the troops in place, by late December Leiter was able to import as many
as sixty new miners at a time. More troubling to the ING officers in
Ziegler were the daily discoveries of dynamite in and around the mine
itself. “That it is not the work of the men on the outside is admitted . . .
it has become so common Guardsmen fear it is the work of men import-
ed into the mine.”83 The two companies stayed in Ziegler until February
8, 1905, at which point things were calm enough that they were sent
home.84
The duration of mine strike policing actions stayed relatively flat from
1877 to 1890, at less than ten days, and averaging about four and one-half
days. The first sign that change was coming was a five-week stint in East
St. Louis in 1886 during the railroad strikes and immediately following a
fight that left six people dead.85 By 1898 and 1899, organized national
unions were locked in conflict with corporations for their right to negoti-
ate for their members, even as the courts were beginning to acknowledge
the legitimacy of union organization.86 In the coal fields of central Illinois,
tensions reached new heights as miners and owners of nearly worked-out
mines fought over wage scales, and miners and their neighbors rioted over
the continuing stream of African American strikebreakers. John M.
Tanner, the Republican governor of Illinois, sought to make a clear and
strong comparison between his administration and that of the previous,
Democratic, and labor-friendly governor John Altgeld, but the added ele-
ment of racial antagonism brought him closer to the support of unionized
miners. Ironically enough, as a result Tanner followed Altgeld closely in
his struggle to limit the use of the ING for strike-policing purposes.
Tanner repeatedly denounced the mine operators during the 1898–99
strikes.87 Like Altgeld, Tanner attempted to deny militia protection to
mining interests desirous of importing strikebreakers, at one point even
accusing mine operators of attempting to “degrade the citizenship of
Illinois for selfish purposes” in importing African Americans from
Alabama to take the jobs of already resident, and white, miners.88 Even
more dramatically than Altgeld, Tanner was willing to use the ING to
arrest managers and their private guards as well as striking workers. 
The role of race in the Pana and Virden confrontations cannot be
underestimated. The strikebreakers who attracted such violent opposi-
tion were African American. The deputies whose weapons the guards-
men confiscated with such rigor were deputized African American strike-
breakers, and the men arrested before the ING arrived were white men
who refused to serve as deputies to protect the African American miners.
Once on the scene, Illinois guardsmen went out of their way to patron-
ize the shops of merchants who were supporting the strikers and who
were opposed to the arrival of African American strikebreakers, a small
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gesture of their solidarity with the white strikers.89 More broadly, accord-
ing to Eric Arnesen, African American strikebreakers raised fears of an
“industrial race war,” and white ING members were torn between doing
their duty and standing with the white strikers whose jobs were vanish-
ing under the watchful eye of white guardsmen.90 Before the full-scale
outbreak of violence at Virden, acting governor William Northcott
explained to a United Mine Workers representative that “the men who
made the trouble at Pana had played directly into the hands of the oper-
ators. By inciting a riot they had made the presence of troops in the town
necessary and now the operators were able to take advantage of the pres-
ence of the soldiers and ship in all the alien labor they wanted.”
Northcott went on to suggest that as long as the strikers “could demon-
strate that there was no necessity for sending troops to Virden” by keep-
ing order, the troops would stay away, and the strikers could continue to
prosecute their cause.91 At least in Virden and Pana, white Guardsmen
sympathized with the white striking workers and did not bring blind loy-
alty to corporate desires to their strike service.
Simultaneously, the ING itself paved the way for Governor Tanner to
allow the ING to stay on duty for such extended periods of time. Not
only did they assume full control of their activities while policing strike-
related disorders, they also began to redefine what constituted a threat
to life and property, focusing in particular on the job of disarming strik-
ers and strikebreakers alike in the name of ensuring security for residents
and laborers. Once they took this job onto their own shoulders, ING
officers ended up with the unenviable task of ensuring that when they
left, the situation would remain orderly and the combatants would
remain disarmed. The only way to do that, it turned out, was to stay for
a very long time.
Rejection of Local Authority and the Rise of “Martial Law”
In order to minimize any possible violent confrontations between mili-
tia and strikers, ING officers initially opted to try to work solely under
the direction of local authorities in their early rounds of strike service.
In 1883 both Colonel Barkley and Governor Hamilton were very care-
ful to ensure that the militia never acted without the full knowledge
and direction of locally elected or appointed civil authorities. They
stressed this point repeatedly throughout the duration of active duty
that year. No move was made without consultation with the sheriffs or
their deputies. This scrupulousness was not explicitly mandated by law,
but it was the manner chosen by ING officers, under the authority of
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the governor, to protect their own interest in neutrality in the face of
antagonistic relationships between labor and owners of mines or rail-
roads.92 However, this stance was difficult to maintain given the ING
officers’ other frustrations with so many of the sheriffs who requested
their presence, and mayors, in turn, who were frustrated by their sher-
iffs.93 In 1894, ING officers discovered the limits to how far they could
force an unwilling sheriff to go in assuming responsibility for his juris-
diction. In some cases, ING officers were able to continue with their old
strategy of close cooperation with the sheriff and other local authorities.
In other cases, particularly where the ING believed that the sheriff and
his deputies were so involved in the local strike politics as to be virtual
combatants themselves, ING officers in charge imposed conditions that
the press called martial law. In Virden in 1898, ING officers treated the
sheriff and his deputies exactly the same way they treated the strikers.
They denied them the opportunity to harass or threaten strikers as well
as noncombatants and confiscated their weapons with the same rigor
with which they confiscated whatever armament the strikers had man-
aged to amass. In both Pana (1898) and Ziegler (1904), grand juries also
handed down indictments against the mine owners and managers for
carrying weapons.94 During the later instances of strike duty, ING offi-
cers in charge expected all current residents of a locality, regardless of
status, to obey the imposed curfews, temporary “dry” restrictions, rules
forbidding the bearing of arms, and edicts about formation of crowds, all
imposed under the formal authority of the county sheriff.95 In 1898 and
1899 in Virden and Pana, reporters were quick to deduce from these reg-
ulations that “martial law” was in effect, a natural conclusion given
statements like the following from Captain Craig in 1898: “In a sense I
am in charge of the town and martial law is in force. We will disarm
every man suspected or known to have a weapon.”96
There was no state of martial law in these places—as the governor’s
spokesmen were quick to point out.97 Colonel Theodore Ewert, assistant
adjutant general, explained that he “did not know what arrangement has
been made at Pana, but I suppose that Captain Craig and the sheriff of
Christian county, together with the mayor of the city, have entered into
some agreement by which Captain Craig’s men are to patrol to the town
and maintain law and order.” Ewert insisted that until or unless “the gov-
ernor declares martial law, the responsibility of the sheriff to maintain
the peace and to keep order, does not cease, no matter how many soldiers
he may have called for.”98 Again in 1904, there was much fevered specu-
lation that the governor would impose a state of martial law, but
Governor Yates issued a firm statement that “[t]here has been no procla-
mation of martial law.”99
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The officers may also have been drawing on lessons of occupation
learned during the Spanish American War, 1898–99. The regular Army
imposed and then struggled to maintain domestic order in Cuba and the
Philippines during the Spanish American War and the military occupa-
tions that followed, and at least one recent study argues that the experi-
ence of the Colorado National Guardsmen during their service in the
Philippines was a significant contributing factor in the Ludlow Massacre
of 1914.100 Likewise, ING service from 1898 to 1899 during the Spanish
American War may have contributed to their changing perceptions and
choices about the ability of military forces to serve as peacekeepers dur-
ing times of civic and social crises. For example, Battery B, the unit that
served in Virden in 1898, was unable to join the United States
Volunteers, and the members were quite aware of their lack of federal
service in comparison to their luckier brethren in Battery A. The fight-
ing in Cuba and Puerto Rico was over quite quickly, and the U.S. army
of occupation turned its attention to peacekeeping and the restoration
of law and order and American-style commerce in the districts ravaged
by the most recent three years of guerrilla combat.101 In both Cuba and
Puerto Rico, this transition moved relatively smoothly and on the
whole, the military had reason to be pleased with its record as model
governors and agents of social uplift. By late September of 1898,
between news reports and the first trickling home of fellow servicemen,
Illinois guardsmen were well aware of what their fellow ING members
were doing while in federal service.
In the years immediately following 1877, ING leaders defined the
threat to life and property as disorder, and once order was restored, the
ING could leave the scene of the intervention with full confidence that
local authorities would handle whatever might occur. However, by the
late 1890s, not only had ING officers come to disparage the abilities of
many local sheriffs to act decisively to protect life and property, they had
also redefined the threat to “violence,” and the cessation of the threat to
“the restoration of law and order.”102 The combination of the loss of
respect for the abilities of some county sheriffs and the assumption of
judgment to themselves as to what constituted conditions for violence
and the restoration of law and order, created situations in which the
ING found themselves policing strike-affected localities far longer that
they had ever previously contemplated. In fact, the “restoration of law
and order” in these late strike situations turned out to mean the end of
the strike itself.103
The only way out of the linguistic and strategic trap the ING thus laid
for itself of essentially becoming world-class mine guards and corporate
thugs was to repeatedly stress the importance of local law enforcement han-
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dling strike-related confrontations themselves. In addition, ING officers
began to imply that a call to the ING for intervention was to advertise a
total breakdown in local control. In 1883, despite Colonel Barkley’s frustra-
tions with Sheriff Hotz, neither he nor his senior officers argued that the ini-
tial failure was Hotz’s and that the militia should not have been necessary.
By 1900, ING officers, up to and including the adjutant general, were so
frustrated by the behavior of some county sheriffs that Adjutant General
Jasper N. Reece proposed a significant shift in fiscal responsibility for mili-
tia service during strike-related duty. “If, by legislative enactment, counties
would have to pay the cost of the strikes occurring in their border, sheriffs
would endeavor through force of public demand to restore peace and har-
mony themselves, and would call for military assistance only when they
themselves had become, in fact, powerless.”104 Reece never detailed more
specific goals, but the basic thrust of his plan seems obvious enough. Reece
wanted the counties to pay for the services of the Illinois National Guard if
they served in their jurisdictions during strike-related tensions. He made
this suggestion because he thought the high cost would serve as a deterrent
to requests for state troops, and the cost could be quite high. For example,
in 1894 the ING racked up $360,091.51 in expenses during the strikes that
year.105 General Reece clearly wanted the ING to be able to avoid future
strike duty if they possibly could. 
Ultimately, ING officers solved their dilemma by redefining the proper
request to the ING from unspecified “aid to civil authorities” whenever local
officials should request it, to a rapid response to a domestic crisis in which case
civil authorities could not be expected to cope without outside intervention.
In light of the controversies, frustrations, and sheer length and expense of
service spawned by events like those in Virden, Pana, or Ziegler, it is not dif-
ficult to understand why the adjutant general of Illinois sought ways to force
local authorities, particularly the sheriffs, to take full responsibility for pre-
venting such violence in communities under their jurisdiction.
Strikes and ING Controversy
In terms of their behavior toward the strikers while policing strike-
related events, ING officers always attempted to remain neutral on the
issues of the strike and to suppress riots, break up mobs, and protect mine
property from destruction at the hands of the miners. These two aims
were not always complementary. The ING almost never broke up meet-
ings of strikers (the only instance where they did while policing a mine
strike situation was immediately after their arrival in Virden in 1898,
when some seventeen people had already died that day). In 1898 the
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ING even attempted to prevent the arrival of new, African American
strikebreakers on the scene. In many cases, the ING officers present
worked to reach some compromise, not on the issues of the strike, but on
the issue of the behavior and practices to which both sides (or multiple
sides if the local law enforcement officials had become virtual combat-
ants as well) would adhere for the duration of the strike.
In their reports, pamphlets, histories, and memoirs, ING members
were quite careful to distinguish between crowds of strikers, bystanders,
and “mobs”; they assigned the latter label only to crowds during active-
ly hostile encounters. Members also carefully noted ethnic and racial
distinctions among the strikers and strikebreakers, indicating that they
were aware of the manner in which corporate managers attempted to
use these differences to divide their laboring forces, and that these tac-
tics usually worked. When ING members claimed that a “mob” was
present, they commonly reported that it contained very few strikers, or
that the strikers were being urged on by “toughs” or “outside, profes-
sional agitators.” Interestingly, one signal that always indicated to ING
members that a “mob” was in formation was the presence of female
strike supporters, especially because of their presumed mastery of the
verbal attack. As soon as the ING dispersed the “mob”—including the
women—officers reverted to their previous characterizations of strik-
ers, or sympathizers, or bystanders, or strikebreakers, or even curious
crowds. Accurate or not, the way members attempted to draw clear dis-
tinctions is another measure of how much they strove to understand
themselves as neutral supporters of order. “Mob” was a temporal and
flexible description of events and conditions that could change quick-
ly as a result of outside stimuli.106
Despite these efforts on the part of ING officers to ensure that all par-
ties recognized their valiant attempts to remain neutral peacemakers,
they did not always succeed. Their failure to convince all participants of
their neutral intentions was partially related to the intensity of emotions
on both sides of the capital-labor contest, and among the various resi-
dents of a strike-affected community. Feelings could run very deep about
the conflicts between company managers, strikers, and strikebreakers. In
1898 and 1899, the mine managers were furious that the governor did not
respond to their pleas to intervene sooner, and they roundly blamed
Tanner for all subsequent violence. At the same time, the strikers and the
unions initially praised Governor Tanner for his staunch refusal to send
troops to protect the mine owners in their plans to import large numbers
of African American strikebreakers. The county sheriffs waffled between
asking for help and refusing it, and they proved unreliable partners once
the ING arrived on the scene. Once the troops did arrive, mine managers
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were able to reopen their mines, sheriffs were able to hand responsibility
off to the ING commander, and strikers took what compensation they
could from the personal sympathy of the troops stationed in their commu-
nities. In 1904 in Ziegler, a similar story unfolded, with local residents sup-
porting the strikers and opposing imported strikebreakers, until several
men were killed in nighttime clashes, at which point the troops were wel-
comed even as they allowed more and more strikebreakers to enter the
mines. From the perspective of ING members, there was nothing they
could do in regard to a strike that would not anger someone.
Finding a Way Out
Strike duty was one of the ING’s most visible activities between 1877
and 1916, and it certainly draws the most criticism of their activities
during these years. However, though strikes in general were complicat-
ed events for all concerned, the overwhelming number of strikes, in
Illinois and nationally, passed without intervention from the state level.
When the state was asked to intervene, it was because local authorities,
in their own judgment, could no longer maintain order alone. That
order was variously defined and complicated the issue for the ING
because it left them with different, short-term goals when called to
police various strike situations, and it left them at the mercy of local
officials’ judgment. Illinois National Guard officers in time came to seri-
ously question the judgment of local officials in these matters. They
developed strategies that would encourage local law enforcement offi-
cials to act decisively and without state aid to prevent violence rather
than calling in the state militia after violent confrontations had already
produced significant property damage or, worse, loss of life. These strate-
gies were twofold. First, ING officers began openly criticizing local law
enforcement when they felt it warranted, making the personal and
political costs of the action quite high for local officials. Second, militia
members expanded the definition of their duty while simultaneously
raising the level of crisis under which they should be called out. In the
end, what ING officers managed to do was unify their definitions of
order to the prestrike conditions of each locality, and to insist on stay-
ing until those conditions were met in any strike intervention, whether
it was rail, coal, or some other issue altogether. The unified ING equa-
tion of order to the preconfrontation conditions prevailing locally grew
out of the ING officers’ need to assume both a noncontroversial role and
at the same time make it a very tough decision for local authority to ask
for their help. Throughout these decades, ING members regarded strike
Lessons Learned 183
Hannah_CH6_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  2:55 PM  Page 183
duty as an unpleasant but necessary function. However, as the political
and financial costs of that service grew over time, ING officers also, and
without embarrassment, sought ways to avoid the assignment and to
focus their time and energy on preparing to serve in a truly military
emergency.
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CHAPTER 7
The Pursuit of State and
Federal Support
What should the government do for the National Guard of the
states in order that we may maintain this unsurpassed fighting force
at its maximum state of practical efficiency?1
—Jasper N. Reece, adjutant general of Illinois and 
president of the Interstate National Guard Association
Nowhere is the ING transition from a local, community-based organiza-
tion to one element of national reserve army more clearly observed than
in their aggressive pursuit of state and federal funding. Guardsmen built
their organization on the twinned notions of military training and man-
hood training, and as long as the latter relied on the former, they had to
pursue military training with as much rigor and seriousness as they possi-
bly could. To pursue serious military training in the later nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries required an ever-increasing expenditure of
funds for an ever-growing array of supplies and equipment. In the early
1870s, Illinois militia companies relied primarily on their own financial
resources plus whatever funds they could raise locally, making them
aggressive fund-raisers and providers of local attractions. Militia mem-
bers quickly discovered that these resources were not enough to outfit
and equip a true statewide reserve training force, and so they turned to
the only possible source to make up the difference, the coffers of the state
and federal governments. To become a tax-supported organization,
guardsmen in Illinois and across the nation learned to create effective
local, statewide, and eventually national lobbies that worked together to
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turn what was essentially a private organization into a permanent and
fully integrated part of the bureaucratic machinery of the state.2 The
logic of soldiering drove militia volunteers to broaden and deepen their
relationships with the state and, especially, the federal government until
by 1916, they had begun the final, irrevocable turn away from their local
communities as they established a new, national identity as the dedicat-
ed core of the national reserve army.
Seeking State Funds in the 1870s
Illinois National Guard officers dedicated to a reserve army role for the
ING and all state militia forces faced their greatest challenges in securing
the militia’s financial base. Volunteer companies, in Illinois as elsewhere,
traditionally were supported primarily by their members’ private contribu-
tions and whatever largesse their local communities could spare. Because
their local communities couldn’t spare as much as militia volunteers
believed they needed to outfit and arm themselves with modern rifles and
equipment, as early as 1874 Illinois militia officers went to the Illinois
General Assembly to ask for an increase in the tax dollar support awarded
to the state militia.3 They did not get an increase in 1874. However, most
local communities could not supply the amount of money required to sup-
ply and train a modern reserve army, and communities certainly could not
do so equally across the state and over time. Complete reliance on local
funding sources, even in a community that generously supported its militia
companies, could produce wildly uneven results. For example, in 1875 the
Committee on Ways and Means of the First Regiment of Chicago report-
ed that citizens had subscribed $13,468.50 and members of the regiment
had given $2,349.50 to the regimental coffers, for a total budget of
$15,818.00.4 Just a little over a year later, the Second Regiment, also entire-
ly made up of Chicago-based companies, was $8,700.00 in debt, with no
immediate relief in sight.5 These awkward and unfortunate results of too
great a dependence on local financial sources drove Illinois militia mem-
bers to their state representatives again and again in ever more organized
lobbying efforts, seeking increased militia budgets.
The dramatic upsurge in membership during the period 1874–76 gave
renewed impetus to the perennial attempts to get a new militia code
passed through the Illinois General Assembly. In 1875 Brigadier General
Alfred Ducat traveled the state and personally visited many militia com-
panies. According to Holdridge Collins of the First Regiment, Ducat was
met everywhere with desire for a new and better militia code. So Ducat
established a committee and set a date for its meeting in Chicago.
CHAPTER SEVEN186
Hannah_CH7_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  2:56 PM  Page 186
Unfortunately, enthusiasm for a new law was not yet at such a pitch as to
induce members from outside the city to attend the meeting. The mili-
tias were still creations of local communities, and their members did not
yet see the benefits of working together at the state level. In this respect,
Illinois militiamen continued to reflect national norms.6
It fell to Ducat and his volunteer staff to come up with a bill. The gen-
eral staff gathered copies of militia codes from other states as well as a
“large mass of statistics” to use in creating their own bill and in lobbying
for its passage. Ducat also sent out a circular to all militia companies
stressing the importance of a united front and steady pressure upon their
own state representatives. The major features of the new code centered
around a yearly appropriation to “meet the expenses for rent of armories,
ordnance stores, camp equipage and transportation of all battalions for at
least one yearly muster, and for ammunition and a Rifle Range for prac-
tice, with an allowance per diem for every man who shall turn out upon
order,” and “with such provisions for the perfection of discipline as may
secure an effective and creditable soldiery.”7 The bill was drawn up and
distributed to all interested and necessary parties.
The Illinois General Assembly met every two years during the late
nineteenth century, and 1877 was a session year. Outgoing Governor
Albert Beveridge and incoming Governor Shelby S. Cullom addressed
the thirtieth session of the General Assembly on the subject of the mili-
tia. The governors’ remarks are particularly interesting for what they
reveal about contemporary concerns about the link between citizen and
soldier and the role of citizen-soldiers in society.
Beveridge concluded his remarks on the incredible growth, and real
problems, of the militia with the following recommendations for a new
militia code: “The Militia Law of the State is very crude and imperfect,
and needs revision. In my opinion, the state should provide for the
organization and discipline of a limited number of Regiments, and for the
encouragement of such organization and the preservation of its own
property, should provide, at least, suitable armories.” He went on to
address any concerns about the presence of these regiments might raise,
assuring his listeners that a “well-organized Militia, composed of our own
citizens, will not endanger the liberties of the people, but on the con-
trary, give greater security to life, property and liberty.”8
Governor Cullom seconded Beveridge’s sentiments in his own
remarks, saying, “I desire to add one suggestion in reference to the affairs
of our own State, by calling your attention to the Militia Law. I believe
a more perfect law should be enacted, which will secure a more thorough
organization of the State Militia.” He continued, “The spirit of our insti-
tutions, and the temper of our people, are hostile to a standing army; and
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I am opposed to any policy, State or National, looking to governing the
people by the bayonet. Yet, in the most highly-civilized communities, a
trained Militia, recruited from the intelligent and industrious classes, is
an almost indispensable auxiliary to the civil power, in the interests of
peace and good order.”9 Beveridge and Cullom both took care to point
out that they did not advocate use of the militia as an extension of the
policing function of the state. However, with the unacknowledged but
powerful underlying subtext of the events concerning the Chicago
“commune” of 1874–75, they both also acknowledged that domestic
order maintenance was a potential function of the militia. They argued
that the best way to ensure that the police function did not become
oppressive was to draw militia members from the citizenry. They
believed that the citizen-soldier by his very nature would act as both a
brake on and an indispensable support to police power. Cullom even
went so far as to link citizen-soldiers with civilization itself, implying
that citizens can best police themselves, and the government, through
the tool of the citizen-militia.
To advance the growth of such an institution, both governors drew
attention to the two most frequently cited problems and solutions for the
better development of the militia. First, the state should pay for the
absolute essentials, that is construction of or rent for armory space and
its upkeep. Second, the law should set a specific term of enlistment
(three to five years) and give militia officers the necessary authority not
only to establish order, but also to enforce discipline. This was not all
Ducat had proposed in his new bill, but it was the obvious minimum.
At this point a possible roadblock loomed, in the form of Adjutant
General Hiram Hilliard. Hilliard was dissatisfied with the proposed
code for a number of reasons, most centering around the rank and
responsibilities of his office. As a result, Hilliard apparently was not
willing to lobby for the bill or to act in any way to help secure its pas-
sage. This was a real blow because Hilliard was the only one with rank
and authority located in Springfield. Ducat lived and was headquar-
tered in Chicago. Just when it seemed as though yet another militia bill
was going to die in committee, Ducat undertook leading the lobbying
effort himself. He used personal contacts with the Cook County repre-
sentatives and also sent two of his officers down to Springfield to pres-
ent their position to a joint committee hearing finally arranged by
Hilliard. The bill was finally accepted by the House in 1877, but not
without some difficulty. There was a substantial minority staunchly
opposed to the bill, and this minority attempted to derail it with a num-
ber of mockingly obstructionist amendments, for example, raising the
number of musicians per company from two to 250.10 The bill was then
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shepherded through the Senate by Martin A. Delany, state senator from
Cook County, sixth district, chairman of the militia committee and sup-
porter of the bill. The bill was passed May 14, Governor Cullom signed
it on the 18th, and it became law. The new militia code went into effect
July 1, 1877.11
The bill was not without its flaws, but most everyone concerned
agreed that it was a good start and that they would try again during the
next session to address the remaining problems. One of the problems that
most irked formalists was that after heavily amending the first half of the
bill and, among other things, changing ranks and organizations, the
House had passed the remainder without consideration for any inconsis-
tencies. The rank charts of the original bill, modeled after the New York
militia, were all one grade higher than in the regular Army. The House
had cut all the division ranks down to regular Army equivalents, but left
Brigade and Regimental ranks alone, so that technically majors were rul-
ing on lieutenant colonels. The Senate passed the House bill without
much debate and no attention to this issue. The tax was limited to one-
twentieth of a mil, enough to build on, according to AG Hilliard, though
not really sufficient to meet all proposed obligations, and far more disap-
pointing, it represented a one-time-only dispersal of funds.12
The new act carried with it no permanent funding clause; under it, all
funds awarded to the militia had to be renegotiated in the general state
appropriations bill every two years.13 So in 1876 the General Assembly
appropriated approximately $20,000 annually for the next two years for
the support of the entire Illinois state militia. This money was still not a
permanently reliable income.14 Further, the mobilization of the infant
Illinois state militia for strike duty in 1877 and 1878 left the state gov-
ernment with unpaid bills for militia service and supplies totaling
$82,060.27, a debt that could not be paid until the Illinois General
Assembly appropriated the funds to do so.15
Militia supporters continued to work hard for a new law, one with a
permanent funding provision, and they were largely successful with the
Militia Act of 1879.16 By 1882 the annual tax levy, as provided for by the
Militia Act of 1879, had grown to $70,000, and in 1888 the adjutant
general requested an annual appropriation of $120,000.17 The state of
Illinois paid close to $400,000 to support the ING from 1895 to 1896,
and in 1896 the AG asked for an annual appropriation increase to
$210,000.18 A decade and a half later, during the period 1911–12, the
ING was costing the taxpayers of Illinois $890,553.36.19 These figures
dramatically illustrate not only the increasing legislative savvy of the
ING leadership, but more significantly, their successful establishment of
the ING as a part of and the responsibility of the state government. The
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increases in state funds for the militia followed a steady, upward course,
never once diminishing over the years, even in periods when the ING
itself shrank. The chief lobbyist for the militia during these years was
inevitably the adjutant general, appointed by the governor and respon-
sible for paying the bills rung up by the militia. As a result of this exec-
utive branch responsibility, the growth in militia appropriations does not
appear to be strongly linked with the political party in power, either in
the General Assembly or in the statehouse.20 The funding increases for
the ING, no matter how gradual over the decades, were not without
detractors. Even such generally supportive voices as the Chicago Tribune’s
raised questions and objections to the steady growth of the state’s mili-
tary budget throughout the 1880s.21 A minor 1883 investigation into
what the paper called “outrageous charges” accumulated during a court-
martial had grown by 1887 into a chauvinistic assault on the excessive
militia budget that could have been shrunk if only a northern camp site,
near the city of Chicago, had been selected over Camp Lincoln down
near the state capitol.22 In 1889 the Tribune was producing exposés on
the extravagances of such Camp Lincoln expenses as swimming pool
maintenance and the inflated price of camp rations.23 Despite the nega-
tive press coverage, the steady biennial budget increases continued.
Changes in the adjutant generals’ biennial reports over the years from
1876 to 1912 are another sign of the success of ING leadership’s legisla-
tive and social agenda to convince the taxpayers of Illinois, and through
them the General Assembly, and vice versa, that the ING warranted this
significant outlay of state moneys. In 1876, in his first biennial report to
the governor who appointed him head of the state forces, adjutant gen-
eral Hiram Hilliard laid out his case for government support of the mili-
tia. His lengthy argument began with a reminder of the various consti-
tutional provisions organizing militias for “the defense of the country
and the maintenance of public order.”24 It was the latter that Hilliard
chose to elaborate on for the state legislature, concluding:
If Illinois intends to keep pace with the other States in the march of
improvement, and if a militia organization is to be maintained, let
such legislation be had as will not reduce our volunteers to the level
of a rabble, and when you place the power to commission officers in
the hands of the Governor, give him and the officers he commissions
the power to enforce discipline.
Taking into consideration that there will always be dangerous men
in society, who, when once aroused, may inflict losses of millions upon
quiet and unoffending citizens, it is not well for a great State, like
Illinois, to allow its militia to fall below a proper standard of excellence.
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Their skill and efficiency must in great measure take the place of
the discipline of regular troops; the greater their proficiency in drill
and marksmanship, the less we shall have to fear from riots and
lawlessness.25
In stressing the public order functions of a militia, Hilliard was reacting,
in part, to events in Chicago over the previous few years, from the riot-
ing following the Chicago fire to the events surrounding the Chicago
Relief and Aid society in 1874 and 1875.26 However, the bill applied to
the whole of the ING, and the money would be spent throughout the
state, as the number of militia companies statewide was growing quickly
in 1875 and 1876. (See appendix J.) To achieve a drilled and disciplined
militia, Hilliard made several recommendations. He argued that giving
the volunteers of the state militia “good arms of the latest pattern, and
plenty of ammunition for target practice” would “fill the ranks with the
best young men of the State” and encourage them in “habits of coolness,
discipline and temperance, which in turn will command universal appro-
bation.”27 Hilliard then went on to warn that if the state did not fulfill
this minimum for the militia, not only would the “rabble” have free rein,
but also, this veteran of the Civil War pointed out, the “reverses that
befell the Union armies in the early part of the recent war” would be
repeated again and again in the face of similar national crises.28 With this
conclusion of his argument for a better-supported state militia organiza-
tion, the adjutant general devoted the next several paragraphs of his
report to a summary of the key points of a bill prepared by General Ducat
and modeled after the militia codes of other large states, tacitly offering
his support to this bill.29 In 1876, the adjutant general of Illinois clearly
believed that he had an important role to play in aiding the lobbying
efforts of militia supporters. In 1878 Hilliard—still adjutant general—
devoted more than half of his report to making the case for the impor-
tance of the militia to the state on the same themes. He made still more
detailed recommendations for changes in the current law and an expan-
sion of the current budget to $200,000 annually.30 Hilliard got less than
10 percent of his funding request, but he was able to win a steady, if small,
permanent appropriation.
I. H. Elliot, Hilliard’s immediate successor, also argued for increased
state support for the state militia, but his arguments shifted away from
Hilliard’s focus on internal order maintenance and toward a broader
understanding of the role of the National Guard in the life of the
nation. Elliot chose to quote two “distinguished” and “eminent”
observers who remarked on the bulwark the state militias created for the
United States.
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I cannot forbear to quote a sentence from a letter on this subject
from one of our most distinguished citizens: ‘A nation of fifty mil-
lions ruling a continent bounded only by the great oceans, uphold-
ing and pledged before God and man to defend a form of civil gov-
ernment adverse in its fundamental principles to every other power
on earth, ought in some way to be a military people;’ and also the
remark of an eminent Englishman upon witnessing the maneuvers of
one of our State Regiments; ‘A country that possesses such a citizen
soldiery as that, has no need of a regular army.’31
Here Elliot chose to emphasize not domestic order, but rather the role of
the militia as a national force in a potentially hostile world. Perhaps the
most telling distinction between Hilliard’s 1878 report and Elliot’s in
1882 is a single sentence: “If [our State troops] are worthy of being sus-
tained at all, they should be well sustained and given a fair chance to
make favorable comparison with the best State Soldiery.”32 The differ-
ence between this argument and Hilliard’s long and elaborate debate
points indicates the progress that militia leadership had made in becom-
ing a regularly supported state agency. The line suggests that Elliot was
sure that the General Assembly already viewed the ING was an integral
part of the responsibilities of state. Elliot actually devoted the bulk of his
report to an argument for increasing the militia appropriation, a case he
made by pointing out that the requirements established by the 1879
Militia Act could not be met under the terms of the current
appropriation.33
By 1888, Adjutant General Joseph Vance limited himself to remind-
ing the governor and the General Assembly not to forget the National
Guard in peaceful years, attributing the peace itself to the “existence of
an organized body of citizen soldiers, which have proven equal to any
emergency in the past, known to be equipped for any active service . . .
doubtless contributed in moral effect to this state of tranquility.”34 After
this opening, Vance kept his argument simple:
In a moment when no clouds obscure our peaceful horizon, will our
General Assembly forget that a few thousand dollars expended in
maintenance of this institution may save the lives of hundreds of cit-
izens and the value of millions in property? Will they preserve this
institution, which has been so wisely and substantially builded [sic]?
Or, influenced by false considerations of economy, will they with-
hold the sustenance that gives it life and strength?35
In 1896, Adjutant General Charles Hilton felt no need to make any par-
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ticular plea about the necessity or importance of the ING to the state or
the nation in his biennial report. Instead, he concentrated his efforts on
a lengthy and thorough report on the state of the ING at his command.36
In 1898, the adjutant general of Illinois boasted that his troops had
achieved “a high and commendable state of discipline and efficiency.”37
The adjutant general credited Governor John R. Tanner for fostering the
institution, but he also recognized that it was mostly owing to “the great
personal interest and sacrificing devotion to duty of all commanders . . .
reinforced by the eager desire to learn, the intelligent absorption of les-
sons and instruction, the unstinted donation of time and energy by offi-
cers and enlisted men alike.” It was these men who “placed the active
National Guard on a high pedestal of usefulness and reliability.”38
By the eve of the Spanish American War, the ING was firmly estab-
lished as a state institution, with a large and active membership commit-
ted to preparing the organization for a role as the nation’s reserve Army.
Seizing on the Spanish American War as a chance to demonstrate that
their long years of preparation had paid off, Illinois guardsmen mobilized
ten full regiments and one artillery battalion for service in the United
States Volunteers for periods of a few months up to a year, a record of
service ING members were able to point to with pride forever after.
In the years after the Spanish American War, ING advocates were able
at last to convince the Illinois General Assembly to begin a building cam-
paign to house the National Guard, in Chicago and across the state, in
state-owned and state-operated armories, and to see their state budgets grow
substantially. With the new money, ING members were able to increase the
rigor and professionalism of their training and acquire the ever more sophis-
ticated technology they needed to keep pace with international military
developments. And each year, some twelve hundred new young men from
a wide range of backgrounds continued to find the ING an appealing organ-
ization that allowed them to take leading roles in patriotic celebrations, par-
ticipate in competitive shooting events, and stake their claim to both citi-
zenship and manliness while having a good time.39
Partisanship, Politics, and Intraguard Tensions
Politics and the state militias have a long, complex history, from the way
individuals used militia rank as a stepping stone to political office,
through parades as statements of civic engagement, to securing the right
to the franchise, to the basics of gaining and holding a berth in the mili-
tia.40 Holdridge Collins’s lengthy account of the effort to secure satisfac-
tory new militia legislation in the 1870s is a primer for the ways politics,
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money, and political egos affected the Illinois militia, and the ways long-
established hostility between downstate politicians and those from
Chicago continued to shape the development of the ING.41 The back-
and-forth between Hilliard and Ducat, and between politicians from
Chicago and from downstate, was at once supremely political and inti-
mately personal. And during the very next session of the General
Assembly, Martin Delany, supporter of the 1877 legislation, protested
violently against further modification of the militia code, and especially
against the permanent budget that was part of the 1879 bill.42 Over the
years other personal and political grudges would continue to affect ING
leadership, from the resignation of Brigadier General Joseph T. Torrence
of the First Brigade in 1882 to the long, involved drama over Colonel
John C. Buckner of the Ninth Battalion in 1897 and 1898.43 Political
alliances for the ING were not necessarily stable or long lasting.
The politics of the ongoing struggles to gain a berth in the ING
reflect similar tensions. In March 1893, the Chicago Inter Ocean report-
ed that then-Governor John P. Altgeld was going to accept a private reg-
iment, the Hibernian Rifles, as the new Seventh Regiment, ING.
According to the paper, the “Hibernian Rifles have strong Clan-na-Gael
affiliations, and have long been recognized by Chicago Irishmen as
belonging to the anti-Cronin faction . . . In light of these facts it would
seem that Governor Altgeld’s object in admitting this regiment into the
State service is to show his recognition of this element with the hope of
attaching to himself no inconsiderable part of the Irish vote.” The arti-
cle goes on to record the objections of several current ING officers to the
scheme, all of whom found a military reason (the companies had too few
members) to object, as well as their complaint that this was an overtly
political move on the part of a struggling governor.44 The Chicago Tribune
was less hostile than the anticorruption Inter Ocean in its coverage of the
story, noting that the previous objections to the Hibernian Rifles’
attempts to gain an ING berth was that “the State did not want class
organization in the Guard,” and that they succeeded because of their
contributions to Altgeld’s election the previous fall.45 Despite the objec-
tions, the Seventh joined the state ranks.
The African American Ninth Battalion had an even tougher time
than the Seventh. African American voters in Chicago had come to
wield enough influence that they were courted by some factions of the
Chicago Republican party as well as Chicago Democrats, and so they
were by necessity pulled into the fray of Illinois party politics, gaining at
least a little leverage to achieve some of their goals.46 Willard Gatewood
unraveled the major threads of the story in his 1975 article on the
Eighth Illinois in the Spanish American War, and “complicated” only
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begins to suggest the twists and turns of this tale. John Buckner, major of
the private Ninth Battalion, though an active Republican politician, was
not a member of the same Republican faction as John Tanner, governor
from 1896 to 1900. In 1895, during the Altgeld administration with its
strong ties to Republicans, including Buckner, in the city of Chicago,
Buckner was a political asset to his regiment. Elected to the General
Assembly in 1894, during the Altgeld administration, Buckner was able
to secure a place for the Ninth Battalion in the ING. In 1897 during the
Tanner administration, Buckner had significantly reduced political pull
with the new Republican administration, which came close to destroying
his organization on the eve of the Spanish American War.47
Major Buckner faced two courts-martial in 1897.48 At the center of
both was a disagreement concerning rail travel to and from summer camp
in 1897. Major Buckner claimed that the train cars provided for his
troops were dirty and unfit for service and refused to use them, eventual-
ly making arrangements on another line. The representative from the
adjutant general’s office disagreed, and the first court-martial on two
charges of refusing an order was the eventual result of the face-off.
Governor Tanner disallowed the “not guilty” findings of the first court-
martial, and he sent the case back to the ING. At the second court-
martial, Major Buckner was also charged with leaving the route of a
parade early, so as not to pass in review before Tanner, and disrupting the
procession as a result. He was found guilty of all three charges, and in
November of 1897 Buckner was suspended from his command for six
months, much to the disgust of the editors of the Springfield Illinois
Record. The editors, Charles E. Hall and James H. Porter, were avid sup-
porters of Buckner and vitriolic opponents of Tanner, staunch though
they were in their loyalty to the Republican Party.49
The “Buckner affair” highlights the political role of the militia with-
in the African American community and on the larger Illinois politi-
cal stage. The political role shouldered by the members of the Ninth
Battalion operated on several levels. The affair was overtly political in
the sense that Buckner belonged to a faction of the Illinois Republican
Party that was competing with Governor Tanner. Some critics suspect-
ed Tanner of attempting to use the Guard to build a statewide political
machine, in which case forcing Buckner out of the Ninth in order to
replace him with someone from Tanner’s own faction makes some
sense.50 The affair was also political in the sense of the ongoing strug-
gle for African American civil rights. Buckner’s original offense was to
refuse transportation that he felt would not have been offered to white
regiments. “We were furnished cars for that trip that were unfit for use.
Some of them had been used in picnic excursion trains and had stood
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several days without cleaning. They were actually filthy, and so dusty
you could write your name with your finger anywhere inside them.”
Some of the other cars provided for his men had not “apparently been
used in years, and were not safe to travel in. Before we had covered the
one and one-half miles from Camp Lincoln to Springfield an air brake
broke on one car and another got out of order so the train had to be
stopped.”51 He protested what he felt was overt discrimination against
African American guardsmen, and when he did not receive satisfac-
tion, he refused to use what he felt were demeaning accommodations
and arranged for new transport, presumably some that treated his
organization with more dignity and respect than they received before.
In fact, it is possible that as much as Tanner’s irritation with Buckner
derived from his loyalty to the wrong Republican faction, it was also
exacerbated by Buckner’s uncomfortable challenge to overt racial
discrimination.
As a final note on the intensity of the political and personal battles
fought over the regiment, Tanner’s choice for colonel of the new Eighth
Regiment in 1898, John Marshall, infuriated the editors of the Illinois
Record, who remained steadfastly loyal to Buckner and their faction of
the Illinois Republican Party.52 The editors took issue with everything
the Chicago-based leadership of the battalion (soon-to-be regiment) did
once Buckner had been suspended.53 Regarding Marshall as a traitor to
Buckner, they castigated him for recruiting problems, for being chosen
over Buckner as colonel, and for being a traitor to his race.54 Later, they
would gleefully publish a series of inflammatory letters from disaffected
soldiers, in particular a Corporal George J. Beard (also a former employ-
ee of the Illinois Record), in Cuba who blamed all their hardships on
Marshall.55 The vitriolic correspondents of the Illinois Record complained
about food, discipline, the heat, and having to stay in camp. They also
continued to slam Marshall, claiming that Marshall had had an affair in
Cuba, and then complaining later that when the several officers’ wives
arrived, all the extra tents and bedding were requisitioned for them
rather than renting quarters for them three and half miles away in
town.56 Despite the criticism, Marshall remained colonel of the Eighth
Regiment until 1913, and he was able to use the position to gain politi-
cal appointments, including deputy sheriff of Cook County and a posi-
tion as a state game warden.57
Over the next decade, the Eighth Illinois continued to operate as a
full member of the Illinois National Guard. The members shared in the
benefits of the gradual expansion of both state and federal budgets,
including the expansion of training opportunities, and they generally
impressed their federal inspectors.58 However, in these years of increas-
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ing racial tension and the rise of Jim Crow in the South, the members
of the Eighth Illinois faced more overt discrimination and racial vio-
lence than they had before the turn of the century. On July 6, 1908, the
Daily Inter Ocean of Chicago reported that members of the Eighth
Illinois had attacked “obnoxious motorists” who disturbed a parade.
Making matters still tenser, on August 14, 1908, Springfield erupted
into one of the most horrific race riots in Illinois history, with whites
turning on blacks and destroying lives, homes, and property. Before it
was over, the majority of the ING was called into service, with over
3,500 men and officers arriving in Springfield to help restore order.59
Only two regiments and a few scattered companies were not called into
service. Neither the Sixth Infantry from northwestern Illinois, nor the
African American Eighth Infantry, not even the company stationed in
Springfield, were called.60 In 1913, a federal inspector acknowledged, in
a confidential report to the chief of the militia bureau, that the Eighth
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Figure 14
African American Officers of the Eighth Infantry, Camp Lincoln, 1903. From left
to right, top row: Edward S. Miller, unidentified man, James S. Nelson. Bottom
row: Major Allen A. Wesley, Colonel John R. Marshall, James H. Johnson.
Courtesy of the Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library. Photographer: Guy Mathis,
Guy Mathis Collection.
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would never be called for domestic service, as the “regiment is always
spoken of as a political regiment in that it is believed that it would be
criminal to order it out for local duty, i.e., for strike or similar duty here
in the state, as it would be almost certain to precipitate a race war.”61
Giving force to his observation, the summer following the Springfield
race riot, on July 18, 1909, the Daily Inter Ocean carried reports of wor-
ries about possible violence in Springfield while the Eighth Illinois was
there for summer camp. On April 8, 1911, the Chicago Defender shared
the story of Colonel Marshall being snubbed at an officer’s school
training in San Antonio. The 1913 federal inspection report tells of a
brick being thrown through the windows of a train car carrying the
Eighth Illinois to camp.62 On August 11, 1915, the Chicago Defender
reported that a race “melee” erupted after a white man slashed a mem-
ber of the Eighth Illinois in Springfield.
It is impossible to divorce politics from the story of the Eighth
Regiment—or from the history of the ING—but these stories also illus-
trate why the statewide organization never explicitly articulated a pref-
erence for any one political party. Politics within militia organizations
could be vitriolic and nasty, and each unit could have its own political
identity and alliances. Despite the internal feuds, the greatest criticism
ING officers leveled at governors over the years was that governors were
attempting to turn the state forces into a “machine” for their particular
party.63 To prevent that from happening, and to lobby for their own
interests as an organization, ING members created the private “Illinois
National Guard Association” in 1882.64 Their purpose was the “promo-
tion of the interests of the State Guard and mutual improvement in mil-
itary matters.”65 By 1887 the association had 227 members who gathered
annually to listen to papers on military affairs and to prepare amend-
ments for the improvement of the laws governing the state forces.66 By
the 1890s, the association had settled into a permanent role as an advo-
cate for professionalization and increased public funding. The statewide
organization could not embrace any one political faction or party with-
out alienating a significant portion of its own membership, not to men-
tion the always-important legislatures, and even destabilizing the repub-
lic itself. In the words of The National Guardsman, “The spectacle of a
militia composed exclusively of democrats or republicans, or Roman
Catholics or Presbyterians for instance, would not only be a singular one,
but one involving the elements of danger and sedition; a menace to all
government and law, and to be suppressed with the same methods as
would be employed in destroying a band of guerrillas or a gang of
pirates.”67
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Costs Grow Faster than State Support
The ever-growing state budget for the militia in Illinois brought with it
increasing state oversight and multiplying regulations for the state mili-
tia. Each militia law had more sections than the last, detailing matters as
diverse as the formation of companies, the election and examination of
officers, the regulations for court-martial, and riot control provisions.68
Each new law also carried with it increased disciplinary powers for all
ING officers to enforce compliance with the increasingly detailed and
demanding regulations. Each new adjutant general imposed further
restrictions on the freedom of militia officers to structure their own com-
pany’s time, either at weekly drills or in their annual calendar of events.69
In 1884, the adjutant general imposed a standard fatigue uniform for the
ING. In 1885, the General Assembly appropriated the funds to purchase
Camp Lincoln, a permanent campground for the ING, so that every
company could spend four to seven days encamped each summer for
training purposes.70 The adjutant general began to mandate the types of
equipment and equipment storage that every armory would have avail-
able to house state property in the mid-1880s. The adjutant general
imposed record-keeping forms and ledgers to unify record keeping
throughout the ING about the same time.71 The office of the inspector
general, created in 1876, was responsible for seeing that all these new
codes, regulations, and practices were followed by each company, and as
such, the office grew in power and importance with each new increase in
state funds and expansion of state policies. State money was, naturally,
the stick as well as the carrot. If the inspecting officer wrote a negative
report, a company could find itself pushed out of the ING in favor of one
of the long list of new companies awaiting a place in the Guard.72
Whatever the price for the funds, however, money from the state
never matched the needs ING members felt they had. For example, the
adjutant general purchased only fatigue uniforms for the ING’s enlisted
men, and not every year. Officers’ uniforms of all types and parade uni-
forms and accouterments for everyone had to be paid for privately. Any
expedition to another city or state had to be privately paid for.
Cavalrymen who owned or rented their own horses paid for these things
out of pocket.73 As a result, fund-raising continued to be an important
and central activity for most ING companies until well after the turn of
the century. Companies held balls, lectures, amateur theatricals, drill
performances, and parades, all in quest of money. They printed up beau-
tiful, glossy souvenir books full of photographs and unit and individual
histories as a means of selling advertising to raise funds. They also
worked all the individual and group connections they had in order to
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ask for the big sums of money necessary to keep ambitious organizations
afloat.74
One of the most expensive items that drove companies or regiments
to their communities for support was armory costs. Armory rent subsidies
from the state barely covered the upkeep of the average leased facility,
and they definitely could not cover the construction of a new armory;
private fund-raising was the only way to achieve that. Illinois moved
quite slowly to state-subsidized armory construction for an otherwise
large and relatively well-supported state militia system. A number of
states had started building or subsidizing armory construction as early as
the 1870s, including New York, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and
Connecticut.75 As late as 1901, the state of Illinois still owned no
armories for the use by state troops. All armories used by ING companies
and regiments were rented for a combined annual cost to the state of
$50,000, with the rare exception of privately constructed armories for
particularly well-financed companies or regiments. Throughout the
1880s and 1890s, adjutant generals requested in increasingly desperate
tones a large arsenal in Springfield to house the adjutant general’s oper-
ations and the Springfield-based ING regiment, and for a new lakefront
armory in Chicago.76 In 1896, Adjutant General Charles Hilton
described the Chicago situation:
The amount expended in Chicago is not sufficient, and in many
cases the deficiency has to be made good by private contributions.
Even with this aid, the armory facilities are entirely inadequate.
Thanks to the great interest taken in this matter by General H. A.
Wheeler, commanding the 1st Brigade, the city of Chicago has given
to the State troops 20 acres on the Lake Front, provided it be used
for armories and drill ground. I strongly recommend that the next
General Assembly be asked to make the necessary appropriations to
utilize this gift. The housing of all the troops in Chicago in adequate
armories on this ground, would be economical in that it would
diminish the annual fixed charges; would do much to encourage
them; and would make them independent of private or extraneous
aid, desirable for many reasons.77
In 1897, the General Assembly did appropriate $10,000 to contribute to
the costs of armory construction in Chicago, but that sum represented
only a fraction of the cost of the proposed armory, and two years later it
remained unbuilt.78 In fact, ten years later, in 1906, Adjutant General
Thomas W. Scott penned an appeal to the General Assembly that
strongly echoes that of Hilton from the previous decade. “Armory con-
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ditions in the city of Chicago are such at this time that, with impunity,
it might be said that an emergency exists, and I recommend to Your
Excellency the great importance of steps being taken at an early date to
provide permanent armory buildings for the several commands in that
city.” 79
It was only after the successes of the ING during the Spanish
American War that the state of Illinois began to build as well as rent
armories for the ING. The long-dreamed-of and oft-requested new State
Arsenal and Armory in Springfield was completed in the period from
1901 to 1902, though not without problems. AG Scott mentioned in his
1906 report that it was “imperative that the electric system in this build-
ing be attended to, as the wiring in its present condition has been a pro-
nounced a menace to life.”80 Finally, in 1907, the General Assembly
appropriated $185,000 for the first armory purchases and constructions
outside of the state capital.81 AG Scott remarked that “this marks an era
in the history of the Illinois National Guard and lends great encourage-
ment to the officers and men who have for years devoted their time and
money to maintaining the high standard of our guard.”82
Of course, once the General Assembly opened the door to armory
construction, they were bombarded with pleas for assistance by the many,
many companies and regiments that had been making do in horrible,
rented quarters. In 1908, the Chicago-based First Cavalry published an
extensive report to present to the General Assembly, documenting the
truly awful conditions in their armory and stables, complete with an
album of photographs illustrating the dangerous condition of their facil-
ity.83 These appeals and others like them had a clear effect, and in 1911
the General Assembly appropriated $395,000 for an armory for the First
Cavalry.84 Two years later, the General Assembly approved a new armory
for the African American Eighth Regiment headquartered on the South
Side of Chicago. The Eighth Regiment Armory opened in the winter of
1914–15.85
In the meantime, the vast majority of companies and regiments across
the state made do with rented facilities. Troops outside Chicago were
“usually quartered in make-shift buildings, sometimes unsuitable, usually
too small, and nearly all in crowded portions of the town, where no
ground is available for drill out of doors.”86 A historian of Company I,
Sixth Regiment, provides this list of armories that served the company in
Morrison from 1877 to 1898.
For an armory and drill room, the basement of the old frame build-
ing which stood on the lot now occupied by the Hub Clothing Store
was secured, remaining here but a short time, the company removed
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to the City Council room, and shortly afterward to the second floor
of Hollar Smith’s blacksmith shop on east Main street. At that time
the members considered themselves extremely fortunate in being so
snugly located. From there they ‘trekked’ to Milne’s opera house, and
later to the old skating rink on Grove Street where they were at home
at the outbreak of the Spanish American War.87
In Springfield, Company C, known as the Governor’s Guard, made do
with the top floors of livery stables.88
In Chicago in 1881, the Second Infantry moved into two rented
upper floors on Randolph Street, the lower devoted to a drill hall, which
was “handsomely papered,” with silvered pillars, an ebony-framed mirror
and a “very elaborate chandelier,” and the upper held the “cosy” compa-
ny rooms.89 That same year, Battery D arranged to build a simple, one-
story brick building on city-owned land that was also used for a circus
ground. When pressed that this might inconvenience the circus, Mayor
Carter Harrison responded, “No, sir . . . It gives them a little less room
for side-shows, but they still have room enough.”90 As the first appropri-
ations for state-financed construction in 1907 were specifically for regi-
ments located in Chicago (the Second and the Seventh), the situation
in Morrison, Springfield, and elsewhere throughout the state was not sig-
nificantly altered for a very long time to come. In the meantime, else-
where as in Chicago, private contributions had to make up the shortfall
between state rent subsidies and the armory needs of each regiment or
company.
Sometimes, private money could be enough. The First Regiment of
Chicago—the wealthiest and best-connected, politically and socially,
regiment in the state—was able to secure custom armory space early on.
The First started out on the top floor of a warehouse when they organ-
ized in 1874, and then in 1875 they moved to a midsize facility built for
their use and then leased to them on Jackson Street. When the fifteen-
year-lease was up in 1890, the owner declined to renew, and the regi-
ment, feeling the space was too small, moved to a larger, grander armory
built by donated funds on a piece of Michigan Avenue property owned
and donated, via a no-payment ninety-nine year lease, by Marshall
Field.91 The large, new First Regiment armory in Chicago, designed by
the well-known architects Burnham and Root, was completed and ded-
icated in 1890. Unfortunately, the armory was destroyed by fire less than
three years later, and it was completely rebuilt in 1894.92 The First
Infantry Association, the private association to which members of the
regiment also belonged, owned both armories. All the amenities—desks,
tables, chairs, pianos, locker rooms, basketball courts, kitchens, and din-
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ing rooms—were privately funded and owned. The inspector general
noted in 1902 that the “company’s quarters are superior to the field and
staff officers’ and have been furnished by the company officers and enlist-
ed men, at their own expense.” He went on to share his opinion that
“these company quarters are as well fitted as many of the first-class clubs
of the city and [are] conducive to the enlistment of the very best of our
citizens. Books on military affairs and the best literature and music are
provided in each of the company quarters . . . which reflects great credit
on the members of the several companies for their zeal and liberality in
making their respective quarters most attractive and unsurpassed.”93 The
“Dandy First,” as they were christened in local papers, was, of course, the
most unusual of regiments, and their amenities merely served to high-
light just how substandard the accommodations for the rest of the ING
were until well after the turn of the century.
The First Regiment was not the only ING organization that was able
to build privately. Capitalizing on their record of wartime service, the
new Captain of Company I, Sixth Regiment in Morrison, was able to
secure a new armory for his organization. This was a tremendous under-
taking for a single company and required much “time . . . expended in
formulating plans and securing the assistance, financially, of interested
citizens. . . . [T]he armory was practically completed by January first,
1901.”94 Like the members of the First, the historian of Company I was
very proud of the company’s home.
The building is constructed of brick and is the full depth of the lot.
The drill room is on the first floor and is large and well proportioned.
The wardrobe room is also located on the first floor. The front of the
building is two stories in height, the ground floor being occupied as
a store room. The second floor is given to a suite of rooms for the use
of the “Morrison Military Club,” an organization founded by the
members of company I. On the east side of the upper floor is the
bathroom, which is equipped with both tub and shower bathing
apparatus, also toilet rooms. Joining this is the captains [sic] office
which opens into the main room or clubroom proper. This room is
large and fitted up for the convenience of the club members, and is a
very pleasant resort for both the old and young men of the town as
well as all citizens are eligible to membership upon payment of the
regularly established quarterly dues. A janitor is in attendance both
day and evening.95
This comparatively luxurious and dedicated facility was built and main-
tained by private funds, raised locally and from the membership dues
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assessed by the Morrison Military Club, and not with state funds. The
existence of this facility serves as a strong reminder of the incredible
importance of local fund-raising for ING companies.
Some of the more massive armories constructed privately or by state
funds in the 1880s and 1890s were built, among other purposes, to pro-
tect the contents (equipment and people) from the putative danger of
rampaging urban mobs. Of the First Regiment’s second (1894) armory,
Inspector General Walter Fieldhouse noted that it was “built in the nor-
mal style of architecture, having massive walls and is practically impreg-
nable against riot or civil insurrection. . . . The main entrance has mas-
sive doors situated in a Norman archway and cannot be entered except-
ing by and with the aid and consent of those in charge of the armory. . . .
The turret and battlement of this armory are conveniently placed to
repel attack. The windows and firing ports are well arranged about 30
feet above the street to protect the entire armory.”96 Historian Robert
Fogelson has dubbed this “normal style of architecture” the “castellated
style,” and the First Regiment armory in Chicago is one of his examples
of the form. Fogelson goes on to argue that these armories can be read as
true statements about fears of the mob and of civil insurrection rather
than as symbolic statements of wealth and power, as some contemporary
critics dismissed them. He points to the realities of the heavy construc-
tion, and to the language the architects and their clients used about their
buildings, language that was heavily laced with issues of defensibility,
impregnability, and the like.97 The fears may have been real, and the
massiveness of the construction certainly was. Exactly how these castel-
lated armories would have stood up to the test of an attacking civilian
mob is unknown, however, as none were ever so attacked. Castellated
armories were also extremely rare among the many, many makeshift,
rented facilitates that stored state arms and equipment for most compa-
nies and regiments in Chicago and around Illinois. The new armory the
Morrison company built in 1900 certainly didn’t have battlements or
rifle slits, and their storeroom was on the main floor, right by the main
door. The powerful need for defensibility appears to have only come into
play when the regiment (and all castellated armories that Fogelson dis-
cusses were built for regiments, as opposed to single companies or
battalion-sized organizations) had plenty of money to spend.
The realities of stone work, masonry, rifle slits, and battlements that
were invested in these large, elaborate armories served chiefly to mark
them as armories in the urban space. They also spoke to fears and situa-
tions, both real and imagined, that the companies they housed might
face. In the final summation, however, it must be noted that the castel-
lated armories, like the First Regiment armory, mostly functioned as
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elaborate clubhouses for members and as a tantalizing vision to potential
recruits, and contemporary critics understood this concept. The state of
Illinois, at least, did not feel called upon to provide its state troops with
any state-financed armories until well after the turn of the century, after
the demise of the castellated style.98 Certainly, as of 1901 the other
organizations in Chicago (the Second Regiment, the Seventh Regiment,
the First Cavalry, the Illinois Naval Militia, and the Eighth Regiment)
did not have large, impregnable castellated armories for their use or to
protect themselves and their equipment in riotous situations. The Illinois
Naval Militia, to cite a particularly whimsical example of nondefensible
architecture, used a brick building built to mimic a ship for the
Columbian Exhibition of 1893 for their armory.99 Regardless of what the
members of the First may have felt about the defensibility of their large,
castle-style armory, the members of the General Assembly, and guards-
men in general, didn’t appear to think it necessary to provide any organ-
ization in the state with such a space. A photograph of the new Eighth
Infantry Armory built in 1914 reveals that it was a simple two story
building with big windows and a standard door.  More than anything
else, it strongly resembles school buildings of the era.100
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Figure 15
New Eighth Infantry Armory, 1915. Courtesy of the Chicago Historical Society.
Photographer: Chicago Daily News. Glass negative DN-0064686.
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Armory construction in Illinois was not only the most expensive hur-
dle for militia companies; it also was up to them to make up whatever
shortfall there was between state appropriations and their needs for uni-
forms, equipment, weapons, and supplies. So ING members relied on
extensive fund-raising within their communities to subsidize their aspi-
rations. Throughout the three decades from 1870 to 1900, most militia
companies in Illinois spent much of their time on fund-raising efforts,
hosting a bewildering array of entertainments—from balls to lectures to
drill performances—to raise the money they needed to raise and main-
tain their organizations.
After the Spanish American War, the ING continued both to be
quite politically active by lobbying on their own behalf and to avoid par-
ticular party alliances, positioning itself in the long tradition of the reg-
ular Army as a nonpartisan organization that stayed above the fray for all
but their own interests.101 As one testament to their success, the
Springfield papers carried pictures throughout the late 1890s and early
1900s of summer camp festivities showing a succession of governors and
their wives and daughters visiting officers for picnics and parades.102
Despite their constant efforts, most National Guardsmen were not able
to raise enough money from their communities to make up the differ-
ence between their needs and the state subsidies, except in the rarest of
situations. So National Guard officers also lobbied their state represen-
tatives throughout the late nineteenth century to increase the state
allotment of funds. Periodically throughout the 1880s and 1890s, and
more persistently after the Spanish American War, they also turned to
the federal government to supply the difference between state appropri-
ations and militia desires.
Creation of a National Lobby for 
Federal Support for State Troops
Flushed with their early successes in gaining increased support from state
governments in the wake of the events of 1877, National Guard activists
in Illinois and in other states began to think in grander terms. In 1878
in Virginia, and in January 1879 in New York, militia activists from
around the country held meetings to establish the National Guard
Association of the United States (NGAUS), which had its first formal
convention in St. Louis in September 1879. The officers who established
this association were, for the most part, the kind of long-term members
who would come to dominance in the various National Guards around
the country during and after the Spanish American War. The officers
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who gathered in St. Louis in 1879 did not focus on domestic order.
Rather, they articulated a belief that the volunteer associations of the
National Guards constituted the best possible defense of the nation.
National Guardsmen from Illinois who shared these sentiments were
active in the organization from the beginning, sending representatives to
the first National Guard Association convention in St. Louis in 1879,
and again in 1881 when Colonel E. D. Swain and Colonel J. H. Shaffer
represented Illinois at the annual convention.103
These militia activists from Illinois and other states held as their goal
nothing less than a complete overhaul of the state militia system nation-
wide, with the explicit aim of turning the militias into a serious reserve
army.104 In the published minutes of the 1879 St. Louis convention, the
secretary proclaimed, “the wars of this country have all been fought by cit-
izen soldiers.” The implication that the entire gathering appears to have
drawn from this statement was that all future wars would have to be
fought with the same type of volunteer, and that such volunteers should
receive serious training with this end in mind. After decrying the “expen-
sive standing army . . . [which was] always increasing in costliness” from
$1.5 million in 1799 to over $40 million a year in 1879, the secretary went
on to suggest the models of Great Britain and Canada in organizing large,
efficient volunteer home armies or militias. Such militias, according to
him, allowed these countries to “dispense with all regular troops,” and
“have convinced our people that our own citizen soldiery can be soon
placed in an efficient condition of organization, equipment and disci-
pline.”105 Of course, militias like those of these other countries were paid
for by the national government, which was not the case in the United
States. In 1881, Colonel Swain of Illinois spoke for many when he
described the cavalry and artillery organizations of the ING. “Our caval-
ry was not equipped by the State. It belongs, however, to the National
Guard . . . Of course, both branches of the service under discussion labor
under the same difficulties that they do in other localities, in the men not
owning the horses.”106 Later, talking of the importance of summer camp,
Swain noted that Illinois set aside about $25,000 annually for camp and
garrison equipment and to pay for the entire ING to encamp for four days
training, though the state did not yet own a single campground. He con-
cluded a long report of the most recent camp experience of the First
Infantry with “I do not think there can be any question as to the advan-
tage of encampments. They are the most efficient schools that we can
have, and more can be done in a week’s encampment, I think, to instruct
the National Guards in the duties of the soldier, than it is possible to do
in armories or by the companies at home and alone during the year.”107 But
to achieve this training, the states needed to supply still more money.
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The suggestion some officers made during the 1879 convention, that
it might be possible to do away with the regulars altogether, turned out
to be a more of a debate point than a serious alternative military struc-
ture, and the notion of abandoning the standing army was quickly
dropped by the National Guard Association. In any case, the association
spent the next several years defending itself from charges ranging from
trying to establish state forces designed to challenge the federal govern-
ment to a strategy to create a 150,000-man standing army under the sole
authority of the president.108 Wild accusations aside, General Wingate of
New York explained in 1881 that the “really great obstacle which we
have to contend against is, the apathy of Congress. Few who have no
actual experience can imagine the difficulty of procuring the passage of
any law by that body which involves no personal or political interest,
and particularly on a subject like this, upon which the average
Congressman knows nothing, and cares less.”109 Despite the apathy of
Congress, concerted efforts by the association over eight years of lobby-
ing did result in a modest gain in federal funding—from $200,000 annu-
ally to $400,000, secured in 1887. However, after several years of such
hard work with so little accomplished toward the original goal of a new
militia law, the association volunteers lost their energy, and the associa-
tion dwindled to a shadow of its former self.
In 1897 a new national lobbying organization was formed by a new
group of activist officers. The Interstate National Guard Association
(INGA)—created initially by representatives of western states—hoped
to achieve much more modest formal gains at the federal level than the
earlier association. Chiefly, they hoped to secure a significant increase in
the federal appropriation—from $400,000 to $1 million—for the state
militias, and they did not seek any dramatic changes to the standing
militia laws.110 However, their vision of the purpose of the National
Guards was nearly identical to that held by National Guard Association
(NGAUS) members twenty years previously. In 1897, General Bell,
adjutant general of Missouri, reminded INGA convention delegates that
“[w]e should realize that the safety of American firesides, in the event of
war with foreign powers, will depend largely upon the standard of our
National Guard.”111 Officers once again cited the models of Great Britain
and Canada as worthy of study and emulation.112
Officers from Illinois played a much more significant role in this sec-
ond National Guard Association than they had in the first. Then adju-
tant general of Illinois, Jasper N. Reece, served on the first executive
committee, followed by two terms as president of the association from
1898 to 1900. The ING sent by far the largest number of delegates to the
INGA conventions in 1897 (ten delegates), 1898 (twenty delegates), and
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1900 (sixteen delegates), and the 1898 convention was held in Chicago,
hosted by the ING. General Reece was personally instrumental in the
negotiations that eventually merged the older association (NGAUS) and
the newer (INGA) into one national association.113 Illinois officers were
quite active in the new organization, perhaps because although it ranked
third among the state militia organizations by size of membership, the
ING ranked only twenty-seventh among the forty-nine state militias in
terms of funding per man. (See appendix I.) Other states with smaller
appropriations managed to make them go further by limiting the size of
their militia organizations or, like Ohio, which had nearly the same size
organization, managed to provide three and a half times the state funds.
The National Guardsmen from Illinois made no attempt to explain why
they elected to arrange for such a comparatively large National Guard
organization without being able to provide for it as generously as most of
their peer organizations. In strict cash terms, the state ranked ninth in
terms of state funding. By cutting the size of their organization in half to
bring their membership size in line with their budget, ING officers could
have effectively doubled the amount of money available to support each
company, as, in fact, they did do in the early 1880s. However, very soon
after, they allowed the ING to grow again.
The ING leadership chose instead to turn aggressively to the federal
government to address the shortfall. They were eloquent on the subject
of national defense and the role played by the National Guards in serv-
ing the nation. In his opening address to the third INGA convention,
Jasper Reece, adjutant general of Illinois and president of the INGA,
thundered:
What does the national government owe the states who furnished the
President with such magnificent fighting material on a single day’s
notice? What have we, the instructors and teachers, a right to expect
from Congress in the way of fair and reasonable appropriations—in
arms, clothing, and equipments—to enable us to again prepare for
unlooked-for emergencies, when the brawn, brain, and muscle of the
volunteer may again be demanded for immediate and dangerous
service? What should the government do for the National Guard of
the states in order that we may maintain this unsurpassed fighting
force at its maximum state of practical efficiency? . . . [W]e do care
to have the national government assume a fair share of the burden
and responsibility in fitting out the soldiers that will some day be
required at our hands to fight national battles; we do care to see the
patriotism and valor of our militia boys adequately recognized by
Congress, and we will have this recognition.114
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In 1900, following the third annual convention, Congress answered
Reece and raised the annual federal militia appropriation from $400,000
to $1,000,000. The ING’s claim that the state of readiness of the
National Guard reserve forces was a national responsibility ultimately
carried the day. The power of this argument drew on the experiences
provided by the mobilization of the National Guards for the Spanish
American War, but the members of the INGA claimed complete respon-
sibility for their triumph in Washington. At the opening of the fourth
annual convention in 1902, the chair summarized the results of the pre-
vious convention for the delegates by asserting that “the result of that
meeting was the increased appropriation which has enabled the
National Guard to equip an organized militia as never equipped before
. . . I want to congratulate the organization on the splendid work they
did.”115 The vigorous debate at this fourth INGA convention concerned
the proposed bill to revise the long-outdated militia law of 1792. This
effort, too, was ultimately successful.
Wartime service from 1898 to 1899 gave representatives of the INGA
the clout they needed to secure long-sought changes in federal militia
law and dramatic increases in federal funding, changes and increases
modeled on those they had already managed to achieve in their own
states. In 1903 Congress passed the first new federal militia law since
1789, and Congress elaborated on the 1903 legislation in 1908. These
new laws recognized the National Guard as the Nation’s reserve Army
and provided significant federal funds and support for that mission. Over
the next decade, this federalization of the National Guards increased the
professionalism and level of training and preparedness among the
National Guardsmen and slowly decreased their reliance on the rela-
tionships with communities and states they forged in the final quarter of
the nineteenth century.116
In 1903, as part of a wider series of military reforms at the organiza-
tional level, Secretary of War Elihu Root pushed through Congress the
Militia Act of 1903, or the “Dick Act,” as it came to be called in honor
of the Ohio National Guard officer and member of Congress, General
Charles Dick, who shepherded the bill through the House of
Representatives. The Dick Act contained many of the provisions debat-
ed and selected by the INGA convention in 1902. The Dick Act recog-
nized the National Guards as the organized militia of the United States.
In exchange for organizing units and uniforming themselves according
to regular Army regulations, drilling a specified number of times per year,
attending summer camps, submitting to annual War Department inspec-
tions, and generally complying with Army regulations on all subjects,
the National Guards of the various states received arms and equipment
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from the War Department and federal funds to pay for attendance at
summer camp and at occasional joint maneuvers with the Army. This
last funding was not even drawn from the militia appropriations, but
rather from the regular military budget. The Dick Act also mandated
that volunteer forces raised for wartime service would be organized
according to the legislation for raising the state troops for the Spanish
American War. Five years later, in 1908, National Guard officers
believed that militia reform had attained all their goals when Congress
passed a series of amendments to the 1903 act. The 1908 amendments
permitted the president to use National Guard troops outside the bound-
aries of the United States and removed the nine-month time limit on
active service imposed by the 1903 act. The 1908 amendments also
explicitly required the president to call the organized militia (i.e., the
National Guard as recognized in the 1903 act) in advance of any other
volunteers, which put firmly into law what had only been implied
before.117
In many ways, the 1903 legislation was the natural outgrowth of the
previous twenty-five years of development. Militia members across the
country had spent two decades lobbying their communities, their state
governments, their congressmen, and the U.S. Army itself for increased
financial and professional support for their organizations in pursuit of
their ambition to create a modern, professional reserve military force. As
a result, by the turn of the century, National Guard enthusiasts were
experienced lobbyists with a number of important successes under their
belts. They had also spent twenty-five years or more as the beneficiaries
of full-time agencies of their state governments, and fifteen years receiv-
ing regular Army inspections and advice. These experiences only encour-
aged National Guard enthusiasts to work harder for new federal legisla-
tion, finally securing the strong federal relationship they wanted in the
first decades of the twentieth century. National Guard officers may not
have predicted exactly how their relationships with the various levels of
government would change as a result of the 1903 federal reforms, but
they certainly knew that they would. National Guard officers embraced
the accelerating pace of change as the twentieth century progressed.118
An important aspect of the successful lobbying efforts on the part of
the National Guard activists in the INGA, and previous efforts by
Illinois guardsmen with the Illinois General Assembly, is that they were
careful not to tie the success of their movement to a particular political
party. The INGA proceedings from these years are full of tips on lobby-
ing legislators and getting press support to influence local congressmen,
but never is there a word breathed about the importance of one political
party over another. The presence of a Spanish American War volunteer
The Pursuit of State and Federal Support 211
Hannah_CH7_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  2:56 PM  Page 211
in the White House, Theodore Roosevelt, must have interested the
1902–3 lobbyists, but the INGA members never mentioned him or his
party by name. Their focus remained squarely on their cause.119
Consequences of Federalization
The ING actively and aggressively sought tax dollar support at the state
and the federal levels from the 1870s onward. Illinois National Guard
officers and National Guard Association members were not interested
only in the money, however much they needed it. They also wanted gov-
ernment identification and the seal of approval that could be given only
by the military professionals of the U.S. Army. That seal of approval was
available only if the National Guard worked hard to meet the minimum
standards established by the U.S. Army. The equipment, time, and train-
ing they needed to meet that standard were expensive, ultimately more
expensive than most communities could afford to raise on their own to
support their local company, and so available only from the federal
government.
With government money came government oversight. In the years
between 1903 and 1916, correspondence between National Guardsmen
and the secretary of war (from 1903 to 1908) and the chief of the Bureau
of Militia Affairs (after 1908) grew exponentially as both sides struggled
to adjust to their new relationship. National Guard officers barraged fed-
eral officials with questions about funding, uniforms, procedures, and
property management. Federal inspection officers exhorted the National
Guard to improve its discipline and military skills. The new, closer ties
between National Guardsmen and War Department officials also creat-
ed new tensions. Several troubling disagreements arose about issues
ranging from pay for National Guardsmen to the exact role the Guards
would play should the United States be drawn into war with a foreign
state. Many guardsmen also experienced intense frustration with
increased War Department oversight and regulation of militia affairs,
which had previously been very much in their own hands.120 In the mid-
dle of the adjustment, the men themselves sometimes got left behind.
Cary T. Ray of the First Regiment, ING, ended up resigning his commis-
sion, without ever making his goal of the captaincy of Company D, over
problems with property returns from the previous captain. Ray had
signed a receipt for the supplies on the promise that the resigning man
would make good the deficiencies, which he never did. Ray got caught
in the ensuing property accounting and left the ING.121 In another iron-
ic turn, by 1914 federal inspecting officers were complaining that guards-
CHAPTER SEVEN212
Hannah_CH7_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  2:56 PM  Page 212
men were giving so much time to rifle and target practice while in camp
that “proper field instruction could not have been given, and it may be
stated that it is not the intention that rifle instruction, important as it is,
shall displace the other forms of field instruction to the extent done” at
camp in 1913.122
As they reconfigured themselves to meet the professional standard
laid out by the War Department and recognized by Congress, the Illinois
General Assembly, and the general public, guardsmen significantly
altered their practices. Drill marching was out, and marksmanship was in.
Much that could be demonstrated with drill marching, qualities that they
had traditionally relied on to convince their local communities that they
were worthy of emotional and financial support, could not be so easily
demonstrated with marksmanship scores. The very identity that the
National Guards had established to secure community support and a
steady stream of new recruits was challenged by the new realities of fed-
eral funds and federal alliances. For the most part, the members of the
ING appear to have been very happy with the change, and the ING con-
tinued to grow in the early years of the twentieth century, attracting
much the same kind of young man it had for decades. The chance to
make a serious claim on the identity of the modern soldier, trained for
the modern battlefield while ensconced in the comfort of a modern,
state-built armory, seemed to satisfy the needs of ING members to con-
vince themselves that by 1915 they had attained the realization of their
goals.
Realization of the Federal Future: Mexican Border Service
and the National Guards
In June of 1916, U.S. troops under the command of Brigadier General
John J. Pershing, chasing the Mexican rebel commander “Pancho” Villa
and his army across northern Mexico, clashed severely with Mexican
government troops in Carrizal. In response to the subsequent diplomatic
crisis, President Woodrow Wilson called 75,000 National Guard troops
into federal service to police the Mexican-U.S. border.123 The members
of the ING, like their counterparts in most states, were thrilled that they
had the opportunity to gain experience in a large-scale military mobiliza-
tion and that their organization was the tool to achieve mobilization in
a national emergency. Many Illinois guardsmen saw the expedition as a
giant training exercise, aimed not so much at containing Pancho Villa as
preparing the U.S. Army and its National Guard reserve troops for their
much-anticipated joining of the ongoing war in Europe.124 Once on the
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border for their three-month tour of duty, Illinois cavalrymen had little
reason to change their minds about the importance of their activities; in
fact, high-ranking Army officers supported this version of events. In the
second weekly issue of the Illinois Cavalryman—a paper published by
members of the First Illinois Cavalry during their thirteen weeks of serv-
ice on the Mexican border—the front page featured an interview with
the general in command of the portion of the border under the control
of the Illinois troops. The headline reads, “PLAN FOR HUGE ARMY
REVEALED—General Parker Declares Border Mobilization Big
Training School—Preparedness Step.”125 From the point of view of many
military men, the Mexican problem was clearly secondary, an excuse to
train for large plans and larger wars.
Illinois guardsmen regularly measured the daily routines of training
and leisure, movement followed by stasis, that they experienced while
on border duty against the horrible conditions troops fighting in Europe
in 1916 were enduring day after day in the trenches. These guardsmen
attempted to seize in their border service the chance to ready themselves
as much as possible for the trials they were convinced awaited them on
the Continent. The writers and reporters of the Illinois Cavalryman filled
its pages with a variety of advice columns devoted to encouraging the
interested soldier to pursue and further develop and refine his profession-
al skills. Articles discussed everything from camp sanitation to marks-
manship and offered a primer in basic Spanish so soldiers could converse
with any potential prisoners of war. Of course, the paper also covered
sporting events—boxing, polo, horse racing, basketball—and social
news for the entertainment of the men marching around the dry mud-
flats of the late-summer border region.126
Those thirteen weeks on the border turned out to be the merest
shadow of the work that lay ahead of what would become the nucleus
of U.S. troops in France. On April 6, 1917, the United States declared
war on Germany, and by the end of 1917, the first of the U.S. troops,
including divisions made up of National Guardsmen, were training for
war outside Paris. General Pershing was again in command, and know-
ing just how much his troops had to learn about conducting themselves
in modern warfare, he devised a ten-month-long training period to pre-
pare them for battle. The experiences on the border the previous sum-
mer had taught regular soldiers and National Guardsmen alike how
much more they needed to know if they hoped to survive to return
home. Those who participated in the border experience also learned
the importance of organized leisure-time activities and distractions for
bored troops. If guardsmen made one small contribution to the prepara-
tions of the United States, it may have been their long experience with
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providing popular entertainments and competitive events for their
members.
Guardsmen training in late 1917 for war in France were exactly where
ambitious National Guard officers for the previous forty years had hoped
to see them—on the front lines as a full partner to the regular U.S. Army.
The National Guards had won their battles—with their communities,
their state governments, and the federal government—to prove that with
sufficient time and money, American men could effectively train them-
selves as the elements of a reserve army from the secure position of a
civilian life. That the reality always fell short of the dream was less
important than the fact that the National Guards had some training,
whereas raw recruits had none.
The reserve army mission was paramount to the volunteers who filled
the ING, and National Guards across the country, because it was through
this role that they elaborated their shared language for identifying them-
selves as men and as citizens of the republic. Having committed to the
power of the word and the image evoked by “soldier” to bring diverse
men together in one common bond, the men who volunteered their time
and money to the ING had to give soldiering their serious attention.
Although change had been almost imperceptibly slow throughout the
1870s and 1880s, by the 1890s it was clear that a commitment to soldier-
ing that was founded on shared social needs would take on a life of its
own and would in time claim the entire National Guard movement for
the reserve army mission.
As National Guardsmen left their local communities further and fur-
ther behind—as the locus of their funding, activities, and identity shift-
ed ever further toward the center—issues of manhood and citizenship
were recast to fit the new realities. The mobilization for World War I and
the creation of a whole new crop of “real” veterans of wartime service
once again helped to draw a dramatic line between the soldier and the
civilian, the boy and the man. This new crop of veterans would be the
ones to shape the National Guard in their own image over the next
decades. They did not identify with their civic fathers who were striving
to mend the union as had a much earlier generation of militia companies,
or the Spanish American War veterans out to turn still amateur soldiers
into true reservists, but with their fellow soldiers and officers from an
overseas combat experience. Citizenship did not seem to be at stake in
this new war (despite the overt and demeaning segregation of the
African American troops), so for the National Guardsmen its only mes-
sage may have been one of the deadly rituals of combat.
The National Guard of the late nineteenth century was an organiza-
tion of civic participation, of manly citizenship, and of patriotic service.
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The Spanish American War was an exciting opportunity for National
Guardsmen to prove that they had been serious all along, an experience
turned sour by lack of preparation and training. The National
Guardsmen who emerged from that contest were finally successful in
prying money, time, modern equipment, and training from the state and
federal governments as their skills and image seemed to reflect on the
possibilities of the rising world power. The Great War was an entirely
different event. The United States was a late and relatively lightly
harmed participant in a grim slaughter. How this experience would
shape the next generation of leadership in the National Guard is an
untold story, but it is a tempting place to look for the fall in popularity
and public approbation that the National Guard suffered, particularly in
the late 1920s and throughout the Depression years, a time when a sense
of civic leadership and identification with responsible manhood might
have allowed the National Guard to shape a different, more traditional
future.
CHAPTER SEVEN216
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APPENDIX A
Occupations Named by Members of the First Infantry, ING,
1890–1903
Occupation No. Occupation No. Occupation No. Occupation No.
Accountant 1 Dentist 6 Medical student 8 Solicitor 2
Actor 1 Designer 3 Merchant 8 Stage worker 1
Advertiser 3 Doctor 2 Metal worker 1 Steam fitter 3
Agent 4 Draughtsman 8 Meter setter 1 Stencil maker 1
AK keeper 1 Driver 5 Milk dealer 3 Stenographer 10
Architect 1 Drug clerk 3 Milkman 1 Stock yards 1
Artist 4 Druggist 6 Mine operator 1 Stockman 1
Assembler 1 Editor 2 Musician 35 Stone cutter 3
Attorney 2 Electrician 26 Music dealer 1 Student 64
Baker 2 Elevator conductor 3 Music student 1 Superintendent 1
Banker 1 Enameller 1 Newspaper man 1 Supv. 1
Barber 3 Engineer 5 Nickel plate 1 Surveyor 2
Bicycle maker 2 Engraver 3 Office manager 1 Tailor 1
Blacksmith 1 Farming 1 Operator 3 Tally man 1
Bookbinder 1 File setter 1 Optician 2 Tavernman 1
Bookkeeper 58 Fireman 3 Orderly C.C.H. 1 Taxi dispatcher 1
Brass finisher 1 Florist 2 P.O. clerk 1 Telegraph operator2
Brick layer 1 Foreman 5 Packer 1 Telescoper 1
Broker 5 Forester 1 Painter 15 Teller 1
Butcher 8 Furniture builder 1 Paper hanger 2 Timekeeper 2
Butler 2 Gardener 1 Paper ruler 1 Tinner 3
Buyer 2 Gen. manager 1 Pass. agt. 1 Train Dis. 1
Carpenter 17 Glove maker 1 Pharmacist 1 Trainman 1
Carriage driver 1 Grain Inspector 3 Photographer 11 Treasurer 1
Carriage maker 1 Grocer 4 Physician 2 Undertaker 1
Cashier 6 Horse-Shoer 2 Plasterer 1 Upholsterer 1
Caterer 1 Hotel employee 1 Plumber 8 Usher 1
Chemist 2 Iceman 2 Porter 1 Vocalist 1
Cigar dealer 1 Illustrator 1 Post office Clerk 1 Wagon maker 1
City buyer 1 Inspector 7 Postal employee 1 Waiter 1
Civil engineer 5 Insurance 9 Pressman 1 Wireworker 2
Clergyman 1 Interior decorator 1 Print sec. 1 Unclear 54
Clerk 598 Jeweler 1 Printer 27 No occupation given 44
Cloak cutter 1 Joiner 1 Publisher 4
Coachman 1 Laborer 2 R. P. clerk 2
Collector 15 Laundryman 2 Railroad man 1
Com. merchant 1 Law student 2 Real estate agent 1
Composer 1 Lawyer 28 Receiving clerk 1
Compositor 2 Letter carrier 1 Reporter 5
Conductor 8 Librarian 1 Rubber worker 1
Confectioner 2 Life insurance
solicitor
1 Sailor 1
Construct fire
proof
1 Lineman 1 Salesman 104
Contractor 3 Lithographer 1 Seaman 1
Cornice maker 2 Lumber dealer 1 Secretary 2
Court clerk 1 Machinist 30 Shipping clerk 1
Credit man 1 Manager 9 Sign maker 1
Cutter 4 Manf. 3 Sign writer 1
Cycle mfr. 1 Mechanic 6 Silversmith 1
Total occupations 1484
Source: Compiled from Descriptive List, Illinois National Guard, First Infantry,
1880–1904, Miscellaneous, RS 301.96, Illinois State Archives.
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APPENDIX B
Occupations Named by Members of Company A, Third
Infantry, ING, 1899–1908
218
Occupation No. of Men Occupation No. of Men
Unknown 8 Molder 3
Baker 2 Nail maker 7
Barbed wire maker 2 Operator 1
Barber 6 Painter 6
Blacksmith 2 Penman 1
Bookkeeper 1 Photographer 2
Butcher 4 Piano maker 2
Cable maker 1 Piano stringer 1
Cement worker 2 Piano tuner 1
Clerk 12 Plumber 1
Cooper 1 Porter 2
Die maker 2 RR signal operator 1
Drayman 1 Restaurant 1
Druggist 1 Salesman 2
Electrician 1 Shoemaker 32
Factory hand 2 Spooler 1
Farmer 25 Student 20
Fence maker 39 Switchman 1
Fireman 1 Teacher 1
Galvanizer 2 Teamster 4
Glove maker 2 Telegraph operator 1
Laborer 35 Telephone service 3
Other 1 Tobacco dealer 1
Landscape gardener 1 Watchmaker 1
Lather 3 Well driller 1
Laundryman 1 Wire drawer/maker 8
Machinist 10 Wood worker 2
Mason 3
Mechanic 2
Miller 1
Source: “Descriptive Book, Co. ‘A,’ 3rd Infantry, ING.” Regional History Center,
Northern Illinois University.
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APPENDIX C
Incidents of Strike-Related Active Duty
on the Part of the ING, 1877–1904
219
Source: “Report Prepared by the Bureau of National Guards for the War
College,”1908, Document #3135, Box 57, Bureau of Militia Affairs, RG 168.7,
National Archives; Biennial Report . . . 1877 and 1878; Biennial Report . . . 1889
and 1890; Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894; Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898;
Biennial Report . . . 1899 and 1900; Biennial Report . . . 1903 and 1904.
Railroad Strikes Chicago 15 days service 7/27–8/11/1877
East St. Louis 15 days 7/27/1877
Coal Strike/Race Riot Braidwood 2 days 8/9/1877
Coal Miners’ Strike Pike County ? 1878
La Salle County ? 1878
Railway Strike East St. Louis ? 1878
Coal Miners’ Strike Madison 5 days 5/25–29/1883
St. Clair 5 days 5/25–29/1883 
Coal Miners’ Strike Joliet ? 5/1/1885 
Lemont ? 5/4/1885
Railroad Strikes East St. Louis 5 weeks 4/9/1886 
Coal Miners’ Strike Braidwood 5 days 5/27/1889  
Spring Valley 6 days 6/1/1889 
Coal Miners’ Strike LaSalle 7 days 5/24/1894
Centralia 3 days 5/24/1894
Minonk/Winona 3 days 5/27/1894
Carterville 3 days 6/5/1894
Pekin 7 days 6/7/1894
Pana 3 days 6/8/1894
Mt. Olive 2 days 6/18/1894
Miners’ Strike Spring Valley 9 days 7/8/1894
Railway Strike Danville 15 days 7/2/1894
Decatur 13 days 7/1/1894
Springfield 3 days 7/5/1894
Mounds 17 days 7/3/1894
Railway Strike Chicago (Pullman) 33 days 7/6/1894
Miners’ Strike Virden 20 days 9/29/1898
Pana 4 months and 23 days 9/30/1898
Miners’ Strike Pana 5 months and 1 day 4/10/1899
Miners’ Strike Carterville 33 days 9/17/1899
Miners’ Strike Ziegler 78 days 11/26/1904
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APPENDIX D
Precipitating Event for Request for
State Intervention in Coal Strikes, 1877–1908
220
Source: Biennial Report . . . 1877 and 1878; Biennial Report . . . 1889 and 1890;
Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894; Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898; Biennial
Report . . . 1899 and 1900; Biennial Report . . . 1903 and 1904.
Braidwood 8/9/1877 Colored miners and their families evicted from their
homes by striking miners
Pike County 1878
La Salle County 1878
Madison County 5/25/1883 Nonstrikers from Abbey “Machine Mine” evicted by strik-
ers, threats to life and property
St. Clair 5/29/1883 Ongoing confrontation between county sheriffs, strikers,
and nonstrikers at Reinecker mine shaft
Joliet 5/1/1885
Lemont 5/4/1885
Braidwood 5/27/1889 Direct confrontation at county line between sheriff and
strikers; sheriff satisfied that threat was beyond his means
to control with 25 deputies
Springvalley 6/1/1889 Attack on sheriff and deputies while protecting miners at
work by striking miners
LaSalle 5/24/1894 Sheriff attacked by rioters
Centralia 5/25/1894 Sheriff with 200 armed deputies could not guard 75 miners
arrested after destroying a local mine and protect 4 more
local mines from destruction
Pana 5/26/1894 Sheriff worried about threatened “invasion” of miners from
Indiana planning to close four working mines—invasion
did not occur
Minonk and
Winona
5/28/1894 Train seized by strikers who blockaded the tracks. Sheriff
asked for guns or troops—state sent troops
Carterville 6/5/1894 Strikers prevented laborers from loading slack—deputies
present, not sheriff, could not stop the attack
Pekin/Peoria 6/7/1894 Direct conflict between sheriffs and strikers; one fatality;
mine destroyed. Sheriff asked for state arms—troops sent 
Pana 6/8/1894 Sheriff worried that presence of some 300 strikers threat-
ened four working mines—no direct confrontation
Mount Olive 6/18/1894 U.S. Marshall requested aid in making arrests
Spring Valley 7/8/1894 Two coal-company-owned stores looted; striker invasions
threatened
Virden 9/29/1898 Ongoing confrontation between strikers and private mine
guards/strikebreakers. Twenty-one fatalities before militia
arrived; almost forty injured in fighting
Pana 9/30/1898 Confrontations between strikers and imported strikebreakers
Pana 4/10/1899
Carterville 6/17/1899 Confrontations between strikers and mine operators
Ziegler 11/26/1904 Sheriff needed aid to protect life and property
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APPENDIX E
ING Membership vs. Days of Strike Policing, 1874–1911
221
Source: “Report Prepared by the Bureau of National Guards for the War College,”
1908, Document #3135, Box 57, Bureau of Militia Affairs, RG 168.7, National
Archives; Biennial Report . . . 1877 and 1878; Biennial Report . . . 1889 and 1890;
Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894; Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898; Biennial
Report . . . 1899 and 1900; Biennial Report . . . 1903 and 1904. The dramatic
decrease in membership in 1880 and 1881 is the result of legislatively mandated
consolidation of the ING. The 1901 decrease is a result of the recovery from the
mobilizations and demobilizations that resulted from the Spanish American War. In
both cases, the size of the ING was affected by official restructuring of the ING, and
by neither a sudden falloff of interested recruits nor a wave of current members quit-
ting.
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APPENDIX F
Selected ING Officers, 1874–90: Military Histories of Officers
with Five to Six Years of Service in Their Current Rank
222
Name Rank Organization Location Military History
Yrs in
Rank
Bowler, H. S. Captain B Chicago 5.9
Harris, Bush
W.
Captain B—8th
Infantry
Newton Captain 5.9
Vickery, John
A.
Captain I—5th
Infantry
Jackson-
ville
Captain 
Private 1876. 
1st Lieutenant 9/9/1888
5.9
Matthews,
Frederick L.
Colonel Staff—ING Spring-
field
Surgeon general
War service—
Private Co C 57th Penn
Volunteer Infantry 9/1861.
1st Sergeant 10/1861. 
2nd Lieutenant 6/26/1862. 
POW 7/1862. 
Paroled and unfit for service
10/1862. 
Major in Union League
Regiment for the protection
of western Penn 7/1/1863 to
30 days.
5.9
Carter,
Charles C.
Major Staff—6th
Infantry
Rock 
Island
Major and surgeon 
Corporal Co A 6th Infantry
11/30/1877. 
Sergeant 5/20/1881.2d
Lieutenant 8/2/1882. 
1st Lieutenant 3/12/1883. 
5.8
Hiltman,
John W.
Captain A—1st
Cavalry
Chicago Captain 
Private 5/20/1880. 
1st Lieutenant 2/21/1880.
5.7
Cheney,
Charles E.
Captain Staff—2nd
Infantry
Chicago Captain and chaplain 5.7
Blanchard,
Sidney R.
Captain D—4th
Infantry
Ottawa Captain 
Private 8/6/1877. 
Sergeant 9/1/1877. 
1st Sergeant 4/1879. 
2nd Lieutenant 8/23/1880. 
5.7
Skelly, George
M.
Captain Staff—5th
Infantry
Spring-
field
Captain and inspector of 
rifle practice 
Private Co C, 5th Infantry
7/1875. QM 5th Infantry
2/9/1878. 
5.7
Holtkamp,
Henry
1st
Lieutenant
I—3rd
Infantry
Galena First Lieutenant 
Private 7/26/1877. 
Sergeant 8/14/1877. 
2nd Lieutenant 5/25/1879.
5.6
Chenoweth,
Frederick W.
Captain I—1st Infantry Chicago Captain 
Private Co C 1st Infantry
7/26/1877. 
Corporal 2/2/1882. 
Sergeant 11/14/1882. 
1st Lieutenant Co I 1st
Infantry 9/26/1884.
5.6
cont.
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Name Rank Organization Location Military History
Yrs in
Rank
Pierce,
Frederick C.
Colonel Governor’s
staff
Rockford Colonel and aide-de-camp 
1st Lieutenant Co H 3d
Infantry 1/11/1883. 
Capt 8/4/1883.
5.6
McIntire,
Arthur C.
Colonel Governor’s
staff
Mendota Colonel and aide-de-camp 5.6
Bogardus,
Charles
Colonel Governor’s
staff
Paxton Colonel and aide-de-camp 
War Service—
Private Co A 151st NY
Volunteer Infantry 8/1862. 
1st Lieutenant 151st NY
Volunteer Infantry
8/13/1862. 
Capt Captain12/12/1862. 
Lieutenant Colonel
11/5/1864. 
Brevet Colonel for “gallant
and Meritorious service
before Petersburg, Virginia.”
to rank from 4/2/1865
5.6
Smith,
Augustus B.
Colonel Governor’s
staff
Lewis-
town
Colonel and aide-de-camp 
War Service—
Captain Co K 103rd Ill
Volunteer Infantry then
AAIG 1st Div 15th Army
Corps. Served 3 yrs.
5.6
Kohler,
Hjalmar
Colonel Governor’s
staff
Moline Colonel and aide-de-camp
Swedish National Guard—
Instructing officer for 2 yrs.
5.6
Otey, Clinton Colonel Governor’s
staff
Harris-
burg
Colonel
1st Lieutenant Co H 11th
Infantry 5/13/1879. 
Captain10/25/1880. 
Transferred to Co G 9th
Infantry 5/1882. 
Discharged 5/1/1885
5.6
Mulock,
Michael B.
1st
Lieutenant
A—3rd
Infantry
Streator First lieutenant 
Private 6/19/1878. 
1st Sergeant 8/31/1880. 
2nd Lieutenant 11/1/1882.
5.5
Saint Clair,
Jacob N.
Captain Staff—3rd
Infantry
Streator Captain 
Private 7/18/1877. 
1st Lieutenant 11/1/1882. 
2nd Lieutenant 10/6/1881.
5.5
Fash, Charles 3rd
Lieutenant
Sherman
Zouaves
Knoxville 5.4
Eads,
Theodore
2nd
Lieutenant
Sherman
Zouaves
Knoxville 5.4
Wright,
George O.
1st
Lieutenant
Sherman
Zouaves
Knoxville 5.4
Tate, Thomas
B. 
Captain Sherman
Zouaves
Knoxville 5.4
cont.
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APPENDIX F224
Name Rank Organization Location Military History
Yrs in
Rank
Smith,
William F.
Captain Spring-
field
A. C. S. 5.4
Smailes,
William
Colonel Staff—3rd
Infantry
Elgin Lieutenant colonel 
Captain 8/1/1877. 
War service—
Private Co A 36th Ill
Volunteer Infantry.
5.4
Evans, Henry
H.
Colonel Regimental
staff
Aurora Aide-de-camp 5.4
Sheets,
Benjamin F.
Colonel Regimental
staff
Oregon Aide-de-camp 5.4
Barkley, James
H.
Colonel Regimental
staff
Spring-
field
5.4
Hilliard,
Hiram
Brigadier
General
Com-in-chief
staff
Spring-
field
Adjutant general 5.4
Barnum, 
James H.
2nd
Lieutenant
E Petersburg 5.3
Lawler,
Thomas G.
Captain B Rockford 5.3
Smailes,
William
Captain E Elgin 5.3
Elder, John Captain C Carthage 5.3
Black, 
Thomas G.
Major Clayton Brigade surgeon 5.3
Hughes, I
Simpson
Major Staff Spring-
field
Major and surgeon 
Major and surgeon 6th
Infantry 8/27/1881
5.3
Meserve,
Arthur G.
Major Staff—4th
Infantry
Robinson Major and surgeon 
Captain and assist Surgeon
3/19/1883
5.3
Fort, 
William J.
Lieutenant.
Colonel
Staff Lacon Lieutenant colonel and
judge advocate 
Private Co H 7th Infantry
3/21/1878. 
Captain and inspector rifle
practice 7th Infantry
8/1/1879. 
War service—
On duty in QM dept as
agent from 9/1/1862 to
10/1865
5.3
Wood, Benson Colonel Regimental
staff
Effing-
ham
Judge advocate general 5.3
Reid, David
O.
Colonel Regimental
staff
Moline Aide-de-camp 5.3
Munn,
Sylvester W.
Colonel Regimental
staff
Joliet Aide-de-camp 5.3
Edgar, William
H.
Colonel Regimental
staff
Jersey-
ville
Aide-de-camp 5.3
Golden,
Thomas J.
Colonel Regimental
staff
Marshall Aide-de-camp 5.3
cont.
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Appendix F 225
Brazee, C. M. Colonel Regimental
staff
Rockford 5.3
Moore, James
H.
Regimental
staff
Sycamore Chaplain 5.3
Davis, Frank
B.
Captain C Chicago 5.2
Reece, Jasper
N.
General Springfield 5.1
O’Conner, 
P. J.
Captain B Chicago 5
Quirk, Daniel Captain E Chicago 5
Hawes,
Charles W.
Captain A Rock Island 5
Dunne,
William P.
Major Regimental
staff
Chicago Surgeon 5
Mills, Charles
F.
Lieutenant.
Colonel
Spring-
field
A. A. G. 5
Name Rank Organization Location Military History
Yrs in
Rank
Source: Officer Rosters in Biennial Report . . . 1873 and 1874 through Biennial
Report . . . 1889 and 1890.
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APPENDIX G
Illinois Volunteer Forces:
Service beyond the United States, 1898–99
226
Regiment Mustered In
Foreign
Service Arrival FC U.S. Return Mustered Out
1st 13 May, 1898 Cuba 9 July, 1898 29 August,
1898
17 November,
1898
2nd 16 May, 1898 Cuba 13 December,
1898
3 April, 1899 26 April, 1899
3rd 7–10 May,
1898
Puerto Rico 31 July, 1898 9 November,
1898
13–24 January,
1899
4th 19–20 May,
1898
Cuba 7 January,
1899
5 April, 1899 2 May, 1899
5th 4–9 May, 1898 None 16 October,
1898
6th 11 May, 1898 Puerto Rico 25 July, 1898 13 September,
1898
25 November,
1898
7th 18 May, 1898 None 20 October,
1898
8th 12–21 July,
1898
Cuba 16 August,
1898
15 March,
1899
3 April, 1899
9th 4–11 July,
1898
Cuba 5 January,
1899
21 April, 1899 20 May, 1899
1st Cavalry 20–21 May,
1898
None 11 October,
1898
Battery A 12 May, 1898 Puerto Rico 4 August, 1898 13 September,
1898
25 November,
1898
Source: Adjutant General’s Office, Statistical Exhibit of Strength of Volunteer Forces
Called into Service during the War with Spain, with Losses from All Causes
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899). Reproduced on the U.S. Army
Center of Military History, Historical Resources Branch Web Page,
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/spanam/spanhtm.htm.
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APPENDIX H
Illinois Volunteer Forces:
Enlisted Losses while in Service, 1898–99
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APPENDIX I
State and Federal Appropriations per Guardsman, by State, 1897
228
Source: Computed from Proceedings of the First Annual Convention, Interstate
National Guard Association, 1897, Appendix.
State State Allocation
Federal
Allocation
Present Aggregate
Strength $ per man
Alabama $24,000.00 $9,488.73 2,552 $13.11
Arkansas None $6,99.90 961 $7.18
California $111,800.00 $7,763.00 3836 $31.17
Colorado $62,689.00 $3,450.45 890 $74.31
Connecticut $140,000.00 $5,175.67 2,779 $52.24
Delaware $3,000.00 $2,587.23 390 $14.33
Florida $12,000.00 $3,450.45 1,088 $14.20
Georgia $15,000.00 $11,213.96 3,193 $8.21
Idaho $255.00 $2,587.83 594 $4.74
Illinois $90,000.00 $20,702.70 6,288 $17.61
Indiana $45,999.00 $12,939.19 2,821 $20.89
Iowa $50,200.00 $11,213.96 2,441 $25.16
Kansas $34,150.00 $8,626.12 1,506 $28.40
Kentucky $7,000.00 $11,213.96 1,597 $11.41
Louisiana $21,000.00 $6,900.00 1,994 $13.99
Maine $32,447.83 $5,175.67 1,367 $27.52
Maryland $45,000.00 $6,900.00 1,732 $29.97
Massachusetts $264,000.00 $12,939.00 5,227 $52.98
Michigan $73,286.11 $12,076.57 2,524 $33.82
Minnesota $50,000.00 $7,763.51 1,935 $29.85
Mississippi $4,400.00 $7,763.51 1,769 $6.88
Missouri $10,000.00 $14,664.41 2,51? $9.83
Montana $22,400.00 $2,587.83 406 $61.54
Nebraska $15,000.00 $6,900.90 1,199 $18.27
Nevada None $2,587.00 400 $6.47
New Hampshire $30,000.00 $3,450.45 1,390 $24.07
New Jersey $171,645.17 $8,626.12 4,258 $42.34
New York $448,000.00 $31,054.05 13,242 $36.18
North Carolina $6,000.00 $9,488.73 1,410 $10.98
North Dakota $11,000.00 $2,587.83 530 $25.64
Ohio $317,235.24 $19,840.00 6,229 $54.11
Oregon $30,000.00 $3,450.45 1,540 $21.72
Pennsylvania $350,000.00 $27,603.60 8,250 $40.92
Rhode Island $67,074.20 $3,450.20 1,268 $55.62
South Carolina $10,000.00 $7,763.51 3,530 $5.03
South Dakota $300.00 $3,450.45 795 $4.72
Tennessee $8,000.00 $10,351.35 2,379 $7.71
Texas $5,000.00 $12,939.18 3,000 $5.98
Utah $3,500.00 $2,587.83 974 $6.25
Vermont $18,000.00 $3,450.45 800 $26.81
Virginia $11,732.91 $10,351.35 3,006 $7.34
Washington $20,000.00 $3,450.45 1,051 $22.31
West Virginia $15,000.00 $3,175.67 892 $20.38
Wisconsin $110,000.00 $10,351.35 2,620 $45.94
Wyoming $5,000.00 $2,587.83 510 $14.88
Arizona $300.00 $2,000.00 442 $5.20
District of Columbia $27,525.00 $8,000.00 1,339 $26.53
New Mexico $1,600.00 $3,000.00 429 $10.72
Oklahoma None $1,412.35 550 $2.57
…. — — — —
Alaska — — —. —
Total $2,799,549.46 $400,000.00 112,082
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Maps Showing Distribution of Illinois Militia Companies,
by City, 1874 and 1876
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Figure J.1
1874 Distribution of State Militia Companies in Illinois by City
Source: Biennial Report . . . 1813 and 1874; Biennial Report . . . 1875 and 1876.
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Figure J.2
1876 Distribution of State Militia Companies in Illinois by City
Source: Biennial Report . . . 1813 and 1874; Biennial Report . . . 1875 and 1876.
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Notes to Introduction
1. Manhood and masculinity have come under increasing historical
scrutiny in the last twenty years, yielding an outpouring of recent work that
uses manhood and gender as one important element in understanding why
men behaved the way the did at various times and places. One of the best early
works is J. A. Mangan and James Walvin, eds., Manliness and Morality: Middle-
Class Masculinity in Britain and America, 1800–1940 (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1987). Two other important older studies are Mark C. Carnes, Secret
Ritual and Manhood in Victorian America (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1989), and Mary Ann Clawson, Constructing Brotherhood Class, Gender
and Fraternalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), both focus-
ing on discussions of nineteenth-century American fraternalism. E. Anthony
Rotundo, American Manhood: Transformations in Masculinity from the Revolution
to the Modern Era (New York: Basic Books, 1993), and Michael Kimmell,
Manhood in America, A Cultural History (New York: The Free Press, 1996),
remain the most thorough surveys of the ways manhood was understood and
expressed in the American past. More recently, scholars such as Gail
Bederman, Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in
the United States, 1880–1917 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1995); Kim Townsend, Manhood at Harvard: William James and Others (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1996); Judy Hilkey, Character Is Capital: Success Manuals
and Manhood in Gilded Age America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1997); Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender
Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Amy S. Greenberg, Cause for Alarm; The
Volunteer Fire Department and the Nineteenth-Century City (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1998); and Clifford Putney, Muscular Christianity:
Manhood and Sports in Protestant America, 1880–1920 (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2001), among others, have explored ways that the
ideas and ideals of manhood were debated and framed during the chaotic times
at the turn of the nineteenth century.
2. Some works that provide an overview of these issues are Mary P. Ryan,
Women in Public: Between Banners and Ballots, 1825–1880 (Baltimore: The
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Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990; reprint, Johns Hopkins Paperbacks edi-
tion, 1992); Alan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of America: Culture and
Society in the Gilded Age (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982); Robert Wiebe, The
Search for Order, 1877–1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967); Michael
Schudson, The Good Citizen: A History of American Civic Life (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). For the antebellum guard see Marcus
Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America, 1775–1865
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968).
3. Jerry Cooper, The Rise of the National Guard, the Evolution of the
American Militia, 1865–1920 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997).
Michael D. Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War (Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 2003), picks up on William Riker, Soldiers of the States: The
Role of the National Guard in American Democracy (Washington, DC: Public
Affairs Press, 1957; reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1979), 21–40 (page cita-
tions are to the reprint edition), to argue that there is a strong connection
between strike duty and the resurgence of the National Guards in the late
nineteenth century.
4. Gerald F. Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in
the American Civil War (New York: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan,
Inc., 1987); Gerald F. Linderman, The Mirror of War: American Society and the
Spanish American War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974). The
classic expression of this in the 1890s is Stephen Crane, The Red Badge of
Courage (1895).
5. David W. Blight, Race and Reunion. The Civil War in American Memory
(The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001).
6. Ira Berlin et al., Slaves No More: Three Essays on Emancipation and the
Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Eric Foner, A Short
History of Reconstruction (New York: Harper & Row, 1990).
7. Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, 70–72.
8. Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, 104; Willard B. Gatewood, Jr.,
Black Americans and the White Man’s Burden, 1898–1903 (Chicago: University
of Illinois Press, 1975).
9. Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, 47–49. Between 1870 and 1899 the
Pennsylvania militia served in nine strike situations, and between 1877 and
1899 the Ohio NG eight, and the New York NG, just six—in comparison to
the ING’s fifteen incidents of strike service.
10. Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, 49.
11. U.S. Const, Art 1, §8.
12. Militia Act of 1792, Second Congress, Session I. Chapter XXVIII,
Passed May 2, 1792, providing for the authority of the President to call out the
Militia.
13. Organization tables are the paper structure of company, regiment,
division. That is the number of men and officers in each and their relation to
each other.
14. U.S. Serial Set: House of Representatives 763 (46–2) 1936, 2–6.
15. Cooper, Rise of the National Guard.
16. See Revised Statutes—Illinois 1874 (Springfield: Hurd, 1874), 1007–8;
Revised Statutes—Illinois 1882 (Springfield: Hurd, 1882), 1043–51; Revised
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Statutes—Illinois 1889, (Springfield: Hurd, 1889), 1299–1307; Revised
Statutes—Illinois 1897 (Springfield: Hurd, 1897), 1525–1536; Revised
Statutes—Illinois 1899 (Springfield: Hurd, 1899), 1632–45; Revised Statutes—
Illinois 1905 (Springfield: Hurd,1905), 1918–42. 
17. See Russell Weigley, The History of the American Army (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1967); Riker; John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and
the National Guard (New York: The Free Press, 1983); John Shy, A People
Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American
Independence, Revised ed. (Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, University of
Michigan Press, 1990).
18. Mahon, 18. See also Weigley, ch. 1; Cunliffe; Riker.
19. Mahon, 110.
20. Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, 153–56.
21. Mahon uses “militia” until the 1870s and then uses the phrase “mili-
tia/national guard.” Jim Dan Hill equates George Washington and other
Revolutionary War generals with modern National Guard officers being
inducted into national service. Hill also identifies the earliest volunteer
companies, for example, New England’s Minutemen with today’s National
Guard. See Jim Dan Hill, The Minute Man in Peace and War: A History of the
National Guard (Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Company, 1964), 5, 11.
Cooper uses “militia” until the post–Civil War period when he adopts
“National Guard.”
22. Weigley discusses recruitment and personnel supply throughout his
volume on the American Army. See also Allan R. Millett and Peter
Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of
America, Revised and Expanded ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1994).
23. Cunliffe, ch. 6.
24. Kenneth M. Stampp, America in 1857 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1990), 146.
25. Doubler, ch. 2; Cunliffe, chs. 6, 7; Susan G. Davis, Parades and Power,
Street Theater in Nineteenth-Century Philadelphia (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1986; reprint, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988),
ch. 3 (page citations are to the reprint edition).
26. Hill, 99–121; Mahon, 108–11; Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, 34.
See also Charles Johnson, African American Soldiers in the National Guard:
Recruitment and Deployment during Peacetime and War (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1992).
27. The two notable exceptions were New York and Connecticut, both of
which had begun to rationalize their large state militia systems before the Civil
War and continued development, albeit slowly, even during this period of
slacking interest and enthusiasm. See Mahon, ch. 8; Cooper, Rise of the
National Guard, 103–4.
28. Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, ch. 8; Doubler, ch. 4.
29. Fourth Annual Report of the Adjutant General of Illinois. December 1872.
Submitted to Governor John M. Palmer by Adjutant General J. Dilger, Dec. 31,
1872 (Springfield, IL: 1872); Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of Illinois,
Transmitted to the Governor and Commander-in-Chief. For 1873 and 1874
(Springfield, IL: 1874); Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of Illinois to the
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Governor and Commander in Chief, 1879 and 1880 (Springfield, IL: Philips
Bros, State Printers, 1880).
30. See Cunliffe and Davis.
31. Biennial Report . . . 1873 and 1874 (Springfield, IL: 1874), 32.
32. Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of Illinois, Transmitted to the
Governor and Commander-in-Chief. For 1875 and 1876 (Springfield: D. W.
Lusk, State Printer and Binder, 1877), 29–33.
33. Biennial Report . . . 1875 and 1876, 33–34.
34. Minute Book: Co. “I” 7th Inf., ING, Record Group 301.106, Illinois
State Archives, 28.
35. W. T. Goode, The Eighth Illinois (Chicago: The Blakely Printing
Company, 1899), 5.
36. Fourth Annual Report . . . December 1872 (Springfield, IL: 1872), 1–2.
37. The Chicago Tribune, Monday 26 September 1881, 1. The Chicago
Tribune, Tuesday, 27 September 1881, 9.
38. Biennial Report . . . 1875 and 1876, 23–43.
39. Descriptive List, Illinois National Guard, First Infantry, 1880–1904,
Miscellaneous, RS 301.96, Illinois State Archives. (See appendix A.)
40. The majority of the membership were laborers, factory workers, or
skilled tradesmen. A breakdown of all 463 members of Company A over the
years between 1898 and 1916 demonstrates that at least in Dekalb, the soldier-
citizen model continued to exert a strong hold on men across a range of work-
ing-class backgrounds. (See appendix B).
41. See twelve-issue run of The Illinois Cavalryman.
42. Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of Illinois Transmitted to the
Governor and Commander-in-Chief. For 1877 and 1878 (Springfield: Weber,
Magie & Co., State Printers, 1878), 51–52. The Sixteenth Battalion included
Companies A and B in Chicago, as well as the Clark County Guards of
Marshall, and in October gained the Cumberland County Guards of Greenup.
Evidence suggests these last two companies were not African American, as
they are listed as “Independent,” though under the Sixteenth Battalion’s offi-
cers and staff, and in 1880 they are assigned with letter designations to the
Seventeenth Battalion. There is no evidence to corroborate this one way or
another, but based on the organization charts it appears that for technical pur-
poses these two white, independent companies were subject to the orders of
the black major of the Sixteenth Battalion, though it is extremely unlikely
that attempt was made to place them under his command. See also Goode, ch.
1.
43. In 1892 most officers in all grades had served for three years or less in
the current position. These patterns appear consistent over time; in 1882 the
number of Captains with three, six, or nine years of service in the ING almost
exactly matches the 1892 figures.
44. Thomas W. Scott, Adjutant General of Illinois, to Lieutenant Colonel
E. M. Weaver, Chief, Division of Militia Affairs, Washington, DC, April 1,
1908, Document #111 April 3 1908, filed with Document #91, Box 45,
Record Group 168.7, National Archives. Illinois actually had a low annual
percentage of enlisted discharges (20 percent) and officer discharges (15 per-
cent) relative to the rest of the State National Guard organizations: 23 out of
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50 states reporting lost over 33 percent of their enlisted personnel each year.
See the chart “Data Relative to Length of Service and Instruction of the
Militia,” Nov. 30, 1908, Document #91, Box 45, Division of Militia Affairs,
Record Group 168.7, National Archives.
45. Mahon, 108–24.
46. See Fourth Annual Report, 1872; Biennial Report . . . 1873 and 1874;
Biennial Report . . . 1875 and 1876; Biennial Report . . . 1877 and 1878; Biennial
Report . . . 1879 and 1880; Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of Illinois to
the Governor and Commander-in-Chief. For 1881 and 1882 (Springfield: H.W.
Rokker, State Printer and Binder, 1883); Biennial Report of the Adjutant General
of Illinois to the Governor and Commander-in-Chief. 1887 and 1888 (Springfield:
Springfield Printing Co., State Printers, 1889); Biennial Report of the Adjutant
General of Illinois to the Governor and Commander-in-Chief. 1889 and 1890
(Springfield: H.W. Rokker, State Printer and Binder, 1891); Biennial Report of
the Adjutant General of Illinois to the Governor and Commander-in-Chief. 1891
and 1892 (Springfield: H.W. Rokker, State Printer and Binder, 1893); Biennial
Report of the Adjutant General of Illinois to the Governor and Commander-in-
Chief. 1893 and 1894 (Springfield: Ed. F. Hartman, Printer and Binder, 1895);
Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of Illinois to the Governor and Commander-
in-Chief. 1895 and 1896 (Springfield: Phillips Bros., State Printers, 1897);
Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of Illinois to the Governor and Commander-
in-Chief. 1897–1898 (Springfield: Phillips Bros., State Printers, 1899); Biennial
Report of the Adjutant General of Illinois to the Governor and Commander-in-
Chief. 1899–1900 (Springfield: Phillips Bros., State Printers, 1900); Biennial
Report of the Adjutant General of Illinois to the Governor and Commander-in-
Chief. 1901–1902 (Springfield: Phillips Bros., State Printers, 1903); Biennial
Report of the Adjutant General of Illinois to the Governor and Commander-in-
Chief. 1903–1904 (Springfield: Illinois State Journal Co., State Printers,
1904); Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of Illinois to the Governor and
Commander-in-Chief. 1905–1906 (Springfield: Phillips Bros., State Printers,
1907); Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of Illinois to the Governor and
Commander-in-Chief. 1907–1908 (Springfield: Illinois State Journal Co., State
Printers, 1909); Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of Illinois to the Governor
and Commander-in-Chief. 1909–1910 (Springfield: Illinois State Journal Co.,
State Printers, 1914); Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of Illinois to the
Governor and Commander-in-Chief. 1911–1912 (Springfield: Illinois State
Journal Co., State Printers, 1914); the reports on the Militia Force of the United
States by the Adjutant General United States Army submitted to Congress and
published in the Senate and House Executive Documents, Serial Sets;
Proceedings of the First Annual Convention. Interstate National Guard Association.
Held at Planter’s Hotel, St. Louis, Missouri, December 7–8, 1897 (St. Louis,
Missouri: 1897), Appendix; “Allotment of Balance of unallotted funds
($84,451.00),” June 2, 1908, Document #25382, Box 140, Bureau of Militia
Affairs, RG 168.7, National Archives; “Expenditures from the appropriation
under section 1661, R.S., and from the $700,000.00 appropriation in Act
approved June 12, 1906, for the participation of the Militia in Army Camps of
Instruction, July to September, 1906,” 1908, Bureau of Militia Affairs, RG
168.7, National Archives; “Data Relative to Length of Service and Instruction
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of the Militia,” Nov. 30, 1908, Document #91, Box 45, Bureau of Militia
Affairs, RG 168.7, National Archives; “Tabulation Showing the Authorized
Strength of the Organized Militia of the several States and Territories on
January 21, 1903, and also the actual strength of the Same as Determined by
the recent Special Inspections, the dates of completion of which range from
the first of May to the last of June 1903,” Oct. 17, 1903, Card # 506151, Box
27, Bureau of Militia Affairs, RG 168.4, National Archives; “untitled,” July
24, 1909, Document #8801, Box 83, Bureau of Militia Affairs, RG 168.7,
National Archives; “Balances, June 1, 1911, prior to allotment of unexpend-
ed balance,” June 6, 1911, Document #25382, Box 140, Bureau of Militia
Affairs, RG 168.7, National Archives; “List of Appropriations made by
Various States and Territories for the Support of the Organized Militia,”
1899[?], Near the back, with 1899 material, Box 23, Bureau of Militia Affairs,
RG 168.2, National Archives; “Expenditures from the appropriation under
section 1661, revised statutes, and from the appropriation: encampment and
Maneuvers, Organized Militia, in connection with the joint maneuvers of
Mobile troops during the calendar year 1908,” 1908, Bureau of Militia Affairs,
RG 168.7, National Archives.
47. Fourth Annual Report, 1872; Biennial Report . . . 1873 and 1874;
Biennial Report . . . 1875 and 1876; Biennial Report . . . 1877 and 1878; Biennial
Report . . . 1879 and 1880; Biennial Report . . . 1881 and 1882; Biennial Report
. . . 1887 and 1888; Biennial Report . . . 1889 and 1890; Biennial Report . . .
1891 and 1892; Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894; Biennial Report . . . 1895
and 1896; Biennial Report . . . 1897–1898; Biennial Report . . . 1899–1900.
48. Biennial Report . . . 1877 and 1878, 1–12; Biennial Report . . . 1881 and
1882, 4–5; Biennial Report . . . 1887 and 1888, 3; Proceedings of the Convention
. . . 1879, 8–11; Proceedings of the Third Annual Convention of the National
Guard Association of the United States, held at Philadelphia, March 7 and 8, 1881,
3–7 (Copy bound with the proceedings of the first convention, in the posses-
sion of the NGAUS Library); Proceedings of the First Annual Convention.
Interstate National Guard Association. Held at Planter’s Hotel, St. Louis,
Missouri, December 7–8, 1897, 10 (Bound typewritten copy of the minutes,
bound in Vol. II [sic], held in the NGAUS Library, Washington, DC). See also
the comments by Brigadier-General Milton Moore, “The National Guard as
Part of the Military Forces of the United States,” in Proceedings, First, Fifth,
and Sixth Conventions (1898), 121; and Colonel E. R. Bliss, “Address of
Welcome,” in Souvenir of the Banquet to the Interstate National Guard
Association by the Illinois National Guard (Chicago: R. R. Donnelley & Sons
Company, 1899), 14.
49. See the following for examples of articles on strike interventions in
which the neutrality of the guard is the central thesis: Andrew Birtle,
“Governor George Hoadly’s use of the Ohio National Guard in the Hocking
Valley Coal Strike of 1884,” Ohio History 91 (1982): 37–57; and Brian M.
Linn, “Pretty Scaly Times: The Ohio National Guard and the Railroad Strike
of 1877,” Ohio History 94 (1984): 171–81. See also Cooper, Rise of the National
Guard, ch. 3.
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION236
Hannah_Notes_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  3:04 PM  Page 236
Notes to Chapter 1
1. State Register, 13 March 1875; Daily State Journal, 13 March 1875
2. See, for example, Bederman; Sarah Deutsch, Women and the City,
Gender, Space and Power in Boston, 1870–1940 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000); Rebecca Edwards, Angels in the Machinery: Gender in American
Party Politics from the Civil War to the Progressive Era (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997); Julie Saville, The Work of Reconstruction: From
Slave to Wage Laborer in South Carolina, 1860–1870 (New York: Cambridge,
1996); Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Unequal Freedom: How Race and Gender
Shaped American Citizenship and Labor (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2002).
3. The literature on manhood was once limited to a discussion of liter-
ate, nineteenth-century men, these men having been responsible for produc-
ing the bulk of the writing on the issue, but recently scholars have tackled
manhood in a variety of environments. See Greenberg; Madelon Powers,
Faces along the Bar; Lore and Order in the Workingmen’s Saloon, 1870–1920
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). See also, E. F. Parsons (2000),
“Risky Business: The Uncertain Boundaries of Manhood in the Midwestern
Saloon,” Journal of Social History 34(2): 283–307; Paul Michael Taillon,
“‘What We Want is Good, Sober Men:’ Masculinity, Respectability, and
Temperance in the Railroad Brotherhoods, c. 1870–1910,” Journal of Social
History 36, no. 2 (2002): 319–38; Julia Grant, “A ‘Real Boy’ and not a Sissy:
Gender, Childhood and Masculinity, 1890–1940,” Journal of Social History 37,
no. 4 (2004): 829–51; and Mike O’Brien, “Manhood and the Militia Myth:
Masculinity, Class and Militarism in Ontario, 1902–1914,” Labour/Le Travail
42, Fall 1998 (1998): 115–41; Matthew Conner, “Minstrel-Soldiers: The
Construction of African-American Identity in the Union Army,” Prospects 26
(2001): 109–36.
4. In Citizen-Soldiers and Manly Warriors (Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc., 1999), R. Claire Snyder examines the theoretical and perfor-
mative aspects of the identity of citizen-soldiers and the construction of
“armed masculinity.”
5. Biennial Report . . . 1873 and 1874, 29–30. The number of new mem-
bers is actually greater than 1200, as between 1870 and 1874 at least four com-
panies, representing about 200 men in total, disbanded, and so the 1874 figure
includes the men who replaced those who left.
6. Biennial Report . . . 1875 and 1876, 2–6.
7. Chicago Times, 15 October 1874. A vote taken during the general con-
vention of the Army of the Tennessee defeated a resolution to allow soldiers as
well as officers into the society. Daily State Journal, 16 October 1874, Illinois
State Register, 15 October 1874. The private military-styled companies of the
fraternal organizations are examples of the types of private organization that
did not seek affiliation with the state.
8. Daily State Journal, 16 October 1874, Illinois State Register, 15 October
1874.
9. Daily State Journal, 16 October 1874, Illinois State Register, 15 October
1874.
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10. For antebellum militias, see Cunliffe, ch. 11; Davis, 66–72; and Ryan,
Women in Public.
11. Jerry Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, ch. 2; Doubler, chs. 2, 3.
12. Davis, 66–72.
13. Daily State Journal, 16 October 1874.
14. Illinois State Register, 15 October 1874.
15. Chas. T. Headenburg, ed., Souvenir History. Governor’s Guard.
Company C, Fifth Infantry, Illinois National Guard, 1866–1902 (Springfield:
Journal Company, Printers, 1902), 15, 19.
16. Daily State Journal, 16 October 1874.
17. This expansion of the types of groups that were able to use the parade
to seize or claim public and therefore political space is one of the main con-
tentions of Ryan, Women in Public, 53–54.
18. State Register, 9–13 March 1875; Daily State Journal, 10–13 March
1875.
19. Ryan, Women in Public, 30–37.
20. State Register, 13 March 1875; Daily State Journal, 13 March 1875
21. State Register, 13 March 1875; Daily State Journal, 13 March 1875
22. State Register, 13 March 1875; Daily State Journal, 13 March 1875
23. This is not meant to discount the very real possibilities that the
“Governor’s Guard” might have been mostly made up of sons of “good” fami-
lies. However, the speeches of both Emma Hickox and Governor Beveridge
assume a common significance for militia membership that does not seem spe-
cific to this single company; rather, this company is a sterling example of a
general principle.
24. Cunliffe, 230–35; Davis, 47; and Ryan, 31–35.
25. State Register, 13 March 1875; Daily State Journal, 13 March 1875.
26. John Alexander Logan. The Volunteer Soldier of America. By John A.
Logan. With Memoir of the author and Military reminiscences from General
Logan’s private journal (Chicago and New York: R. S. Peale & Company,
1887).
27. Biennial Report . . . 1873 and 1874 (Springfield: D.W. Lusk, State
Printer and Binder, 1875), 28.
28. Cunliffe, 218–30.
29. Adjutant General of the United States Army, Militia Force of the
United States, 43rd Congress, 1st sess., 1874, S. Exdoc. 41, Serial 1580, 2.
Biennial Report. . . . 1873 and 1874, 28. Why Illinois officials failed to report
these companies to Washington remains a mystery whose only solution seems
to be that the Governor and his staff simply didn’t think they were significant.
Also, some companies never chose to seek affiliation with the state, preferring
to remain purely private social organizations, albeit with military-styled uni-
forms, drills, and parades. See Henry Barrett Chamberlin, “A Sketch of the
Oakland Rifles,” in Historical Sketch of the Oakland Rifles and Company “C,” 4th
Infantry I.N.G (1889).
30. Biennial Report . . . 1873 and 1874, 28; Fourth Annual Report . . .
1872, 1–2.
31. The Chicago Times, Thursday, 25 February 1875, 3–4.
32. Cunliffe, 241–47. Also, recall the Zouaves from Atlanta in Gone with
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the Wind by Margaret Mitchell. The year 1860 was also the year that Ellsworth
came to the attention of Abraham Lincoln, accompanying him to Washington
as a bodyguard and receiving a 2nd Lieutenant’s commission in the profession-
al army. Ellsworth was shot and killed just after the firing on Fort Sumter while
attempting to remove a Confederate flag from a Washington, DC, hotel and
was briefly immortalized as the Union’s “First Martyr.”
33. That the Zouave Cadets were remembered is in no doubt: “Chicago
once sent out an independent company which beat the world. . . .” (The
Chicago Times, Thursday, 29 July 1875), 5.
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ing 1875 alone.
39. Biennial Report . . . 1875 and 1876, 12–20.
40. Critics insisted that the First Regiment was formed to oppose socialist
demonstrations in Chicago and that the Bohemian Rifles were formed to oppose
the First Regiment. This is both a Chicago-centric view and one that insists that
militias served only overt class and political interests; it does not place these
Chicago organizations within a broader statewide or national context. Richard
Schneirov, Labor and Urban Politics, Class Conflict and the Origins of Modern
Liberalism in Chicago, 1864–97 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 59.
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NGAUS Library.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE262
Hannah_Notes_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  3:04 PM  Page 262
of reserve army because they believed that it would be virtually impossible to
significantly alter the status quo. Alterations in the reserve system were
believed impossible because (1) the people of the United States would never
accept a large standing army, (2) there were no serious military threats to the
security of the national boundaries to worry the population and so Congress,
(3) the public was totally uninterested in military matters, (4) any changes
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Notes to Chapter Five 263
Hannah_Notes_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  3:04 PM  Page 263
20. Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, 98–105.
21. “Telegram from the Secretary of War, Russell A. Alger to the
Governor of Illinois, 25 April 1898,” Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898, 22.
22. Cosmas, 12–3, chs. 4, 5, 6; Trask, ch. 7.
23. O’Toole, 195. Seventy-seven percent of the volunteers were rejected
on physical grounds, and 90 percent of those seeking commissions in the vol-
unteer forces were rejected as well.
24. Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898, 24.
25. Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898, 32.
26. Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898, 28.
27. Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898, 25.
28. Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898, 28. See also Cosmas and Trask for
their discussions of the difficulties of supplying the troops in the first weeks of
the war. The limited supplies on the market only exacerbated the problems
because the Army itself was not in the habit of stockpiling even such less per-
ishable items as tents, clothing, and munitions.
29. Troops were also being mustered for an expedition for the Philippines,
but those troops were drawn from the western states and gathered in San
Francisco.
30. Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898, 27.
31. Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898, 37.
32. Illinois State Journal, 15, 28, 29, July 1898.
33. Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898, 38.
34. Bunzey; Cosmas, 230–36.
35. Biennial Report . . . 1899 and 1900, 8–9.
36. Biennial Report . . . 1899 and 1900, 4.
37. Cosmas, 251–52; Doubler, 131.
38. “1st Illinois Volunteer Infantry, Morning Reports,” bound book, RG
94, National Archives.
39. Cosmas, 251.
40. Cosmas, 251–52.
41. “1st Illinois Volunteer Infantry, Morning Reports,” bound book, RG
94, National Archives; and Thomas Miller Meldrum, The Cuban Campaign of
the First Infantry Illinois Volunteers, April 25–September 9 1898 (Chicago: T.M.
Meldrum, 1899).
42. Kendrick to Scriven, Kendrick Collection, manuscripts division, CHS.
43. Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898, 39–40; McCard, 87.
44. Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898, 39; McCard, 87.
45. Cary T. Ray to Charles Belt, 17 November 1898, Memoirs, Folder 2,
Ray Collection.
46. See Johnson for a state-by-state breakdown of African American
troops in state militias and National Guards from 1870 through WWII.
47. “Negroes Wish to Go,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 22 May 1898, 2.
48. McCard, 83.
49. Goode, 65–69.
50. Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898, 39.
51. Goode, 36–47; McCard, 83–85; Biennial Report . . . 1897and 1898, 39.
52. Biennial Report . . . 1897and 1898, 39.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE264
Hannah_Notes_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  3:04 PM  Page 264
53. McCard, 85.
54. “John C. Bruckner Is Striving to Get a Command,” Chicago Daily
Tribune, 27 May 1898.
55. Illinois State Journal, 15 July 1898.
56. Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898, 39–40; McCard, 87.
57. “1st Illinois Volunteer Infantry, Morning Reports.”
58. Goode, 44–45. The editors of the Illinois Record protested this belief
earlier, after the 10th Cavalry was ordered to Cuba, 9 April 1898.
59. According to the following: Adjutant General’s Office, Statistical Exhibit
of Strength of Volunteer Forces Called into Service during the War with Spain, with
Losses from All Causes (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1899).
Reproduced on the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Historical Resources
Branch Web Page, http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/spanam/spanhtm.htm, and
Adjutant General’s Office, Statistical Exhibit of Strength of Volunteer Forces Called
Into Service During the War With Spain, with Losses From All Causes
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1899). Reproduced on the
U.S. Army Center of Military History, Historical Resources Branch Web Page,
http://www.army.mil/CMH-PG/documents/spanam/ws-stat.htm, accessed on
3/21/05. Only sixteen men of the Eighth Illinois died of disease, fewer than any
other Illinois regiment that saw service outside of the United States.
60. Gatewood, “An Experiment in Color,” 307–8.
61. The New York Times carried a brief notice of adjustment problems for
the Eighth in San Luis on August 20, but there were no later national reports
of trouble for the Eighth.
62. McCard, 90–96; Goode, chs. 7, 8, 9.
63. McCard, 88–91.
64. Goode, 212–14.
65. McCard, 95. It was fairly common for some officers’ wives to join their
husbands’ regiments during garrison duty in Cuba and Puerto Rico. For exam-
ple, several wives of the senior officers of the 2nd Illinois USV Infantry spent
time in Cuba. See H. W. Bolton, ed., History of the Second Regiment Illinois
Volunteer Infantry from Organization to Muster-Out (Chicago: R.R. Donnelley
& Sons Company, 1899).
66. “Excerpt from a letter by Dr. Curtis, 1st Lt, 8th Ill. USV,” reprinted in
Goode, 233–34.
67. McCard, 91–92; Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain . . . from
April 15, 1898, to July 30, 1902 (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office 1902), 246.
68. McCard, 91–92.
69. McCard, 92.
70. Goode, 171. Goode includes a quote that the soldiers of the 8th
believed to have been uttered by General Leonard Wood: “The soldiers of the
Eighth were made up of the scums and slums of Chicago, or the state of
Illinois.” Unfortunately for the 8th in this case, Wood was successfully maneu-
vering to be made the governor-general of all of occupied Cuba. Goode
responded to the insult with “They were the scums of Chicago because they
had Negro officers, we infer. Many thanks to General Wood.”
71. Goode, 238.
Notes to Chapter Five 265
Hannah_Notes_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  3:04 PM  Page 265
72. Goode, 238.
73. Goode, 238.
74. Goode, 237.
75. Goode, 278; McCard, 95.
76. McCard, 92, 95. 
77. Bolton, 23.
78. Skinner, 286.
79. See the photographs reproduced in Meldrum, The Cuban Campaign.
80. John F. Kendrick to Margaret Scriven, 28 September 1958, John
Kendrick Collection, Chicago Historical Society. Other memoirs of members
of the First Regiment and their service in Cuba held at the Chicago Historical
Society include those of Cary T. Ray, Horace Mellum, and Nicholas Budinger.
81. Address of Lieut. J. H. Parker, Souvenir of the Banquet, 45.
82. Skinner, 386
83. Bunzey, 37.
84. Bolton, 433.
85. Bunzey, 352.
86. Goode, 5.
87. McCard, 5.
88. McCard, 81.
89. Souvenir of the Banquet, 27.
90. In lieu of their first goal of obtaining a completely federalized reserve
army, members of the regular army often proposed a system for reorganizing
the National Guards to make them more efficient and useful by their stan-
dards. In the 1880s a favorite organizing strategy was to have one regiment per
congressional district and to legislate a three-party payer system—federal,
state, and local—to carry the significant cost increases that reformers felt
would be necessary to properly outfit, supply, and train the new “reserves.” For
example, see “Comment by General Fry” in Sherman. Fry refused to accept
the viability of the militias and reiterated a commitment to the establishment
of an entirely federalized reserve under the authority of Congress to raise an
army, and he rejected the notion that the militia could ever be a useful or effi-
cient body of reserve troop training. See also Price and Wagner. National
Guard leadership also advocated different missions for the militias.
Guardsmen along the Eastern Seaboard tended to be content with the idea of
the militias as coastal defense alone, whereas Guardsmen from the interior
states, like Illinois, tended to advocate a much more aggressive role for the
Guard at home and also abroad as a reserve army. See Derthick, chs. 1, 2.
However, very few Guardsmen advocated a primary role for the Guards as
state strike police.
91. Upton, The Military Policy of the United States.
92. The federal appropriation for the militias doubled in 1887 from
$200,000 to $400,000 as a response to National Guard Association (est. 1879)
lobbying. Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, ch. 3.
93. Upton. See also Magie, 73.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE266
Hannah_Notes_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  3:04 PM  Page 266
Notes to Chapter 6
1. “Report of C.C. Craig, Capt, Artillery Battalion, Btty B, ING,” in
Biennial Report . . . 1899 and 1900, 160.
2. Chicago Daily Tribune, 20 January 1892.
3 See Montegomery; Schnierov et al., Introduction.
4. Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, 49. The ING intervened in fifteen
strikes (nine in the coalfields) between 1878 and 1899, the Ohio National
Guard in eight, and the New York National Guard in six; the Pennsylvania
National Guard troops intervened in only four strikes after 1877.
5. See “J. H. Barkley, Colonel Commanding the Fifth Regiment, ING, to
Brigadier General J.N. Reece, Commanding the Second Brigade, ING.
Springfield, IL, 6 June 1883, ” 1883, 1883 Strike File, Governor Hamilton’s
Correspondence, J. H. Barkley, RG 100.19, Illinois State Archives.
6. Brackett, William S., The Rising Menace Against the Peace of American
Society, delivered December 8, 1892.
7. Brackett, 16.
8. Brackett, 19.
9. Smith, ch. 10.
10. The Chicago Tribune, 30 May 1883.
11. Bolton, 17.
12. Bolton, 19.
13. Cary T. Ray Papers, “Resume of Service” File 1, Collection of the
Chicago Historical Society.
14. “Report of C.C. Craig,” Biennial Report . . . 1899 and 1900, 157–60.
15. Ray Papers, “Resume of Service.”
16. Bolton, 20.
17. Bunzey, 24.
18. Bunzey, 24
19. Ray Papers, “Resume of Service.”
20. Caroline Waldron Merithew and James R. Barrett, “‘We Are All
Brothers in the Face of Starvation’: Forging an Interethnic Working Class
Movement in the 1894 Bituminous Coal Strike,” Mid-America 83, no. 2
(2001): 121–54, 133. See also Montgomery, “Strikes in Nineteenth-Century
America.”
21. Merithew and Barrett, 138–39; “Occasions on which the Organized
Militia has been called out in aid of Civil Authorities,” Report Prepared by the
Bureau of National Guards for the War 1908, Document #3135, Box 57,
Bureau of Militia Affairs, RG 168.7, NARA.
22. Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894, XIV–XXVIII.
23. Merithew and Barrett, 142.
24. Merithew and Barrett, 148.
25. “Occasions on which the Organized Militia has been called out in aid
of Civil Authorities,” 1908.
26. Schneirov et al., 9.
27. For a basic overview of the issues and the events of the strike interven-
tion in Chicago, see the following in Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894:
Report of the Adjutant General, XIV–XXVIII; Altgeld’s Protests and the
Notes to Chapter Six 267
Hannah_Notes_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  3:04 PM  Page 267
President’s Replies, XL–XLIV; Reports by various officers about the Chicago
strike intervention, 103–38. For a detailed analysis of the U.S. Army involve-
ment see Jerry M. Cooper, The Army and Civil Disorder: Federal Military
Intervention in Labor Disputes, 1872–1900 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1980); Robert W. Coakley, “The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic
Disorders,” ed. D. F. Trask, Army Historical Series (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1988); Montgomery, The Fall of the House of
Labor; Schneirov et al.
28. Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894, XL–XLIV. See also Cooper, Rise of
the National Guard; Cooper, The Army and Civil Disorder; Coakley; and
Schneirov et al.
29. Ray Papers, “Resume of Service.”
30. Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894, XV–XVI.
31. Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894, XVI.
32. Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894, XVII. “Moving the Trains” gener-
ally consisted of guarding, with however many men were necessary, each train
as it left the train yards and proceeded out of town far enough to pick up speed
sufficient to prevent any sensible person or persons from personally blocking
the tracks. “Guarding” was when the engine and cars were surrounded by ING
troops facing outward toward the crowds. The guards moved with the train,
keeping it surrounded and forcing individuals who might be blocking the
tracks to clear them until open track was reached. In his article “‘Honest Men
and Law-Abiding Citizens’: The 1894 Railroad Strike in Decatur,” Sampson
claims that Altgeld “over-reacted” to the strike and that militia intervention
in Decatur was not necessary.
33. Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894, 100. Report of Frank P. Wells, Lt.
Col. 5th Inf, Decatur, July 30, 1894.
34. Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894, 92–98. Report of J.S. Culver,
Colonel 5th Inf, Springfield, October 5, 1894.
35. Montgomery; Schneirov et al.
36. See “Governor Altgeld’s Protests Against the use of Federal Troops in
Illinois During the Late Strikes and the President’s Replies,” in Biennial Report
. . . 1893 and 1894, XL–XLIV.
37. Robert D. Sampson, “‘Honest Men and Law-Abiding Citizens’: The
1894 Railroad Strike in Decatur,” Illinois Historical Journal 1992 85(2): 74–88.
38. Merithew and Barrett, 142.
39. Merithew and Barrett, 142; Smith; Ray Papers, “Resume of Service.”
40. “Report of Adjutant General H. Hilliard to Governor Cullom,
9/30/1878, in Biennial Report . . . 1877 and 1878, 1.
41. “Report of Adjutant General Thomas Scott to Governor Denenn,
10/1/1906,” Biennial Report . . . 1903 and 1904.
42. Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, ch. 3.
43. This observation comes from reading the coverage of several strikes in
The Chicago Tribune and the Illinois State Journal, including editorials, front
page articles, wire service notes, and back page follow-up pieces. See, for
example, The Chicago Tribune, frequent coverage daily between 28 May–6
June, 1883, on Collinsville and Belleville; and 30 September–20 October,
1898, on Virden and Pana.
NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX268
Hannah_Notes_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  3:04 PM  Page 268
44. Barkley to Reece, 6 June 1883, 8.
45. “Governor Hamilton, Springfield to Fred Ropiequet, Sheriff,
Belleville, Illinois, 27 May 1883,” 1883, Strike File 1883, Governor Hamilton’s
Correspondence, Governor Hamilton, RG 100.19, Illinois State Archives.
46. “Governor Hamilton, Springfield to E. J. Crandall, Collinsville,
Illinois 26 May 1883,” 1883, Strike File 1883, Governor Hamilton’s
Correspondence, Governor Hamilton, RG 100.19, Illinois State Archives.
The Governor sent this message via telegraph, collect.
47. “Report of Adjutant General Alfred Orendorff to Governor Altgeld,
October 1, 1894,” in Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894, VII–VIII.
48. “Report of Adjutant General Alfred Orendorff to Governor Altgeld,
October 1, 1894,” in Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894, VIII.
49. Notwithstanding General Order No. 8, the commander of the strike
intervention in La Salle encamped his men on mine-owned property, though
apparently well away from the actual mine and mine buildings. See “Report of
Col. Fred Bennitt, 3rd Inf, ING to Adjutant General Orendorff, 1 June 1894,”
Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894, 42; Biennial Report . . . 1889 and 1890,
154–75.
50. Illinois State Journal, 30 September 1898.
51. “L.E. Bennitt, Col. 4th Inf, ING to Brig. Gen’l J. N. Reece, Carterville,
11 July 1899,” Biennial Report . . . 1889 and 1890.
52. Josiah Fletcher, “Letter to the Editor II; The Army and the People,”
Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States (JMSI) 7, no. 25
(1886): 103; William R. King, “The Military Necessities of the United States,
and the Best Provisions for Meeting Them JMSI 5, no. 20 (1884): 355–91;
Otho E. Michaelis, “The Military Necessities of the United States, and the
Best Provisions for Meeting Them,” JMSI 5, no. 24 (1885): 272–91; General
E. L. Molineux, “Riots in Cities and their Suppression,” JMSI 4, no. 16 (1883):
335–70; Elwell S. Otis, “The Army in Connection with the Labor Riots of
1877,” JMSI 5, no. 24 (1885): 292–323; George R. Price, “The Necessity for
Closer Relations Between the Army and the People, and the Best Method to
Accomplish the Result,” JMSI 6, no. 24 (1885): 303–30; General William T.
Sherman, “The Militia,” JMSI 6, no. 21 (1885): 1–26; Arthur L. Wagner, “The
Military Necessities of the United States, and the Best Provisions for Meeting
Them,” JMSI 5, no. 24 (1884): 237–71; Alexander S. Webb, “The Military
Service Institution: What it is doing; What it may do; Its relations to the
National Guard,” JMSI 5, no. 27 (1884): 1–28; R. W. Young, “Legal and
Tactical Considerations Affecting the Employment of the military in the
Suppression of Mobs; Chapter Three. Martial law,” JMSI 9, no. 33 (1888):
95–116
53. Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894, 103–38; Biennial Report . . . 1889
and 1890, 154–75. Merithew and Barrett, 142; Ray Papers, “Resume of
Service.”
54. Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898; Biennial Report . . . 1899 and 1900.
55. “Report of J.S. Culver, Colonel 5th Inf, ING to Adjutant General
Orendorff, 5 October 1894,” in Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894, 95.
56. Strikers and bystanders were killed and wounded by ING rifle fire in
1883 (one killed and one wounded) and 1894 (at least six killed and many
Notes to Chapter Six 269
Hannah_Notes_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  3:04 PM  Page 269
more wounded). Biennial Report . . . 1883 and 1884; Biennial Report . . . 1893
and 1894, 95.
57. “Report of A. Ducat, Major General, Commanding ING,” in Biennial
Report . . . 1877 and 1878.
58. Chicago Tribune, 30 May 1883.
59. Biennial Report . . . 1883 and 1884; Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894,
95.
60. Biennial Report . . . 1889 and 1890, 154–75; Biennial Report . . . 1893
and 1894, 103–36.
61. Illinois State Journal, 2 October 1898.
62. Illinois State Journal, 2 July 1898, 17 July 1898.
63. Illinois State Journal, 27 July 1898.
64. Illinois State Journal, 13, 14, 15, August 1898.
65. Illinois State Journal, 15 September 1898.
66. Illinois State Journal, 18 September 1898.
67. Illinois State Journal, 29, 30 September, 1 October 1898.
68. Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898, 41–42; Thomas Scott, Illinois
Adjutant General to Chief of Division of Militia Affairs, January 25, 1909,
NARA, RG 168.7, Box 57, Document 4369-A.
69. Illinois State Journal, 8 October 1898; Pana/Virden strike photographs,
ALPML; Biennial Report . . . 1899 and 1900.
70. Illinois State Journal, 23 September 1898.
71. For studies of the role of African American strikebreakers and the
reactions to them, see Ronald L. Lewis, “Job control and Race Relations in the
Coal Fields, 1870–1920,” The Journal of Ethnic History 12, no. 4: 35–64; Mark
A. Lause, “‘The Cruel Striker War’ Rail Labor & the Broken Symmetry of
Galesburg Civic Culture 1877–1888,” Journal of the Illinois State Historical
Society 91, no. 3 (1998): 81–112; and Merithew and Barrett, 142–52.
72. Illinois State Journal, 23, 24, 26, 27 September 1898.
73. Illinois State Journal, 10 October 1898.
74. “Report of C.C. Craig, Capt, Artillery Battalion, Btty B, ING,” in
Biennial Report . . . 1899 and 1900, 157–60. See also Lewis, “Job Control and
Race Relations.”
75. “C.C. Craig, Capt. Artillery Btty B, ING to AG Reece, Galesburg, 9
November 1898,” in Biennial Report . . . 1899 and 1900, 160.
76. The Chicago Tribune, 13 October 1898.
77. The Chicago Tribune, 15 October 1898; see also The Chicago Tribune,
26 October 1898.
78. The Chicago Tribune, 13 October 1898.
79. Lewis, “Job Control and Race Relations.”
80. The Chicago Tribune, 15 October 1898; see also The Chicago Tribune,
26 October 1898.
81. Illinois State Journal, 24, 28, 30 November 1904.
82. Illinois State Journal, 3 December 1904.
83. Illinois State Journal, 21 December 1904.
84. Biennial Report . . . 1905 and 1906, 5.
85. Biennial Report . . . 1885 and 1886, 20–33.
86. Schneirov et al., 1–14.
NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX270
Hannah_Notes_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  3:04 PM  Page 270
87. The Chicago Tribune, 15 October 1898; see also The Chicago Tribune, 26
October 1898.
88. The mine operators did so anyway and were promptly rewarded with
the riots that all had predicted. When the militia was sent to intervene, they
pointedly refused to guard African American strikebreakers or arrest strikers.
Biennial Report . . . 1889 and 1890, 154–75. Illinois State Journal, 10 October,
1898.
89. Illinois State Journal, 2 October 1898.
90. Eric Arnesen, “Specter of the Black Strikebreaker: Race, Employment,
and Labor Activism in the Industrial Era,” Labor History 44, no. 3 (2003):
319–35.
91. Illinois State Journal, 8 October 1898.
92. This practice changed over time, and in 1898 and 1899 Illinois militia
spent months occupying strike-torn regions. See appendix H.
93. See Lause, “Cruel Striker War.”
94. Illinois State Journal, 15 September 1898, 1 December 1904.
95. Biennial Report . . . 1889 and 1890, 154–75.
96. Illinois State Journal, 2 October 1898.
97. Illinois State Journal, 2, 4 October 1898.
98. Illinois State Journal, 4 October 1898.
99. Illinois State Journal, 3 December 1904.
100. Anthony Roland DeStefanis, Guarding capital: Soldier Strikebreakers on
the long road to the Ludlow Massacre, PhD Dissertation, The College of William
and Mary, 2004.
101. Cosmas, Millett, and Maslowski.
102. See sections of the AGs’ introductory reports titled “In Aid of the Civil
Authorities,” in Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894; and Biennial Report . . . 1889
and 1890. According to Merithew and Barrett, coal strikes did get more violent
beginning in 1894.
103. See the several reports of strike duty beginning on page 154 in Biennial
Report . . . 1889 and 1890.
104. “Report of Adjutant General J. N. Reece to the Governor, Oct. 1,
1900,” in Biennial Report . . . 1899 and 1900, 7. AG Reece went on to note
that the militia accounts were overdrawn by $128,000 because of strike service
in 1898 and 1899.
105. Alfred Orrendorf to T.B. Needles, Chairman House Committee
Appropriations, 14 February 1895, copy in Governor’s Correspondence,
Illinois State Archives.
106. See Barkley to Reece, 6 June 1883, Chicago Daily Tribune, 29 May
1883. See also Eugene E. Leach, “Literature of Riot Duty.”
Notes to Chapter 7
1. Proceedings of the Third Annual Convention of the Interstate National
Guard Association, 163–64.
2. This process is very similar to the processes of state building described
in Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social
Notes to Chapter Seven 271
Hannah_Notes_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  3:04 PM  Page 271
Policy in the United States (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1992).
3. Collins, 17.
4. Collins, 18.
5. Biennial Report . . . 1875 and 1876, 30.
6. Collins, 46–57; Schneirov, Labor and Urban Politics, 59, suggests that
this bill represented a “stunning triumph of Chicago’s top citizens in creating
new state administrative apparatus and centralizing political power.” This
view is quite Chicago-centric and overlooks how relatively little Ducat
received in light of what he requested.
7. Collins, 46–47, Circular of Oct., 15, 1876 reprinted in full; 38–47 for
information on the proposed bill.
8. Collins, 38–39.
9. Collins, 39–40.
10. “State Affairs,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 30 March 1877.
11. Collins, 46–57.
12. Collins, 46–57.
13. Revised Statutes. Illinois 1874 (Springfield: Hurd, 1874), 1007.
14. Biennial Report . . . 1877 and 1878, 15–17.
15. Biennial Report . . . 1877 and 1878, 10.
16. Collins, 57.
17. Biennial Report . . . 1881 and 1882, 5–7. Then–Adjutant General I. H.
Elliot used his opening statement in the Biennial Report to explain that this
appropriation (The Military Code of Illinois, Article 10, provided for a 0.01
mil property tax to supply militia funds—see Revised Statutes. Illinois, 1882)
was at least $20,000 short of meeting the obligations imposed by the 1879
Military Code. Biennial Report . . . 1887 and 1888, 13.
18. Biennial Report . . . 1895 and 1896, 7–8.
19. Biennial Report . . . 1911 and 1912, 144. And this was long after the
federal outlay for the National Guards had moved in the millions annually.
20. See Adjutant General’s reports at the front of each of the biennial
reports issued between 1874 and 1912.
21. For more on late-nineteenth-century attitudes against state govern-
ment spending, see Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, 42–43; Schneirov,
Labor and Urban Politics, 329–35.
22. Chicago Daily Tribune, 6 June 1883, 13 March 1887.
23. Chicago Daily Tribune, 3 July 1889.
24. Biennial Report . . . 1875 and 1876, 7.
25. Biennial Report . . . 1875 and 1876, 7.
26. Schneirov, Labor and Urban Politics, 59. Schneirov argues that the
“Businessmen’s Militia”—his name for the First Illinois—was formed solely in
response to these events. Schneirov ignores militia companies elsewhere in
the city and around the state and so does not read the First Illinois as part of
a larger militia phenomenon. In 1874 Chicago was home to another regi-
ment’s worth of companies—most were gathered together the following year
into the Second Regiment—and to scattered and small African American
companies as well. There were also a steadily growing number of companies
scattered throughout the state. See appendix J.
NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN272
Hannah_Notes_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  3:04 PM  Page 272
27. Biennial Report . . . 1875 and 1876, 7.
28. Biennial Report . . . 1875 and 1876, 8.
29. Biennial Report . . . 1875 and 1876, 8–9. There was great controversy
at the time over the role that Hilliard would play in pushing for the 1879 leg-
islation, with some observers feeling that he did all but scuttle the bill over a
disagreement about the size and type of responsibilities that would be given the
Adjutant General. See Collins.
30. Biennial Report . . . 1877 and 1878, 1–12. Hilliard did not get anywhere
near so princely a sum as $200,000 annually, but he did get an annual appro-
priation in the next militia act.
31. Biennial Report . . . 1881 and 1882, 4–5.
32. Biennial Report . . . 1881 and 1882, 5. Elliot’s opening line of his argu-
ment is almost as interesting: “It is not my province to discuss in this report the
necessity of what is known as a National Guard in the United States, but . . .”;
he then goes on to do a bit of that anyway, which is why his other sentence is
more interesting.
33. Biennial Report . . . 1881 and 1882, 5–6.
34. Biennial Report . . . 1881 and 1882, 3.
35. Biennial Report . . . 1881 and 1882, 3.
36. Biennial Report . . . 1895 and 1896, 3–18.
37. Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898, 15.
38. Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898, 15.
39. In 1908 the Adjutant General of Illinois estimated that over the preced-
ing five years the ING lost on average 20 percent of its almost 6,000 strong mem-
bership annually. That meant that every year ING officers needed to recruit on
average 1,200 new members. Thomas W. Scott, Adjutant General of Illinois to
Lieutenant Colonel E. M. Weaver, Chief, Division of Militia Affairs, Washington
DC, April 1, 1908, Record Group 168.7, Box 45, #111 April 3, 1908, Filled with
#91, National Archives and Records Administration.
40. See Kutlowski and Kutlowski, 5–38, for a discussion of militia service
records and elective offices. The Kutlowskis suggest that among other factors
the impression of military service conferred on retired militia officers who car-
ried their rank with them out of the National Guard was a significant contri-
bution to men attempting to climb the ladder of political influence. See also
Cunliffe; Douglass; Ryan; Schneirov, Labor and Urban Politics; Hannah, “A
Place in the Parade,” 82–108.
41. Schneirov, Labor and Urban Politics; Schneirov et al.
42. Journal of the Senate, 1879, 1003–4.
43. For information on Torrence, see Chicago Daily Tribune, 29 January
1882; 31 January 1882.
44. Chicago Inter Ocean, 28 March 1893.
45. The Chicago Tribune, 15 September 1895.
46. Roger D. Bridges, “Equality Deferred: Civil Rights for Illinois Blacks,
1865–1885.” Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 1981 74(2):
82–108.
47. Willard Gatewood Jr., “An Experiment in Color. The Eighth Illinois
Volunteers, 1898–1899,” Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 1972
65(3): 293–312.
Notes to Chapter Seven 273
Hannah_Notes_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  3:04 PM  Page 273
48. “General Orders No. 22, November 9, 1897,” in Biennial Report . . .
1897 and 1898, 755–62; Johnson, 56–57. Illinois Record, 13 November 1897,
19 March 1898.
49. “General Orders No. 22,” in Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898,
755–62. The Illinois Record, 13 November 1897, 19 March 1898. See Also
Gatewood, “An Experiment in Color.”
50. Gatewood, “An Experiment in Color,” 296–98.
51. “Buckner on the Carpet,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 27 July 1897.
52. Illinois Record, 19 March 1898.
53. Illinois Record, 19 March 1898, 9 July 1898. Goode, 36–47.
54. Chicago Daily Tribune, 27 May 1898.
55. All of the relevant correspondence is reprinted in Willard B.
Gatewood, Jr., “Smoked Yankees” and the Struggle for Empire” (Urbana, IL:
University of Illinois Press, 1971) 179–235. It is worth noting that skin color
played at least a part in some of the controversy as John Marshall was very
light-skinned and had blue eyes, fair enough some said to pass for white if he
wanted to. The complaints of the men in Cuba focused on food, being kept in
camp, the heat, tropical illnesses, and Marshall’s extremely exacting standards
for behavior, which resulted in some 200 courts-martial for disciplinary infrac-
tions while the unit was stationed in San Luis.
56. Illinois Record 26 November 1898, 4 February 1899.
57. Gatewood, “An Experiment in Color,” 312. In 1913 Marshall was
charged with filing a time card for his game warden duties the same week he
also filed to receive pay for attending ING summer camp, and he had to resign
from the Eighth in some disgrace.
58. See, for example, Captain Lewis D. Greene to The Chief, Division of
Militia Affairs, War Department, Washington, DC, 10 September 1909,
NARA RG 168.7 Box 78 #8237-B filed with #8071, BR 1906, Inspection
reports, BR 1908 inspection reports, Report of 12 Sept 1910, NARA RG
168.7 box 103 #14286-D.
59. Biennial Report . . . 1907 and 1908, 263–93. See also Roberta
Senechal, The Sociogenesis of a Race Riot. Springfield, Illinois, in 1908 (Urbana,
IL: University of Illinois Press, 1990).
60. Biennial Report . . . 1907 and 1908, 270.
61. “Confidential sheet to accompany Field Inspection Report of 8th
Illinois Infantry, in camp at Camp Lincoln, Springfield, Illinois, Aug. 31st to
Sept. 6th, 1913.” RG 168.7 Box 189, #43389, filed with #41592, National
Records Administration, Washington, DC.
62. “Confidential sheet to accompany Field Inspection Report of 8th
Illinois Infantry, in camp at Camp Lincoln, Springfield, Illinois, Aug. 31st to
Sept. 6th, 1913.” RG 168.7 Box 189, #43389, filed with #41592, National
Records Administration, Washington, DC.
63. Chicago Daily Tribune, 8 February 1879; Gatewood, “An Experiment
in Color.”
64. See Chicago Daily Tribune, 1 August 1881, for a call for ING officers to
create just such a body to see to their concerns.
65. Chicago Daily Tribune, 7 December 1887.
66. Chicago Daily Tribune, 8 December 1887. The amendments that year
NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN274
Hannah_Notes_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  3:04 PM  Page 274
were bent toward increasing the abilities of officers to enforce discipline among
the enlisted personnel.
67. Editorial, The National Guardsman Vol. 6, No. 2, June 1893, 1.
68. The laws also included a clause that prohibited any but recognized
militia companies from parading with weapons unless they had a special
license from the Governor. Militia Law of 1879 in Revised Statues. Illinois 1882.
69. Illinois Statutes. The Militia Law was rewritten or substantially amend-
ed in 1874, 1876, 1879, 1885, 1897, 1899, and 1903. See the General Orders
published in the complete run of the biennial reports.
70. Biennial Report . . . 1885 and 1886; Illinois’ Writers Project, “Camp
Lincoln.”
71. See General Orders and Circulars in Biennial Report . . . 1883 and
1884; Biennial Report . . . 1885 and 1886.
72. Biennial Report . . . 1885 and 1886, 4; Biennial Report . . . 1887 and 1888, 4.
73. See Collins; Turner; Headenburg; Fourth Annual Report; Biennial Report
. . . 1873 and 1874; Biennial Report . . . 1875 and 1876; Biennial Report . . .
1877 and 1878; Biennial Report . . . 1879 and 1880; Biennial Report . . . 1881
and 1882; Biennial Report . . . 1883 and 1884; Biennial Report . . . 1885 and
1886; Biennial Report . . . 1887 and 1888; Biennial Report . . . 1889 and 1890;
Biennial Report . . . 1891 and 1892; Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894; Biennial
Report . . . 1895 and 1896; Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898; Biennial Report
. . . 1899 and 1900; Biennial Report . . . 1901 and 1902; Biennial Report . . .
1903 and 1904; Biennial Report . . . 1905 and 1906; Biennial Report . . . 1907
and 1908; Biennial Report . . . 1909 and 1910; Biennial Report . . . 1911 and
1912. See also Roy Turnbaugh, “Ethnicity, Civic Pride, and Commitment: The
Evolution of the Chicago Militia,” Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society
72, no. 2 (1979): 111–27.
74. Turner, Collins, Headenburg, Chamberlin, Goode, Minute Book
Company “I.” Turner, Headenburg, Goode, and Chamberlin are all examples
of fund-raising materials. See also Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, 60.
75. Robert M. Fogelson, America’s Armories: Architecture, Society, and
Public Order (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989).
76. Biennial Report . . . 1895 and 1896, 8. Some regiments owned or leased
their own specialized armories, but these were privately constructed.
77. Biennial Report . . . 1895 and 1896, 8–9.
78. Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898, 19.
79. Biennial Report . . . 1905 and 1906, 6.
80. Biennial Report . . . 1905 and 1906, 5–6. Scott was unfortunately pre-
scient. The state arsenal building burned down completely in the early 1930s.
81. Biennial Report . . . 1907 and 1908, 9.
82. Biennial Report . . . 1907 and 1908, 9.
83. Collection G1986:097, Prints and Photographs Division, Chicago
Historical Society. The report emphasizes the terrible conditions the cavalry
put up with. The armory was really just the offices in front of and over an old
stable complex, with ladder stairs between levels, low Jerry-rigged hallways
hung above the riding arena to provide access to company quarters in an old
hay loft and storage areas, and poor stable conditions for the horses them-
selves—in short a giant fire-trap.
Notes to Chapter Seven 275
Hannah_Notes_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  3:04 PM  Page 275
84. Biennial Report . . . 1910 and 1911, 3.
85. “The Chicago Defender, 17 October 1914,” File 6, Notes . . .
1914–1915, Box 20, Vivian G. Harsh Research Collection of Afro American
History and Literature, Chicago Public Library, Carter Woodson Branch.
There was some disgruntlement in the black community over the eight-month
lag between promised completion and actual opening of the new armory.
86. Biennial Report . . . 1895 and 1896, 8.
87. Bunzey, 13.
88. Headenburg, 31.
89. Chicago Daily Tribune, 22 May, 1881.
90. Chicago Daily Tribune, 15 April 1881.
91. Turner, 23–24. There is an extensive biographical essay on a major
donor, Mr. Marshall Field, in the souvenir, who purchased the land and then
gave the First Regiment a very generous 99-year lease on the property and the
building they erected on it.
92. Chicago Inter Ocean, 25 April 1893
93. Biennial Report . . . 1901 and 1902, 17–19. See also Turner.
94. Bunzey, 355.
95. Bunzey 355–56.
96. Biennial Report . . . 1901 and 1902, 17.
97. Fogelson.
98. Fogelson, ch. 5.
99. Historical and Pictorial Review—1940. National Guard and Naval
Militia, State of Illinois (Baton Rouge, LA: Army and Navy Publishing
Company, Inc. 1940). Taken from typewritten copy held in the records of the
Illinois National Guard files.
100. 8th Regiment Armory, Douglass Community Area, 1915, DN-
0064686, Chicago Historical Society, Prints and Photographs Division.
101. Millett and Maslowski, ch 5.
102. “Springfield Girls Guests at Camp Lincoln in 1907”; “Mansion
Tallyho Party Bound for Camp Lincoln,” Camp Lincoln Vertical File,
Sangamon Valley Collection, Lincoln Library, Springfield, Illinois.
103. “The Volunteers of America. Proceedings of the Convention of
National Guards, St. Louis, October 1, 1879,” in The Volunteers of America.
Proceedings of the Convention of National Guards, St. Louis, October 1,
1879,1–2; Proceedings of the Third Annual Convention of the National Guard
Association of the United States, held at Philadelphia, March 7 and 8, 1881. Even
though the printed title reads “Third Annual Convention,” the opening
remarks of General Wingate of New York read, “I have much pleasure in
informing you that since the last convention of this association met in St.
Louis in, in October, 1879 . . . ,” 3.
104. The Volunteers of America. The proposed militia bill indicates a close
relationship with the regular army via regulation and boards of inspection and
training made up of representatives of both the National Guards and the regu-
lar army. This proposed bill also mandated an organizational plan that assigned
to each congressional representative a minimum of 700 uniformed militia as the
basis for receiving federal aid. Seven hundred men would be either a minimum
strength regiment or a maximum strength battalion organization.
NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN276
Hannah_Notes_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  3:04 PM  Page 276
105. The Volunteers of America, 1–2.
106. Proceedings of the Third Annual Convention, 14.
107. Proceedings of the Third Annual Convention, 24–26.
108. Proceedings of the Third Annual Convention, 3–7. 
109. Proceedings of the Third Annual Convention, 5.
110. Proceedings of the First Annual Convention. Interstate National Guard
Association. Held at Planter’s Hotel, St. Louis, Missouri, December 7–8, 1897.
Initially there was much debate over how much to ask for—$1 million, $2 mil-
lion, $5 million—but the convention members settled on $1 million as the
most feasible project.
111. Proceedings 1897, 10. Derthick comments on the “vague” notions that
INGA and the NGAUS held about their goals and their future, but I think
these statements, twenty years apart, are far more notable for their singleness
of purpose and the clarity, if not the feasibility, of the vision.
112. The Volunteers of America, 1–3.
113. Proceedings of the Third Annual Convention of the Interstate National
Guard Association of the United States, held on Tuesday and Wednesday, Jan.
23–24, 1900, in the House of Representative, at Indianapolis, Ind. Gen. J. N.
Reece, of Illinois, presiding; Col. C.E. Bleyer, of Illinois, Secretary (Indianapolis,
IN: 1900), 164.
114. Proceedings of the Third Annual Convention of the Interstate National
Guard Association, 163–64.
115. Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Convention of the Interstate National
Guard Association of the United States, held at Washington D.C., January 20, 21,
22, 1902, 209–10.
116. For discussions of the Federalization, or Nationalization, of the Guard
over the first quarter of the twentieth century see Cooper, Rise of the National
Guard, chs. 5, 6; Derthick; Doubler; Hill; Mahon; Riker.
117. For extended analysis of these bills see Louis Cantor, “Elihu Root and
the National Guard: Friend or Foe?,” Military Affairs 33 (1969): 361–73;
Elbridge Colby, “Elihu Root and the National Guard,” Military Affairs 23
(1959): 28–34; Russell F. Weigley, “The Elihu Root Reforms and the
Progressive Era,” in Command and Commanders in Modern Warfare, ed. William
Geffen (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1971), 11–27. See also
Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, Riker, Mahon, Derthick, and Hill.
118. Cooper, chs. 5, 6; Proceedings of the Third Annual Convention of the
Interstate National Guard Association, 163–64; Proceedings of the Fourth Annual
Convention of the Interstate National Guard Association of the United States, held
at Washington D.C., January 20, 21, 22, 1902 (Washington, DC: 1902),
209–10.
119. See Proceedings INGA for 1897, 1898, 1900.
120. Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, 111–27.
121. “Memories,” Folder 2, Ray Collection.
122. A. L. Mills, Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, to Adjutant
General of Illinois, 2 February 1914, Document 43398, Box 189, RG 168.7,
NARA.
123. American Military History (U.S. Army Center of Military History,
1988), 354–57.
Notes to Chapter Seven 277
Hannah_Notes_3rd.qxp  12/20/2006  3:04 PM  Page 277
124. See front page editorial cartoon in the Illinois Cavalryman, 5 August
1916. The cartoon features a wounded soldier from the fighting in Europe,
front and center, and on the distant edge of the picture is a small line of tents
marked “Mexican Border.”
125. Illinois Cavalryman, 12 August 1916.
126. See complete run (twelve issues) of the Illinois Cavalryman.
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